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Abstract 
This thesis first presents an empirical investigation, using WERS98 data, confirming that 
wages are bargained in accordance with a firm's financial performance. The impact of the 
future financial performance variable is positive and significant. This is in contrast to results 
attained in the past, with the imposition of the static Nash bargaining solution in wage de- 
termination models, which is oblivious to the fact that the relationship is inherently ongoing. 
This empirical result was complemented by another empirical study and a theoretical 
result. The second empirical study examined in detail, using ordered probit estimation, the 
importance of recruitment and retention of labour in wage determination and affirmed this 
phenomenon. This is congruent to the finding that more prosperous establishments across 
industries, regions and bargaining groups over the duration of the eighteen years that are 
analysed, are the ones that are more likely to consider the recruitment and retention of 
labour a major bargaining consideration. Additionally, I find that recruitment and reten- 
tion of labour is a very important bargaining consideration that is affected by the size of 
the bargaining group, the introduction of new technology, and establishments with different 
methods of measuring company performance. 
Complementing the first empirical result and pursuing its consequences with the added 
ingredient of full rationality, this thesis presents a new development of a classical problem, one 
which presents itself in various forms, as dynamic bargaining, dynamic search and matching, 
dynamic tenure rent-sharing in insiders and outsiders, and so forth. It may be conceived as a 
non zero sum, two-agent dynamic game in an ongoing relationship. The two agents considered 
in this treatment are the firm and worker. In this development a few general assumptions 
axe made relating to the behaviour of both the agents in a dynamic environment. As a 
consequence, a solution to the classical labour economic models and equilibrium value are 
found to be functions of time. When this characterisation is embedded into the labour maxket, 
the full model can generate outcomes of a unique equilibrium, with saddle-path stability. This 
is impossible if one imposes a steady-state Nash solution in any of the important aspects of 
the dynamic model as in the past. The theoretical examination confirms that if wages are 
bargained with the added ingredient of rationality, they axe then in accordance with the firm's 
financial performance, which reinforces the first empirical result of this thesis. 
IV 
Despite their importance, none of the above studies have been attempted in the past. 
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CHAPTERI 
INTRODUCTION 
Forward-looking behaviour and its consequences, and a thorough examination of the im- 
portance of recruitment and retention of workers, is feasible and useful for analysing more 
realistic/plausible wage determination. The core chapters in this thesis firstly, empirically 
show, using two different types of dataset, how wages are determined, which is in contrast to 
all previous studies in labour economics; second, they provide an analysis of how to analyse 
the consequences of forward-looking behaviour within a rational expectations equilibrium 
framework. 
The first part of the very first sentence is shown in the core chapters 3-5 of this the- 
sis, where I provide two empirical studies to show that forward-looking behaviour and the 
recruitment and retention of labour as major bargaining considerations, reflects reality. This 
analysis uses two different datasets, estimation techniques and data structures, permitting 
generality for my arguments. I then explain the feasibility of how to theoretically demon- 
strate the consequences of forward-looking behaviour with full rationality. It follows that 
my arguments are robust from the important theoretical, as well as as from an empirical 
perspective. 
Lindbeck and Snower have developed a very fruitful theory of the game between firms 
and workers in their book Insider- Outsider Theory of Employment and Unemployment. Their 
book comprehensively develops a theory where incumbent workers exert excessive influence in 
the wage-bargaining process, on account of their tenure with the firm. This exertion of power 
by incumbents whilst bargaining with the firm, and the ensuing higher wage, has hitherto 
been analysed in steady-state, although the firm and workers axe in an ongoing relationship. 
My theory, in contradistinction, is. essentially dynamic. This is assumed at every aspect of 
the game, after having shown empirically, first, that forward-looking behaviour matters in 
wage determination. In addition, I also establish empirically that recruitment and retention 
is important in wage determination in detail, for which no attempt has been made in the 
past. 
The notion of dynamic equilibria in wage-bargaining is the basic ingredient in my theory. 
This notion yields a generalisation of the concept of the solution of an in or out-of-steady- 
2 
state wage-bargaining/labourl market model with static wage equations. It turns out from 
my simulations of the labour market, that such imposition of steady-state wage equations 
in an out-of-steady-state model, for example, leads the economy to instability. That is, the 
equilibrium points appear to be simply opposing the correct strategies. 
In chapter 5,1 consider dynamic equilibria in a labour market model with random 
matching and strategic bargaining. Lindbeck and Snower and all other wage determination 
studies focus on steady-state wages, or, if dynamics axe discussed at all, merely impose Nash's 
axiomatic bargaining solution, as in Pissarides (2000). Imposition of the Nash solution out of 
steady-state is tantamount to assuming that agents are myopic. In my game, I assume that 
workers and firms are forward-looking and pursue the consequences of this behaviour, with 
the added ingredient of full rationality, and show that this generates qualitatively different 
equilibria. I consider situations where there is no delay in bargaining, and hence, there is 
immediate trade equilibria (ITE henceforth). The concept of expectation with foresight is 
crucial in my theory and this is what drives most of the thesis. The consequences of using 
ITE, as opposed to the Nash bargaining solution, is that first, we can examine whether 
the equilibrium is subgame perfect; second, we can analyse whether the equilibrium is well 
behaved, unique and saddle-path stable; third, simultaneously/synonymously assess whether 
forward-looking behaviour is consistent with stable and unique outcomes in wage-baxgaining. 
These outcomes complement the empirical establishment of the forward-looking behaviour of 
bargainers in Chapter 3. 
In terms of results in labour economics, I show that with the consequences of forward- 
looking and rational behaviour in the bargaining process, the full system of the labour market 
has a unique equilibrium, which is saddle-path stable in nominal prices and real economic 
activity. The examination of the full system of the labour market is infeasible in the same 
model with steady-state/myopic bargaining, these type of equilibria are not possible in such 
a model. Thus, the forwaxd-looking nature of the bargaining solution makes a qualitative 
difference. My discussion has highlighted the fact that the imposition of a steady-state wage 
in a dynamic environment will yield distorted results. Chapter 5 provides a wholesome 
theoretical analysis of the consequences of forwaxd-looking wage-bargaining. I also provide 
empirical verification in support of the forwaxd-looking and rent-sharing behaviour in chapters 
'As in the out-of-steady-state labour market model of Pissarides (2000) and in the steady state model of 
Lindbeck and Snower (1988). 
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3 and 4 respectively. 
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows: 
In Chapter 2,1 review all the insider-outsider models of wage determination, with respect 
to both the theoretical and empirical contributions of the theory, and I also highlight im- 
portant gaps in the literature that this thesis will bridge. This chapter also shows how my 
contribution fits into the literature. 
In Chapter 3,1 empirically verify the other main element of Theorem 1 in Chapter 5 of 
this thesis, which is that forward-looking behaviour matters in wage determination and which 
is also the main foundation of this thesis. The results of the cross-section data estimation 
for approximately 2,000 firms, which strongly demonstrate that future financial performance 
has a positive and significant impact on wage settlements. 
In Chapter 4,1 provide a comprehensive empirical verification of the importance of re- 
cruitment and retention as a wage determinant. That is, it was shown in Theorem 1 that 
the negotiated wage is monopolistically priced and the agents are forward- looking. This is 
manifested in establishments reporting the importance of recruitment and retention of labour 
as a major bargaining consideration, using cross-sectional time-series data provided by the 
Confederation of British Industry. The data enable the identity characterisation of the estab- 
lishments who consider the recruitment and retention of labour as a very important factor 
in wage-bargaining. Using ordered probit estimation, I am able to identify the regions, in- 
dustries and bargaining groups in which the need to retain and recruit as a very important 
factor in exerting upward pressure in wage settlements is highest. In particular, my results 
show that it is the more prosperous/successful firms which report that the recruitment and 
retention of labour is a major bargaining consideration. That is, there is a positive correla- 
tion between the prosperity of an establishment and their reporting of the recruitment and 
retention of labour being a very important bargaining consideration. These results provide 
strong complementary support for the first empirical chapter of this thesis, which was inves- 
tigated in the context of the insider-outsider theory, which is sustained by labour-turnover 
costs. While there are ample theories on some types of labour turnover models (for example 
insider-outsider theory, on which I applied my empirical analysis in particular), no endeavours 
have been made to provide a comprehensive empirical analysis of the relevance of turnover 
models. 
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In Chapter 5,1 analyse dynamic baxgaining and show that the wage is a differential 
function of time in equilibrium. This is in contrast to previous studies, which have imposed 
steady-state wages in a dynamic environment, or, if out-of-steady-state dynamics are consid- 
ered in labour market models, the steady-state wage is imposed. I then derive a differential 
equation representation of equilibrium in a labour maxket. Third, I embed the solution to 
the dynamic bargaining game into the labour market model and describe labour market 
equilibria. 
In Chapter 6,1 conclude by providing the main results of this thesis, citing the limitations 
of this research and suggesting extensions for future research, which are naturally those which 
stem from the research conducted in this thesis. 
CHAPTER 2 
THE INSIDER-OUTSIDER THEORIES: A REVIEW 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
Unemployment and wage determination have always interested economists and policymakers. 
Explanations of changes in unemployment, both secular and cyclical, emanate importantly 
from the models of wage determination. A central theme in the wage determination liter- 
ature has been to understand how the procedure of wage-setting and the process by which 
bargainers negotiate, affect the wage outcome. 
A two-person ongoing bargaining situation occurs when two individuals who have the 
opportunity to collaborate for mutual benefit in a long-term relationship in a number of 
ways. In the simpler case, considered in most of this thesis, in contrast to earlier studies, 
no action which has repercussions for the future taken by one of the individuals without the 
consent of the other can affect the welfare of the other one. In addition, considering that 
in a two-person ongoing bargaining situation between a firm and worker, labour from the 
latter constitutes the most fundamental and essential factor of production, it is crucial that 
a detailed examination of the recruitment and retention of labour is accomplished and not 
only as paxt of a general enquiry into wage determination as has been done in the past. This 
deficiency is addressed in Chapter 4. 
Wages are the remuneration paid to workers by a firm in return for their labour services, 
. The firm utilizes the labour services to produce output, which the 
firm sells to maximise 
its profit, while workers maximise their utility in terms of the wages they receive. Given 
these incentive incompatibilities between these two agents, as they both want to enhance 
their respective objectives, one way to reach a mutually beneficial agreement is to utilize the 
forward-looking Nash solution to determine wages. Earlier studies focus on steady states or 
impose the static Nash solution, when dynamics are discussed at all. This determination of 
wages is only accomplished in steady states and essentially assumes myopia on the part of 
the bargainers. This shortcoming is addressed in Chapter 5. 
Prior to my development of dynamic bargaining in labour markets in the succeeding 
chapters, it will be useful to review past studies on wage determination. The two agents 
5 
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who determine wages are conventionally considered to be firms and workers. The objectives 
of the firm generally are to maximise profits, and the workers generally want to maximise 
utility. There is some debate concerning the objectives of unions. Certainly, according to one 
of the main theories of wage determination; most insider-outsider theories (IOT, henceforth 
or IOM for model and 10 for insider-outsider), first comprehensively developed by Lindbeck 
and Snower (1988) (LS henceforth), insiders are not interested in the employment prospects 
of unemployed workers (outsiders). 
Many non-competitive models of wage determination have been proposed, most notably 
union bargaining and efficiency wage theory (henceforth EWT). It is well known, that labour 
markets are imperfect and there can be a considerable amount of involuntary unemployment, 
for example, not in the UK currently, but it is true in Germany. The employment and 
unemployment statistics in the 1980s, when unemployment wa's persistently high, despite 
high wages, particularly in Europe, excited a great deal of interest. IOT was one of the 
theories developed to explain this persistency. This particular hypothesis which states that 
wage setting is dominated by insiders, that is, incumbent workers with tenure (they could be 
union or non-union members), has gained popularity amongst economists and policyrnakers. 
This chapter focuses particular attention on IOT. 
It is the purpose of this chapter to provide a summary of the literature of the main 
theories of wage determination, focusing on 10 theories as an example, to identify/highlight 
the lacuna in the literature, that my thesis will bridge. 
2.1.1. Wage Determination Theories 
A whirlwind tour of the main theories of wage determination, which have informed empirical 
studies over the years, will now be conducted, with paxticular attention being accorded to 
the EWT, since IOT is an offshoot of the labour turnover and union threat models of EWT. 
The discussion will provide an indication of the variables used in the empirical specification 
in chapter 3. Special attention of course, will be focussed on IOT. 
These extant theoretical determinants of wages, shown below, appear to focus more on 
predicting wage levels rather than pay adjustments, which accrue to reflect the change in 
circumstances that have occurred since the previous pay was determined. I analyse pay 
adjustments in Chapters 3 and 4 to formulate a more satisfactory empirical specification. 
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We now turn to the theories of wage determination put forward by other authors. 
Neoclassical labour market theory 
In the competitive labour market theory, labour supply is assumed to be perfectly elastic, 
i. e., the firm can hire as much labour as they like at the going wage rate. If there is a gain 
i. e., an improvement in the financial performance of the firm this will be translated into 
increased output and employment at the going wage, prior to the improvement in financial 
performance. Here higher wages are paid to workers in short supply. 
Imperfectly competitive labour and product markets 
Imperfectly competitive labour market theories gives rise to different predictions. If the firm 
is a monopsonist, the prediction is that the firm will pay each worker's reservation wage and 
if identical wages are paid to all workers, the wage will be less than the value of the workers' 
marginal product. A variant of this model is the dynamic monopsony model of Burdett and 
Mortensen (1998), where they show that larger firms pay higher wages and these firms are 
also subject to lower quit rates and find hiring is easier and cheaper, thus enabling them to 
increase in size. Green, Machin and Manning (1996) also find that the correlation between 
wages and firm size will be prominent where the labour market is more monopsonistic. 
Where the firm is a monopolist or near monopolist in the product market, the firm may 
pay higher wages, since the firm faces less competition in the product market. But the trade 
unions representing all or most of the employees may wish to negotiate the wages with the 
firm. In such cases, both the firm and the trade union may negotiate the employment level 
and wages. This form of bargaining is known as the efficient bargaining model. In other 
cases, only the wage is bargained for by both the agents, and the firm unilaterally determines 
employment. This form of bargaining is the right-to-manage model. The bargaining models 
predict higher wages, as the trade unions are better able to seek the rent accruing to the firm. 
Efficiency wage theory 
Another imperfectly competitive labour market theory is the efficiency wage theory. The 
main assumption of the EWT is that workers exert greater effort when higher wages are 
paid. All models of wage determination refer to the payment of higher wages to increase 
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encourage efficiency and/or productivity. The notion that high wages encourage efficiency 
is explicitly and extensively discussed in EWT. It will be useful to consider very briefly, the 
source of insider power, since IOT is a special case of EWT, as noted previously. 
In the EWT, higher wages are paid to elicit greater effort. The fundamental notion un- 
derlying EWT is that wages in excess of the market clearing wage are paid to provide an 
incentive to yield greater efficiency per unit of output, resulting from greater effort from its 
workforce. The firm pays higher wages to provide incentive to yield greater effort from its 
workforce. Leibenstein (1957) first put forward this notion for underdeveloped countries. 
The fundamental assumptions of the theory are: first, firms exert market power in the wage 
determination process and firms have imperfect information on the productivity of their work- 
ers. Since firms have imperfect information about individual worker's productivity, firms use 
wages to augment information dissemination. There axe several reasons for paying efficiency 
wages; first, payment of higher wages provides an incentive for workers to not shirk and to 
exert greater effort (see, for example, Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) and Wadhwani and Wall 
(1991)), who show that there is a positive correlation between higher wages and productiv- 
ity. Second, higher wages are paid to attract better quality applicants to apply for the post, 
thereby attempting to alleviate adverse selection. Third, higher wages also dissuades a firm's 
workers from forming a union. Fourth, payment of higher wages discourages workers from 
quitting, thereby, reducing the firm's turnover costs. Fifth, higher wages increase goodwill 
amongst employees, that is, if the firm share its profits when it is financially performimg well, 
then in return the worker will exert greater effort (that is, both paxties can be perceived as 
exchanging gifts), thereby enhancing productivity, see Akerlof, 1982). Thus, firms have an 
incentive to pay wages in excess of the market clearing level. 
All models of the EWT suffer from a number of problems. First, the weakness of the 
shirking model is that posting of bonds upon entering the firm, which will be forfeited if 
employees shirk or quit; or payment of an entry fee, which is returnable at the normal 
retirement age, can obviate the need to pay efficiency wages. However, for legal and moral 
hazard reasons, i. e., the incentives for the firm to announce that performance was inadequate 
and retain the bond, and for imperfect capital market reasons (Akerlof and Katz (1989)) we 
do not observe the posting of bonds in the real world. But, we do observe wage profiles in 
the primary sector, which can be seen as a form of 'bond posting'. The difficulty is that the 
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original shirking model was not intended to provide explanations of unemployment in the 
primary sector. 
The weakness of the adverse selection model is that higher wage offers do not preclude 
less able workers from applying for posts. The weakness of the union threat models is that 
the payment of higher wages does not prevent workers from acting as though they belong to a 
union. This is where the explanation provided by the IOT comes in; it provides an additional 
reason to prevent the formation of a union, thereby rehabilitating the union threat model of 
the EWT. The difficulty with the turnover model is that the payment of higher wages does 
not prevent workers from quitting. Again, this is where IOT comes in, by providing a potent 
reason for reduced labour turnover, i. e., persistence in employment. 
Evidence in support of the payment of efficiency wages include Krueger and Summers 
(1988). Using panel data they find that the difference in wages when an individual changes 
job to another industry is similar to the industry wage differential. Krueger and Summers 
have ruled out that industry wage differentials are due to demand shifts. They find the 
correlation between the industry wage differential in 1974 and 1984 is 0.97. However, this 
study did not rule out measurement error or endogeneity problems. Murphy and Topel (1987) 
attempted to overcome the first problem and found that wage differentials across industries 
were due to unmeasured quality effects. But these unmeasured quality effects rendered their 
results biased upwards. Gibbons and Katz (1992) also found wage differentials to exist across 
industries, which cannot be explained by competitive models. Pencavel (1972) and Freeman 
(1980) find that there is a negative correlation between quits and higher wages. In interviews 
with the UK firms, Kaufman (1984) found that higher wages axe paid to induce greater 
effort and in fairness to workers. Wadhwani and Wall (1991) as noted, have shown there is a 
positive relation between higher wages and productivity and that the latter increases when 
the level of unemployment rises. However, the results are flawed, as they have not adequately 
explained the inclusion of the unemployment variable in their model, that is, the effect of 
unemployment on productivity. Fairris and Alston (1991) have also shown that efficiency 
wages are paid to workers. 
The most plausible empirical studies of EWT were conducted by Capelli and Chauvin 
(1991) using a time-series study, and Leonard (1987), who used cross-section data. In the for- 
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mer study, the structure of the data set2 they utilised controls for a number of problems that 
confronted other tests on efficiency wage effects. In the latter study, he examines EWT at 
the level of the firm, utilising detailed occupational classification to act as a control on worker 
quality, which is preferable to the ubiquitously used age and education measures. However, 
Leonard estimated a production function, with explanatory variables which included wage 
premiums and supervisory intensity. Such testing for substitution between two factors of pro- 
duction by regressing wage premiums on the supervisory intensity attracts several criticisms. 
Factor combination is a function of factor prices and, possibly, scale. Second, the choices 
of levels for both factors of production are endogenous and jointly determined, thereby ren- 
dering the interpretation of a positive correlation between supervisory intensity and wage 
premiums unsatisfactory and unconvincing. 
These studies have provided some, although not conclusive, evidence in support of EWT; 
specifically, overall the evidence for efficiency wage theory is inconclusive. 
IOT reduces to the union threat model and the labour turnover model of EWT as a 
special case as noted. Specifically, IOT is a comprehensive development of both the union 
threat model and the labour turnover models of EWT. It is a special case of the former, 
as insiders are paid higher wages to prevent them from striking, giving rise to a lockout or 
causing other general disruptions to the firm. The labour turnover model of EWT is a special 
case of IOT since payment of higher wages to insiders will discourage a high turnover, which 
is costly to the firm. 
Accordingly, IOT accords greater power to the workers to elicit higher wages than that 
paid by firms (in accordance with the EWT explanation). As a consequence, insiders exert 
labour market power in the wage-bargaining process. 
Another theory that is developed from the EWT is the dual labour market hypothesis. 
This theory assumes that workers in the primary sector axe better paid, have good work- 
ing conditions, employment security and have promotional prospects, while in the secondary 
sector, workers axe lower paid, experience scant employment security and have less promo- 
tional prospects. Due to their employment in the secondary sector, they are less attractive 
to employers in the primary sector. This theory predicts that there is a positive correlation 
between eaxnings and tenure. 
2 That is, they use a very precise measure of shirking obtained from the company's internal records. 
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Insider-outsider theory 
Higher wages are paid to workers, on account of labour turnover costs. Thus, workers with 
tenure seek to share the gains arising from the firm's financial performance, irrespective of 
whether the gains are current or future, and firms pay higher wages to incumbent workers. 
IOT is based on the notion that if wage-bargaining is a prevalent feature of the labour 
market, the interactions between employment and the group of insiders may give rise to 
substantial employment and unemployment persistence (Blanchard and Summers 1986). Al- 
though the association of pay being related to profits goes back to Dunlop (1944), the seminal 
contributions to the development of the IOT are Blanchard and Summers (1986,1987) and 
LS's (1986,1988a, 1988c). Other important contributions to the insider-outsider literature, 
include Solow (1985), Gottfries and Horn (1987), Carruth and Oswald (1987), Begg (1988) 
and Drazen and Gottfries (1990). 
IOT was initially most comprehensively developed by LS to provide an explanation for 
the unemployment persistence, notably in Europe. Their research has attracted a good deal 
of attention and has become particularly influential. 
Sanfey (1995b) provides a distinctive survey of IOs in union models, which focuses on 
the role played by the insider-outsider distinctions in modifying trade union models. It 
must be noted that LS emphasises that insiders can exert power in the wage-setting process 
individually or collectively through union representation, which Sanfey (1995b) acknowledges. 
This chapter differs from the 10 survey in Sanfey (1995b) in not just the objectives, but also 
in a critical fundamental respect. We differ with respect to the former, since the purpose 
of my review, is to provide the background of the pertinent labour economics literature, to 
highlight and identify my contributions to the literature. We dffer also from Sanfey's focus on 
summarising the modification of traditional union models, which have been incorporated with 
the 10 distinction, within a static LS IOT framework. Sanfey's survey makes no attempt to 
incorporate non-union models, since IOT is applicable to both union and non-union models. 
Hence, the survey is restricted to union models that have incorporated the 10 distinction 
to modify these models. In contrast, I review the 10 explanation for wage determination in 
both union and non-union settings and check how robust this explanation is in the light of 
the existing theoretical and empirical studies. 
The extension to non-union setting is important, as it exposes the full and true potency 
12 
of the IOT, in the spirit it was written. Insider power can be exerted individually and in 
non-union settings as well, in line with the correct predictions of the IOT, i. e., the theoretical 
foundations for insider effects on wage determination are not restricted to union models - 
several alternatives are examined in LS (1986,1988a), Solow (1985) and Nickell and Wadhwani 
(1990). To focus solely on the unionised setting is an unappealing feature of his survey. In 
particular, it fails to emphasise the full power of IOT, particularly as union density has 
inexorably decreased both in the US and the UK. Also the shaxing of rents, and for example, 
accepting a decrease in wages if the firm is not in good financial health, do not require a 
unionised setting3. In addition, incorporating the 10 distinction to the monopoly union has 
endowed it with some strange properties. Jones and McKenna (1989) find the treatment 
of outsiders distorts the characteristic features of the monopoly union model and gives it 
unappealing properties. In Sanfey's survey, none of this is evident. But a paxtial survey of 
any kind is unattractive, and his survey is no exception. Moreover, with respect to theoretical 
studies, for example, the source of insider power, the impact of insider membership rules, and 
how they relate to and differ from each other, with respect to these main features, are not 
fully examined in Sanfey. On the basis of the empirical evidence, I seek to evaluate the 
pertinence of the 10 models in providing an explanation for wage setting. This is important, 
as we can then evaluate the power of IOT in detecting movements in unemployment. This 
has important policy implications. 
Like Sanfey, this chapter focuses on the insider-outsider distinction in transforming union 
models. Unlike Sanfey, this review considers the influence and relevance of insider power in 
wage-setting in all IOMs, irrespective of whether the workers exert insider power collectively 
or individually. In this review, I focus on the importance of the insider-outsider distinction 
in conventional trade union models, all other IOMs and the econometric findings to date. 
The main deficiency with the IOT literature is that it does not consider the importance 
of incorporating future financial performance when determining wages. This is a serious 
omission. Even the most casual empirical observation, or the industrial relations facts of 
life, indicate that workers and their firms tend to gain together when the future financial 
performance is seen to be healthy, and vice versa, and this is reflected in the wage bargain. 
For example, there is a body of evidence that suggests that workers are prepared to take a 
3 To put it another way, the latter is a sufficient, but not a necessary condition. But clearly, insiders 
represented collectively are more powerful. 
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wage cut, if the firm's financial health is poor (see, for instance, Smith, 2000). Naturally, my 
review highlights this deficiency and proposes a means of incorporating this formally. Indeed, 
the goal of this thesis is to bridge this important lacuna. 
Insiders exert bargaining power in the division of rents. LS analyses extensively and 
explicitly reviews the sources of this insider power. To motivate this review, it is natural and 
useful to consider what these are. 
The main sources of insider power, emanate from labour turnover costs, including hiring 
and firing costs, and threats and costs associated with non-cooperation and harassment of 
entrants, so as to raise their disutility from working in excess of the utility they derive from 
it. On the basis of this power, insiders extract rent from the firm. Extant theories have 
only considered extracting current rent, but the following chapters will show that forward- 
looking behaviour is important, and the consequences of this behaviour. In addition, although 
turnover costs sustains the extant theories, these studies have also made no attempt to 
empirically show the importance of recruitment and retention of labour in detail, which is 
also established in a following chapter. 
These costs suggest that the firm will not be a viable concern if insiders are replaced by 
outsiders at a lower wage. The potential gain to the firm is outweighed by the costs of such an 
action in addition to the loss of training invested in and payment of severance pay to workers. 
There are several costs associated with replacing workers. Even the new workers will incur 
hiring costs, such as, seaxch (advertising), screening (interview), negotiation costs, training 
and severance payments and the implementation of expensive firing procedures. Moreover, a 
high turnover is detrimental to the firm, as the workers obtain firm-specific skills which are not 
readily replaceable. Non-cooperative activities, by creating a productivity differential, have 
an adverse affect on the firms' profitability, amongst other things, in turn its stock prices, as 
do haxassment activities targeted at entrants. Such activities are designed to dissuade firms 
from employing entrants, so as to create and increase the wages demanded by incumbent 
workers. Furthermore, exertion of effort is essential to increase productivity, as in EWT. 
If the current wage is associated with workers' past effort performance, then an increase in 
a firm's rate of labour turnover decreases its workers' expected future effort reward. This 
decline in effort reward has a negative substitution and positive income effect. If the former 
dominates, productivity falls, due to a decline in the effort exerted. Thus, the firm incurs an 
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effort-related cost of labour turnover, which is damaging to the firm. 
According to LS (1988c), IOT explains how trade unions derive their power, thus, trade 
union models have been modified to take account of the 10 distinction, so it would be useful 
to make this source explicit. Besides, the basic distinction of wage determination is between 
theories involving trade unions and wage-bargaining, and theories where workers can bargain 
as individuals, as in IOT. Since traditional trade union models are a special case of IOT, I 
will also review how these models have been transformed to account for the 10 distinction, 
and the theoretical implications of such modification from the wide range of models and the 
empirical verification to date. 
The past literature has extensively analysed the importance of distinguishing between 
'insiders' and 'outsiders' in both the union and non-union models. The literature has incor- 
porated these modifications in both one-period models, where the union/incumbent workers 
are indifferent to the welfare of the outsiders, and in dynamic models. In the former, the tra- 
ditional union maximands have been modified, as noted, to incorporate the 10 distinction. 
This is attained in the literature by adopting various modelling approaches with inherent 
degrees of variations, including the assumption that all workers/unions are homogenous and 
they care about real wages of the employed workers and the level of employment. The liter- 
ature also puts more structure on the basic utility function of the workers, by assuming the 
function is either of the expected utility, the related utilitarian function or impose a particular 
functional form, such as Stone-Geary. Some studies also associate the probability of employ- 
ment to the labour demand curve. According no weight to the outsiders in union/worker 
preferences is rather unrealistic, so other studies have accord ed some weight to outsiders, but 
less than that of the incumbent workers. As noted above, the alternative utility function to 
use is a specific functional form, such as the Stone-Geary utility function. This has found 
favour in the literature on account of its tractability, including its amenability to econometric 
testing. Other single-period union maximands in IOT assume that unions are only concerned 
about deviations in employment from the level at which all insiders are employed. 
As these single-period models, fail to account for dynamic considerations (such as, unions/ 
workers lasting for multiple periods and negotiating repeatedly), some studies have considered 
dynamic union models. In addition, the assumption of homogeneity of workers, is rather un- 
realistic, so some studies have introduced heterogenous workers into traditional union/labour 
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market models, which incorporates the 10 distinction. 
To gauge the implications of these models, the preferences of the firm need to be embodied 
and the bargaining/structure needs to be modelled. Three baxgaining models have gained 
immense popularity in the literature. A wide range of theoretical implications and predictions 
emanate from these models, notably, wage rigidity, asymmetric adjustment and employment 
persistence. Of course, a whole host of empirical tests have been conducted to verify the 10 
models. 
Thus, the natural organisation of my literature review, is in four parts and is as follows: 
Section 2.2 reviews the seminal models. Section 2.3 reviews the incorporation of the 10 
distinction into trade union models and their implications, including, how union preferences 
have been transformed to embody insiders and outsiders in both single period and dynamic 
models. I then review studies which examine the impact of incorporating heterogenous work- 
ers, such as the length of service with the firm, into union preferences. I then consider the 
literature on bargaining models between unions/workers and firms. Section 2.4 reviews the 
more recent developments of 10 models, in conjunction with the predictions of 10 models, 
some of which are model dependent and others are more robust to variations in union prefer- 
ences or the form of the bargaining. Section 2.5 reviews the empirical tests conducted by the 
10 models, in accordance with the questions that were analysed most. Within these ques- 
tions, I summarise the outcomes in accordance to one source of variation, which is the degree 
of aggregation used in these studies. Section 2.6 concludes by highlighting and identifying 
my thesis's contributions to the literature. 
2.2. SEMINAL INSIDER-OUTSIDER MODELS 
This section provides a review of the seminal and earlier developments of 10 models. 
The seminal contributions to the 10 literature are Blanchaxd and Summers's hysteresis 
model of unemployment persistence (1986,1987) and LS's (1986,1988a, 1988c) IOM. I have 
chosen these models as the most important, since they are the earliest developments/contribut ions 
to the IOT and are the most influential. Most studies are developments of these studies in 
the 10 literature. The reason for reviewing the seminal studies is because they aptly embody 
the true spirit of the IOT. These studies were the first to develop the concept of incumbent 
workers using their market power to raise wages and cause employment persistence, as in the 
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LS model and hysteresis in the Blanchard and Summers model. More details of these models 
are provided below. 
All seminal and earlier studies utilize a two-period model, with the exception of LS and 
Drazen and Gottfries (1990), where the former uses a one-period and the latter uses an 
infinite-time model. In addition, all seminal and earlier models use the monopoly union 
bargaining framework, with the exception of LS (1988c) and Carruth and Oswald, who use 
the right-to-manage and efficient bargaining models respectively. See Table 2.1. 
TABLE 2.1 
SEMINAL INSIDER-OUTSIDER MODELS 
Insider- 0u tsider 
Study 
Sources of 
Market Power 
Time Period Wage 
Bargaining 
Model 
Partia eneraF 
Equilibrium 
Framework 
Lindbeck and Labour turnover Une Period Right to Partial 
Snower, costs; firm-specific Manage 
1988c 1992 human capital 
Blanchard and Labour turnover Two Periods Monopoly Partial and 
Summers, costs; firm-specific Union General 
1986,1987 human capital 
Solow 1985 Firm-specific Two Periods Monopoly Partial 
human capital Union 
Gottfries and Labour turnover Two Periods Monopoly Partial 
Horn, 1986 costs Union 
Carruth and Labour turnover Two Periods Efficient Partial 
Oswald, 1987 costs Bargaining 
Begg, 1988 Firm-specific Two Periods Monopoly Partial 
human capital Union 
Drazen and Labour turnover Infinite Time Monopoly Partial 
Gottfries, 1990 costs Union 
Blanchard and Summers (1986) develop intertemporal models of insiders lowering the 
employment prospects of outsiders and accepting higher wages for themselves. Again, insiders 
are assumed to set wages and the firm unilaterally chooses employment, ex post, after the 
revelation of product market conditions. The instantaneous utility of the insider is linear in 
the probability of employment and the wage. 
How does this model help explain how insiders translate contraction in employment op- 
portunities into higher wages? An adverse shock is not anticipated prior to the wage-setting 
contracts employment. Now the fall in insider membership is associated with the lowering of 
wages. With the recovery of the demand for labour, higher wages are accepted, leading to 
lower employment prospects for the outsiders. 
Blanchard and Summers provide a provocative account of how insiders can contribute to 
the hysteresis effect in particular, but it has some flaws. My first objection is that there are 
limits to the extent which insiders can drive up wages without the outsiders undercutting 
them. This constitutes a logical problem in their model, since the wages would be increasing 
without bound and the employment contracting without limit (Hall, 1986). Vetter and 
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Andersen (1994) show that insiders will not raise their wage a great deal, as the higher they 
raise their wage, the higher the incentive for outsiders to underbid to gain insider status. 
The second objection is that insiders need to be not only uncertain about the state of 
labour demand, but also uncertain about who is going to be laid off in a trough. In addition, 
wage determination behaviour is dependent solely on changes, not levels of employment 
(Hunter 1988, Booth 1995). This seems rather absurd, as economies with different levels of 
employment should experience similar wage claims. Fourth, why has high labour turnover of 
the labour force not lead to a fall in employment, if unions are only interested in incumbent 
insiders in wage-bargaining? Fifth, the strong version does not take into account the fact 
that in the long-run, there is an association between the level of employment and the size of 
the labour force, Layard and Bean (1989). Sixth, the strong version again does not take into 
account the bargaining strength of the firm, like all the seminal models, enabling the firm to 
go directly to the outsiders at some cost (Blanchard and Summers, 1987). 
Moreover, the model ignores the effects of conditions in other than what labour markets, 
other than labour markets have on the persistence of unemployment (Adams, 1988). Accord- 
ing to Adams (1988,393 - 4), the structure of financial markets is important, as it has an 
impact on the conditions on which finance will be available for the setting up of new firms 
and a firms incentive to bargain with outsiders directly. 
Some of the criticisms I raise here axe also applicable to other seminal models. (See 
also my Theorem 1 of Chapter 5, where I show the wage determined in equilibrium is both 
monopolistically priced and is a differential function of time. ) 
10 models provide a distinct explanation of wage determination on account of turnover 
costs. Many of its testable implications are consistent with the following stylised facts: 
(i) It shows why payment of wages in accordance to tenure leads to substantial wage 
dispersion 
(ii) It shows why workers' with tenure earn higher wages than a new entrant to employ- 
ment. 
(iii) It shows why workers' wages are positively correlated with firm or industry-specific 
skills. 
(iv) It explains why large firms on average pay high wages, for example, large profitable 
firms on average axe associated with greater wages. 
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Any model that is consistent with these stylised facts is clearly an important contribution 
to the theoretical literature within labour economics. 
However, for tractability, LS and all other main theories of wage determination, assume 
that each bargained wage is separable from and linear in t, and agents have a constant discount 
rate, since the bargainers are myopic, i. e., each bargainer posts a static bargained wage which 
is fixed for the entire period till the next bargaining round. In addition, despite IOT being 
a comprehensive development of labour turnover theory, the importance of recruitment and 
retention is not empirically established in detail by LS or any other authors in the past. 
In addition, for tractability, LS assumes gains to trade between unemployed workers and 
insiders and firms and also assumes that these agents are not forward-looking when bargaining 
for wages and employment. I relax these assumptions, consequent to empirically establishing 
these agents are forward- looking. I pursue the consequences of this behaviour theoretically: 
here each firm and workers can costlessly realise gains to trade and the wage can be costlessly 
changed at any time. This is a crucial extension for the following reason. In the LS model, 
all firms make the same profits. However, some firms have more workers than others. If any 
firm were permitted to deviate from the fixed wage and could change the wage, it would lower 
it to the workers' reservation wage, thereby extracting their full search rents and bargain in 
accordance to the future performance of the firm. LS rules this out by the assumption that 
firms are never allowed to change wages. But this is an unappealing property of their model. 
In particular, incorporating full wage flexibility and exhibiting forward-looking behaviour 
would lead to a very different type of equilibrium. 
In addition, there is a body of evidence, for example, Fernandez and Glazer (1991), 
Halter and Holden (1991), Holden (1994), which suggests that to model wage-bargaining 
that corresponds to that of the real world, it is necessary to incorporate the long-term nature 
of the firm-worker relationship. In other words, these studies have shown that labour market 
games axe not a one-shot game. Indeed it is an ongoing game and analysis of labour market 
outcomes should reflect this. LS does not allow agents to be fully rational, as a consequence of 
being forward-looking, when baxgaining for wages in particular. If they did then a different 
equilibrium would emerge. I in contrast permit agents to be fully rational, consequent to 
establishing that agents are forward-looking empirically. The equilibrium that emerges is not 
qualitatively different in my chapter 5, in the limit as t --+ oo or equal discount rates, but not 
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otherwise. 
Like LS, chapter 5 of this thesis is consistent with the four stylised facts mentioned above. 
Unlike LS (when firms have identical productivity), it also implies that larger firms make 
greater profits. The equilibrium characterised here converges to the LS's insider-outsider 
equilibrium in the limit as rf = r,, and t --+ oo. Their assumption that wages cannot be 
altered, does not affect the qualitative nature of the equilibrium in this limiting case. 
Currently in this chapter of the thesis, I am adhering to the spirit of the LS model, 
accepting wages of both unemployed workers and insiders as given, as stated earlier. In my 
theoretical model in chapter 5,1 show that agents operate in a nonstationary environment 
and we need to take this into account, in contrast to the LS mode14 , thereby rendering the 
agents in my model as forward-looking in contrast. The enrichment of the characterisation of 
these wages which both agents (firms and workers) find acceptable, rendering it dynamically 
consistent, for example, will follow in chapter 5. 
Similar results to that of LS have been found by Solow (1985) who emphasised the im- 
portance in wage-bargaining of internal pressures as opposed to external pressures, such as 
the rate of industry-wide, regional, national unemployment rates. He recognised the power 
of insiders in appropriating higher wages following higher demand for a firm's products. He 
stresses the conflict of interests between the employed and the unemployed workers. The 
focus of his paper is on skill differences and long-run considerations. Solow (1985) develops 
a two-period model, where the firm staxts with established workers who are experienced. It 
is assumed recruits are less productive initially. Recruits are given insider status after one- 
period's employment. The insiders do not take into account the interests of the recruits in 
the first year, but they do so in the second year. The firm wants to increase its workforce, 
and insiders, on the other hand, axe interested in curtailing the membership of insiders. The 
insider group quotes wages w1l and W12, for inexperienced workers, for the two periods. The 
firm chooses employment of both insiders and outsiders unilaterally. To exclude outsiders 
from the current period, the insiders set wages sufficiently high, so as to prevent the recruit- 
ment of entrants in the next period. As the current productivity of entrants is assumed to 
be sufficiently low, they will be laid off. Due to the assumption of fluctuating demand con- 
ditions for its products, the firm only hires workers if their productivity exceeds the wage. 
4 Or any other author(s). 
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These outsiders will be hired in period 2, if the firm faces favourable demand conditions. But 
recruitment will be hampered if insiders translate favourable market conditions into higher 
wages for themselves. 
Solow (1985) did not utilize the Nash solution to solve for wages, which is the common 
method of determining wages, nor are turnover costs (specifically bargaining of severance 
pay) modelled explicitly. 
Carruth and Oswald (1987) suggested the incorporation of the insider-outsider distinction 
into the traditional labour contracts. This is a vital step, as the IOT according to LS (1988c) 
provides an explanation for union models, of how unions derive their clout and also since the 
traditional union models are a special case of IOT. It also follows that such an incorporation 
will specify union preferences over all employment levels, not just below current membership 
levels. With such incorporation, they find that insiders tend to increase their wages at the 
expense of the employment prospects of outsiders. Product price rises are reflected in changes 
in wage and employment levels. When product prices increase, first, wages are rigid and 
employment rises; then as product prices continue to increase, employment stays fixed, so as 
to translate the product price increases into higher wages for insiders. With the next rise in 
product prices, insiders opt for increased employment and wages stay the same. 
But Jones and McKenna (1989) find such an integration renders the monopoly union 
model to have some strange and unattractive properties, as noted. The weaknesses of the 
Carruth and Oswald formulation is that there is no differential between an employed outsider 
and an unemployed outsider. Hence, no weight is accorded to the former. They show that 
unions would attach importance to employed outsiders if it values future membership. The 
second weakness is that there are no economically significant differentials between the insider 
and the employed outsider. They find that, even with full wage coverage, there are some 
benefits which only the insiders enjoy. Hence, McKenna and Jones propose an alternative 
characterisation of the 10 distinction into this traditional trade union model, which restores 
the monopoly union model. 
However, this does not detract from the power of IOT's explanation for wage-setting, 
although the earlier studies have embodied this in a static Nash equilibrium, when discussing 
the determination of wages in this conventional way. 
In addition, again in Carruth and Oswald (1987), turnover costs, notably, the bargaining 
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over severance pay, is not modelled. 
Gottfries and Horn (1987) also find that insiders tend to lower employment for outsiders 
and accept higher wages for themselves. Like Blanchard and Summers (1986) they develop an 
explicit intertemporal model, where outsiders are assumed not to undercut insiders. Again, 
unanticipated shocks to labour demand lead to a fall in employment. But when labour de- 
mand recovers to the status quo ante, as there are fewer workers following a negative shock in 
the previous period, insiders translate this into higher wages and lower employment oppor- 
tunities for outsiders. As a consequence, fewer outsiders will be recruited. Thus, a negative 
shock will both increase insiders' wages and decrease the employment prospects of outsiders. 
They also show that insiders have precedence in accepting the jobs that are available in any 
period. Their model shares the same monopoly union assumption of Blanchard and Summers 
(1986), where again insiders set the wage and the firm chooses employment unilaterally. 
Thus, the objections I raised with the Blanchard and Summers (1986) models is unfor- 
tunately applicable here as well, i. e., the model requires not just uncertainty about the state 
of demand, but also uncertainty about the layoff queue. 
Begg (1988) also finds that insiders raise their wages and decrease the employment op- 
portunities of outsiders, using a monopoly union model in common with most 10 models 
within an overlapping generations framework. He uses dynamic game theory to study the 
objectives of firms and insiders. Insiders set the wages of both entrants and themselves. If 
insider wages are lowered, due to increases in recruitment, insiders will increase the entrant's 
wage immensely to preclude the hiring of outsiders. 
McCausland (1998) includes training costs to the Begg (1988) model and finds that this 
may generate multiple employment equilibria. He uses the same overlapping generations 
framework, and the monopoly union model, where the union (insiders) sets the wages for 
both insiders and outsiders, and demonstrates that the presence of training costs may give 
rise to multiple equilibria. He shows that adverse technological shocks shift employment from 
a high to a low employment equilibrium, which is the local attractor in the steady-state. Even 
if the technological state reverts to its original state, low employment equilibrium may remain 
the local attractor. 
Gottfries and Sjostrom (2000), with the inclusion of training costs, examined under what 
conditions the Begg (1988) result can be attained, specifically, the association between insider 
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and entrant wage, where the entrant wage is set sufficiently high so as to curtail the latter's 
recruitment. They demonstrated a rigid seniority wage schedule, which is resistant to business 
cycle shocks or any other factor that may contribute to the alteration of the insider wage. The 
seniority schedule is a reflection of the training costs and productivity differential between 
insiders and entrants. Thus, Gottfries and Sjostrom (2000) find that the insiders will not raise 
the outsiders' wage overly high, as in the Begg (1988) story, to preclude their recruitment. 
The result of Gottfries and Sjostrom (2000) is not unique. They rule out the inclusion 
of severance payment, which is a major component of turnover costs, which sustains the 
extant IOT. Gottfries and Sjostrom's reason for such exclusion is that it induces quits. This 
seems rather counterfactual, casual empirical observation suggests that several firms pay these 
but exodus has not been noticed as a result. In addition, casual empirical observation also 
suggests that frequent changes of jobs is not seen as a good signal by a prospective employer, 
indicating that there is a body of evidence to suggest that severance pay is paid, see for 
example Pissarides (2001). If insider wages are set to reflect perfect price discrimination by 
both firms and insiders as in this thesis, there will be no incentive for the insider to even 
contemplate quitting, as a result of the inclusion of severance payment, which is also set as 
a result of perfect price discrimination by both agents, in this thesis. 
However, Zwick, Bunke, Maks and Muysken (1995) show that, when the potential outsider 
wants to invest in human capital, due to his expectations of becoming an insider in the future, 
he may outperform the insider in this respect. The insider would find that it is in his interest 
to forestall the outsider, so that the insider can recover all the rents generated. 
Related to the issue of wage-setting is unemployment, since the former detects movements 
in the latter. IOT can also exhibit employment hysteresis, which can emanate from insiders 
dominating wage determination, as first shown by Blanchard and Summers (1986), which 
was based on Gregory (1986) and Gottfries and Horn (1987). These studies assumed that 
insiders are rather indispensable, in the sense that they axe not substitutable by outsiders. 
The cause of hysteresis is due to the fact that the optimal insider-wage depends on current 
insiders, which in turn depends on past employment of insiders (I shall not be considering 
this possibility in this thesis). 
Kiander (1993) finds the exercising of the bargaining power axising from labour turnover 
costs, and the provision of credible threats, depends on the fixed and storage costs and 
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the profitability of the firm. Although he provides a distinct explanation for the sources of 
credibility of the workers' strike threat and bargaining power, there are a number of flaws 
with Kiander's analysis. As it stands, it is logical faulty. In addition, Kiander's result is not 
a subgame perfect equilibrium. 
To recapitulate, LS provides a distinct explanation for unemployment, but suffers from 
problems. It is unfortunately an inherently static model: it specifies that insiders (workers 
with tenure) exert market power in the wage- negotiating process on account of tenure. They 
exercise this power in the wage-bargaining process in their sole interest without taking no 
or full interests of the outsiders. It is assumed that there are gains to trade between firms, 
insiders and outsiders. The insiders negotiate high wages for themselves and accept low 
employment for outsiders. 
This outcome in terms of both wages and employment is jointly inefficient, for both 
agents. If turnover costs are to sustain the theory, we need to examine the dynamics of the 
turnover costs properly within a game theoretic or rational expectations framework. The 
thesis adopts the former route. As agents are bargaining in non-stationary environments, 
it is crucial to take into account the fact that bargainers are forward- looking, and hence it 
is crucial to take into account the future financial performance of the firm when bargaining 
wages. This important gap is prevalent in the static IOT. This gap will be bridged by this 
thesis, specifically, chapter 5, where I pursue the consequences of forward-looking behaviour. 
It is well known that a product market monopolist can discriminate among consumers 
with private information by using a non-uniform price schedule, see for example, Spence 
(1977), Mussa and Rosen (1978), Goldman, Leland and Sibley (1984), Maskin and Riley 
(1984). 
The non-uniform model has not been applied to factor market monopolists, such as trade 
unions, with the exception of Kuhn (1988). Despite its simple and powerful result, no work 
has hitherto considered applying non-uniform pricing to factor market monopolists, i. e., where 
firms extract rent from different types of workers whose only distinction arises from tenure 
in the previous period, within a game theoretic equilibrium framework. 
The usefulness and realism of the 10 theory have been questioned. In a study by An- 
dersen and Vetter (1995), it was shown that the possibility for insiders to extract rents from 
exogenous turnover costs is restricted due to the fact that higher are the current rents to 
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nsiders, the more aggressively outsiders will seek to attain insider status in the future. It 
ias been shown that with homogenous workers, with the only distinction being the age, 
, 
i. e., young workers are outsiders and older workers are insiders (who receive a wage above 
he reservation wage)), unemployment will be unequally distributed. Senior workers are 
)ften those most vigorously arguing against lower wages for youth (see Andersen and Vetter 
1995)). Non-myopic firms tend to hire more workers and the cyclical response is stronger 
luring booms than in the trough, (see Vetter and Andersen, 1991). 
A general criticism applicable to all the above studies and previous studies in labour 
ýconomics, is that a subgame perfect equilibrium with rationality in wage-bargaining is not 
-nodelled. In this thesis, we pursue the consequences of forward-looking and rational behav- 
our in the bargaining process. 
Thus, the goal of this thesis is to analyse the dynamics of the game between workers and 
irms within a game theoretic equilibrium framework, that is, in a strategic bargaining en- 
Aronment, utilising variables which depict the fact that forward-looking behaviour matters; 
; hese variables are notably those which reflect the future financial performance of the com- 
)any. It will be shown that these variables will be taken into account when bargaining. This 
vill provide us with novel and important insights in the game between insiders, outsiders 
tnd firms. This will deepen our understanding of pay settlements. Our model also benefits 
iom potentially possessing empirically testable predictions, many of which will potentially 
)e consistent with the stylised facts noted above. 
Next I turn to the role of insider-distinction in transforming the traditional trade union 
nodels, and the theoretical implications which ensues5. 
'5The point of reviewing IMIs in trade union models, is to show how pervasive IOT has become. 
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2.3. INCORPORATION OF THE INSIDER-OUTSIDER 
DISTINCTION INTO TRADE UNION MODELS 
AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 
IOT is in fact, a comprehensive development of the union threat model of the EWT, which 
is a special case of IOT. The informal reason for this is because IOT explains in detail why 
firms have to pay higher wages to hamper workers from disrupting production by engaging 
in strike activity and so forth. Thus, the IOT also explains how the trade unions derive 
their power. In acknowledgment of this, trade union models have now been modified to take 
account of this. The purpose now is to review how the 10 distinction has been incorporated 
into the conventional trade union models, and the theoretical implications that emerge from 
these modified models. 
Union Preferences 
Single Period Models 
There is no consensus among economists as to what should be included in the union max- 
imands. A widely held view is that the utility function should maximise variables such as 
employment and pay. This point will not be reviewed here. But I shall review how the 
trade union models have been redesigned to take account of the 10 distinction. Table 2.2 
summarises the studies that have taken this distinction into account. 
I assume homogeneity among insiders, in terms of chaxacteristics, human capital, earnings 
and all have an equal chance of being laid off. Since the literatures postulates that union 
cares about both employment and wages, the union's utility function can be expressed as 
U(w, n), Ul, U2 > 0. (1) 
where U= utility function, w= wage and n= employment. Most studies axe based on (1). 
Most studies modify (1), by assuming the utility function is of the expected utility form, 
utilitaxian form, or impose a specific functional form or models, for example, Stone-Geary, 
see Oswald (1985). 
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TABLE 2.2 
STUDIES WHERE THE 10 DISTINCTION IS 
INCORPORATED INTO TRADE UNION MODELS 
5tudy Modifying the Unions' UtUity Punctton 
Oswald Expected Utility, Utilitarian or the imposition of 
1985 a specific functional form, such as Stone-Geary 
Studies where union is more interested in securing employment for its members (insiders) 
A: Theoretical Studies 
Gottfries and Horn Expected utility of a representative 
1987 insider maximised 
Sampson Maximises the sum of the expected 
1988 utilities of members 
Black and Buckley Maximises only the welfare of its 
1989 members for low levels of demand 
McDonald Union which maximises exclusively the 
1989 utility of its employed members 
Holden Union is solely concerned about insiders and negotiate a wage which 
1990 sustains just the insiders at the expense of the outsiders. Moderate 
wages may be sought to avert lay-offs amongst insiders 
Creedy and McDonald Insiders maximise their utility (wages) subject to the constraint that all 
1991 
Huizinga and Schiantarelli 
insiders are in em loyment 
Utilitarian union 
Function; 
cares solely about maximising the 
1992 total utility of the insiders 
B: Empirical Studies 
ffr--un--eT1_o Annual panel Wage equations estimated Union solely concerned 
and of 157 Japanese for a sample of large with the utility 
Wadhwani manufacturing Japanese firms. Wage of insiders 
1989 firms and equations also estimated 
aggre ate UK f for varying firm sizes. 
data or Equation estimated by 
manufacturing; Generalised Method 
1977-1987 of Moments technique 
LýMM, henceforth) 
Nickell and Annual panel of 219 Firm level wage Both insider and outsider forces 
Wadhwani UK manufacturing equation estimated have an important influence in 
1990 firms, 1972-1982 by GMM wa e determination 
Blancliflower, British Workplace Wage equations 
m 
U ty function increasing in wage, 
Oswald Industrial Relations for unskilled, contingent on all employees being 
and Garrett Survey (henceforth, semiskilled and employed. Demonstration of both 
1990 WIRS2) on 2019 skilled workers insider and outsider factors having 
firms of 1984 estimated an impact on wages. Insiders 
Nickell UK annual data Unrestricted wage maximise wages subject to the 
and Kong for 14 two-digit equation estimated. F constraint that all the insiders are 
1992 industrial sectors, tests conducted for the in employment. Insider power has 
1961-1985 joint significance of an important impact on wages. 
insider variables. This importance is attributed to 
Interindustry variation both union power and the degree 
between union power and of monopoly in the product 
insider forces examined market. External factors as captured 
by the state of the aggregate labour 
market have an important 
influence on wages 
The utilitarian approach can be expressed as 
nu(w) + (m - n)u(b) 
where m= union membership and b is the alternative option. If the union is more interested 
in securing employment for its members (insiders), and shows no interest for outsiders, then 
(2) should be modified to 
mu (w) +u (b) -u (w)) max (0, m- n) (3) 
i. e., the union only cares about outsiders if m>n (where unemployed remain members). 
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A plethora of papers encompass this concept, including Gottfries and Horn (1987), Samp- 
son (1988), Black and Bulkley (1989), McDonald (1989), Brunello and Wadhwani (1989), 
Nickell and Wadhwani (1990), Holden (1990), Creedy and McDonald (1991), Blanchflower, 
Oswald and Garrett (1990), Nickell and Kong (1992) and Huizinga and Schiantarelli (1992). 
Studies have also shown the probability of employment being on the labour demand curve, 
(see for example, Gottfries and Horn (1987)). 
They assume the labour demand curve at t is expressed as 
nt = D(wt)Et (4) 
where D,, <0 and E is a random variable with a time invaxiant distribution G with zero 
mean and finite variance. Gottfries and Horn (1987) assume that first, wages are set prior to 
the revelation of the value of - (but with complete information of G); second, employment is 
set on the labour demand curve; third, employment is equal to the last period's employment. 
Then the probability of retention is 
min [ (D (wt) et» /nt - 1), 1] 
dG (e) (5) 
If outsiders' interests are taken into account to some extent, then this can be readily embodied 
into the above specifications, as in for example, Chapman and Fischer (1984), Nickell and 
Andrews (1983) and Jones and McKenna (1989). In the latter, employment of outsiders is 
considered beneficial, as the recruitment of outsiders will now boost membership, and these 
entrants may become insiders in the future. See Table 2.3. 
TABLE 2.3 
STUDIES ON THE PROBABILITY OF EMPLOYMENT ON THE LABOUR DEMAND CURVE AND 
OUTSIDERS ACCORDED SOME WEIGHT IN THE OVERALL UNION PREFERENCES 
B: Empirical Studies 
Study Data Source Testing Method Utility Function Encompassed 
Nickell and Annual UK data from various sources, Labour Union utility lunction in terms 
Andrews including National Income and demand of both employment and 
1983 Expenditure and Bank of England and real wages maximised of the Quarterly Bulletin and Economic wage insiders. Some weight, a is 
Trends Annual Supplement; equations provided to unemployed 
1951-1979 estimated outsiders and 0< ck <I 
Horn 1987 always retain their employment 
Studies Embodying Outsiders Interest to Some Extent, But Less Than That of Insiders Chapman and Outsiders are accorded some weight in 
Fischer 1984 the overall union preferences 
Jones and Unions provide some weight to employed 
Mckenna 1989 outsiders since they value future membership 
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In the Stone-Geary utility function, as in for example, Dertouzos and Pencavel (1981) 
(w - w*)O(n - n*)'-o (6) 
where w* and n* are interpreted 'reference' values of w and n respectively. If these are zero, 
then 0 shows the relative weight of wages to employment as in Dertouzos and Pencavel (1981). 
Studies that use this or other specific functional form, for example, CES, include Pencavel 
(1984a, 1984b, 1985,1989), Hersoug et al. (1986), Pencavel and Holmlund (1988), Lockwood 
and Manning (1993), Pehkonen (1990) and Doiron (1992). 
Such functional forms are tractable and amenable to econometric testing. Naturally, 
there is a positive correlation between 0 and insider strength. Low values of 0 indicates their 
interests in increasing employment. 
The Stone-Geary functional form has been extended as in Pencavel (1989) to 
(w - w*)O(n -01 - n*)'-O, 0< V) <1 
where 1= labour force and V) is indicative of the strength of insider forces (all variables are 
in logs). See Table 2.4. As in Pencavel (1989), a high value of '0 indicates outsiders' interests 
are taken into account and a low value of V) indicates the insiders' interests in securing higher 
wages at the expense of the recruitment of outsiders. 0 is interpreted as the coefficient of 
relative risk aversion. One must be sceptical of the interpretation accorded to 0. Some studies 
have shown that low values of 0 should be indicative of greater acceptance of vaxiability to 
employment for example, Pencavel (1989), Pehkonen (1990), Pencaval and Holmlund (1988). 
But in a bargaining approach, for instance, wages may be invariant to changes in product 
demand. See Table 2.5. 
Some studies have shown that insiders only care about deviations in employment from 
that of full membership (for example, Blanchard and Summers (1986), Manning (1988)). 
Then the specification may be expressed as 
-(n _ M)2 (8) 
It seems rather absurd to suggest that insiders wiH accept any wage, provided m=n. 
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TABLE 2.4 
STUDIES UTILISING THE STONE-GEARY OR CLOSELY RELATED UTILITY FUNCTIONAL FORM 
Study Data Source Testing Method Utilitv Function 
Vertouzos International T, ographical Union Jý i Structural parameters Evidence of the 
and ITU, hencefor 
Io 
i the Cincinnati V estimated by maximum Stone-Geary 
Pencavel ost data and ot er local unions likelihood utility function 
1981 data from Typographical Journal. 
Wa e data tor typographers from 
ITU Bulletin, linage data from April 
issues of Editor and Publisher. 
Published Bureau of Labour 
Statistics and Department of 
Commerce publications were 
other data sources; 1946-1965 
Pencavel ITU data on US newspaper The marýinal rate of Stone-Geary utility function, 
1984a industry of ten cities. Data on substitution of wages with the elasticity of 
the production processes also for emplo ment substitution between wages 
obtained for the estimateY and employment 
Cincinnati Post; 1946-1965 rangin6from zero to unity 
Pencavel US Annual observation of Reduced-form Stone- eary 
1984b variables includin& wages estimation of the utility 
and employment describing 
ITU and the news a er 
Stone-Geary utility 
function In addition 
function. 
The elasticit p p 
industry in ten cities. Data . , estimation of the 
y 
of 
from various publications of Marginal Rate of substitution 
the ITU and the newspaper Substitution equation is 0.5 
industry; 1946-1965 from an Addilog 
objective function 
Pencavel Swedish Quarterly Examining the Expected utility of a union 
1985 mining and difficulties of applying member is a combination of 
. manufacturing sector 
- 
these models at the the weighted average, of the 
data; 1968.1-1 982.4 macroeconomic level utility of the real wage 
by maximum likelihood received in employment and 
estimation the utility of real income 
received, employed at his 
outsi option ýe 
Pencavel UK annual data; Current and lagged wage tone S Geary 
1989 1953-1979 equations estimated by utility function 
instrumental variables. 
Structural parameters for 
real wages, employment 
and labour force 
estimated by nonlinear 
three-stage least squares 
Hersoug, Norwegian data from the Parameter estimates Union utility is a 
Kjaer mantificturing sector, obtained for alternative function of real 
and 
R d h 
from va. rious sources including 
N f 
expectations of import 
d 
wage and the 
o set orwegian wage rates rom the prices an unit employment 
1986 Norwegian Federation of wage costs rate and resembles 
Empl9yers and various data 
f lA 
estimated b R 
l h 
the CES 
rom Nationa ccounts maximum i ood e 
Pencavel Swedish data from Determinants of employment Stone-Geary 
and the mining and and hours of work equations utility function. The 
Holmlund manufacturing sector; from 1950-1983 estimated by elasticity of the 
1988 1950-1983 instrumental variable. Wages, demand for 
employment and hours of work employment with 
equation are estimated by OLS respect to the real 
and Non-Linear Least Squares. wages is -0.68 The structural parameters of 
these three equations are 
i db f ll i f i est mate y u n ormat on 
maximum likelihood 
Lockwood UK data from Reports of the Nonlinear Utility function is a 
and Commissions of the Inland Revenue, wage equations weighted average of 
Manning DHSS Social Security Statistics, estimated individual utilities 
1993 1986, British Labour Statistics over both wages and 
Historical Abstracts and Yearbooks, employment 
De. partment of Employment Gazette, 
British Labour Statistics Yearbook 
1969-1976, BLS Historical Abstract 
1948-1986 and other aggregate 
Pehkonen 
sources 
Annual Finnish data on Estimation of the first-order Stone-Geary utility function. 
1990 manufacturing and condition for rational union The long-run real wage 
mining sector drawn 
h 
behaviour based on 
S G f i lf 
elastici! y of employment is 
l 3 Th mainly from t e 
f h 
tone- eary unct ona orm 
d d f d 
ap x1mate y -0. 5. e pro i f0 dataset o t e an re uced orm wage an po int est mate o in 
Bank of Finland; employment equations also equation Vý ranged from 
1960-1987 estimated 0.02 and .1 Doiron Canadian data which Bargaining model between A CES utility 
1992 includes inputs, outputs, labour union and function with 
non-labour inputs, representatives from the 
hC l b W d 
employment and 
h ff l waKps and employment Britis o um ia oo 
d i d i i d 
t e di erentia 
b d in the woodproducts 
i h 
ro ucts n ustry, s est mate . P f th i 
etween wages an 
l i industry in Brit s arameters o e un on a ternat ve wages 
Columbia; 1963-1983 objective function and the as argument 
firm's technology are estimated 
Study Extending th e Stone-Geary Functional Form 
A Study Using Aggregate Data 
Pencavel UK annual data; Current and lagged wage Stone-Geary utility function 
1989 1953-1979 estimated by instrumental extended by incorporating 
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TABLE 2.4 
(CONTINUED) 
Study Data Som-e Testing Method Utility Function 
Study Extending the Stone-Geary I 
A Stud Using Aggregate 
variables. 
Ftructural 
parameters for real wages, 
employment and labour force 
estimated b non-linear 
three stage 
least 
squares 
7unctional Form 
Data 
and assessing the 
importance of the measure 
of the 10 considerations in 
the union functional form. 
Thepoint estimates did not 
provide a great deal of support 
for the 10 distinction. However, 
these results are imprecise 
TABLE 2.5 
STUDIES SHOWING A LOW LEVEL OF 0 INDICATIVE OF A GREATER 
ACCEPTANCE OF VARIABILITV OF EMPLOYMENT 
1989 
Pehkonen 
1990 
Pencavel 
and Holmlund 
1988 
uh annuai aata; 
1953-1979 
Annual Finnish 
data on 
manufacturing 
sector drawn from 
the dataset of the Bank of Finland; 
1960-1987 
Swedish data 
from the mining 
and the 
manufacturing 
sector; 
1950-1983 
uurrent anci laggea wage 
estimated by instrumental 
variables IV, henceforth). 
Structuraf parameters for 
real wages, employment 
and labour force estimated 
by non-linear three stage 
least squares 
Estimation of the first-order 
condition for rational union 
behaviour based on Stone- 
Geary functional form and 
reduced form wage and 
employment equations also 
estimated 
Determinants of hours of 
work from 1950-1983 and 
employment equations 
estimated by IV. Wages, 
employment and hours of 
work equations are 
estimated by OLS and Non- 
Linear Least Squares. The 
structural parameters of 
these three equations are 
estimated b full information 
maximum 
Relihood 
Lower vaiues ot u, suggests k 
greater acceptance 
of variability of employment 
vis-a-vis wages 
The point estimate of 0 varied from 0.02 to 0.11, but on average 
is not significantly the different from zero. Estimates of 0 from 
reduced form equation is 0.03 
and is statistically significant. These results sug&est a greater 
ýcceptance of flexibility 
in employment Unions relative aversion 
to fluctuations in 
employment are lower 
Studies Showing that Insiders Only Care About Deviations In 
A: Theoretical Studies 
Employment From That 6f Full Membership 
MUCIV Vata 6ource TestinLz Method Utilitv kunction /liesults 
1986 
bank and D. Grubb, employment, 
see Grubb, 1984; unemployment 
1953-1984 processes 
equation 
estimated for the UK, France, 
German 
the US 
y and 
Germany, Frince and the UK as 
opposed to the US, where it is 
considerably lower. Incumbent 
workers are solft concerned 
ýC about their emp oyment as 
opposed to the outsiders. Membership effects is attributed 
to be a major source of hyst resis, articularly during 
troug s wit out much reliance 
place on unions 
Studies Showing that the Union Maximises a Linear Combination 
of the Probability of Both Employment and the Wage 
B: Emi)irical St 
Blanchard L)hL; I) data w e, empioyment v V Y 
l 
kin account ol membershi 
id i 
lLl 
and bank 9b 1984 G 
an unemp oyment 
ti 
cons erat ons, union is s y 
d b f ll l Summers ru processes equa ons concerne a out u emp oyment 
1986 and various estimated f6r of all incumbent members, in 
other the UK, France, contrast to the unemployed. 
B: Empirical Studies 
of employment and t1fe real wage 
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TABLE 2.5 
(CONTINUED) 
B: Emr)irical St 
Otuay i-)ata aource iesting metnoa utinty runction /itesuits 
sources; Germany Incumbent workers maximises 
1953-1984 and the US their wages (utility A series of 
adverse aggregat 
Imand 
shocks stimulated more 
va 
unem loyment, which 
Fr vi ed the impetus for 
ur2er wage increases by the 
incumbents. These are 
maximised contingent upon all 
insiders being employed 
Other studies have shown that the union maximises a linear combination of the probability 
of both employment and wage, for example, notably Blanchard and Summers (1986), Burda 
(1990). It appears rather unrealistic to suggest that unions can bargain for a massive wage. 
All the studies considered so far have been single-period static models. The main draw- 
back of these studies is that in a non-stationary environment, agents (bargainers) will be 
forward-looking in their behaviour accordingly. 
This leads us to consider dynamic insider-outsider models. 
2.3.2. Dynamic Insider- Outsider Models 
The single period models are distinctive, but static, and cannot fully account for some of the 
characteristics of bargaining; first, bargaining models are of a long-term nature; second, it 
follow that decisions taken today will have repercussions for the future; third, it also follows, 
m and thus the number of insiders is not constant through time, but changes over time in 
accordance with n. Some studies have attempted to specify the utility function in a dynamic 
context. We consider these models now. 
When dynamics are introduced in the modelling of trade union behaviour in a dynamic 
context, studies have generally used one of the three models. The first approach assumes 
that the union has an infinite-time horizon, the second model assumes the union lives for 
finite multiperiods, mainly, two periods, and the third, assumes an overlapping generations 
model of the union. I will consider all these approaches in turn. 
In the infinitely lived union models, m adjusts completely over time to any changes 
between n and m. Insiders take into account the interests of the future members' and 
incorporate their utility in the union maximands (Kidd and Oswald, 1987). Thus, their 
model does not have the kink. Miaouli (1990) does attempt to embody this kink. Insiders in 
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this study also takes into account future members utility, but each period, the indifference 
curves are horizontal at the point n=m. Another modification is taking into consideration 
quits in their specification, see Huizinga and Schiantarelli (1992). 
Some studies show an intertemporal extension of (8), where the union is only interested 
in deviations of n from the level at which all insiders are employed, as found in Manning 
(1988), Lockwood and Philippopoulos (1994) and Miaouli (1990). But the objections raised 
with respect to (8) are applicable here as well. 
In the finite horizon models, two periods are commonly analysed, as in Gottfries and 
Horn (1987), Solow (1985) and Vetter and Andersen (1991,1994). The model is solved using 
backward induction, then the impact of first period n on second period wages, for example, 
can be examined. Solow (1985) shows that unions can also set the wage for both themselves 
and recruits. Entrants in the first period become insiders in the second period, with the 
same probability of retention in the second period as the insider in the first period. Turning 
to overlapping generations approach; Begg (1988) shows that unions set both their and the 
recruits' wage, and the union utility function ensures all insiders are employed, i. e., from 
second and final Year of employment. See Table 2.6. 
TABLE 2.6 
DYNAMIC INSIDER-OUTSIDER MODELS 
Study Utility Function 
Kidd and 
InjAnitely-lived masmauals 
The union takes into account the utility of the future members and 
Oswald incorporates this in the union maximands. Membership adjusts over time to any 
1987 differentials between employment and membership. Thus, the 10 kink is excluded 
Miaouli Embodies the 10 kink, analysing union behaviour in terms of wage and 
1990 employment in a dynamic context 
Studies which permit quits each period 
Huizinga and Union will maximise utility taking into consideration quits each period. The troughs 
Schiantarelli 
1992 
for large negative shocks are characterised by decline in employment, lay-offs 
and additional reductions on account of gradual attrition 
Lockwood and The unions in an intertemporal extension of (8) are solely 
Philippopoulos concerned about deviation from employment from the level 
1994 
Miaouli 
at which all insiders are employed 
The unions in an intertemporal extension of (8) solely 
1990 maximise employment 
Finite Horizon Models 
Gottfries and . 
Then the impact 
Horn examined. The 
1987 r is maximised 
Solow setting of two-period contracts by the 
1985 s in the second period with the same 
sider in the first perioa. Expected 
sed 
Vetter and Tw erio mo I is investigated using backward induction, then 
Andersen the in uence of e first period employment on second period 
1991,1994 wages is analyse 
Begg Unions set both their and the recruits wage and the union utility function ensures 
l d h i f d d fi l f l ll i id 1999 ers are emp oye ,t at s, rom secon an na year o emp oyment a ns 
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2.3.3. Heterogenous Insiders 
Next I consider studies that have introduced some heterogeneity amongst insiders. Two issues 
have been addressed. It has been commonly observed in the literature, mainly non insider- 
outsider literature, that intrafirm wage differentials exists on account of seniority. This fits 
with the empirical observation. This has been omitted in the 10 literature for various reasons, 
mainly because they are not generally used, as both low and high paid workers exert the same 
market power in the wage setting process. 
Several studies have considered the issue of insiders differing in terms of seniority. It 
has been commonly observed that wages are positively correlated to seniority. However, this 
has not been incorporated in the 10 studies, with the exception of Solow (1985) and Begg 
(1988). The reasons for the omission include tractability, but mainly because low and high 
paid workers are not in favour of a two-tier wage schedule, as found in Kaufman (1984), 
Heetderks and Martin (1991). Another possibility for heterogeneity amongst insiders is when 
lay-offs are on last-in, first-out basis (LIFO) or any other a priori determined and publicly 
known basis. 
In the 10 case, where lay-offs are made according to inverse seniority, and governed by 
majority voting, then as long as a substantial amount of insiders will not be laid off and if they 
are not risking promotion probabilities (see Brunello, (1990a)), insiders will only be interested 
in maximising wages, as shown in Oswald (1986a, 1986b, 1993), Weitzman (1987), Layard 
and Bean, (1989), Layaxd (1990), Beckerman and Jenkinson (1990), Blanchflower (1991) and 
Gottfries (1992). Inverse seniority rules are not always enforced, due to the uncertainty in 
the labour demand, see Farber (1986). Second, sometimes lay-offs rules may be overruled by 
other factors, such as skills (see, Turnbull, 1988). Third, plant or firm-specific considerations 
may naturally take precedence, such as closure of unprofitable plants, as demonstrated in 
Manning (1993). 
The implications of LIFO axe less clear cut, in a dynamic setting. In Drazen and Gottfries 
(1990), negative shocks causes some senior workers to be laid off. However, in Roberts 
(1989) multiple equilibria arise due to the possibility of successive voting driving the median 
voter out of his employment. Therefore, I turn next to the preferences of the firm and the 
bargaining structure. See Table 2.7 for a summary of the studies that have taken into account 
heterogenous workers. 
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TABLE 2.7 
HETEROGENOUS WORKERS 
Study Utility Function 
Studies showing waqes rise with seniority 
Solow 1985 Wages are positively correlated to seniorit l 
Begg 1988 Seniority enhances the wages of the incumi ent workers 
Studies showing why two tier wage schedules are not preferred 
Kaufman 1984 Low and high paid workers are not in favour of two-tier wage schedules 
Heetderks and Low and high paid workers do not consider the two 
Martin 1991 tier wage schedules advantageous 
B ll 
Studies showing union utility is not to maximise wages under majority voting 
C bi i f1 h i l d rune o om nat on o 0 considerations wit majority vot ng prec u es 
1990a workers from solely maximising wages due to promotional probabilities 
Studies showing where insiders are solely interested in maximising wages" 
Oswald 1986a, 1986b, 1993 Unions indifference curves are 
Weitzman 1987 horizontal at n= in/2. Under 
Layard and Bean 1989 marrity voting, the decisive voter 
L d 1990 i t ith di i it ayar s (e one w me an sen or y, 
Beckerman and who opts solely to maximise 
Jenkinson 1990 wages on account of his 
Blancliflower 1991 employment being secure 
Gottfries 1992 
Studies showing that inverse seniority rules may not always hold 
in aiding employees to solely ma. ýi. mise wages 
Farber Insiders are not solely interested in raising wages on account of inverse seniority rules 
1986 due to the uncertainty of the labour demand, particularly if the wage is set ex ante 
Turnbul11988 Factors such as skills may overrule layoffs on account of inverse seniority 
Manning The profitability of plants may take precedence prior to seniority 
1991 of the worker, in the closure of unlucrative plants 
Studies of the implications of LIFO in a dynamic context 
Drazen and There are only senior and j ior workers. Union set the 
Gottfries 1990 wage, but adverse labour 
deumnand 
1: ýs off senior workers 
Roberts The median voter refrains from sole yN bein& interested in raising wa es, since 
1989 there is a possibility of successive voting driving him out of his em. 
fOlyment 
The main criticism of the dynamic union models is that again, no account is taken of 
the fact that the bargaining agents are in a non-stationary environment, and thus the agents 
will be forward-looking in their behaviour and that recruitment and retention is a major 
bargaining concern. 
The main assumption with the studies on heterogenous workers, is that the union is unin- 
terested in employment beyond a certain point. To obtain a clearer idea of the implications of 
these models, we need to embody the preferences of the firm and thus model the bargaining 
structure. 
2.3.4. Bargaining Structure 
It is standard for wages to be determined by bargaining between firms and workers, due to 
problems arising from incentive incompatibility. Most bargaining models which are mentioned 
below use the Nash-bargaining solution. Three bargaining models have been extensively dis- 
cussed by economists in the literature, namely, the monopoly union model (MUM henceforth), 
the efficient bargain (EBM henceforth) and the right-to-manage model (RMM henceforth). 
The characteristics of these models are as follows: the monopoly union model, specifies 
that the wage is set unilaterally by the union and the firm then determines employment 
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unilaterally from the firm's profit-maximising labour demand function (see Dunlop (1944)). 
In the RMM, the union and firm bargain over wages, but the firm then sets employment 
unilaterally. In the EBM, both the firm and union bargain over both pay and employment. 
These models are popular in the literature, see for example, Leontief (1946), Fellner (1947). 
McDonald and Solow (1981), Oswald (1985), Manning (1987), Holmlund (1989), Ulph and 
Ulph (1990), Kaufman and Martinez-Vazquez (1990), Creedy and McDonald (1991) and 
Christofides and Oswald (1991). Most studies utilize the Nash solution. 
Max: (U - U*)"(7r - 7r*)'-" (9) 
where U* and 7r* = threat points of the union and the firm respectively and 0= the measure 
of the bargaining strength of the union. 
All three models are shown to be special cases of a general class of models in Manning 
(1987). However, there are a multitude of models that are in between his specifications. It 
follows that it may not be appropriate to asses whether the wage and employment outcomes 
are in accordance to one of the three bargaining models, that is, EB, MU or the RM model. 
Espinosa and Ree (1989) show that, where both the agents negotiate repeatedly over time, 
the typical wage-employment outcome will be between the monopoly union and efficient 
bargain cases, depending on the rate of time preference of the bargainers. See Table 2.8, 
which summaries the studies on bargaining structure. 
Most studies in the insider-outsider literature utilise one of the three bargaining models 
noted above. 
Theoretical predictions 
These models embody a wide variety of theoretical propositions and implications, some of 
which have been empirically tested extensively in the literature; the aim now is to categorize 
which implications axe model dependent, or robust to variations in specifications and mod- 
ifications such as union goals or the form of the bargaining. Since I do this below when I 
review theoretical propositions and implications of IOMs generally, I will not consider them 
here. 
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TABLE 2.8 
Dunlop 1944 
Leontief 1946 
McDonald and Solow 1981 
Oswald 1985 
Manning 1987 
Holmlund 1989 
Ulph and Ulph 1990 
Kaufman and Martinez- 
Vazquez 1990 
Creedy and McDonald 1991 
Christofides and Oswald 1991 
BARGAINING STRUCTURE 
mssing mumpte/pol 
mum 
mum 
MUM, EBM 
RMM, EBM, MUM 
MUM, RMM, EBM 
MUM, RMM, EBM 
EBM, RMM 
MUM, EBM 
RMM, EBM, MUM 
EBM 
Study which finds all three bargaining models 
as a special case of a general class of models Manning Utilising a Nash solution it is shown all three bargaining 
1987 models are a special case of a general model 
Study showing that in a repeated game, the typical wage-employment outcome 
is between the monopoly union and efficient bargain models 
Espinosa and Rhee In a dynamic context, the wage-employment outcome is between 
1989 the monopoly union and the efficient bargain formulation 
2.4. MORE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS OF 
INSIDER-OUTSIDER MODELS 
We review the additional and the more recent developments of IOMs. Relatively more at- 
tention will be focused on the most important developments. A large variety of theoretical 
implications and predictions emerge from these IOMs. My aim is to separate out groups of 
theoretical implications and predictions which are model-specific, from those that are more 
robust to variations in specifications and modifications. 
It is useful to consider first the implications and propositions about wage rigidity. Wage 
rigidity can arise in a variety of ways, including in EWT and implicit contract theory. 
I shall first consider the question of whether wages are rigid in IOMs. 
Shaked and Sutton (1984) applying the Rubinstein (1982) model, shows that firms domi- 
nate the baxgaining process, which precludes the existence of wage rigidity, flexibility upwards, 
employment adjustment or unemployment persistence, which arise on account of the insider 
power. Dominating the baxgaining process permits the firm to be in an asymmetric position 
in relation to the worker. This in turn permits the firm to broaden its range of alternatives 
available to the firm in the baxgaining. The firm does this by structuring the bargaining 
process, in a way which is most advantageous to the firm, including increasing the baxgaining 
period slightly. 
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There are four criticisms to note here. First, my main source of concern is that there exists 
an asymmetry between the bargaining position of the firm and the insider. If an agreement 
has not been reached within a certain time T, it permits the firm to substitute the insider as 
a bargaining partner to the outsider. It is this asymmetry between the bargaining positions 
of the firm and insider which sustains the Shaked and Sutton model. This seems a very 
one-sided affair. In practice, no such asymmetry between the bargaining positions of the firm 
and worker exists. Put -it another way, casual observation suggests this asymmetry does not 
prevail, as clearly insiders can bargain with other firms at any time. What they have omitted 
to show, more importantly, why insiders do not do this. (I will not consider this in detail 
here, but my theoretical analysis chapter will). 
Second, the model assumes that they assume turnover costs are embodied in the fixed 
number of times the firm and the insider are supposed to bargain with each other. Thus, this 
substitutability between the bargains with an insider and outsider depends on the length of 
this time period. In reality, turnover costs are a monetary costs as opposed to a temporal 
constraint on bargaining. In addition, switching partners incurs a monetary cost (see Manzini 
and Snower, 2002). Third, as in Rubinstein (1982), bargaining occurs prior to production, 
and if the agent disagrees, they earn nothing. Thus, in Shaked and Sutton's model, this 
implies that when workers disagree, they will engage in a strike. Hence, it is inappropriate, 
and indeed attracts strong criticism, to apply the Rubinstein model straightforwardly. 
There is a considerable body of evidence, for example, Fernandez and Glazer, 1991, Hal- 
ter and Holden, 1991, Holden, 1994, which suggests that to model wage-bargaining which 
corresponds to that of the real world, it is necessary to incorporate the long-term nature of 
the firm-worker relationship; thus, the main objective of the bargainers will be to agree on 
the division of the flow of profits. If I incorporate this into the bargaining between a firm 
and insider, it is the bargain over the division of the flow of per period payoffs, i. e., wages 
and profits retained by the firm, per period. Fourth, although, Shaked and Sutton recognise 
and indeed, assume that replacing workers involves time and expense, this recognition or as- 
3umption is not realised in their model. In addition, they also do not provide an explanation 
Ets to what criterion is used to reject the insider's offer and vice versa, or what criterion leads 
ýo an agreement between the firm and the outsider. 
Caxruth and Oswald (1987), Black and Buckley (1989) and Huizinga and Schiantarelli 
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(1988) address the issue of wage rigidity using the efficient baxgain model. Holden (1990) 
compares the monopoly union bargaining framework with the right-to-manage framework. 
All three studies assume that the utility function is utilitarian and the union's indifference 
curve is downward sloping in w-n space until where n=m. 
Carruth and Oswald (1987), using wage simulations, demonstrate that as the product 
price (p) increases, wage (w) is rigid and n increases, until n=m. Further increases in p 
are translated into higher wages and depriving outsiders of employment, i. e., n is fixed. The 
increments in wages continue until a certain point and w becomes rigid again and n>m. 
Thus, wage rigidity occurs when n :ým. In Huizinga and Schiantarelli (1988), however, w 
increases in all three stages, i. e., n<m, n=m, n>m, but it is most pronounced when 
n=m. The contrasting results in both these studies arise mainly due to the use of different 
functional forms used for the firm's production technology. 
Black and Buckley (1989) show both w and n are rigid over a range of p, when n=m. 
Union utility is maximised subject to the firm's total profit constraint. The main assumption 
is that if members are unemployed, the employed members redistribute their wages to the 
unemployed members, until the marginal utilities of both types of workers utilities are the 
same. A similar result, is found in Miaouli (1990), where the union sets nominal w, to retain 
employment at all periods in the future. A similar result emerges in Fitzenberger and Ranz 
(1999). In the context of aspects of an IOM, they show that the employment performance is 
better when unions give precedence to employment, compared to wages, and show a long-run 
orientation to wages. This result implies that for employment to take precedence over wages 
in the union objectives, wages have to be rigid at some phase to sustain the precedence of 
employment, as in for example, Black and Buckley (1989) and Miaouli (1990). With these 
union objectives, w must be rigid, in certain phases, to ensure n is at least equal to m. 
Jones and McKenna (1989) find when n>m, the union may give more weight to current 
employed outsiders, if it values future membership. It is not abundantly clear, though why 
it is interested in future membership. Holden (1990), applying the Manning (1987) model 
to compare the monopoly union model, where, 0, the measure of bargaining strength = 1, 
Etnd the right-to-manage model where 0, the measure of baxgaining strength, is < 1, shows 
Lhat, for various values of 0, both bargaining models yield the same outcome. Their results 
ýesemble Carruth and Oswald (1987). 
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Thus, wage rigidity is prevalent in some circumstances only, but not in others. The 
incorporation of seniority considerations does not strengthen the weak rigidity results. If 
there is a trend decline in the foreign price of the union's output only, then Grossman (1984) 
shows in a monopoly union model, governed by majority rule, the long-run wage will be 
rigid only in special cases, for example, if the firm's production function is Cobb-Douglas. 
When the union utility function comprises of the real wage solely as an argument, then 
Oswald (1993), demonstrates that in an efficient bargaining framework, with no uncertainty, 
the wage is rigid only under special cases, for example, if the firm's production technology 
is constant elasticity. If there is ex ante uncertainty about the price of the output, Oswald 
(1986b) reports that wage rigidity is present, conditional on a special relation, occurring 
between the firm's relative risk aversion, the elasticity of labour demand and labour's share 
of the revenue, specifically, = (1 - a)e, where, -; = firm's relative risk aversion, a= labour's 
share of revenue, and -= elasticity of demand. These three results imply wage rigidity 
is rather a lottery. Thus, the conclusion is that wage rigidity is not a general and robust 
implication of IOMs. 
The issue of nominal wage rigidity has been investigated by Gottfries (1992) in an IOM 
model. He finds from his numerical experiments that the gain from indexation is less than 
M per cent of wage, i. e., it is small. This implies that nominal wage rigidity may be present 
in IOMs. But it must be noted, as is common in the literature, this relies on the specific 
functional form used. Since evidence from most OECD countries is that job creation and 
destruction arise in conjunction with each other in all stages of business cycles' uncertainty 
3hould be incorporated into his model. Laseen (2003) does just this: i. e., he analyses the 
4uestion of wage rigidity, incorporating firm-specific uncertainty6. He finds the gain from 
ýndexation is notable, specifically, the inclusion of uncertainty, to the Gottfries (1992), model 
ncreased the gain from 0 to 1.5 per cent of the wage. His result appears more plausible, in 
Aew of the fact, that, for example, most studies show that, most unemployment experiences, 
see Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1997). See Table 2.9 for , an be explained by uncertainty, 
L summary of the most recent developments of IOMs. 
Next, I turn to the more important question of asymmetric adjustment of wages as in, 
60n the point about uncertainty being omitted from Gottfries's (1992) model, Leslie (1992) demonstrates 
hat IOT's treatment of uncertainty is unsystematic and would therefore benefit from an integration with 
mplicit contract theory. 
40 
TABLE 2.9 
MORE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS OF INSIDER-OUTSIDER. MODELS 
Studies on the Presence of Wage Rigidity in Insider-Outsider Models 
ubinstein m 
Sutton 
1984 
Carruth A utilitarian utility 
and function; ag regate Oswald sum of meMers utility 1987 levels maximised 
Huizinga and EBM Schiantarelli 
1988 
Black and EBM union ob tive is maximised ý c Buckley contingent to t e firm's total profit 1989 constraint. If members are 
unemployed, employed members 
redistribute their wages until the 
mar inal utilit ot types of T 
wo ers are the same. Holden Compares the MUM with RMM 1990 utilising the Manning 1987 
technique 
Miaouli MUM 
1990 
Fitzenberger Aspects of IOM integrated with 
and theoretical consideration with Franz respect to an optimal degree of 1999 centralisation of wage-bargaining 
Jones and Incorporates the 10 distinction into the 
McKenna static MUM and finds this 1989 unsatisfactory. Hence, revives the MUM Grossman MUM 
1984 
Oswald Union utility function with the real 1993 wage solely as an argument, in an EBM 
Oswald 
1986b 
Gottfries Insiders maximise their waees 1992 contingent on employment of 
all insiders. Wage of the 
outsiders is suppressed Laseen Impact of firm-Specific shocks 
2003 incorporated into state 
contingent wage 
contracts model 
rirm. structures the bargaining process, to be most 
advantageous to the firm. There exists an unrealistic 
asymmetry between the bargaining position of the firm 
and the insider. If agreement has not been reached 
within a certain time T, the firm substitutes the insider 
as a bargaining partner for the outsider 
As product prices (p) rises, wages (w) rise 
simultaneously, until n= in. Further rises ing, are 
translated into higher wages, deprivii _ Ers of emp! oyment, i. e., n is fixed. The increments in wages 
continue until a certain point and w becomes ri id- again 
and n> in. Thus, wage rigidity occurs when n in 
w increases in all three stages, i. e., n< in, but it is 
most pronounced when n= in 
Both w and n are rigid over 
a range of p when n=m 
Their results of the two models are identical for a 
varietr of values of 0 and resembles the Carruth and 
L( Oswa d 1986b outcome Wages are set to retain employment of insiders at all 
times in the future. If unemployed outsiders' interests are 
taken into consideration I then employment converges towards its stead state level of full employment Employment perlo; mance is better, when unions give 
precedence. to employment vis-a-vis wages and show a 
long-run orientation of wages. Implying 
unemployment to take precedence over yages, wages have to be rigid at some phase to sustain 
employment, so that n is at least equal to in When n>m, the union accords more weight to 
current employed outsiders and if it 
values future membershi With the union governehy majority voting, the long-run wage will be rigid only in special cases, for example, if the firm's production is Cobb-Douglas In the absence of uncertainty the wage is rigid 
only, 
sunder 
special cases, for example, if the f lrm production technology is constant elasticity. If there is ex ante uncertainty about the price of output, 
wage rigidity is present contingent on a'special 
relationshi ) occurring, 6etween the firm s relative risk 
aversion, ilge elasticity of labour demand and labour's 
share of the revenue Gains from indexation are less than 0.1 per cent of wage. This is reliant on the specific functional -form utilised. Since jo 
ib 
creation and destruction occurs simultaneously, 
uncerta nt should be incorporated in his model The gain 
irro"m 
indexation increased enormously from 0 to 1: 5 per cent of the wage. Small cost of indexation is insufficient to support an equilibrium 
with a rigid nominal wage 
for example, LS (1988c, chapter 9). This refers to wages exhibiting downwaxd rigidity and 
upwaxd flexibility in IOMs. In the strong versions of IOMs, insiders will want higher wages 
provided there axe no layoffs; showing no interest in expanding employment. McDonald 
(1989) shows wages are asymmetric. A similax result is demonstrated by Begg (1988), in a 
dynamic overlapping generations model. All these studies use the monopoly union bargaining 
Framework; LS (1988c) demonstrates the presence of asymmetries in a right-to-manage model. 
Ruizinga and Shiantarelli (1992) show asymmetries emerge using an efficient bargain model. 
rhe use of the seniority system may strengthen this result. For example, Turnbull (1988) 
, hows that in the presence of increase in demand, insiders want this translated into higher 
wages, but when demand falls, unions governed by majority and seniority rules ensure that 
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ýhe impact of the reduction in demand is absorbed by contraction in employment. with 
wages remaining rigid. This result is confirmed by Prachowny (1987), McDonald (1989) and 
Kauftnan and Martinez-Vazquez (1990). See Table 2.10. 
TABLE 2.10 
STUDIES ON ASYMMETRIC ADJUSTMENT OF 
WAGES IN INSIDER-OUTSIDER MODELS 
Study Bargaining Structure/Utility Function Results/Main Criticisms 
LS RMM Wages adjust asymmetrically, contingent 
on an optimal upper bound on wages 
McDonald MUM, EBM, MUM Wages adjust asymmetrically. 
and Wa s are flexible upwards but 
Solow 
y 
rigi downwards unless the firm 
1981 retaining its viability is in jeopardy 
Begg 1988 MUM Asymmetric wage adjustments 
Huizinga EBM Wage adjustments are 
and asymmetric 
Schiantarelli 
1992 
Turnbull Union governed by seniority rule More potent asymmetric adjustment of wages. More 
1988 upwardly flexible, for example, when demand is 
favourable and more contraction of employment 
during adverse demand 
Prachowny RTM with union governed Asymmetric adjustment of wages. Favourable shocks to 
1987 by seniority rule productivity, for example, are translated into higher wages 
and the impact of the reduction in demand is absorbed 
by contraction in employment with wages rigid 
McDonald MUM with plant Asymmetric adjustment of wages; flexible upward during 
1989 specific unions peaks and rigid downwards during troughs 
Kaufman MUM, EBM and All three models exhibited 
and median voter model asymmetric behaviour post demand 
Martinez- shocks. This is explicitly propounded 
Vas e 
199ou 
, in the median voter model 
However, this result is not entirely general and may not hold under various scenarios, 
namely: the presence of negotiations over wages; when wages set are determined by bargaining 
over wages, limit price, by aggressive underbidding by outsiders, differences in productivity 
and training costs between insiders and outsiders, as shown in Layard (1990), McDonald 
(1991b), Vetter and Andersen (1994), Gottfries and Sjostrom (2000) respectively. A simple 
demonstration of the first point is in Layard (1990), who notes that, in the absence of large 
shocks, it is advantageous for the median voter to seek the highest feasible wage, irrespective 
: )f the state of the product demand. The firm, on the other hand, will want to pay the lowest 
wage possible. The common method of resolving this incentive incompatibility is through 
baxgaining, where the relative strength of the bargainers will be taken into account, amongst 
Aher related factors, to determine the actual wage. Thus, it is wrong to assume that unions 
ovill increase wages in a boom and accept layoffs in a trough; instead, they will be attempting 
-o maximise the wage each period. McDonald (1991b), using a monopoly union model, 
lemonstrates that it is the limit price (i. e., if goods axe priced in excess of this price level 
oreign competitors will absorb all the firm's sales) which determines the wages set. Thus, it 
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s wrong to consider that in the presence of adverse unfavourable shock, wages will rise and 
Ace versa, as in LS (1988c) for example. Instead they will fall, if the limit price dictates this. 
. ndeed 
it will fall, since adverse shocks imply prices will be lower, and hence the wages. 
Vetter and Andersen (1994) show using a two-period model, that it is outsiders who set 
; he limit on the wages insiders demand, and insiders are also constrained from restricting 
. mployment opportunities to outsiders. This is because the higher the wages set, the more 
iggressively outsiders will underbid current insiders to gain insider status, since the loss to 
in outsider if permanently an outsider, is immense, rendering their incentive to underbid 
, nsiders very strong. As a consequence, it becomes very difficult for insiders to protect their 
, mployment. This result is reinforced by Andersen and Vetter (1995), where it is shown 
, hat the outsiders do not want to underbid, as they are hampered by their expectations of 
)ecoming insiders in the future. Thus the last two results show that insiders' wages and 
)reservation of their employment are kept in check by outsiders. This, makes it incorrect 
;o consider that insiders boost wages in a boom and accept reductions in employment in a 
; rough. Gottfries and Sjostrom (2000) show that it is differences in productivity and training 
, osts between insiders and outsiders that determine the insider and outsider wages. Hence, 
; he unions do not increase wages in an upturn and accept layoffs in a downturn; wages are 
ietermined by both the agents productivity differentials. 
The occurrence of asymmetric wage adjustment in IOMs is sensitive to the assumptions 
Lbout the form of the bargain, the unions' power to negotiate wages, union goals, outsiders' 
)ower to influence wages, and the productivity and training cost differentials between insiders 
Lnd outsiders. See Table 2.11 summarising the irrelevance of the asymmetric adjustment in 
0 Models. 
A related question is of employment adjustment and unemployment persistence. Are 
hocks to employment persistent in IOMs? A simplified version of the monopoly union 
aodel would indicate they are. Fundamentally, the argument is as follows: assume the union 
ets wages so that En = Em, where E is the expectations operator, which is equal to the 
ast period's employment level. The value of shocks is only revealed after the wage is set. 
"hen an adverse unfavourable shock will contract employment now, and thus membership 
ext period. The new reduced membership will disregard some of the existing members next 
eriod, and demand higher wages at their colleagues' expense. In the absence of additional 
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TABLE 2.11 
STUDIES ON THE IRRELEVANCE OF THE ASYXI. XIETRIC 
ADJUSTMENT IN INSIDER-OUTSIDER MODELS 
Study Bargaining Structure/Utility Function Results 
Layard KI M with layotls by seniority Ihere is no asymmetric adjustment of wages. 
1990 Workers will demand the highest feasible wage 
with the firm's objectives as the constraint McDonald 
1991b 
MUM Limit-pricing and increasing returns to scale 
' 
Vetter Two period IOM with 
nature of producer s technology dictates the wages set 
Outsiders constrain the high wage demands of the 
and turnover costs insiders and also their restriction of employment Andersen opportunities to outsiders, since higher wages spurs 1994 outsiders to underbid more vehemently Andersen IOM with seniority rule and In the presence of youth unemployment on account of 
and continuous entry and exit to seniority rule, young outsiders do not want to underbid, Vetter the labour market because of their expectations of becoming insiders in the 
1995 future 
Gottfries IOM Wage differentials between insiders and outsiders are 
and attributed to productivity and training costs differentials Slostrom 
2000 
hocks, employment will stay at the new level and unemployment persistence will ensue. 
Aore comprehensive versions of this account are in Blanchard and Summers (1986,1987), 
xottfries and Horn (1987), McDonald (1989), and Burda (1990). Blanchard and Summers, 
ýnd Burda, use a multiperiod model, to show that employment follows a random walk with 
)ositive or negative drift, conditional on the size of the variety of parameters used. Gottfries 
. nd Horn demonstrate, using a two-period monopoly union model, that low employment in 
he current period leads to higher wages in the following period. Persistence is also prevalent 
a the dynamic seniority model of Drazen and Gottfries (1990), depending on the assumptions 
,f the form of the seniority system. See Table 2.12, which summarises studies on employment 
, djustment and unemployment persistence. 
TABLE 2.12 
STUDIES ON EMPLOYMENT ADJUSTMENT 
AND UNEMPLOYMENT PERSISTENCE 
StudZ Data Source Testing Method Results 
A: h; mpiricaJ Study 
Blanchard and Summers OECD data Wage, employment and Employment follows a random 
1986 and Grubb employment processes equations walk with a positive or negative 
1984; estimated for the UK, France, drift conditional on the size or 
1953-1984 Germany and the US the variety of parameters used 
B: Theoretical Study 
Blanchard and Summers Multi : Results as above 
1987 
Burda 1990 Multi: Results as above 
Gottfries and Two-period, Low employment in the current period leads 
Horn 1987 mum to higher wages in the following period 
McDonald MUM in the Union precludes the increase in employment by averting the entry of 
1989 context of new firms. Asymmetric wage adjustments, whereby, following an 
single and adverse shock, wages remain unchanged and employment contracts, 
multi periods which leads to employment persistence, due to the wage setting 
behaviour of the incumbent workers. 
Drazen and Dynamic Unemployment persistence prevalent depending 
Gottfries 1990 seniority model on the assumption of the form of the seniority rule 
The criticisms of these results are as follows: first, even the use of the monopoly union 
. odel, 
does not necessarily show that higher membership is tantamount to lower wage de- 
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iands, if the union's indifference curve in w-n space, is downward sloping until n=m, 
, nd horizontal after this point. The utilitarian union is interested in achieving higher wages, 
, roviding all its members are employed, as shown in Blanchflower et al. (1990). Indeed, 
ýominal wages will only be set in such a manner, so that all members are employed at all 
imes in the future, as observed by Miaouli (1990). 
Second, after a shock, and the prevalence of persistency, there may be multiple equilibria; 
vith a high employment equilibrium initially and then a low equilibrium after that, in which 
he system remains stuck. McCausland (1998) shows that after an adverse technological 
hock, the system moves from a high to a low equilibrium, due to the cubic cost and profit 
unctions, and the system remains stuck in this state. 
Third, persistence may not neccesarily hold, if the union must negotiate over the wage with 
he firm. The implication of the Layard (1990) argument is that employment returns to its 
aitial level following a one-period shock, since the union's utility does not alter in accordance 
vith employment changes, (see McDonald, 1991a). If one assumed that bargaining power 
hanges with employment, then there could be serial correlation in employment changes. If 
his was the case, then this could give rise to negative serial correlation. 
V- 
. Fourth, persistency may not arise 
if the wages set are determined by limit price. The 
/IcDonald (1991b) argument implies that employment increases after a favourable shock, but 
L will not remain stuck at that level, since employment does not move with the aggregate 
[emand, but it moves with aggregate demand as in the conventional Keynesian relation. 
Fifth, persistency may not be prevalent if the wage set is not sufficiently high to induce 
utsiders to underbid. The Vetter and Andersen (1994) argument implies that employment 
iill return to its original level after a one-period shock, since insiders will not set their wage 
ufficiently high to induce outsiders to bid for their post, i. e., employment does not change 
rith wages, but it moves with the wage-setting behaviour of the insiders, which in turns 
ffects the outsiders' behaviour. 
Sixth, persistency may not occur, if the wage determined is a reflection of productivity 
ifferentials between insiders and entrants. The Gottfries and Sjostrom (2000) argument 
nplies that employment will return to its initial level after a one-period shock, since pro- 
uctivity and training differentials between the insider and the entrant win not change, when 
mployment changes. 
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It is useful to note some additional points. First, shocks can be present, but in a fun- 
amentally asymmetric fashion; see for example, Kidd and Oswald (1987), Lockwood and 
lanning (1987) and Huizinga and Schiantarelli (1992). The first two studies show this util- 
; ing the intertemporal monopoly union model within a partial equilibrium framework and 
ssumes exogenous reservation level of utility Huizinga and Schiantarelli utilise the efficient 
, argain model within a general equilibrium framework, endogenising the level of utility- All 
hree studies find that employment falls instantaneously in troughs, but in Huizinga et al. 
his is attained through quits as well; but only gradually adjusts to its status quo in booms. 
ýecond, while shocks to employment may be persistent, the magnitude of the initial effect is 
maller than it would have been in a competitive market, see Ball (1990). Studies critiquing 
he employment adjustment and unemployment persistence outcome are summarised in Table 
. 13. 
TABLE 2.13 
STUDIES CRITIQUING THE EMPLOYMENT ADJUSTMENT 
AND UNEMPLOYMENT PERSISTENCE OUTCOME 
tudv Result 
Blancliflower, 
Oswald 
Even in the MUM, it is not unequivocally true that higher membership is 
tantamount to lower wage demands if the union's indifference curve is 
and Garrett w-ri, space is downward sloping until where 
1990 n= in and horizontal after this point 
Miaouli Nominal wage will only be set in such a manner, so that all members are 
1990 employed at all times in the future 
McCausland After an adverse technological shock, the system moves from a high equilibrium to a low, 
1998 due to the cubic cost and profit functions, and the system remains stuck in this state 
Lavard Employment returns to its initial level following a one-period shock, since 
' 1990 the unions utility does not alter in accordance with employment changes 
McDonald Employment increases after a favourable shock, will remain stuck at that level, since 
1991b employment does not move with the aggregate demand, but it moves with aggregate demand 
in the conventional Keynesian relation 
Vetter Employment will return to its original level after a one-period shock, 
and since insiders will not set their wages sufficiently 
Andersen high to induce outsiders to bid for the post 
1994 
Gottfries Employment will return to its initial level after a one-period shock, 
and since productivity and training differentials between the insider 
S'OStrom 6 and the entrant will not change when employment changes 
2 00 
Kidd In an intertemporal MUM within a partial equilibrium framework and 
and exogenous reservation level of utility, shocks can be persistent 
Oswald but in a fundamentally asymmetric fashion 
1987 
Lockwood As above 
and 
Manning 
1987 
Huizinga In an EBM within a general equilibrium framework , endogenising the 
level 
and of utility and with exogenous quit rate each period, employment falls 
Schiantarelli drastically in troughs and the adjustment is gradual to its status quo 
1992 during booms 
Ball The initial effect of shocks to employment is smaller than it 
1990 would be in a competitive market 
However, the overall argument about employment persistency is not completely general 
not robust, and may degenerate if a non-myopic firm hoards labour to counteract the 
N 
I 
mer of the insider, as in Vetter and Andersen (1994). In addition, the arguments in Layard 
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1990), McDonald (1991b), Gottfries ad Sjostrom (2000), all suggest that the employment 
)ersistency argument breaks down after a shock. Thus, persistence arising in IOMs is rather 
ensitive to assumptions about the form of the model, i. e., it is rather model-specific. 
A general implication of IOMs is that wages axe a convex combination of insider and 
)utsider factors. The most simple exposition of this point is in Blanchflower et al. (1990): 
Lssume wages are determined using the right-to-manage framework. If the union is risk- 
ieu tral and is indifferent to employment, then utility is U=w. Then the negotiated wage is 
L solution to the following Nash bargaining problem. 
max,,: (w - b)"(7r - 7r 
T-0 
7rn = 
The foc is: 
0)7rw 
= 
7r - 7r * 
tearrangement of this equation yields 
b+ 
: imilar results are found in Carruth and Oswald (1989a) and Beckerman and Jenkinson 
1990). In the latter case, the union is also interested in employment. 
More general wage equations are found in Nickell and Kong (1992), Nickell and Wadhwani 
1990), Holmlund and Zetterberg (1991), Brunello and Wadhwani (1989) and Dolado and 
lentolila (1993). See Table 2.14 which summaxises studies on wage equations. 
A general criticism of all the studies reviewed is that bargaining over severance pay is 
TABLE 2.14 
STUDIES ON WAGE EQUATIONS 
nuay tiesuit 
ffFan-ZHIlower, Oswald and Wages are a convex combination of insider and outsider forces 
Garrett 1990 
Carruth and Oswald 1989a As above 
Beckerman and Jenkinson Union is interested in wage and employment 
1990 
Nickell and Kong 1992 More general wage equation incorporates the state of the ag regate labour market 
%ckell and Wadhwani 1990 General wage equation, which includes external factors and 
fagged 
dependent variable 
Flolmlund and Zetterberg Wage equations which include capturing the degree of centralisation 
1991 
3runello and Wadhwani Wage equations which include wage aspirations and nominal inertia. 
1989 
)olado and Wage equations incorporating permanent membership, labour productivity, the 
3entolila ratio of temporary to total employment in the firm and lagged dependent variable 
ý993 
-- H 
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A explicitly modelled. This is important, as it is turnover costs that sustain the IOT and 
. verance pay is the most important source of turnover costs. 
An important general implication of Blanchflower, Oswald and Garrett (1990) is that 
ae of the main internal factors is the firm's performance. Some of the internal factors are 
)nsidered in, for example, Nickell and Wadhwani (1990), Dolado and Bentolila (1993). The 
3. rlier studies have not taken into account the future performance of the firm influencing 
, age setting, since the environment is of a non-stationary nature and empirical observation 
. iggests the 
bargainers are forward- looking. Coles and Wright (1998) find this is the case, 
sing a monetary model. It is this factor, i. e., the future performance of the firm, that the 
. 1esis 
is devoted to analysing empirically in chapter 3 and theoretically in chapter 5, pursuing 
. ie consequences of 
forward-looking and rational behaviour in the bargaining process. 
All the above authors unfortunately omit to take this into account, including Dolado and 
ýentolila (1993), Nickell and Wadhwani (1990), and Blanchflower, Oswald and Garrett (1990). 
'hey consider steady-state analysis of a firm's future financial performance; that bargaining 
etween agents are in non-stationary environments. Therefore, agents' behaviour must be 
)rward-looking, so it is important to take into account the future financial performance of 
ae firm. Studies in the past have made no attempts to accord explicit prominence to factors 
iat affect the future performance of the firm. Prior to undertaking that I summarise the 
terature on the empirical tests on the 10 models in the next section. 
2.5. EMPIRICAL TESTS OF INSIDER-OUTSIDER 
MODELS: LITERATURE REVIEW 
'he theoretical review discussion has shown that there are abundant theoretical results and 
ropositions in the IOT, and many of these have been extensively tested empirically. Five 
Liestions have been given particular attention, paxticulaxly the last question below. 
(1) Are unions/incumbent workers mainly interested in increasing wages? 
(2) Do shocks generate unemployment persistence, and if so, why? 
(3) Are wage adjustments asymmetric (i. e., rigid downwaxds and upwards flexible)? 
(4) Do wages depend on 'insider-outsider' factors, such as a firm's level of productivity 
id profits? 
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(5) Does unemployment have a negative impact on wage settlements? 
There are a wide variety of answers to these questions, and I review the main results 
-low. Indeed, one source of variation is the degree of aggregation used in the studies; tests 
ive been conducted using economy-wide, industry-wide, firm-level or individual level data. 
: )r each question, the answers found by different authors are discussed in accordance to 
le decreasing levels of aggregation. My aim is to assess how these results match with the 
leoretical results. Generally, the aim is to evaluate if the implications and predictions (posed 
; questions above, since they have received empirical attention), are empirically robust to 
langes in approach in the use of datasets, specifications, in the style of methodology and 
le like, and other modifications. 
. 5.1. Are Unions/Incumbent Workers Mainly Interested in Increasing Wages? 
here are a great deal of problems estimating the parameters of a union utility function, to 
, sess if the unions are mainly interested in seeking higher wages. This leads one to question 
le validity of the use of aggregate data in examining this issue. The common problems of 
rgregation suggests that any attempt at seeking the answer to this question, would require 
itally implausible assumptions, so much so that to do so would negate the effort expended 
seeking an answer to this question. 
However, Hersoug, Kjaer and Rodseth (1986), Pencavel (1985,1989) and Pehkonen (1990) 
nbody estimates. Yamane (1998) provides evidence using Japanese data. Hersoug, Kjaer 
id Rodseth use Norwegian data and an union utility function closely resembling the CES. 
lie estimates of the parameter lack precision. Pencavel (1989) uses an extension of the 
, one Geary utility function using aggregate UK 
data. He finds estimates of the paxameter 
flecting 10 considerations are close to 1, which implies outsiders axe fully accounted for in 
.e utility 
function, which implies that the unemployment rate is embodied in their union 
, ility function. He also 
finds the estimates of the coefficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA) 
zero, suggesting they are highly risk-averse to changes in real wages. Pencavel (1985) and 
ýhkonen (1990) examine the manufacturing sector in Sweden and Finland respectively. In 
, ncavel, the estimate of CRRA is 0.35, Pehkonen finds the usual estimate of the several 
estimates is considerably lower. The latter estimates the paxameter of a monopoly union 
Ael, and find that workers are risk-averse to wage changes. The restrictions with regard to 
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ie use of monopoly union model are invalidated by the data. Yamane (1998) using aggregate 
apanese data, finds, that unions have a strong preference for employment stability. See Table 
. 15. 
TABLE 2.15 
STUDIES ON WHETHER UNIONS/INCUMBENT WORKERS 
ARE MAINLY INTERESTED IN INCREASING WAGES 
Hersoug, 
Kjaer 
and 
Rodseth 
1986 
Pencavel 
1989 
Pencavel 
1985 
Pehkonen 
1990 
Yamane 
1998 
Carruth 
and Oswald 
1985 
Doiron 
1995 
Pencavel 
1984a 
1984b 
Svetar 
8 198 
Doiron 
1992 
Yamane 
1998 
aruates using Ag! 
Norwegian data from the 
manuf9cturing sector, 
obtained from various 
sources, including ývage 
rates from Norwegian 
Federation of Employees 
and various data from National 
Accounts; 1962-1978,1980 
UK annual data; 
1953-1979 
Swedish quarterly 
mining and manufacturing 
sector data- 
1968.1-198 .4 
Annual Finnish data 
on manufacturing 
and mining; 1960'-1987 
Quarterly data on the number 
of non- agricultural employees from the management and Coordination Ageng from 
1 their Labour Force urvey: 
Japan; 1983-1992 
UK mining industry; 
1950-1980 
British Columbian data on 
the International 
Woodworkers of America 
and the wood products 
industry; 1964-1984 
of the Tokyo Osaka and 
Nagoya Stock Exchanges from 
Japan Development Bank 
Corporate Finance Databank 
Wage and 
employment 
equations 
estimated 
Studies Using Firm Level Data 
International Stone-Geary union 
T hi al union; djolrag ic preferences d ti t t 1 
- 
PýLýame er es ma e 
ili between 12 large US firms 
1950s and late 1670s' 
union ut ty 
arameters estimated 
British Columbian data on the estimated by maximum 
firms from the International likelihood methods for a 
Woodworkers of four-equation system for 
America; 1963-1983 different va! ues of the firms bargaining strength 
ith li t t d IOM 1147 firms listed of which 775 s es e w mode 
are manufacturing and 372 respect to the impact of 
are non manufacturiný firms, union behaviour on the 
on the first and se_cond sections variability of employment 
Estimates of the 
parameters 
Iack precision 
CRRA to change in employment 
approximately equal to 0. 
Outsiders are fully accounted for in 
the utility function, which implies 
unemployment rate is embodied 
in their utility function 
Estimates of CRRA = 0.35 
to changes in employment. 
Restrictions with regard to the 
MUM are invalidated 
by the data 
Evidence of Stone-Geary utility function. The long-run real wage 
elasticiýy of employment is 
aptroximately -0.35. Workers are 
ris -averse to wage changes 
Unions have a strong 
preference for 
employment 
stability 
Unions are risk 
averse and CRRA 
estimated to be 0.8-1.2 
IOM is consistently rejected and 
some positive weight is given to all 
levels of employment. The weight 
the union piaces on employment 
is negatively related 
to the level of employment 
No general estimate due 
to considerable 
variation in them Estimates particularly for the risk 
aversion parameter lack precision 
The estimate of the importance 
attached to employment and wages 
in the CES utility function fluctuated 
in accordance to the approach 
used Consistent confirmation 
of the union preferences 
for employment. Their 
preferences for 
employment is 
stronger than that 
of the US unions 
Carruth and Oswald (1985) use industry data for the UK to estimate parameters. Doiron 
. 
995) also uses industry-level data to examine union preferences generally. Carruth and 
swald (1985) find unions are risk-averse and CRRA is estimated to be 0.8 - 1.2. Doiron 
. 
995), using data on the International Woodworkers of America and the wood products 
we Levet vara 
Parameters of 
the union utility 
function 
resembling the 
CES 
estimated 
Equation (7) 
estimated 
Current and lagged wa 
equation estimated by 
and structural parameters for real wages, employment 
and labour force estimated 
Wb three stage least squares 
stimation of the first order 
condition for rational union behaviour based on 
Stone-Geary functional form 
and reduced form wage and 
employment equations are 
also estimated Variations in 
employment 
estimated 
Studies Using Industry Data 
Estimates 
union 
parameters 
a 
U 
I 
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industry in British Columbia, Canada, finds that the IOM is consistently rejected in support 
of models in which some positive weight is given to all levels of employment. However, she 
also finds that the weight the union places on employment is negatively related to the level 
of employment. This result appears rather contradictory. Her last finding is in favour of the 
IOMS. 
Studies using firm-level data to estimate union utility parameters include Pencavel (1984a, 
1984b), Svcjncr (1986) and Doiron (1992). Yamane (1998) also uses firm-level data, and 
examines union preferences generally. Pencavel examines the International Typographical 
Union; using a Stone-Geary utility function, he was unable to find a general estimate, as the 
estimates varied considerably. Using data on twelve large U. S. firms, Svcjner estimates both 
the CRRA and the measure of the workers' bargaining strength. His estimates lack precision 
and in some cases this may be due to the small data set and simplifying assumptions he uses, 
and exogenising variables, which are explicitly endogenous. He also ignores the possibility, 
indicated by Manning (1987), that the bargaining strength of the union over wages is not the 
same as its bargaining strength over employment. 
Doiron (1992) also estimates the measure of the bargaining strength of the workers, using 
a maximum likelihood method for a four-equation system, for different values of the firm's 
bargaining strength. The estimates of the importance attached to employment and wages 
in the CES union utility function fluctuated in accordance to the approach used, i. e., they 
were sensitive to the approach used. Consistent confirmation of the union preferences for 
employment in Japanese firms is demonstrated in Yamane (1998), where he finds that their 
preferences for employment are stronger than US unions. 
Overall, from the small (four) precise results we have, the evidence is naturally inconclu- 
sive. But there is support for unions to be interested in employment. As we saw and noted, 
we do not have sufficient results to say this affirmatively. With regard to most of the studies, 
we saw it was problematic to provide useful interpretation of union power. One must note 
two additional points in this regard. The problems of using aggregate data suggest, that the 
results produced from using it will be highly implausible or lack any precision in most cases, 
particularly for the UK, where bargaining is conducted in a relatively decentralised manner. 
Second, these results are often dependent on using the monopoly union model. This implies 
that the union indifference curve, in w-n space, is tangental to the labour demand curve. 
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However, if agents baxgain over wages, then the union indifference curve is not generally tan- 
gental to the labour demand curve, but flatter. Thus, the use of the monopoly union model 
biases estimates, providing the distorted view that workers are more interested in employ- 
ment (Oswald, 1989). (See Table 2.16. ) In fact, using survey evidence, Clark and Oswald 
(1993) find that the union leaders prefer a5 per cent wage increase, as opposed to increase 
in employment, (see Table 2.17). However, Japanese unions have a stronger preference for 
employment stability than U. S. unions, as found in Yamane (1998); which implies that they 
are more interested in employment than wages. Doiron (1995) shows that the utility derived 
from wage increases is higher if there is a corresponding increase in employment in Cana- 
dian wood industry unions, although the weight the union places on increased employment 
declines with the level of employment. This then implies that the unions would rather opt 
for a5 per cent increase in wages than an equivalent increase in employment, which conforms 
with Clark and Oswald's (1993) findings. 
TABLE 2.16 
STUDY CRITIQUING THE MONOPOLY UNION MODEL 
btudý Results 
Uswald MUM distorts the estimates of the union utilit-y-Fut-nction-by providing th 
1989 view that workers are more interested in employment 
TABLE 2.17 
STUDY ON UNIONS STRONGLY PREFERRING WAGES 
Study Data Source Testing Method Results 
Clark and Survey of UK Trade Union Estimation of Unions would prefer to opt for a 5% 
Oswald leaders' perceptions about union increase in wages than an 
1993 their own union's preferences preferences equivalent increase in employment 
2.5.2. Do Shocks Generate Unemployment Persistence? 
Studies examining unemployment persistence, using aggregate data, include Blanchard and 
Summers (1986), Alogoskoufis and Manning (1987,1988), Brunello (1990b), Mulvey (1997) 
and Yamane (1998). Fundamentally, these tests entail examining non-stationarity or a unit 
root in the unemployment series. Blanchard and Summers demonstrate that the presence 
of unemployment persistence is more prevalent in the UK, France and West Germany as 
opposed to the U. S.. But Alogoskoufis and Manning (1987a) report that these results are 
sensitive to the specifications of the model. When they incorporated a squared-time trend, 
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11 four countries, including Japan, exhibit almost the same degree of persistence. Despite 
Itempting to explain the reason for this persistence in their estimates of coefficients they 
vere unable to obtain a general result (Alogoskoufis and Manning, 1988a). Ball (1990), finds 
hat there is no correlation between the estimates of coefficients for persistence and the level 
)f unionisation amongst European countries. 
Brunello (1990b) conducted some formal unit root tests, using Dickey Fuller statistics, to 
ind evidence and support for the null hypothesis that unemployment in both the UK and 
lapan exhibits unit root. Yamane (1998) confirms the invalidity of insider power being the 
, ause of persistence in unemployment in Japanese data. However, Lever and van Werkhooven 
1996) find no evidence of the influence of insider power causing unemployment persistence 
n the 68 three-digit industries in Dutch manufacturing. Mulvey (1997) using UK data for 
)oth motor vehicle and electrical engineering industries for the period from 1952 - 1985, also 
inds no support for the impact of insider power on the persistence of unemployment in these 
ndustries. Graafland and Lever (1996), estimating a wage equation following Nickell and 
Yadhwani (1990), cast doubts on the influence of insiders being the reason for unemployment 
)ersistence, in 18 sectors in the Dutch market sector for the period from 1967 to 1990. They 
ound the estimates for the influence of the change in sectoral employment on sectoral wage 
letermination are insignificant and of the wrong sign, which they interpret as insider effect 
inlikely to have an effect on unemployment persistence. 
Risager (1992) demonstrates that neither the current nor the lagged unemployment, or 
he change in current or the lagged rate of unemployment, have an impact on real wages, 
)y testing the hypothesis that the wage is a negative function of past employment. He also 
inds that the coefficient of the lagged employment, is positive for skilled men, whereas the 
vage equation for unskilled men has a stable and highly significant negative coefficient on the 
9, gged employment variable, implying that insider power causes persistence in unemployment. 
ýamane (1998) finds in Japanese firm data that there is no evidence in support of the fact 
hat insider power causes unemployment persistence . 
See Table 2.18 for a summary of the 
tudies examining whether shocks generate unemployment persistence. 
There axe two criticisms to note here with respect to studies using unit root tests based 
n Dickey-Fuller tests. The first criticism is that studies based on time-series analyses of 
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TABLE 2.18 
STUDIES ON WHETHER SHOCKS GENERATE UNEMPLOYMENT PERSISTENCE 
Study Data Source 1esting MethoU Results 
Blanchard 
5tudzes 
OECD databank 
Usi Aggregate Levei Data Wage, 
employment and Unemployment 
and and Grubb 1984 unemployment processes persistence is more 
Summers and various equations estimated for the prevalent in the UK, 
1986 other sources; UK, France, Germany and France and West 
(henceforth 1953-1984 the US. Fundamentally, the Germany as opposed 
BS, 1986) tests sought non-stationary to the US 
or a unit root in the 
unemployment series 
Alogoskoufis Annual unemployment data from Incorporated a square time The results of BS 
and France, Germany, UK, US and trend to the B&S 1986 are sensitive 
Manning Japan and various other 1986 to the specifications 
1987 sources, including OECD, IMF, 
International Financial 
Statistics; 1951-1986 
Alogoskoufis Unemployment data on 
and countries including France, 
Manning Germany, US Japan and other ý 1988a European an Scandinavian 
countries; 1952-1985 
Ball From G. Bertola 
1990 
Brunello OECD Economic Outlook 
1990b no. 44 December 1988. 
OECD Historical Statistics 
Yamane Quarterley data on the number 
1998 of non-agricultural employees 
from the Management and 
Coordination Ageng: from 
their Labour Force urvey: 
Japan; 1983-1992 
Studies 
Lever Panel of annual 
and observations for 68 Dutch 
van manufacturing industries; 
Werkhooven 1974-1986 
1996 
Mulvey UK data on the electrical 
1997 engineering and motor 
vehicles and various other 
data, including OECD Main 
Economic Indicators; 1952-1985 
Graafland 18 sectors in the 
and Dutch market; 
Lever 1967-1990 
1996 
Estimated to obtain 
a reason for the 
unemployment 
persistence 
coefficients 
Persistence of 
unemployment and 
variance of the innovation 
of the unemployment 
equation estimated 
Conducts formal unit root 
tests usin Aufmented 
Dickey-Fuiler ests 
Variation in 
employment 
tested 
Us%g Industry Level Data 
age 
equations 
estimated by 
GMM 
Loý of waT 
estimated y 
two stage 
least squares 
Wage equation 
estimated by 
GMM 
Studies 
Yamane 1147 firms of which 775 are 
1998 manufacturing and 372 are 
nonmanufacturing firms listed 
on the first and second 
sections of the Tok o, Osaka ý 
h xc and Nagoya Stock anges 
from Japan Development 
Bank Corporate Finance 
Databank; 1978-1992 
Risager Danish data on firms in 
1992 the manufacturing and 
construction sectors 
affiliated to the Danish 
Employers Federation; 
1951-1987 
Using Firm Level Data 
IOM is tested 
with respect to 
the impact of 
union behaviour 
on the variability 
of employment 
Wage equations 
estimated to 
examine if 
wage is a function of past 
emplo6ment. Estimation 
is by eneralised 
Instrument Variable 
Estimation method 
of the model. 
Unsuccessful in 
attaining a general 
result for the reason 
the unemployment 
persistence coefficients 
No correlation between 
the estimates of 
persistence coefficients 
and the level of 
unionisation 
Evidence for the null hypothesis 
that unemployment in both the 
UK and Japan exhibits unit root 
Evidence of the 
invalidity of insider 
power being the 
cause of persistence 
in unemployment 
No evidence of the 
influence of insider 
power causing 
unemployment 
persistence 
No support of the 
impact of insider 
power on the 
persistence of 
unemployment 
Doubts the influence 
of insiders, being the 
reason for unemployment 
persistence 
The coefficient of the 
impact of union variable 
is negligible and 
statistically insignificant. 
No evidence in support 
of IOM and the 
persistence of shocks 
to unemployment 
in Japan 
The current nor the lagged 
unemployment rate has an impact 
on wages. The coefficient of the 
lagged employment is positive 
for skilled men. Whilst, the wage 
equation for the unskilled has a 
stable and highly significant 
negative coefficient on the lagged 
employment variable, implying 
that insider power causes 
persistence in unemployment 
unemployment persistence data do not explicitly identify the reasons underlying the persis- 
tence in the model, as the. studies have made cleax, with the exception of Yamane (1998). 
A second criticism is that Brunello's (1990b) study based on Dickey-Fuller tests may not 
be valid when the time-series under investigation is affected by a structural break (Perron, 
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1989). 
Overall, the evidence is not in favour of persistence of unemployment shocks arising from 
the influence of insider factors. Also, when there are problems interpreting some of the 
results, because of tests being based on a unit root in unemployment, it makes deciphering 
which of the labour market explanations accounts for unemployment persistence difficult. 
2.5.3. Are Wage Adjustments Asymmetric? 
Evidence on this question is rather scant, however, a few studies have demonstrated some 
indications of the presence of asymmetric wage adjustments. Andersen and Hylleberg (1993), 
and Jansson (1995), for example, find that shocks have an impact on wages (see Table 2.19). 
Andersen and Hylleberg (1993) use the quarterly data from the Danish manufacturing sector 
for the period from 1974.1 - 1991.4, to estimate a bivariate error-correction model (Johansen 
and Engle-Granger two-step procedures) of wage and employment formation, to show that 
both unanticipated and anticipated shocks have an impact on wages; but the impact of 
unanticipated shocks has more impact on employment than on wages. 
Jansson (1995) using quarterly data from Swedish private manufacturing sector for the 
period from 1965.1 - 1991.4, and the same testing strategy, confirm the significant influence 
of both unanticipated and anticipated shocks on wages; only unanticipated shocks have an 
impact on employment. One must note that the demerit of using aggregate level data for 
these types of studies, is that there is a chance that some information may be lost in the 
aggregation. In addition, the results obtained from these tests, in common with other studies, 
are immensely reliant on the chosen strategy. 
For the U. S., Bell and Freeman (1985) find that wages are strongly correlated to value 
productivity per worker, particularly for industries with higher-than-average value produc- 
tivity per worker than for industries with lower than average. This could be interpreted as 
wages exhibiting more flexibility upwards and more rigidity downwards. 
Nickell and Wadhwani (1990) (NW henceforth) using data on 219 UK manufacturing 
firms, for the period from 1972 - 82, also find some evidence of wage rigidity downwards. 
Johansen (1996) using Norwegian data on 117 industries for the period from 1966 - 87, 
corroborates with NW (1990). That is, he provides evidence in support of asymmetric wage 
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adjustments, since wages are more responsive to insider effects in peaks and in expanding 
industries, as opposed to troughs and declining industries. Grosfeld and Nivet (1999), using 
data on 173 large Polish manufacturing firms for a period of seven years, find that wages 
adjust asymmetrically to productivity changes. Brunello and Wadhwani (1989) using data 
on 157 manufacturing firms for the period from 1977 - 87 and utilising four different types 
of dummy variables, find that the asymmetric behaviour of wages are mixed, as they seem 
to be dependent to a large extent on the dummy variables used. With Japanese firm-level 
data, they found that in two cases wages appeared to be more responsive to insider effects 
in a boom and in two cases in a trough. In UK firms wages were more responsive to insider 
effects in troughs in three of the four cases examined. 
Blanchflower (1991) using data on 5,300 employees in the UK from the British Social At- 
titude Survey for the period from 1983 - 86 and 1989, estimating individual wage equations, 
finds that wages adjust asymmetrically. Specifically, in firms which expected expansion in 
employment, wages also increased by 8 percent, but wages did not fall notably when em- 
ployment was expected to contract, i. e., wages were more rigid in the presence of negative 
demand shocks. In another study for the US, Holzer and Montgomery (1993), using a sur- 
vey of 3,400 firms for the period from 1980 - 82 to estimate wage and employment-growth 
equations, find wages are very inflexible compared to employment. They also found that the 
wages were rigid downwards in both non-unionised firms and unionised firms, but both types 
of firms exhibited more upward flexibility. In addition, they also found wages adjust highly 
asymmetrically to sales growth, i. e., invariably wages increased when sales rose, but when 
sales fell, wages did not fall. See Table 2.19 for a summary of the studies in asymmetric wage 
adjustments. Blanchflower, Oswald and Garrett (1990) using the Workplace Industrial Rela- 
tions Survey of 1984 (WIRS II), also find limited evidence that a contraction in employment 
leads to an increase in wages in the future. Christofides and Oswald (1988), using Canadian 
contract data, found no support for this wage flexibility effect in response to contraction in 
employment. 
Briefly, the issue of whether wages are more variable upwards than downwards, either 
as a reward for contracting employment or for other factors, has not been resolved by the 
empirical 
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TABLE 2.19 
STUDIES ON ASYMMETRIC WAGE ADJUSTMENTS 
Study Data Source Testing Method- Results 
Studies Using Vregate Level Data 
Andersen 
and 
Quarterley data 
fi th 
I Studies sing me Series Data 
Estimation of a Bivariate Both anticipated and unanticipated 
Hylleberg 
om e 
manufacturing sector; 
wage-employment 
error-correction model 
shocks have an impact on wages. 
Only unanticipated shocks have 1993 drawn from Danmarks (Johansen and Engle- an impact on employment Statistik; Denmark; Granger two steps 
Jansson 
1974.1-1991.4 
Qýiarterley data from 
procedures) 
Estimation of a bivariate wage Both anticipated and unanticipated 1995 private manufacturing -employment error correction shocks have an effect on wages. 
sector: Sweden; model (Johansen and Engle But only unanticipated shocks have 1965.1-1991.4 -Granger two-step procedures) an impact on employment 
Studies Using Industry Level Data 
Bell 
and 
US data on 53 
industries- 1970- 
Wage productivity 
equations re-estimated; 
Wages are strongly associated to value 
productivity per worker in the US Freeman 1982,1PO-1980 the sample firms divided , particularly in industries with higher 1985 into two groups than average value productivity per (productivity growth) of worker as opposed to industrie's with 
above and below below average of the same. Wages are 
Johansen Norwegian data 
average growth 
Wage equations 
more flexible upwards than downwards 
Wages adjust asymmetrically. Wages 1996 on 117 
industries; 
estimated by the 
one-step robust 
are more responsive to insider effects 
in peaks and in expanding industries 1966-1987 GMM as opposed to troughs and declining 
industries 
Studies Using Firm Level Data 
Nickell Annual panel of A dummy variable DT Evidence of asymmetric adjustment 
and UK 219 used (-1, when expected of wages. Wages are more rigid Wadhwani manufacturing sales changes below other downwards than upwards 1990 firms; trend, it is equal to zero 
1972-1982 otherwise). This interacted 
with the insider variables 
of the firm-level wage 
equation 
Grosfeld 173 large Polish Wage equations Wages adjust asymmetrically 
and manufacturing firms. estimated to productivity changes Nivet Most of the data was 
1999 drawn for the 
state-owned firms 
Zarzfromadzanie until 
1991 and thereafter 
from Zycie 
Go oda c sp r ze; 
1988-1994 
Brunello Annual panel of Four different kinds Asymmetric behaviour of wages are 
and 157 Japanese of dummies utilised, mixed, as they seem to be dependent Wadhwani 
1989 
manufacturing firms 
d t UK 
which were 
i d i h h 
on the dummy variables used to a 
an afgrega e nteracte w t t e large extent. With Japanese firm-level 
C C data or insider effects, to data, they found that in two cases, 
manufacturing; evaluate the extent wages are more responsive to insider 
1977-1987 to which these eff6cts during peaks, in the other two 
responses are cases, the reverse is true. In the UK 
asymmetric firms wages were, more responsive 
to insider effects in troughs in the 
three of the four cases examined Holzer US survey data from Reduced form wage Wages adjust highly asymmetrically 
and the Employers and employment in response to sales growth; (wages 
Montgomery Opportunity Pilot equations are more flexible upward than 
1993 Project, on 3400 US estimated downward. Wages are considerably 
firms on 28 labour less variable than employment 
markets; 1980,1982 
Studies Using Employee Level Data 
Blancliflower UK survey data Estimated individual Evidence of asymmetric wage 
1991 from the British annual wage a4justments. Specifically, in firms 
Social Attitudes equations which expected expansion in 
Survey of 5300 employment, wages also increased by 8 
employees; 
1989 1986 1993 
per cent, but wages did not fall notably 
h l t d , - w en emp oymen was expecte to (which includes contract, that is wages are more rigid in 
Northern Ireland the presence of negative demand shocks. 
data) No evidence of the upward wage 
flexibility effect in the future, in 
response to contraction in employment 
Studies Using Firm Level Cross Section Data 
Blancliflower, WIRS2 of 1984 Lo t' forguafithinic wage equa ions 
Limited evidence of a contraction 
Oswald and on 2019 nskilled, semi-skilled in employment leads to an increase Garrett, 1990 establishments and skilled workers estimated in wages, in the future 
evidence. Overall, the evidence for employment persistence is very thin and inconclusive. 
It is unclear if anything can be inferred from these results. As the theoretical review made 
clear, other labour market models can also lead to symmetric wage adjustment (i. e., wage 
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rigidity) and no persistence in employment shocks, which is applicable to some of the results 
based on unit root tests for persistence in unemployment. But with regards to persistence in 
unemployment shocks, the overall evidence is in favour of insider power not being the cause 
of persistence in unemployment as noted. 
2.5.4. Do Wages Depend on 'Insider' Factors, such as a Firm's Level of 
Productivity and Profits? 
Possibly the most robust implication of IOMs, is that wages should be determined, at least 
partly, by insider factors; that is, factors specific to the firM7 , which arises from the firm's own 
financial performance (or industry, when the level of disaggregation is at this level). Some 
studies have used aggregate level data to examine if this is the case, including; Dreze and 
Bean (1990), Carruth and Oswald (1987,1989a), Christofides and Oswald (1992), Rowlatt 
(1987), Carruth and Schnabel (1993), Prachowny (1987), and Holden (1989). See Table 2.20. 
Dreze and Bean (1990), using data for ten countries including Austria, Belgium and the UK, 
and utilising a macroeconomic framework, find that productivity gains are highly correlated 
to wages. Carruth and Oswald (1987,1989a) and Rowlatt (1987) using UK data estimate 
the quarterly average of the Department of Employment monthly survey based series of 
manufacturing earnings. Rowlatt finds that profits have an impact on wages. Christofides and 
Oswald (1992) demonstrate that the real wage is an increasing function of past profitability 
in the industry. 
Carruth and Oswald (1989a) find the elasticity of wages with respect to profits per- 
employee is approximately 0.05. Carruth and Schnabel (1993) using German data for contract 
wages, also find that in the long-run contract wages are associated with productivity (with 
unit elasticity). Prachowny (1987), estimates a conventional Phillips curve, with an aggregate 
measure of Tobin's q included as an additional variable, as a proxy for economic rent. The 
coefficient of q was positive and significant. He inferred this to be evidence for the importance 
of insider factors. In addition, he also regaxded the results to imply the importance of 
seniority systems in layoffs. The deficiency of his result is that insider factors are important 
7 This implies, of course, to rent sharing factors that are specific and internal to the firm which incumbent 
workers, irrespective of their union affliation can capture. To confirm as noted at the outset of the chapter, 
insiders here and throughout the thesis refers to both union and non-union members in the spirit of Lindbeck 
and Snower (1988c) in contrast to Sanfey (1995), where insiders are considered to be union members only. 
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in non-unionised settings, where seniority rules are less likely to be important. In addition, 
Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) find the concept of the Phillips Curve inherently incorrect. 
However, Holden (1989) finds that the ratio of gross product to wages has no effect on wage 
drift in the manufacturing sector in Norway (wage drift is one of the main ways of determining 
wages in Norway). 
TABLE 2.20 
DO'INSIDER FACTORS'HAVE AN IMPACT ON WAGES? 
Studies Using Aggregate Level Data 
Study Data Source Testing Method Results 
Dreze Ag regate data 1 Wage equations which In Europe 
and on 0 countries; 1960-1985 provide the elasticity of the productivity %ains are 
Bean real product wages with swiftly transferred 
1990 respect to average labour into wages 
productivity are estimated 
Carruth Annual data from the manufacturing Real product wage rate Aggregate profits 
and sector drawn mainly from Layard and and consumption earnings have a direct 
Oswald Nickell (1986) for a variety of variables, 
l 
for manufacturin b impact on 
b h i 1987 including rea product wage and 
ti i 1954 1983 
industries in the K 
ti t db IV 
ot equat ons 
consump on earn ngs; - es ma e y Carruth Annual data mainly sourced from Real product Elasticity of wages 
and Layard and Nickell (1986). Profit waýe equation with respect to 
Oswald data from the Appropriations estimated by IV profits per 
1989a Account of Industrial and employee of 
Commercial companies; 1956-1983 a roximately 0.05 p 
Rowlatt Quarterly average of the Department Manufacturing Lapged profitability 
1987 of Employment monthly survey based 
data of the UK manufacturingý 
earnings equations 
estimated 
has a significant 
impact on wages 
sector's earnings; 1960s'-1980s 
Christofides Labour Canada drawn from Real wage Real wage is an 
and contracts agreed in the equations increasin ý function of past h d fi b Oswald private noncontrolled estimated by GLS i Ity ustry. il in t e in pro ta Th l i i f 1992 sector between 68 unions and IV-GLS based ee ast c ty o wages 
across a wide range of on 595 contracts with respect to 
industries; 1978.1-1984.4 
d 
is 0.006 f ro fiht sl 
Carruth German data for contract wages Equation estimate Wa e g n t e ong-run 
and 
Schnabel 
from various sources including 
Monthl Report of tlie Deutche 
. t1lising cointegration b 
techuniques, namely, 
German nominal wages 
are influenced by 
1993 Bundes ank; 1965-1989 Engle and Granger rices and productivity 
two-step procedure 
ýb 
h with unit elasticity) ot 
h d ifi Prachowny Annual US data from the h 
Rate of increase of 
i l 
cant e positive ýn siýn 
bl 1987 Appendix B of t e Economic wage nom na d i 
varia e envisa ed a 3 
i 
f 
h Report of the President, to exam ne estimate emonstrat on o t e 
on non agricultural the Phillips curve importance of insider 
industries; 1957-1983 with an aggregate factors. He considers this to 
measure of Tobin's be a reflection of the 
'q' incorporated to relevance of seniority rules 
represent economic in layoffs. But insider 
rent factors are also important 
in largely non-union settings 
where layoffs by seniority 
are lessprevalent 
Holden Annual Norwegian data Nominal wage The ratio of gross product 
1989 on the manufacturing increases in to wa es has no impact on 5 
sector; 1963-1986 percenta e equation g wage rift in the 
estimate manufacturing sector in Norway 
Studies using data disaggregated by industry are more popular than aggregate studies. 
Naturally it is more appropriate when investigating the influence of insider factors on wage 
determination. Coe (1990), Holmlund and Zetterberg (1991) and Pi§sarides and Moghadam 
(1990) are multi-country studies: Coe studies 14 OECD countries and 196 industries, Holm- 
lund and Zetterberg investigate Sweden, Norway, Finland, Germany and the U. S., and Pis- 
sarides and Moghadam (1990) examine Sweden, Finland, U. K. and U. S.. Carruth, Oswald 
and Findlay (1986), Nickell and Kong (1992) and Beckerman and Jenkinson (1990) analyse 
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U. K. industries. Freeman (1986), Pugel (1980), and Bell and Freeman (1985) investigate 
U. S. industries. Lever and van Werkhooven (1996) and Graafland and Lever (1996) analyse 
the Dutch industries, whereas Holden (1989) and Johansen (1996,1999) study Norwegian 
industries, the latter, 117 of these. See Table 2.21. The general conclusions are as follows. 
First, both insider and outsider factors matter in wage formation. It is interesting to note 
that Holmlund and Zetterberg (1991) find that sectoral productivity changes, and also price 
changes have the most impact on wages in the US economy; they conclude that rent-sharing 
is a distinctive aspect of wage determination. Pugel (1980) shows that profits axe a significant 
determinant of wages, but the significance declines sharply when an index for schooling is 
incorporated in the specification. 
Profits are also significant in the UK data set examined by Beckerman and Jenkinson 
(1990), they estimated the long-run elasticity of wages to profit per worker to be 0.044. Long- 
run profits are the main long-run determinant of Norwegian industries data set analysed by 
Johansen (1996) from the period 1966 - 1987. He finds the full sample estimate indicates 
a long-run insider weight of approximately 0.2. Johansen (1999) also confirms that there is 
a significant permanent relation between industry profitability and industry wages from the 
period 1962 - 1991. The estimated long-run weight is in excess of 0.2 and stable both over 
time and across countries. It should be noted that in both the Johansens' studies, no control 
for the skill mix was included, thereby rendering the insider influences on wage-setting to be 
overstated. This criticism may be applicable to other studies as well. 
Graafland and Lever (1996) also find that value added price and output per worker are a 
significant determinant of wages in the 18 sectors in Holland; with the relative weight for such 
internal factors being 0.14. Holden (1989) finds that the ratio of the gross product to wages 
has only a small positive effect on wage drift. Nickell and Kong (1992) and Lever and van 
Werkhooven (1996) find that the degree of monopoly in the product market is an important 
determinant of wages. The former finds this in the 25 years of annual data for 14 two-digit 
industries they analysed, and the latter finds product market power has a significantly positive 
influence on the wage rate in the 68 industries they analysed: with the internal factor weight 
of 0.12. Holmlund and Zetterberg (1991) and Nickell and Kong (1992) find some limited 
evidence that their estimate of a general 'insider' coefficient, A is positively correlated across 
industries with union power. However, evidence in Sanfey (1995a) demonstrates the reverse 
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conclusion for the US: he finds wages appear to be less influenced by insider effects in heavily 
unionised industries. 
As with the results for industry data, firm or individual data appear to contradict both 
classical competitive models of wage determination and pure IOMs; both insider and outsider 
TABLE 2.21 
DO 'INSIDER FACTORS' HAVE AN IMPACT ON WAGES? 
Studies Using Industry Level Data 
Study Data Source Testing MethoJ Results 
Coe OECD sectoral base data on Urowth ot real product Insilcler factors matter in wage 
1990 14 OECD countries and 196 wage equations estimated formation. Aggregate consumer 
manufacturing and service for both the manufacturing prices and output prices have 
industries; 1963-1986 and service sectors an important influence on wages 
Holmlund Panel data from various Log-linear wage Sectoral roductivity and price M 
and sources on industries of 5 equations estimated changes, e the most 
Zetterberg countries: Sweden, Norway, with industry/time important impact on wages in 
1991 Finland, Germany and the dummies the US economy. They conclude 
United States; early that rent-sharing is a distinctive 
1960s' to mid 1980s' aspect of wage determination 
Pissarides Quarterly data with respect to Relative hourly Insider factors are 
and various industries: with respect earnings are important in all four 
Moghadam to Sweden from 1974.1 to estimated for all 4 countries at varying 
1990 1986.2; Finland from 1971.1 countries levels of importance 
-1985.4; UK from 1963.1-1982.4 
and US from 1963.1-1984.4 
Carruth, UK annual data on 2 Reduced form wage Wages are correlated 
Oswald industries: coal mining; and employment with insider variables 
and 1950-1980 and Steel; equations estimated 
Findlav 1949-1979 
1986 - 
Nickell UK data on 14 pooled Both unrestricted and Wages are influenced by insider 
and production industries from tightly specified waye factors namely, the degree of 
Kong various sources, including equations estimated monopoly power in the product 
1992 real labour cost from for each industry market. Some limited evidence 
Employment Gazette; of insider power being enhanced 
1961-1986 by the presence of unions across 
industries 
factors appear to be important. See Table 2.22 for a summary of the studies on the influence 
of 'insider factors' on wages, using firm-level data. Nickell and Wadhwani (1988,1990), 
Scaramozzino (1991), Nickell, Vainiomaki and Wadhwani (1992), Hildreth and Oswald (1997) 
and Brunello and Wadhwani (1989) using firm-level data, provide evidence of the influence 
of insider factors in wage determination in the UK. The latter also examine the influence of 
insider factors in Japan using firm-level data, and finds that insider power is more important 
in Japan than in the UK. Dolado and Bentolila (1993) and Martinez-Roz (2001) provide 
evidence of insider power in Spain. Grosfeld and Nivet (1999) provide evidence of the influence 
of insider power in Poland, Lee (1999) in China, Risager (1992) in Denmark and Forslund 
(1994) in Sweden. 
Nickell and Wadhwani's (1990) model is an influential, and may even be regaxded as a 
seminal model, in empirical labour economics for a variety of reasons, including the extensive 
and comprehensive dataset they have used, their estimation model, method of testing and so 
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forth. Indeed, a number of studies have followed the study in their own empirical modelling. 
It would be useful, to consider their study. 
Nickell and Wadhwani (1990) use firm data for 219 firms, using EXTAT and DATAS- 
TREAM for the period from 1972 - 82. The firms are fairly large in terms of employment, 
average employment in 1982 was 6,046. They also used questionnaire responses from Per- 
sonnel Managers of 75 selected firms to gain information about unionisation. Their empirical 
model is as follows (the model is in logs): 
ji)w-1 + /-tfA[(p +y- n)' + Cel)3 + Ce2l] + (1 - A)0-1ý -'Y2bl + Cf3An' 
where p+y-n is the firms revenue per head, plus the value of sales, divided by employment, w 
is the wage, An' is the hysteresis term, w is aggregate wage, 1 is the liquidity/cash flow terms 
includes, the firm's debt-equity ratio, the minimum lending rate and the deposit/liability 
ratio, 0 is the measure of union power, \ is the insider weight, b is the benefit replacement 
ratio, i. e., unemployed benefit level ratio to the expected level of net earnings, w-I is lagged 
wages, i7v is the aggregate UK wage, p is the output price, y-n is the output per head. As 
revenue per head and employment change refer to expectations, they then replaced them with 
actual values. Their method of estimation is GMM, due to Arellano and Bond (1991). They 
estimate a fixed effects equation, which has firm-specific constant and separate dummies for 
each of the nine yeaxs they covered. 
They found, first, wages were positively correlated to product price and productivity 
terms, and these factors are strongly correlated to the firm's financial position. Second, the 
total outsider effect of unemployment is strong and well determined at the aggregate level. 
Third, wages were negatively correlated to interest. Fourth, the firm's liquidity effects are 
not insignificant at all and indeed, they find a strong correlation between wages and interest 
rate. In addition, when the real rate is incorporated, it shows no impact. Thus, a liquidity 
rate as opposed to aggregate demand interpretation appears appropriate. They also provide 
weak favourable evidence on the role of lagged employment on wages. Furthermore, when 
the aggregate variables axe replaced by time dummies, those results which stay relevant are 
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TABLE 2.22 
DO'INSIDER FACTORS'HAVE AN IMPACT ON WAGES? 
Studies Using Firm Level Data 
Study Data Source Testing Method Results 
--N -RR-elr- 219 UK Wage equation Insider factors. such as rise in 
and firms; estimated productivity has a positive 
Wadhwani 1974-1982 impact on wages 
1988 
Nickell 219 UK manufacturing firms, Wage equation in Insider effects, including from 
and obtained from integrating the conjunction with union financial variables have an 
Wadhwani EXTAT data ta e with the O coverage interactions important influence on wage 
1990 DATA STREA n-line estimated determination 
service; 1972-1982 
Scaramozzino The basic data is drawn from a Wage equation Evidence of the important 
1991 panel of 215 UK manufacturing estimated impact of insider forces, 
firms derived from amalgamating articularly, those emanating F 
the DATASTREAM on-line rom profits per employee, 
service with the EXTAT data on wage determination. 
týj)e; 1974-1982 
Nickell, unbalanced panel of 814 Basic wage equation in Firm-specific factors, 
Vainiomaki UK manufacturing firms. conjunction with two sets including product market 
and The data is obtained b T of variations of the basic power, have an impact 
Wadhwani amalgamating DATAS REAM wage equation estimated. on wages. Their inability 
1992, on-line service with the EXTAT First, with the firm size to control for the skill 
(henceforth, data tape. The data constitute interactions. Second, composition of the 
NVW) a continuous series for each orates a restricted incory workforce detracts from 
company which has a minimum e sam p of companies the reliability of these 
of six observations; 1975-1986 who responded to NVW results 
union questionnaire 
Hildreth Unbalanced panel of GMM IV estimation Product market power has a 
and 329 firms obtained of the wap equation positive effect on wages, which 
Oswald from EXTAT database; on both the panel of is more pronounced in large 
1997 1981-1990. In addition i 329 co anies and fi h 
m firms, irrespective of the union i ti i L another balanced pane of 58 58 esta b s ments a ons n ong-run var status. 
establishments collated wages are correlated with earlier 
in a survey by Hildreth variations in the measure of 
was also utilised; 1980-1986 profitability. The long-run 
elasticity of company wages and 
establishment wages with 
res ,t to profit per employee 
is 
WiegchTtly 
less than 0.02 and 
0.04 elasticity 
Brunello 157 Japanese extremely Wage equations The elasticity of wages with 
and large manufacturing estimated by respect to sales per worker 
Wadhwani companies drawn from GMM (AB, 1988) is 0.33 and 0.1 in Japan and the 
1989 the Japan Development UK, respectively, suggesting 
Bank tape; 1971-1986; insider effects are more 
1964-1980 important in Japan than in the 
UK, but less so in small firms in 
both economies 
Dolada Panel data on 1667 Wage Liquidity and market 
and non-energy private equation ower variables are F 
Bentolila mainly large manufacturing estimated by ound to have a marginally 
1993 firms, drawnfrom the database 
S 
GMM (AB, 1991) . 4ficant impact on wages. 
ht of firm- 
s1re 
insider wei T urvey at of the Balance Sheet g 
the Bank of Spain; 1985-1988 specific factors is : C: 10 per cent 
Martinez- Encuesta sobre Estrategias Panel data techniques Innovations are found to be a 
Roz rvey Empresariales (ES EE ) utilised to control good approximation to economic 
2001 
;ý 
data conducted by the inistry unobserved rents. Firms undertaking 
of Industry and Energy on 2188 hetero neity. Estimation 5e process and product 
Spanish manufacturing metho by Arellano and innovations 
companies; 1990-1994 
l hl 
Bover (1995) employed 
Wa ee uations for 1989 
pay higher wages 
Insider effects had a Grosfeld 
and 
arge 173 Po is 
manufacturing firms; 
g q , 
when subsidies were used significantly lower effect in 1990. 
Nivet 1988-1994 to enhance wages and in During 1991-1994, in State 
1999 1990 when these were Owned Enterprises 
curtailed immensely are (SOEs', henceforth), insider 
estimated. Then from ower is imfortant as measured it t 
E 
1991-1994, two versions C y o Yt oyees capac 
of the wage equations appropriate productivity gains is 
estimated; one with firms prevalent. Post 1990, in firms 
with increasing and the transformed into Treasury owned 
other with firms with joint stock companies, 
decreasing productivity insider effects are weaker 
Lee Firm level panel data 
f 681 SOEs' derived 
Wage equation 
estimated by seemingly 
Evidence of insider power in 
China, manifested in the 1999 o 
from a matched dataset unrelated regression prevalence of rent-sharing 
Risager 
from two surveys 
Firms affiliated to ' 
technique (SUR) 
Wage reaction d i 
activities 
Wage setting of unskilled men 
e affected b insider forces 1992 the Danish Employers 
Federation; 
mate functions est 
for skilled and 
y . ar Their results were inconclusive 
1951-1987 unskilled men by the as to whether insider effects 
Generalised IV have an impact on the wages of 
Estimation Method skilled men 
Forslund Swedish data on 128 firms, Log of wage equation Demonstrate a small and 
1994 derived from an annual survey based on NW (1990) insignificant insider effect. 
The 
conducted by the Federation of estimated by GMNI estimated insider weight 
is 0.07. 
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TABLE 2.22 
(CONTINUED) 
Study Data Source Testina Method Results 
Swedish and IV method. The main ditterence is that in Forslund However, it should be noted. 
Industries; (1994) the union objective function is with respect to wage that, these results are highlý 
1984-1988 income and the destination of a union member who does sensitive/sways in 
not find a regular job pursues a labour market programme accordance to the estimation 
method chosen 
almost the same, with the exception of the insider effect which seems rather stronger, at 
A=0.17. 
Their main result is that both external and the firm's degree of financial prosperity de- 
termines the wage rate and that insider factors have a significant influence on wage determi- 
nation. They also find that wages become rigid when there is an anticipated fall in demand. 
Their investigation is distinct: the weakness of their model is that the bargainers are in 
a non-stationary environment, and as the behaviour of the agents is forward- looking, it is 
important to incorporate additional forward-looking variables, such as P/E ratio, net income 
to sales ratio and so forth, to reflect these important aspects of bargaining. The importance 
of such an incorporation will be noted later in my succeeding chapters. 
Nickell and Wadhwani (1988) also found financial vaxiables are important in determining 
wages in the data for 219 UK manufacturing firm over the period from 1974 - 82; in fact, 
noninclusion of these variable renders the coefficient on the level of the wage to be insignif- 
icant. Indeed, they conclude that one of the main reason for the rise in wages is due to 
the improvements in the financial health of the firm, for example, improved liquidity and 
gearing and accompanied falling of interest rates have led to firms conceding to higher wage 
demands. Dolado and Bentolila (1993) confirm that though liquidity variables in the 1,167 
large manufacturing firms in Spain were significant, they were only marginally so. The overall 
estimated insider weight is approximately 0.11. Scaramozzino (1991) also finds that profits 
are a significant influence on wages in 215 UK manufacturing firms from 1974 - 1982. 
Risager (1992) finds that output price has an influence on wages, in the Danish data. 
Grosfeld and Nivet (1999) finds that wages in State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are positively 
and significantly influenced by productivity changes, but only in an upward direction in the 
Polish data. Lee (1999) finds that insider forces are important determinant of wages in the 
769 SOEs over the period from 1980 - 1994. This is manifested in the prevalent rent-sharing 
activities. Maxtinez-Roz (2001) confirms the importance of rent-sharing on wages, 
in firms in 
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the manufacturing sector in Spain. Here the rent arises from innovation activities, particularly 
when both product and process innovation is undertaken simultaneously. Nickell, Vainiomaki 
and Wadhwani (1992) find that product market power has a positive influence on wages in 
the 814 manufacturing firms over the period 1975 - 1986. However, the lack of control for 
the skill mix detracts from the reliability of these results. Forslund (1994) finds insider forces 
to have a small and insignificant influence on wages in the 128 firms for the period from 
1984 - 1988. The estimated insider weight is 0.07. However, it should be noted that his 
results are highly sensitive to the estimation method chosen. 
Blanchflower and Oswald (1988), Blanchflower, Oswald and Garrett (1990) and Stewart 
(1990) examine the survey data set WIRS 84/11 (noted above), to provide evidence of insider 
power in wage setting. Blanchflower and Oswald (1988) show that firm-specific variables 
are important determinants of pay; although their paper does not embody any econometric 
estimations. Blanchflower, Oswald and Garrett (1990) also show that insider variables such as 
firm performance are important influences on wages of skilled workers in both the unionised 
and non-unionised sectors, than it is for unskilled workers, particularly if they are non- 
unionised. Stewart (1990) demonstrates that the union wage mark up is positively and 
significantly correlated to product market power. 
FM (2000a) uses the 1998 WERS to provide evidence of the impact of insider power 
in wage formation. They find that changes in product demand has an influence on wages 
in the private sector, and the bargained settlements are lower than non-bargained ones. 
Blanchflower (1991) also confirms the influence of insider power using the data from British 
Social Attitudes Survey to show that workers in more prosperous larger firms appropriate 
more rent. 
Gregory, Lobban and Thomson (1985,1986,1987) use the data from Confederation of 
British Industry's (CBI) Databank to provide evidence of insider power in wage determina- 
tion. These studies conclude that profitability and productivity and financial strength were 
two of the main determinants of pay. See Table 2.23, which provides a summary of the 
studies, using UK British/UK survey data. 
For the US, several studies have used the extensive Current Population Survey (CPS) 
data source, for example, Dickens and Katz, 1987; Krueger and Summers, 1987,1988; Katz 
and Summers, 1989. The general conclusion is that wage differentials across industries can- 
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TABLE 2.23 
DO 'INSIDER FACTORS'HAVE AN IMPACT ON WAGES? 
Studies Using UKIBritish Survey Data 
and 
Oswald 
1988 
Blanchfiower, 
Oswald 
and 
Garrett 
1990 
Stewart 
1990 
Forth 
and 
Millward 
2000a 
Blanchfiower 
1991 
Grepry, 
Lobban 
and 
Thomson 
1985 
Gre ory, 
Lo 
tan 
and 
Thomson 
1986 
Grepry, 
Lobban 
and 
Thomson 
1987 
L"It'1011 Ourvey Uata from the 1984 WIRS, 
which have 25 or 
more employees 
British Survey data 
from the 1984 WIRS, covering 
all manufacturing and the 
service sectors in both the public 
and service sectors and union 
and nonunion establishments. 
A sample of 2019 
establishments were utilised 
1984 WIRS data on private 
sector establishments, employin 
semi-skilled manual workers anT 
also provide sufficient information 
on the wage and the control 
variables and have also answered 
sufficientIr the question on the 
number o competitors faced by 
the establishment in the market for its products and services WERS 1998 UK data of 
workplaces with 10 or more 
employees from all sectors, 
with the exception of 
agriculture and coal mining; August 1977 to July 1988 
UK data on 5,300 employees 
collated through questionnaire from the five pooled British 
Social Attitudes Survey; 
1983-1986 and 1989 
Approximately 1,200 
manufacturing industries, 
encompassing approximatel 
2,000 settlement groups anT 
600,000 employees from the 
Confederation of British 
Industries (CBI, henceforth); 
1979-1984 
1319 UK establishments 
from the CB1 Pay 
Databank; 1979-1984 
UK CBI Pay Databank 
Survey of Pay Settlements. 
The data comprises of a 
series of five sequential 
annual surveys of a sample 
of settlement groups 
Statistics to show the factors 
which have an impact on 
the level of wage in the 
most recent settlement 
Three logarithmic weekly wage 
equations with respect to the 
unskilled, skilled and unskilled 
workers estimated. Per skill 
categories, two equations are 
reported, one with the (natural 
logarithm of the) county 
unemployment rate variable, 
and the other with the (natural 
logarithm of the) county average 
weekly wage rate as the external 
variables. One equation with the 
total sample; second equation 
with the unionised private sector 
subsample and the third 
equation with the 
non-unionised private sector 
subsample are estimated 
Lo* linear wage equations are 
estimated by maximum 
likelihood estimator, with 
controls including the size of 
the ownership, establishment 
facin competition and Ilishments 
with estab 
market power 
Wage settlements 
for the largest 
occupational 
group (excluding 
managers) estimated 
by OLS 
Natural logarithm 
of annual earnings 
equation estimated 
Analysed wage 
settlement equation 
to ascertain the 
factors that have 
an impact on wage 
determination 
Examined factors 
that have an 
impact on wage 
determination, by 
bargaining structure 
Joint Generalised Least 
Squares estimates for each 
year's cross-section in a 
four year equation system 
is estimated by Zellner's 
method on 848 
observations, or the factors, 
which have an impact on 
pay settlements, 1980-1984 
r, vi(ience ot insider power 
in wage setting 
Insider variables such as firm performance and 
market competitiveness 
are important influences 
of wages of skilled 
workers in both the 
unionised and 
nonunionised sectors, but 
not for unskilled workers, 
particularly if they are 
nonunionised. The firm's 
financial performance 
has a positive and 
significant impact on 
wages in most of the 
semi-skilled and 
skilled regression 
Union wage markup 
is positively and 
significantly 
correlated to product 
market power 
Evidence of the impact of 
insider power in wage formation. Improving 
product demand induces 
higher wage payments in 
the private sector. 
Bargained settlements are lower than non-bargained 
ones 
Workers in more 
rosperous larger 
rms appropriate 
more rent 
Profitability had an 
important impact on 
wages for the 
high settlers 
Firms who have product 
market power are awarding higher pay rises to fairly 
well-established and 
relatively secure employees 
in the labour market 
Insider power is important 
in wage determination. 
ProfitabilityFlays an 
im rtant ro e in pay detpeormination, 
consistently 
not be fully explained by skill or compensating differentials. See Table 2.24. Dickens and Katz 
conduct the following two-step procedure: first, estimate wages on individual characteristics, 
geographic dummies and three-digit dummies on industry characteristics, such as profitability, 
concentration and the like. An interesting result is that the coefficients on the profit variables 
66 
TABLE 2.24 
DO'INSIDER FACTORS'HAVE AN IMPACT ON WAGES? 
Studies Using US Survey/Canadian Contract Data 
and 
Katz 
1987 
Krueger 
and Summers 
1987 
vo aata irom uurrent ropuiation 
Survey (CPS, henceforth). The 
sample comprises of private sector, 
non-agricultural employees, 16 years 
of age or older with complete data 
on either hourly wages or normal 
hours of work per week; 1983-1985 
wage equations, are 
estimated in a two 
step_procedure. In 
the first step wages 
are estimatea on 
individual 
characteristics, 
geographic dummies 
and- three-digit 
industry dummies. 
In the second ste 
the coefficients oF 
the three-digit 
industry dummies 
are estimated on 
industry 
characteristics such 
as profitability, 
concentration ratio 
and so forth 
Industry wage 
differentials 
equations, with 
and without 
labour quality 
controls estimated 
US data from 1984 CPS. 
The sample comprises of full and 
part-time privately emplogd 
non-agricultural workers 6 
years old or older. 
A number of 
standard 
cross-section wage equations 
estimated to investigate the 
importance of industry 
affiffiation in accounting for 
relative wages, with controls 
for human capital, demographic 
background and so forth 
Rents accruing to labour and 
capital in various US industries 
are estimated. The estimated 
wage differentials are 
normalised as deviations from 
the employment-weighted 
mean differential 
Krueger US cross sectional and 
and Ion itudinal data on individuals la Summers ted by the Bureau of the col 
1988 Census for the May 1974,1979 
and 1984 CPS and the University 
of Michigan's Quality of 
Employment Survey (QES) 
Katz 
and Summers 
1989 
Vroman 
1984 
Blanchflower, 
Oswald 
and Sanfey 
1996 
Mitchell 
1978 
US cross section data on individuals from the 1984 CPS. All twelve 
monthly surveys are amalgamated. 
Their sample comprised of private 
), 
Xloyees sector nonagricultural em 
who are 16 to 75 years ol The earnings variable is 
normally week1l hours US data from tKe US Labour 
Department's Current Wage 
Developments (henceforth, CWD) 
comprising of 2,274 very large 
collective bargaining situations; 1957 to 1980 
US March CPS data on 200,000 
individuals for the manufacturing 
sector, from 1984-1985 was 
combined with annual profit data 
for four dig: it manufacturing 
industries Productivity Database; 
1964-1985. The earnings data are 
drawn from the 19654986 CPS. 
Individuals were asked to report 
the earnings in the recedin year 
Two data source utRised. 
Re 
first, is a six data series drawn 
from the U. S. Bureau of Labour 
Statistics CWD; 1960-1976. The 
second are data on large union 
agreements per IIt 
chanpsin pay tes 
foroselected 
units in the manufacturing, mining 
and transport industries 
profits variables are 
mostly significant for 
nonunion workers, but 
are usually insignificant for union workers. 
There were substantial 
wage differences 
amongst firms. The 
upper bound on the 
importance of industry 
effects is that they 
account for 30 pei cent 
of the wage dispersion. Establishment size and high capital intensity 
had a positive 
impact on wages 
H her wage industries Juirge high guality 
workers. vidence of 
wage structure is 
relativelv stable over 
consider'ably long time 
and the ranking of 
different industries are 
remarkably stable 
across countries. 
Workers of the same 
uality are paid 
ifferent wages at 
different firms. Wage 
distribution in the US, 
tends to be 
countercyclical, 
in the short run 
The dispersion of wages 
across industries is 
immense, that is, 
workers in high wage 
industries obtain 
noncompetitive rents 
adross space and time 
There are significant 
interindustry wage 
differentials on account 
of rent-sharinp, that is 
inconsistent with the 
com etitive labour 
marEft theories. 
Influences of union wage Profits have a 
contract settlements in significant impact 
manufacturing estimated on wages 
Wage equations 
estimated 
Wage changes estimated in 
annual equations vis-a-vis, year 
to year per cent changes in 
CPI (P) and the reciprocal of the 
unemployment rate (U-1). Two 
forms of unemplgyment rate are 
estimated: specifically, the official 
rate and the weighted Perry rate. 
The latter adjusts for changes 
in the composition of the labour 
force that have had an impact on 
the relationship between 
Wages are a 
reflection of ast 
profitability. 
PB 
ut. w hen 
the firms prosperity 
inýreases some of the 
gains are %propriated 
b the wor ers. The 
eiasticity of pay with 
respect to protit per 
employee is 0.008 
Lagged prices 
generally had 
a negative 
impact on 
wages 
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(CONTINUED) 
es ii lt s 
Hamermesh Wage and profit data drawn 1970 from bargainini situations in twelve manu acturing and four in public utilities. Wage rate and cost of I! ving 
allowances data are derived from the Bureau of Labour Statistics series of wage 
chronologies and their 
continuations are found in CWD. Profit rate data are 
computed using post tax 
pronts as the numerator 
and the net tangible 
assets as the denominator. Data for the former are from Mood's Industrial 
Manual and profits data 
are from Standard and Poor's Coo ration Records-19 8-1967, 
1948-1961 nd 1962-1967 
Currie Large panel dataset of US labour 
and contracts from CWD Contract tape McConnell sourced from the Bureau of Labour 1992 Statistics. With respect to almost half 
the contracts, the wage levels were 
obtained from an independent contract listing published by the Bureau of National Affairs. For the remainder 
of the contracts annual hourly earnings for the mpropriate 4 digit Standard 
Industria Classification categoyy are d f E l rawn rom mp oyment and Earnings 
as the base wage level. Accounting 
information is drawn from Standard 
and Poors' Industrial Compustat. The 
wage equation is estimated using data derived from approximately 
1300 US contracts settled, 
ertaining to 28 different 2-digit 
IC industries; 1970-1981 
Sparks Data from the Canadian Department 
and of Labour, and mainly drawn from the 
Wilton Dominion Bureau of Statistics, which 
1971 documents source of profit data from 
the Department of National Revenue 
Taxation Division, Taxation Statistics 
Part Two. Pooled saTple of time 
series observations with respect to 
14 Canadian manufacturin& 
industries. Data on industrial contracts 
utilised. Profits were designated as a 
per cent of assets. Profits data and 
total assets by industry were derived 
from the Department of National 
Revenue Taxation Statistics, Part Two 
Christofides Canadian data on 595 labour 
and contracts from labour Canada. Oswald Annual data on net profits and 
1992 equity were drawn from Corporation 
Financial Statistics (Statistics 
Canada 61-207); 1978.1-1984.4 
observed unemployment 
and the "tightness" or 
"looseness" of the labour 
market 
Four waly ýquations 
estimate . Two with and two without the linear 
approximation to the non- 
linear wage cost-of living 
relationship. Two 
equations also incorporate 
profit rate and changes in 
profit rate and changes in 
profit variables. First set 
of estimations pertain to 
the period from 1948- 
1967. These equations 
reestimated with a set of 
firm dummies utilising 
135 contracts baTained 
between 1948 an 1961 
and subsequently for 
45 contracts bar ned 
between 1962-19ta7i. 
Second set of equations 
reestimated to obviate 
the potential serial 
dependence among 
residuals which renders 
the estimates to be 
inefficient. Third set 
of equations estimated 
to compare wage 
bargaining, behaviour 
between 1962-1967, 
vis-a-vis 1948-1961 
Firm specific 
determinants 
of the 
logarithm of 
the average 
expected real 
wage 
estimated 
Rates of 
change of 
wages 
equation 
estimated 
Log of the 
difference of 
the real wage 
equations 
estimated by 
Generalised 
Least and IV-GLS. 
Mainly one equation 
is estimated without 
the incorporation of 
the 
pri es and industry c 
with incorporation 
of industry prices 
Profits 
irrelevant in 
explainin 
bargaineT 
wage changes 
Profits have a negative 
insignificant impact on 
wage. This could be 
attributed to their use 
accounting profit, 
which has 
semblance to 
economic profit 
or the size of the 
rent. Sales have an 
important effect on 
wages. Their 
estimates indicate 
that at the average level of sales a 10 
per cent increase in 
sales per employee 
enhances the real 
wages by 1 per cent 
Profit had a positive 
and highly significant 
influence on wages 
and 
the 
of 
Profits have a significant 
impact on wages. Evidence 
of profit elasticity of pay is 
0.006. The long-run 
elasticity of pay to profits is 
about 0.01. Since 
percentage change in profits 
are often in excess of 100 
per cent this impact is very 
im. Portaýt.. When industry' 
prices are incorporated to 
the equation, profits retain 
its positive significance on wages 
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Data Source " u d Testing Method Results 
. a r Uanadian collective buga ning settlements negotiated in the Canadian 
1988 manufacturing sector. December 1985, Labour Canada's Wage Tape 
Determinants ot the 
expected average 
Indu strv 
specific" 
on wage rates and other provisions with respect to 1467 contracts and 
298 b i 
real wages sellin ll 
arga ning pairs pertaining to 500 or more employees; Three di f it estimated. price ias 
industry data f6r 1961-1971 were drawn from Statistic Canada Rea Specifically; first a positive 
Domestic Product by Industry 1961-71 (Ottawa Statistics Canada). difference of the impact 
These data were categorised b industry on the basis of the 1960 F expected average on wages 
standard industrial codes (SI , 
henceforth ý. Data on a 1971 industry real wage rate 
t code basis for 1971-83 were derived from te 1978 and 1984 issues equation is 
of Gross Domestic Product by Industry (Ottawa: Statistics Canada). estimated with 
The 1960 and 1971 industry codes were then matched and the price all explanatory 
series were integrated at 1971. For the 31 3 digit industries which variables 
lacked data on a consistent basis the appropriate two-di it industry 
data were utilised. The period oý analysis is from 1966-1583 
incorporated as first 
difference form 
are generally positive and significant for non-union workers but axe generally insignificant for 
union workers. Vroman (1984) demonstrates the influence of profit on wages, and Blanch- 
flower, Oswald and Sanfey (1996), which combines CPS data on individuals with four-digit 
profit data for the manufacturing sector only, finds the estimated elasticity of wages to profits 
per employee to be 0.08. However, profit is not an infallible influence on wages in the US; 
Mitchell (1978) shows, using contract data from the BLS publication Current Wage Develop- 
ments, that lagged prices generally had negative coefficients in wage equations. Hamermesh 
(1970) also casts doubts on the importance of profits in the US. Currie and McConnell (1992) 
confirms that profits had a negative impact on wages. 
Using Canadian contract data, Sparks and Wilton (1971) show that profits have a highly 
significant influence on wage equations. Christofides and Oswald (1992) confirms that profits 
have a significant effect in Canadian wage determination; the long-run elasticity of wages 
is less than 0.01. Since the percentage change in profit is massive, this could amount to a 
great deal. In addition, studies have also shown that industry prices also have an important 
positive impact on wages, as we have seen in the studies using industry data. Card (1988) 
using Canadian contract data, shows that wages are positively correlated to industry product 
prices and profitability. Table 2.24 provides a summaxy of the studies on the effect of 'insider 
factors' on wages, using US survey level/Canadian contract data. 
2.5.5. Does Unemployment have a Negative Effect on Wage Settlements? 
Another most robust implication of insider-outsider models is that wages are shaped at least 
partially by external factors, that is, factors that are not specific to the 
firm or industry (when 
the level of disaggregation is at this level), including notably, unemployment rate/level, cost 
69 
of living, the prevailing wage rate in the firm/industry, the external pay structure and the 
replacement ratio, which has an impact on the expected cost of job loss and other general 
factors that have an impact on the incumbent workers' expected alternative income. Some 
studies have used aggregate data to verify this: examination for the UK includes Carruth 
and Oswald (1987,1989a) and Rowlatt (1987). These studies find that aggregate unemploy- 
ment, i. e., specifically, both the change in unemployment and its level, has an impact on 
wages in the UK. This is corroborated by Christofides and Oswald (1992) who also find the 
level of unemployment in the employers region has a negative impact on wages in Canada. 
Unemployment in the outside labour market acts to subdue workers' bargaining power. 
Carruth and Schnabel (1993) also find, using cointegration regressions, that long-run W. 
German wages are influenced by unemployment. Holden (1989) estimates a wage equation, in 
which the variable vacancy rate captures labour market pressures. He finds the vacancy rate 
is significant, with the inclusion of unemployment rate. Thus he demonstrates that labour 
market pressures are positively related to wage drift. Dreze and Bean (1990) find that the 
effect of unemployment on wages is generally weak. See Table 2.25 for a summary of the 
studies showing the impact of unemployment on wage settlements using aggregate level data. 
We now turn to studies showing importance of outside factors using industry data. Most 
of which are in the affirmative include Coe (1990), Graafland and Lever (1996), Carruth, 
Oswald and Findlay (1986), Lever and van Werkhooven (1996), Johansen (1999), Beckerman 
and Jenkinson (1990), Nickell and Kong (1992), Johansen (1996) and Holden (1989). See 
Table 2.26. Coe (1990) finds the impact of unemployment is less important when analysing 
14 countries individually but not when estimating pooled data for groups of countries. He also 
finds aggregate labour market conditions, proxied by the unemployment rate, does not have 
an impact on industry wages. But the examination of pooled data for groups of countries, 
demonstrates that it has an important influence on the level of wages. Graafland and Lever 
(1996) find sectoral wages axe strongly influenced by the macrowage rate and the impact 
of the unemployment rate is minimal. Further estimation of the three groups of industrial 
sectors and service sectors, shows unemployment has a negative correlation or has no effect on 
wages in the Dutch industrial sector. They also find unemployment has a negative influence 
on wages in also the service sectors. The unemployment effects axe more pronounced in the 
service sectors, as opposed to the industrial sectors. 
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TABLE 2.25 
DOES UNEMPLOYMENT HAVE A NEGATIVE IMPACT ON WAGE SETTLEMENTS? 
Studies Using Aggregate Level Data 
and sector drawn mainly from Layard aiid 
Oswald Nickell (1986), with respect to a variety 
1987 of variables including the real product 
wage, real consumption earnings 
and the labour force 
Carruth Annual data mainly drawn from Layard 
and and Nickell (1986). Profit data from the 
Oswald Ap ýropriations Account of Industrial T 1989a an Commercial Companies; 1956-1983 
Rowlatt Quarterly average of the Department 
1987 of Employment monthly survey based 
manufacturing sector's earnings; 
1960s' - 1980s' Christofides Canadian contract data from Labour 
and Canada on various Canadian private Oswald uncontrolled industries. Other data they 
1992 also utilised including the ratio of average 
weeft benefits to average weeklý earnings fro l tI St ti ti m nemp oymen nsurance a s cs 
(Statistics Canada 73-2025). Data on 
average weekly earnings on industrial 
composite (Cansim M1433-493) 
were utilized; 1978.1 to 1984.4 
Carruth Various sources, including index of hourly 
and contract wages from the Monthly Report 
Schnabel of the Deutsche Bundesbank, various 
1993 issues; unemployment rate drawn from 
Bundesanstalt ffir Arbeit; Statistiches 
Bundesamt and Carruth and 
Schnabel's calculation; 1965-1989 
Holden Annual Norwegian data on the 
1989 manufacturing sector from various 
sources, including ILO standard, i. e., 
AKU data and OECD Main 
economic indicators which provide 
the vacancy rate, obtained dividing 
vacancies by the labour force 
Dreze Aggregate data on 10 
and countries; 1960-1985 
Bean 
1990 
e 
ttew proauct wage 
rate and consumption 
earnings for 
manufacturin n the 
UK estimateTby W 
Real product wage 
equation by IV 
Change in average 
wages in 
manufacturing 
equations estimated 
Real wage equations 
estimated by GLS 
and IV-GLS based on 
595 contracts 
Wage equation 
estimated by 
cointegration 
regressions 
techniques 
Nominal wage 
increases in 
percentages estimated 
by OLS and IV regression, 
where the variable 
vacancy rate captures 
labour market pressures 
The derivatives of the rate 
of owth of real wages 
witT respect to the rate of 
unemployment estimated 
Aggregate unern ioým 
that is specifically, ol 
the changes in 
unem loYment and its 
level, 
Us 
an impact 
on wages in the UK 
Aggregate 
unemployment has 
an effect on wages 
Evidence of both the 
change in and the level 
of unemployment has 
an impact on wages 
Regional unemployment 
rate has a negative and 
significant impact on 
wages. The 
unemployment elasticity 
of real wage is about -0.08 
and this is found to be 
stable, and consistent, 
when experimenting with 
a wide range 
of specifications 
Long run equilibrium 
unemployment dampens 
the union's bargaining. 
In the short run it is 
changes in unemployment 
which leads to 
wage reductions 
Labour market pressures 
as captured by the 
vacancy rate is positively 
related to wage drift. 
Vacancy rate is significant 
with the inclusion of the 
unemployment rate 
in the equation 
The effect of 
unemployment 
on wages is 
generally weak 
Carruth, Oswald and Findlay (1986) interpret the significance of unemployment benefit and 
unemployment in employment equations, as a cause for rejection of the seniority/flat indif- 
ference curve union utility, although this is not a strong test; incorporation of these vaxiables 
is congruent with some specifications of the seniority model. They also find aggregate un- 
employment has a significant and negative impact on miner's wages. A 10 per cent increase 
in the alternative wage leads to a6 per cent increase in steelworkers wages. Lever and van 
Werkhooven (1996), find that the effect of unemployment and change of short term unem- 
ployment has a stronger effect on wages in some of the sectors. They find the weight of 
the external factors to be 0.88. Johansen (1999) also find wages are significantly affected 
by aggregate unemployment. The estimated long-run insider weight ranged from 0.19 to 
0.222, whereas, the estimated long-run unemployment coefficient ranges from 0.040 to 0.050. 
Beckerman and Jenkinson (1990), using pooled two-digit industry data, find that industry 
unemployment has a positive effect on wages in the UK, they infer this to be in support of 
the hysteresis/membership interpretation. Nickell andKong (1992) find that when two-digit 
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TABLE 2.26 
DOES UNEMPLOYMENT HAVE A NEGATIVE IXIPACT ON WAGE SETTLEMENTS? 
Studies Using Industry Level Data 
uoe yj: ýwj sectorai wage equations estimated Aggregate iaDour marKet conaitions 
1990 base data on 14 for the manufacturing and proxied by the unemployment rate 
OECD countries service sectors on all 14 does not have an im ortant impact h i i 
W 
and 196 countries. Also wage on e exam nat ut t on industr3 
manufacturing equations for the pooled of pooled data Tor groups of countries 
and service time-series cross-country demonstrates that it has an important 
industries; 1963 -1986 data estimated influence on the level of wages Graafland Dutch pooled Wage equations Evidence of external factors having an 
and cross-sectional are estimated important sectoral impact on wages, 
Lever time-series annual by GMM, AB (1991) in the 18 Dutch market sector. 
1996 data, drawn from the Estimation for industrial and service 
Central Planning 
hi h B 
sectors independently reveals that 
i t diff h di are ureau w c erences in wage nc ere are st t 
based on the determination. In the industrial sector 
National Accounts the macrowage has a strong impact 
of the Central on wages. They suggest it indicates 
Bureau of a weak insider gower. This is not 
Statistics in necessarily so. ee my theoretical 
Netherlands; and empirical chapters. They also then 
1967- 1990 find unemployment has no impact on 
wages which they attribute to powerful 
insider effects. With respect to the 
service sector, they demonstrate, that 
their wages are determined in the 
light of the macrowage 
Carruth, 
O ld 
UK annual data from 
l di i i 
Wage equations 
b th ti t df 
In the mining industrd, both the 
e an unem lo ment arative wa m swa ous sources, u ng var nc o es ma e or p y g co p 
and Unemployment Benefit data industries for the benefit has unit elasticity. Aggregate 
Findlay from Social Security 8 ective periods sp unemployment has a significant 
1986 Statistics average wage rate 
f f M hl Di d 
LS , usin6 the d b 
0 
i 
d 
and negative impact on the miner's 
cent increase in the A 10 e gest o ata rom ont ry an r a en wage. p r ý 
Statistics, Unemp oyment package, GIVE wage paid elsewhere leads to a6 
data from Economic Trends, per cent increase in steelworker's 
Annual Supplement (1983 wage. Unemployment benefit has 
edition) and Income Tax a strong negative impact on 
data from Economic Trends, wages in the steel industry, which 
Annual Supplement (1983 is startling. Lagged unemployment 
edition) and Income Tax has scant influence on the level of 
data from Economic Trends real wages in both industries 
Annual Supplement and 
data on 2 industries: coal 
mining; 1950-80 and 
steel; 1949-79 
Lever Dutch panel of annual Wage equation Evidence of the weight of external 
and observations for 68 without and with factors to be 0.88, with res ect to the 7 
van 3-digit industries, with the concentration 68 industries. The effect 
Werkhooven 10 or more employees; ratio variable for unemployment, change of short-term 
1996 1974-1986 68,36 industries unemployment and taxes is more 
and large and powerful in the 36 industries as 
small firms opposed to, in all 68 industries. The 
separately, unemployment benefit ratio has a i ll i i i fl estimated by 
GMM 
uence on wages n sma os t ve n Erms 
and a negative effect on 
CAB, 1991) wages in the large firms 
Johansen Panel of annual time Change in Aggregate unemployment has a 
1999 series data from the wage costs per significant impact on industry wages. 
National Account hour estimated In the full sample, unemployment has 
Statistics, for 117 by GMM a negative impact on wages. An 
Norwegian (AB, 1991) to increased unemployment ratio from 1 
industries; eliminate to 2 per cent induces a long-run 
1967 - 1991 and industry fixed 
decrease in wages by 2.3 per cent. The 
1970 -1991 effects with predominant 
determinant of industry 
respect to the wages is the outside wage both in the 
full and short and the long-run. In the full 
subsample sample, in the short -run, impact is 0.87 and the long-run elasticity is 0.77 
Holden Norwegian Nominal Unemployment has a negative influence 
1989 data on 6 wage on wages. Vacancy rate has a positive 
industries; increased and significant impact on wages. 
1970-1978, equation Increases in the payroll tax rate has a 
1980-1985 estimated ne ative influence on wage drift. l h by OLS as a negative and Re ative wa es E 
ct on wage drift, which is significant eý 
M si ificant at the 10 per cent level. 
is is attributed to the operation of 
the error correction mechanism, that is, 
if the relative wage in an industry is 
lower relative to the average value 
over the estimation period, then this 
raises the wage drift in the industry 
Beckerman UK Census data on Wage equations Industry unemployment has a positive 
and pooled 14 estimated 
by impact on wages in the UK, they 
Jenkinson manufacturing OLS. The impact attribute this to the hysteresis/ 
72 
Nickell 
and 
Kong 
1992 
Johansen 
1996 
industries unemployment by 
industry aata from Employment Gazette. Aggregate 
unemployment rate for the whole 
economy from Economic Trends 
Annual Su plement; 
1971 - 198E UK data on 14 production 
industries. Other data sources 
include UK male unemployment 
rate, mid year, from Layard and 
Nickell (1986), industry 
unemployment rate, for male and female; mid year from Employment 
Gazette. Average aggregate 
hourly wages male October 
figures from Layarý and Nickell 
(1986). Tax rate on labour paid 
by employers, drawn from Layard 
and Nickell (1986); 1961 - 1986 Panel of annual time-series 
data from the National 
Account Statistics, for 117 
Norwý, gian ipqustries 
including mining, 
manufacturing, and 
some private services 
TABLE 2.26 
(CONTINUED) 
oi reiative wage movemenEs 
on wages in an individual 
industry is captured by the 
variable (W - Wjt-17 where 
W is the wage, Wi is the 
. nominal wage in industry z 
and t is the time subscript 
Unrestricted and tightly 
specified form of the wage 
equation estimated for 
each industry. The 
association between union 
power, insider and 
aggregate unemElo ment 
ee e ects from bot tKe 
equations are also 
examined 
nesuits 
membership effects. Aggregat 
unemployment has a negative 
influence on industry wages. 
Relative wages have an 
important impact 
on industry wages 
Overall, unemployment has a 
positive impact on few of the 
industries in the unrestricted 
wage equation. Prevailing 
aggregate labour market 
Fonditions also have an 
important influence on 
wages 
Wage equations 
estimated by GMM 
(AB, 1991). The model 
is first-differenced to 
eliminate the individual 
fixed effects 
Unemployment has a 
significant im act on industry 
wages. The 
%rwegian 
wage 
curve is highly non-linear and 
tends to be flat for moderate 
levels of unemployment. The 
principal long-run determinant 
and the short-run determinant 
of industry wages, is the 
outside wage. Both the short 
and long-run elasticities are in 
excess of 0.8. Payroll taxes are 
wholly bourne by labour 
industries are analysed separately, this effect is only prevalent in a minority of industries. 
Johansen (1996) finds industry wages are significantly influenced by unemployment. Holden 
(1989) finds that unemployment has a negative influence on wages. 
In congruence with the results pertaining to industry data, firm or individual data (which 
we pursue below) appear to contradict both classical competitive models ofwage determina- 
tion and pure IOMs. Outsider factors also appear to be important in conjunction with insider 
factors, as noted earlier. Nickell and Wadhwani (1990), one of the seminal empirical studies 
in empirical IOT as noted above, found aggregate unemployment exerts downwaxd pressure 
on wages. Other studies that have examined the importance of outside factors in wage deter- 
mination using firm-level data include: Grosfeld and Nivet (1999), Brunello and Wadhwani 
(1989), Risager (1992), Forslund (1994), Dolado and Bentolila (1993), Nickell, Vainiomaki 
and Wadhwani (1992) and Nickell and Wadhwani (1988). See Table 2.27 for a summaxy of 
these studies, which show the impact of unemployment on wage settlements. Grosfeld and 
Nivet (1999) find unemployment has no affect in privatised and corporatised. firms, but has 
a significant downward impact on wages in SOEs. Brunello and Wadhwani (1989) find that 
there is no substantial difference in wages to vaxiations in unemployment in large Japanese 
and UK firms. Risager (1992) finds that current or lagged unemployment does not have a 
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direct impact on wages. This also applies to the current or lagged rate of change of unem- 
ployment. Forslund (1994) found that aggregate unemployment did not influence wages. His 
result is rather imprecise and unreasonable, due to the small number of time periods and low 
degree of variability in the variables during his sample period. Dolado and Bentolila (1993) 
find that aggregate labour market variables have a strong and significant impact on wages, 
in particular the Spanish unemployment rate, which he found had a negative (-0.928) and 
significant (5.60) impact on wages. Nickell, Vainiomaki and Wadhwani (1992) find that the 
external labour market captured by the unemployment terms have an important impact on 
company wages. Nickell and Wadhwani (1988) also find that both aggregate and industry 
unemployment exerts downward pressure on pay. 
In conjunction with the importance of external factors on wages, in studies using UK/British 
survey data, Blanchflower and Oswald (1988) also find that external pressures also have an 
impact on wage settlements. Blanchflower, Oswald and Garrett (1990) also confirm the im- 
portance of external pressures. In fact, they demonstrates that pay moves with factors such 
as unemployment and the going rate of pay in the firm's vicinity. 
Blanchflower (1991) uses the data from British Social Attitudes Survey, to show unem- 
ployment in the individual's region lowers pay with an average elasticity of - 0.1. In addition, 
wage is influenced more by changes in the unemployment rate in the non-union as opposed 
to the union sector. 
Gregory, Lobban and Thomson (1985) (henceforth, GLT) find the risk of redundancy 
exerts a downward pressure on pay settlements. They also found other external factors 
having an important impact on wages, specifically, intracompany comparisons, attained an 
almost constant rating. But the importance of each of the other external focus of comparison, 
that is with the industry, locality, nationally and with national agreement, declined shaxply 
in 1980, with only minimal improvements post 1980. GLT (1986) also find that marginal 
employers axe severely restricting pay increases to those employees who are subject to the 
threat of redundancy. Thus external factors, notably the redundancy rate, has a negative 
impact on pay. GLT (1987) find that accelerating unemployment, its duration and the risk 
of redundancy, has a minimal negative impact on wages over the period 1981/82 - 1983/84. 
However they find that the risk of redundancy played an important role in exerting 
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TABLE 2.27 
DOES UNEMPLOYMENT HAVE A NEGATIVE IMPACT ON WAGE SETTLEMENTS? 
Studies Using Firm Level Data 
Study 
- - - - 
Data Source 
- 
Testing Method Results 
7 ro sf eld 173 I arge Wage equations estimated: Unemployment and other labour 
and Polish some for the period pre market conditions had a 
Nivet 
1999 
manufacturing 
fi 
1990, prior to the change downward impact on wages in 
rms; in ownership of large SOEs. When firms with high 
1998-1994 industrial firms an the and low productivity were 
others following the estimated separately between 
transformation of 1991-1994; only wages in firms 
ownerships of these in the latter categor were T 
B ll 7J 
firms post 1990 unemployment repressed by r_ 
rune o 15 apanese published Wage equations There is not an enormous difference 
and account of large estimated at firm-level in the responsiveness of wages to 
Wadhwani manufacturing companies, and Japanese wage unemployment in large UK and 
1989, mainly drawn from the equations by the size Japanese firms. In both these 
(henceforth, Japan Development Bank of firm estimated by countries wages in small firms are 
BW) tape; which is from the GMM (AB, 1988) more responsive to unemployment 
financial accounts of large than they are in large firms. BNA' 
corporations listed principally attribute the variability of a gregate T 
on the First Section of the in Japan to the abun ance of wages 
Tokyo Stock Exchange. fi small rms vis-a-vis OECD countries. 
UK data is derived from The long-run elasticity with respect 
the Census of Production 
l t d 
to an increase in outside wage is 
l l ti it l Whil t th on wages emp o men an Z y ong-run e as c ower. s e 
value ad&d by rm size on of the wage with respect to 
the manufacturing sector; unemplo ment ranges from -0.07 to la 1971-1986 and 1964-1980 pan and is approximately -0.15 in 
-0.1 in the UK; and they are 
statistically insignificant for Japan. 
Risager Firms affiliated to the Wage reaction Both the current and lagfed 
1992 Danish Employers function estimated unemployment rates are ighly 
Federation which 
f th fi i 
for skilled and 
kill d b 
insignificant in both the wage 
ti ti f kill d d ses o e rms, compr uns e men y reac on equa ons or s e an 
in the manufacturing the Generalised unskilled men. The current and the 
and construction Instrument Variable lagged rate of change in 
sector; 1951-1987 Estimation method unemployment, also does not have 
any impact on wages. 
Dolado Panel data on 1667, Wage equation Aggregate labour market variables 
and non-energy private chiefly estimated by have a strong and significant impact 
Bentolila large manufacturing firms GMM (AB, 1991) on wages. Outside 
1993 drawn from the database, opportunities in particular, with 
of the Balance Sheet respect to wages, have more 
Survey at the Bank of impact in sectors with lower 
Spain; 1985-1988 productivity growth 
Nickell, Unbalanced panel of 814 UK Basic wa e equation l ' Conditions in the external 
Vainiomaki large manufacturing estimate , in 
labour market as captured by the 
and companies. The data were conjunction with two unemployment terms have a very 
Wadhwani derived by amalgamating the sets of variations of important impact on company 
1992 EXTAT data tape with the the basic wage wages, but the effect is 
DATASTREAM on-line equation estimated. diminished for firms with a high 
service. The data constitute First, with firm size degree of market power 
a continuous series for each interactions. Second, 
company which has a incorporates a 
minimum of six observations. restricted sample 
Industry unemployment rate of companies 
is drawn from the Department who responded 
of Employment Gazette until to NVW's union 
1982 and the Labour Force questionnaire 
Survey (LFS, henceforth). 
Econornywide unemployment 
data obtained from 
Department of Employment 
Gazette. Union mark-up from 
R. Layard and S. Nickell 
(1989): "The Thatcher 
Miracle?, " Centre for Labour 
Economics, Discussion 
Paper 343, Table 29b. Series 
rescaled to 0.08 in 1976. 
Aggregate wage derived from 
S. Savouri (1991): "Regional 
Data 1967-87, " Centre for 
Economic Performance, 
London School of Economics, 
Working Paper 133. Period 
1986 l d 1975 ana yse : - 
Nickell 219 UK firms; Wage equation Unemployment re resses wages. f l 
and 1974-1982 estimated A gregate unemp O yment and 5I 
Wadhwani in stry-wide unemployment u 
1988 has a ne ative impac of wages l " 
Nickell 219 fairly large UK Basic wage equation Outside a ctors, especially the state 
and manufacturing companies in conjunction with union of the 
labour market as captured 
Wadhwani derived from integrating coverage interactions by aggregate unemployment has 
1990 the EXTAT data tape with an important impact on pay 
the DATASTREAM on-line 
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TABLE 2.27 
(CONTINUED) 
Study Data Source Testing "%reltlod ResultS 
service. Industry unemployment obtained trom Department ot 
Employment Gazette and aggregate male unemployment rate from 
Layard and Nickell (1986); 1975-1982 
a significant and negative impact on pay in 1980/81, when the rates of plant closures and 
redundancy were exceptionally rife. They also find intracompany comparisons have a sys- 
tematic impact on pay. See Table 2.28, which summarises the effect of unemployment on 
wage settlements in studies using UK/British survey level data. 
As for the importance of outsider factors in studies, using US survey/Canadian contract 
data, Dickens and Katz (1987) estimate the influence of industry unemployment on wages 
was highly unreliable, as it was sensitive to small variations in the specification. Krueger 
and Summers (1988) show that industry variables have a large impact on relative wages. 
From the finding of inter-industry wage differentials, they infer that firms are less inclined to 
adjust wages in the presence of prevailing unemployment. Vroman (1984) demonstrates that 
unemployment has a positive and significant impact on wages. 
Blanchflower, Oswald and Sanfey (1996) obtain a mixture of results for the influence of 
unemployment on pay in the variety of log earnings equations they estimated. In the hourly 
and annual log earnings equation estimated, the unemployment elasticity of pay is negative. 
But in the equation on the logarithm of the average level of hourly earnings in each industry 
for each year, the long-run unemployment elasticity is ill-defined. 
Mitchell (1978) also obtained a mixture of results with respect to the impact of un- 
employment on pay. In the annual wage adjustment equation for manufacturing he found 
wage setting is not highly influenced by short-run unemployment changes. But using the 
unions contract data, he showed that unemployment has an important effect on short but 
not long-term contracts. He also demonstrates that wage adjustments inter- industries are 
highly intercorrelated. Hamermesh (1970) affirms unemployment has a significant impact on 
wages in the US. 
Currie and McConnell (1992) finds that the higher aggregate unemployment is, the lower 
is the bargained wage. Industry wage also plays an important role in influencing real wage. 
Using Canadian contract data, Sparks and Wilton (1971) show that unemployment has a 
highly significant impact on wage determination. Christofides and Oswald (1992) confirm 
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the significance of unemployment in Canadian wage determination. Regional unemployment 
has a negative and significant impact on pay. The unemployment elasticity of pay is ap- 
proximately -0.08. In terms of the bargaining process, unemployment in the outside labour 
market depresses pay. Card (1988), using contract data, finds regional unemployment rates 
have a negative influence on wages. Furthermore, increases in alternative wages, have a pos- 
itive impact on wages. See Table 2.29 for a summary of the studies showing the effect of 
unemployment on wages, using US survey/Canadian contract data. 
Overall, the evidence is that unemployment does have an influence on wages; this conforms 
with the insider-outsiderhypothesis. The reason for this, is that w is inseparable and non- 
linear in t and bargainers have nonconstant discount rates. 
Although the proposition that wages are a convex combination of insider and outsider 
factors seem to have empirical support, Manning (1993) has casts some doubts on their 
validity, since he argues that majority of these tests are either not identified, or if they are, 
they are identified only by exclusion restrictions. See Table 2.30. 
Thus, the econometric evidence noted above, that variables like productivity and profits 
influence wages are dubious, since in a majority of cases (for example, if the firm's production 
function is Cobb Douglas) a positive correlation between these variables would exist on the 
labour demand curve. However, in reply one could argue that the use of lagged variables 
obviates this problem. Thus, the wage equations may be identified using lagged variables, 
and indeed, it is lagged profits that have a strong influence on wages, as noted in the above 
studies. In addition, both Blanchflower, Oswald and Sanfey (1996), as noted, and Hildreth 
and Oswald (1997) show that total profits in a wage equation are positive and significant, 
which defies the labour demand curve interpretation. See Table 2.31. 
Irrespective of what is the best way of modelling empirical tests of insider effects, the 
body of evidence appears to clearly imply that, they are a prominent wage determinant. 
TABLE 2.28 
DOES UNEMPLOYMENT HAVE A NEGATIVE IMPACT ON WAGE SETTLEMENTS? 
Studies Using UKIBritish Survey Data 
Study 
__ ___ 
Data Source Testing M thod Results 
BTan cH Hower British WIRS1984 data Empirical evidence External pressures 
and on 1,267 private sector presenting the results have an influence Oswald 
1988 
establishments with 
l 
which constitute the 
f A 
on pay 
equa to or greater actors which in uence 
than 25 employees; the level of pay in the 
1981 and 1084 most recent settlement 
Blanchflower British survey data of Three logarithmic External pressures have an important 
Oswald WIRS 11 (1984) covering wage equations are impact on pay in the unskilled sector. 
and 
G tt 
all manufacturing and 
i t i b th 
estimated. One 
ti ith th t t l 
The unemplovinent elasticity of 
Th external i 0 14 b & arre serv ce sec ors n o equa on w e o a . e wages sa - . o 1990 public and private sectors. sample, second wage elasticity is approximately equal to 
A sample of 2019 eq4atjon with the 0.7. The external wage rates aiid 
- establishments were unionised private unemployment levels have a significant 
utilized. Two external sector and the third impact on skilled, semi-skilled and 
variables were also 
d h i 
equation with the non- Q i 
unskilled workers waýes. The elasticities 
fb h h ncorporate to t e unionis pr vate ese external pressures are o ot t WIRS2 data, 
ll ifi 
sector. Two equations 
d i 
largest in the unskilled sector. In the 
th kill d i i d t t l y county spec ca per are est mate uns un on se sec or, e ex erna e 
unemployment rates three of the skill wage has a coefficient of 0.49 as 
and county wage 
rates derived 
groups. One with the 
county unemployment 
osed to 0.92 in the non-union sector. Mile 
unemplc! yrnent has an elasticity of 
from the Department rate and the other -0.16 in the unionised sector as 
of Employment. with the county opposed to 0 in the non-unionised 
These provide average weekly sector. In the non-unionised sector, 
h i fl l disaggregated wage rate as the as more n uence the externa wage 
roxies across external variable on wages in the unskilled sector than 
5 British counties in the skilled sector. In the 
unskilled non-union sector, the 
partial wage elastjcitý with respect 
I to external wage is a most unity- 
whilst for other sectors of the labour 
market it is almost a half. High 
external unemployment weakens 
the workers' bargaining strength. Unempýoy! nent is not significant in the 
non-unionised sector. It is consistently 
significant in the unionised sector, with 
coefficients ranging from -0.09 to -0.16 Blanchflower UK data on 5300 Natural Fear of unemployment seems to reduce 
1991 employees collated through logarithm wages vastly. Unemployment detracts i i h W k f h b v estionnaires from the of natural arga n ng strengt . or ers rom t e d d t 9 h b e pooled British Social earnings un an earn per w o expect to e re Attitudes Survey. Regional equations cent less than their counterparts. 
unemployment which is estimated Workers in the non-union sector who 
the unemployment in the expect plant closure, earns 19 per cent th l ' U l ti l Standard Region drawn n e emp oyee s ess. nemp oymen 
from the various issues of re on reduces pay with an average i 
iti 
it f 0 1 W i fl ced l 
g 
Employment Gazette. age c yo - . . s n uen a s e Regional wage, which is the 
weekly eýrnin s of male g 
more by changes in unemployment 
rate in the non-union than in the 
workers in the Standard union sector. High unemployment Reg! on is derived from in the vicinity contributed to the 
ýRegional Trends, various highest union mark up in the - issues. Psychological 80s' 19 data based on the series 
of surveys pertaining to 
Gre ory, t 
expected redundanc A roximately equal to 3R Analysed Evidence of the risk of redundancy 
ressure on a exertin a downward Lob an O manufacturing 1, wage p p y g 
and . industries encompassing settlement settlements. They also found other 
Thomson ap roximately equal to 
2%10 ttl t 
equation to 
ascertain the cii 
an important external factors havin 
speci cally impact on wage 1985 se emen 
grou'ps and 600,000 f th 
factors that 
have an 
, , . comparisons within intracompan but tKe attained a constant rating employees rom e Confederation of impact on 
, importance of each external focus of 
British Industries wage comparison with the industry, locality, 
(C B I, henceforth) determination nationally and with national agreements, 
declined sharply in 1980, with only 
minimal improvements post 1980 
Gregory, 
L b 
1319 UK 
establishments 
Analysed 
factors that 
Marginal employers are restricting pay 
increases to those employees who are o ban 
and from the CBI have an subject to the threat of redundancy. 
Thomson Pa Databank; impact on wage Thus, external factors, notably the 
1986 1X9-1984 determination, redundancy rate has an impact on pay, by bargaining 
t t e 
particularly, with less rosperous 
ers and less weN established lo em s ruc ur p y 
employees. 
Gregory, 
Lobban 
CBI Pay Databank 
Survey of Pay 
Joint Generalised 
Least Squares 
Unemplo ment its duration and the risk 
of redunTaIncy has a minimal negative 
and Settlements. The (henceforth, JGLS) impact on wages over the period 
Thomson data comprises of a estimates estimated ' 
1979/80-1983/84. Although, they 
1987 series of five by Zellner's Method naturally, find that the risk of redundancy 
sequential annual on 848 observations, played a significant role in exerting. a 
surveys of a sample showed the importance significant negative impact on pay in 
group of settlement s of factors that have 1980/81. They also find intracompany 
19 1979/80- 83/84 an impact on pay comparisons has a systematic 
settlements; 1980-1984 impact on wage settlements. 
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TABLE 2.29 
DOES UNEMPLOYMENT HAVE A NEGATIVE IMPACT ON WAGE SETTLEMENTS? 
Studies Using US Survey/Canadian Contract Data 
Study Data Source Testing Method Results 
Dickens US data from the UPS Wage equations are The estimates 
and from 1983 to approximately estimated in a two-step of the impact of 
Katz 
1 
equal to 1985. The sample 
f 
procedure. In the first step, indust C7 
987 comprises o private sector, ývages are estimated on 0yment unemp 
non-agricultural em ees f l o y individual characteristics, on wages was 
16 years of age or o d e r 
i h l d 
geogra Xhic dummies and 
i i h i i i d 
highly unreliable 
i w t comp ete ata on . t ree- g t n ustry as t was 
either hourly wages or dummies. In the second sensitive to 
normal weekly earnings step, the coefficients of the small variations 
and normal hours of three-digit industry dummies in the 
work per week. The are estimated on industry specification 
industry unemployment characteristics, such as, 
rate are incorporated profitability, concentration 
ratio and so forth 
Krueger US cross sectional A number of cross-section Industry variables have a larKe impact 
and and longitudinal wage equation estimated on relative wages. For example, wage 
Summers data on individuals to investigate the earnings of an avera e employee in the M 
1988 collected by the importance of industry 4 per cent higher minin 11(idustry ar l i ll 
& 
Bureau of the affiliation in accounting e average emp oyee na than f h Census for the for relative wages, with uman or industries, after controlling 
Ma 1974,1979 Y controls for human týital and demographic background. ca f l l i l an 1984 CPS 
d th U i it 
capital demographic 
b k d d 
T I ad a air y 
4 
ve wages p us, re at 
e etermination tant role in wa i an e n vers y 
of MichiLran's 
ac groun an 
so forth 
g mpor 
intraindustrv. It is inferred from the 
quality 6f finding of large interindustry wage 
Employment differentials, that profits may be 
Survey (QES, relatively insensitive to wages over a 
henceforth) wide range. Thereby, rendering firms 
less inclined to adjust wages in the 
esence of prevailing unemployment 
Vroman US large-scale Influences of union wage 
Une 
pl ment had a positive in 10 I 
1984 longitudinal micro contract settlements in cant impact on wages and sign database from the manufacturing 
US Labour estimated 
Department's Current 
Wage Developments 
comprising of 2274 
very large collective bargaining situations; 1 7-- 1990 
Blancliflower, 
95 - US March CPS data on The logarithm of the The industr unem%jloyment elasticity d 
Oswald 200,000 individuals, for average level of hourly .-; e logarithm of of wage iE 
and the manufacturing sector ýarnings in each industry worker's weekly and hourly earnings Sanfey from 1964-1985 was in the relevant year, using estimated. In the second equation, 
1996 combined with annual cell means estimated. the long-run unemployment elasticity 
profit data for four digit Annual log earnings of wage is ill-defined. In the annual 
manufacturing industries. equations, using cell means d f hi d A 
earnings equation, the long-run profit i t l l ti t f The latter is drawn from 
' 
set o r reestimate . t wage is approx ma e y e as ci yo t f d I h l s Productivit NBER ý equations of hourly log h d 
se o e thir to 0.06. nt equa 
t th l ti IC database. The 1972 
definitions are utilised; 
ustry earnings wit in 
dummies from First-Stage 
oymen e unemp equa ons, 
elasticity of wage are negative and d h hi 1964-1985. The earnings Regressions are estimated. ti h t f Af 
et r significant. With res ect to t 
-run uations tMon t of e data are drawn from the ons se o eqýia ourt , g se q 1965 to1986 CPS. of annual log earnings unemployment elasticity of wage is t th f th ill d fi d I Individuals were asked equations for US equa ions, n e our - e ne . to report their earnings manufacturing utilising ti t d ll 
the set of long-run unemployment 
e in the low-union l ti it of wa in the preceding year. 
Industry unemployment 
ma e . means are es ce A fifth set of equations of 
e as c y g 
sectors are also ill-defined. In the fifth 
derived from external hourly log earnings set of equations, the unemployment 
sources (see Sanfey, equations by union status elasticity of wages are -0.05 and -0.03, 
1995 for further details) estimated in the second-stage regressions and 
cell means respectively. 
Mitchell Two data Wage changes At 6 per cent official unemployment 
1978 sources 
utilised. The 
estimated in annual 
e uation vis-a-vis 
increases, aI percentage point increase 
in the unemployment rate, depresses 
first is a six t 
§e 
year-to-year h 
the non-union wag! ý rate by 0.4 
Variations in short- ercenta oint e data series 
drawn from 
per cent c an s rl 
in the CPI anYthe 
p . p g run unemployment has only a small 
the US reciprocal of the 
t l 
impact on wage-settin First-year 
ust ments in both t& major and ad Bureau of oymen unemp j 
Labour rate (U-1). Two minor unions display the same 
Statistics- forms of sensitivity to unemployment as the W h 1960-1976. 
The second 
unemployment 
rate are estimated; 
respect to nonunion sector. it 
reaction of deferred wage changes 
is a file of svEcifically, the d h 
to lagged unemployment in the minor 
e oint increase ercenta 1 t large union 
agreements 
o ficial rate an t e 
weighted Perry rate. d t h l 
p g or, a p sec 
in the official unemployment rate from 
curtail the life er cent level would a6 pertaining to 
changesin 
atter a jus s e T 
for changes in the 
, p 
-of-contract wage increase by a quarter 
ay rates For 
selected 
composition of the 
labour force that 
of I )er cent. The response is 
considerably lower for three year h l i d f units in have had an i act inK e re at ve ex o t contracts. The in 
manufacturing ip on the relations wage status of an industry pr-ior to the 
mining and between observed effoictive date of the contract, 
transport unemployment and (henceforth, REL)1. has a negative 
industries the "tightness" or and significant impact on wages. This 
uREL is ciýn_iiwted by dividing the base earnings by average hourly earnings for the non-agricultural sector in the year preceding the Then the ratio was normalised by dividing it by its mean value for all contracts pertaining to the same t t effective date of t rac . he con 
M em loyer in the contract. is incorporated in the regression in ratio form. For example, an industry with wage sI per cent in excess of the normal has a 
REL=1.01. 
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TABLE 2.29 
(CONTINUED) 
"tudy 
_Data 
Source Yesting Method Results 
"looseness" of the Tn7icates that it wages in an 
labour market. industry were 10 per cent in 
Wage ýquation from excess of the normal prior to 
the union contract bargaining, that is, 
data also estimated (REL = 1.10), wages would 
increase more gradually, by 
about two percentag points in 
the first year than t ey would 
otherwise, that is, if REL 
1.00. Regressions of the 
contract sample, show that 
ýinemployment has an 
important influence on short 
term contracts. For instance, 
a1 percentage increase in 
the official unemployment rate 
from a6 per cent level would 
curtail the life-of-contract wage 
movements by 1.2 percentage 
points. Obversel ' L 
unemployment es not have 
a significant impact on the 
entire duration of the 
long-term contracts 
Hamermesh Wa e and 9 Negotiated wage change at Unemployment 
1970 pro t data annual rate are estimated rate has a 
drawn from incoTporating the inverse of significant 
bargaining the unemployment rate. The impact on wages 
situations in twelve non-linear form of the 
manufacturing and unemployment variable is 
four in public utilities. included as in A. W. Phillips 
Wage rates data are (1958). The specific form of 
derived from the Bureau the variable is indicated in 
of Labour Statistics Perry (1966). Estimation 
series of wage method is by the least squares. 
chronologies and their To curb serial dependence 
continuation are found amongst the residuals, caused 
in the recent issues of by the heterogeneity in the 
CWDs. The size of the wage settlement 
unemployment rate is the negotiated he reestimates all 
CPS seasonally adjusted 
i ili l t 
equations with a set of dumm 
i bl ll th fi 
N 
f c v an unemp oymen var a or a e rms, w es 
rate for the month when the exception of one and tests 
the new wa e is settled. g if the vector of coefficients is 
alýses are Period of an 
from 1948-196 for the 
significantly different from zero. 
F Jrst set of equations estimated 
whole period and from from 1948-1967. Equation 
1948-1961 and reestimated with a set of firm 
1962-1967 separately dummy variables, utilising 135 
contracts bargained between 
1948 and 1961 subsequently 
for 45 contracts bargained 
- between 1962-1967. Third 
set of equations examined to 
compare the impact of wages 
during 1962-1967, 
unemployment vis-a-vis to 
that observed in 1948-1961 
Currie Large panel dataset of US Firm-specific determinants Industry level wage has an i h and labour contracts from CWD of the logarithm of the important mpact on t e h h h McConnell Contract tape derived from average expected real real wage. T e ig er 
1992 the Bureau of Labour wage estimated by Two the ag&regate h Statistics. With respect to Stage Least Squares unemployment, t e more 
almost half the contracts the a 
(TSLS) depressed the bargained 
i t F wage levels were obtaine wa&es are. or ns ance, 
from an independent contract their estimates indicate 
listing published by the Bureau an increase in the 
of National Affairs. For the unemployment rate by 
remainder of the contracts, 10 per cent lowers 
annual hourly earnings for the bargained wage by 
appropriate 4-digit Standard 
Industrial Classification 
approximately 
equal to 1.5 
category are drawn from per cent 
Em loyment and Earnings as 
theTase wage level. The 
wage equation is estimated 
using data derived from 
approximately equal to 1300 
i d Th b ne . ese arga US contracts 
cover 28 different 2-d' it 
1 81 
Sparks 
SIC industries; 1970- 
All wa e settlements data Rate of Unemployment has a highly 
and from 
Me 
Canadian change significant impact on wage 
Wilton Department of Labour and of wages determination. With respect 
1971 data for the remainder of the eatiation to the interactions effects of 
variables were mainly drawn eitimated unemployment with price 
from the published Dominion changes, the evidence 
Bureau of Statistics documents. suggests for instance, at 
Sources of profit and total three per cent unemployment 
assets data by industry. were the ratio of change of prices 
derived from the Department has minimal impact on wage 
of National Revenue Taxation changes, whilst the influence 
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TABLE 2.29 
(CONTINUED) 
Pooled sample of time-series data with 
respect to 14 Canadian manufacturing industries. Data on individual 
contracts utilised. Profits were designated as a per cent of assets Christofides Canadian data on 595 labour 
and contracts from Labour Canada. Oswald Regional unemployment data is, 1992 also derived from the Labour Canada tape. The national 
unemployment rate is drawn from Cansim (D767611). 
Detailed province/SIC 
information on average 
weekly earnings deflated by the CPI, is a proxy for 
outside wage rate are 
obtained from Cansim 
M8007-M8727); 
978.1-1984.4 
Card Labour contracts data from the 
1988 Canadian manufacturing sector. December 1985, Labour Canada's 
Wagý Tape on wage rates and other 
provisions with respect ýo. 1467 
. contracts and 298 bargaining pair 
pýrtaining to 500 or more employees. 
The average hourly earnings in all 
manufacturing from January 1961 to 
March 1983 drawn from Cansim D1518, 
from the 1983 University Base Tape 
(December 1983 Release). From April 
1983 to June 1986 data was derived from Cansim L5607 from the various 
issues of the Bank of Canada Review. 
Data from April 1983 onwards are 
multiplýeýd by 1.040 to take account of 
the revision in the establishment 
survey. Unemployment rates were 
seasonally adjusted. Rates for January 
1966-1983 were derived from the 1983 Cansim University Base Tape. Rates 
from December 1983-December 1985 
were drawn from the Bank of Canada 
Review, November 1986. The followini; 
were utilised: Quebec-Cansim D76847 Ontario-Cansim D768648- British 
Columbia-Cansim D7692H reminder 
of the provinces-Cansim Dý67611 
(national rate); 1966-1983 
Log of the real 
difference in real 
wage equations 
estimated mainly 
without 
incorporating 
industry prices. 
Regressions with 
the industry 
prices substitutes 
yýar dummies 
with a constant. 
Estimation 
method is by 
Generalised 
Least Squares 
and IV-GLS 
Determinants of 
the expected 
average real wages 
estimated. Specifically, first 
difference of 
expected average 
real wage rate 
fquation estimated, 
in conjunction with 
all explanatory 
variables 
incorporated also 
as first difference form. To alleviate 
the first order 
moving average 
error component from the 
observations from 
a &iven bargaining 
pair the estimation 
method is by two 
step procedure. This eliminates the 
residual correlation 
between consecutive 
contracts for a bargaining pair, it i,,; 
claimed 
higher rates of 
unemployment. Incorporation 
of industry effects the relative 
base rate variable to be 
, ificant Signnemployment 
in the outside 
labour market depresses pay. 
Unýmployment in the employers's 
region has a negative and 
significant impact on wages. The 
outside wage in the vicinity and 
with the same SIC categor); 
generally, has a positive and 
significant im act on pay. The 
outside wage 
tas 
a positive 
coefficient of approximately 0.06 
and the general statistical 
significance is at 5 per cent level. 
Replacing the full set of time 
dummies by a constant, yields 
almost identical results. When 
indust ... corporated, 
regiona unemployment retains the 
negative and sgificant impact on 
pay. National anadian 
unemployment rate also has a 
negative and sIgnificant influence 
on real wage. The national 
unemployment elasticity of the 
real wage is aplgOximately 
equal to -0.08. ut 
simultaneous inclusion of the 
re . ial unemployment with 
inTuOsItry prices as explanatory 
variable renders national 
unemplO ment to be insignificant 
Regionaly 
unerntloyment 
rates ave a 
negative impact 
on wages.. Increases in 
alternative wage 
has a positive 
influence on 
wages. It is 
claimed, these 
estimates are 
robust to other 
specifications 
TABLE 2.30 
A STUDY WHICH CONSIDERS WAGES TO NOT BE A CONVEX 
FUNCTION OF INSIDER AND OUTSIDER FACTORS 
Study Data Source 
- 
Testing Method Kesults 
Manning UK annual wage setting 4a57. 
1993 The 52 times weekly earnings 
Unemployment 
and real 
Majorit t the econometric tests noted above 
are invaTido since they are not identified or if 
data for full time male manual consumer they are, 
ley are identified only by arbitrary 
l i i i Th workers in all industries and wage growth exc us on restr ct ons. us, most econometric 
services is drawn from the equations evidence noted in the studies above, that variables 
Department of Employment estimated with such as productivity and p. rofits influence wages 
Gazette, British Labour real consumer are dubious, since in a majority of cases (for 
' Statistics Yearbook 1969-76, wage growth as example, if the firm s production function is Cobb 
BLS Historical Abstract 1948- a refressor in Douýlas) a positive correlation between these 
l i ld i h l b d yment 1986. Male unemplo 
data obtained from Department 
I the ormer. 
Estimation is 
ab es wou var ex st on t e a our emand curve. 
Howe in reV one could argue that the use 
of Employment Gazette- Retail by IV method 
m ý 
e of lagge varia e obviates this problem. Thus, 
e index data deriveý from Nio the wage equations may be identified using la ed variables and i d d it i l d fi nomic Trends; 1956-1987 gg , n ee , s agge pro ts that have a strong influence on wages 
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TABLE 2.31 
STUDIES WHICH DEFY THE LABOUR DEMAND CURVE INTERPRETATION FOR THE IMPACT OF 
VARIABLES SUCH AS PROFIT AND PRODUCTIVITY ON WAGES 
manctinower, 
Oswald 
Uýi data on manufacturing indust, , pertaining to approximately equal to 2GO, 000 f2time, 
The logarithm of the 
average level of hourly 
Total profits 
are positive 
and Sanfey 
1996 
ffill-year workers drawn from the March 
tapes of the CP§. Earnings data are drawn f 1965 1986 CPS P fi d i d df 
earnings equation in 
each industry in the l 
a. nd 
sigificant. hi i rom - . ro t ata s erive rom re evant year, using w ic s n NBER's Productivity Database constructed by cells means estimated. defiance of the Gray (1989). The database comprises of 450 
f d i f 
Annual log earnin&s labour 
d d our- ig t manu acturing industries utilising the 1972 SIC d fi iti 1964 1985 
equations using cell 
ti t d 
eman curve 
i t t ti 
Hild h e n ons; - A l means rees ma e n erpre 
a on fi ret nnua data on unbalanced panel of 329 firms derived Wage equations Total pro ts 
and from an EXTAT database on company accounts estimated by GNINI are positive Oswald pertainin& to both manufacturinjg and IV with respect to and 1997 norimanufacturing industry. Which comprises of 38 fi i f f 
first, the panel of significant in h b h rms regorting n ormation rom 1983-1990.209 firms f 19 2 199 d2 fi f 
329 companies d d 
e wage t ot 
i rom - 0 an 8 rms providing in ormation from the eriod 1981 1990 W th tt th 
an secon , tt ith 
equat ons 
ertainin to p - . i respec o e respec oa w p g establishment panel, annual observations on 100 panel of 58 companies 
establishments were collated in a survey by Hildreth. establishments and It focuses in the West Midlands region of the UK. establishments. Dataset compiled by utilising three types of survey This 
techniques interviews; contact with local industrial violates/ 
organisations which yielded an incomplete databank nullifies 
on manufacturing industry in the region, a postal d l h l l 
thelabour 
d d an te ep one survey was also conducte Ultimate y 58 plants are utilised for their analysis due to reasons 
eman 
interpretation 
including anomalies in the data; 1980-1986 
2.6. CONCLUSIONS 
We have reviewed all the main theories of wage of wage determination, with special attention 
being focused on 10 theories. In essence, they are all species of the rent-sharing theories. 
Only, if there is rent to be shared, will firms pay higher wages. This is a phenomenon 
which EWT omits to take into account, in conjunction with agents being fully rational', as a 
consequence of forward-behaviour. These are the prime deficiencies of EWT. 
I have abstracted from the situation8 to form an empirical and theoretical model in terms 
of which to develop the empirical and theoretical analyses in the context of IOT. Indeed, the 
main wage determination theories have also made no attempt to show the consequences of 
forwaxd-looking behaviour of agents, nor have any studies in the applied labour literature, 
established forward-looking behavior. Furthermore, recruitment and retention is of funda- 
mental and chief importance in labour turnover theories. Empirical studies in the past have 
examined recruitment and retention as a part of a general enquiry on wage determination. 
But these examinations have made no attempt to investigate the importance of recruitment 
and retention in wage-baxgaining in detail. Since the review focusses on IOT, I also reviewed 
the seminal contributions and early developments of IOT. 
IOT, as developed by many authors, is an important contribution to our understanding of 
how wages are determined. I have reviewed the main contributions and the main conclusions 
8That is, the development of these phenomenon in EWT. 
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are as follows. First, several implications of some IOMs are not robust to variations in the 
model's specification. For example, the implication of asymmetric adjustment in wages and 
persistence in unemployment is not necessarily valid. However, the implication of insider and 
outsider factors influencing wages is robust: this is strongly supported by both theory and 
empirical evidence, which suggests that insider forces, that is, forces emanating from within 
the firm, are a prominent determinant of wages. This conclusion applies to all corporate 
entities, irrespective of whether the workers in these entities are unionised or not. 
One point that emerged from the body of evidence is that unemployment has a nega- 
tive impact on wages; this is in line with both the efficiency wage hypothesis and insider- 
outsiderhypothesis and also Blanchflower and Oswald's (1994) wage curve. Since from the 
efficiency wage hypothesis, we know that unemployment is a disciplinary device (see Shapiro 
and Stiglitz, 1984); workers exert greater effort as to avoid being laid off, particularly since 
higher wages are also paid for the exertion of greater effort. This results in greater productiv- 
ity, which in turn leads to greater rents that the workers can appropriate from the firm, due 
to insider power, as propounded in the insider view of wage determination. But higher un- 
employment depresses the wages insiders can demand. This confirms my casual observation 
that EWT is informally a special case of IOT. From the review (evidence), the most striking 
determinant of wages appeared to be the firm's financial vaxiables as shown by a body of 
studies, for example, Wadhwani (1987), Nickell and Wadhwani (1988,1990), Blanchflower 
Oswald and Garrett (1990), Scaramozzino (1991), and Dolado, and Bentolila (1993). As for 
the importance of the implication for the impact of outside factors in wage determination, 
unemployment, overall, has a negative impact on wages as noted. 
Research Question 
I recapitulate and state the main goals of this thesis: 
1. A concise statement of the question that my thesis tackles. 
2. Justification, by direct reference to the above literature review, that my question is 
previously unanswered. 
3. Discussion of why it is worthwhile to answer this question. 
I will discuss each of these items in turn. 
With respect to item 1, when rational agents with foresight bargain in an ongoing rela- 
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tionship, it is natural for each agent to consider all the utility (both present and future), of 
the respective players. The worker would want to take account of rents available for sharing, 
both now and in the future, as noted above. For example, if the future financial performance 
of the firm is favourable, higher wages will be sought. Obversely, if the future financial per- 
formance is unfavourable, workers will lower their wage demands and may even take a pay 
cut. For example, the crew of United American Airlines9 accepted a pay cut to avert bank- 
ruptcy for three months. There is also a body of formal evidence to suggest this: for example, 
Nickell and Quintini (2003). First, I empirically investigate to establish whether bargainers 
care about the future. I then, naturally, pursue the consequences of this behaviour, with the 
added ingredient of full rationality. In the interim, I also establish the inherently fundamental 
phenomenon of the importance of recruitment and retention of workers in wage-bargaining 
in detail. 
Item 2 above, is largely covered in the main text above, where I have analysed what I have 
presented above and pointed the weaknesses of the past literature, I also state now that my 
task is to develop an empirical and theoretical model assuming that the terms of trade will be 
a differential function of time, since bargainers bargain with foresight, and are fully rational. 
For example, the distinct explanation put forward by LS is inherently static as noted above. In 
the past authors have made no endeavour to chaxacterize the behaviour of the terms of trade 
as a function of time in an ongoing relationship as noted above. In addition, in the interim my 
task is to develop an empirical model to establish the importance of recruitment and retention 
in detail. There has been no attempt to accomplish this in the past. This thesis will develop 
an empirical model establishing forward-looking behaviour and a theoretical model pursuing 
the consequences of this behaviour, and a further empirical model establishing the importance 
of recruitment and retention as a major bargaining concern; to prove why this problem is 
crucially important and should not be neglected. In the labour market I have already shown 
above each class of previous approaches fails (that is, for example, with respect to pursuing 
the consequences of forward-looking behaviour, all studies of wage determination focus on 
steady-state wages and if out-of-steady- state dynamics are discussed at all, again steady-state 
wages are imposed). 
In the last item, I will point out why taking into account bargainers are forward-looking 
9See Financial Times, 28/4/04. 
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is highly useful and can be applied to any economic axea. It is worthwhile to answer these 
crucially important questions, otherwise there will be a void in our understanding of wage 
determination. If these important aspect of bargaining in particulax axe precluded, then the 
existing theory is deficient and the predictions derived from it are distorted. 
By including all the essential aspects of the bargaining process, we can then provide a 
wholesome perspective of wage determination. Both my empirical studies have confirmed 
this fact. 
As I have noted above, as with all the theoretical studies all the empirical studies have 
made no attempt to regard the game in its entirety, by seeking first, theoretically, to show 
what it is worth for each agent to have the opportunity to engage in the game, taking into 
account, not just utilities and endowments, available for bargaining today, at time t, but 
-also at time t+1. Of course, it follows that no empirical verification has been made of 
this important dimension of bargaining, which has been ignored in the past, as has the 
consequences of this forward-looking behaviour. But even more fundamentally, given that 
recruitment and retention of workers is paramount to any firm/organisation and indeed is a 
indispensable concern in wage-bargaining, no endeavours have been made to establish this in 
detail empirically. 
This thesis is devoted to analysing both empirically the forward-looking behaviour in 
wage-bargaining and theoretically the consequences of this behaviour of agents, and investi- 
gating the importance of recruitment and retention of workers as a major bargaining concern 
in detail (with some degree of forward-looking effects'O) for which no attempts have been 
made as fax as I can ascertain. Since the game is played by forward-looking and fully rational 
agents in a dynamic environment, with recruitment and retention of workers an important 
wage determinant, it is crucially important to incorporate these features into the game, either 
jointly or independently. So it is clearly, of immense interest to investigate the forward-looking 
behaviour of agents and this I undertake in the next chapter. 
"Given the dataset I have at my disposal currently. With DATASTREAM on-line, for example, I would 
expect to establish full forward looking effects. I will leave this for my immediate future research. 
CHAPTER 3 
DOES FORWARD-LOOKING BEHAVIOUR 
MATTER IN WAGE DETERMINATION? 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
A dynamic wage-bargaining situation involves a firm and a worker, or workers representatives 
such as, a union, who have the opportunity to collaborate for their mutual benefit in multiple 
ways. In the case considered in this chapter, bargainers will want to bargain not just about 
what is available today, at time t, but also in the future at t+1. No action will be taken by 
either bargainer without taking into account what is available for bargaining from the other 
party. 
The economic situations between firms and workers are regarded as bargaining problems 
which two agents solve to their mutual satisfaction. This economic situation has occurred in 
one form or another for centuries, irrespective of the presence of the unions. It is the purpose 
of the chapter to provide an empirical verification of this problem. This is a classical applied 
wage determination situation, as treated by Nickell and Wadhwani (1990) (NW henceforth), 
Blanchflower, Oswald and Garrett (1990) and others", which permits the identification of 
this typical wage-bargaining situation in a steady-state. 
In general terms, I idealise the bargaining situation and hence the empirical formulation, 
by assuming that the two agents are fully rational, maximise an intertemporal utility function, 
and axe forward- looking. They accurately compare their desires for the future, they are 
equally skilled in dynamic bargaining, and each has full knowledge of the extent of the future 
preferences of the other. 
In order to provide an empirical treatment of the wage-bargaining situation, I abstract 
from the situation to form an empirical model which enables us to develop the analysis. 
" Other authors include Slichter (1950) who was the first to show that there is a positive correlation between 
'the firm's ability to pay' and wages, in contrast to the predictions of the competitive theory. This was 
confirmed by Dickens and Katz (1987), Krueger and Summers (1987,1988), Katz and Summers (1989), and 
Blanchflower, Oswald and Sanfey (1996) using US time series data. Using European data, Blanchflower and 
Oswald (1990), Beckerman and Jenkinson (1990), Carruth and Oswald (1989a), Christofides and Oswald 
(1992), Holmlund and Zetterberg (1991), Denny and Machin (1991), Hildreth and Oswald (1997) and Nickell 
and Wadhwani (1990) reach similar conclusions. 
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In estimating my wage-bargaining model, I employ a regression equation, which reflects 
the main determinants of wage-bargaining. That is, I incorporate into the empirical model, 
the desire of each forward-looking agent to maximise his dynamic gain, specifically from the 
future financial performance of the firm, in bargaining. In addition, I also incorporate other 
gains emanating from within the firm, and other external factors, such as unemployment, 
which are beyond both agents' control. 
How do the agents seek their goals? Is it determined individually, collectively or by other 
means? Whenever workers are in employment, they would have to be paid the appropriate 
wage and it does not matter whether they seek this collectively or individually. Unionisation 
is not necessary to increase wages, see for instance, Card (2001), who found that despite 
sharp shifts in union membership, the structure of union wage effects was about the same 
in the mid-1990s as it was in the mid-1980s. This was confirmed by a number of studies, 
for example, Hoxby (1996) and Menezes-Filho (1997), which show that wage increases reflect 
the desire of managers to share the profits of the firm with workers and axe predisposed 
against unions. It follows that unions are not required to reach a satisfactory conclusion. 
Unions of course, enhance the bargaining power of workers in a modern setup, but they are 
not necessary, and there is a considerable body of evidence which suggests this (Lindbeck 
and Snower, 1988c; Brown, Ingram and Wadsworth, 2004). It has also been suggested that 
employer and workplace characteristics generally have a greater effect on pay than union 
bargaining (see Forth and Millward, 2000b, (FM (2000b), henceforth)). 
Wage-baxgaining is still very important, but the means of facilitating it have altered. 
That is, unions do not play as significant a role in wage-bargaining as they did up the decline 
in union power around to early 1980s. The real wage growth over the last 21 years does 
not indicate that there has been a decline in the rate of wage growth, to coincide with the 
decline of the unions, in contrast to when union strength was at its peak prior to the Thatcher 
era (Gray, Ingram and Rickman, 2004). But the money wage may have risen more slowly, 
preventing inflation (i. e., cost-push inflation may have decreased). This again suggests that 
unions are not important for effective wage-bargaining. 
Policy prominence with regaxd to industrial relations has declined, but this does not imply 
that wage-bargaining has altered irrespective of the form it takes. Indeed, there is evidence 
to suggest that 89 per cent of establishments (with employees in excess of 10) that had an 
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annual settlement also have a review of pay (FM, 2000b). In the non-union sector. most 
employees have an annual pay review (Ingram, Wadsworth and Brown. 1999; Brown. Ingram 
and Wadsworth, 2004). Indeed, it is the same in other countries. For example, Japan12 has an 
annual review called the Japanese Shinto, analysed in Barnichon, Olivei and Tenreyro (2005). 
Theories such as efficiency wage theory and insider-outsider theory do not need unions for 
the workers to receive wage increases. Of course in the IOT, unions only enhance the power 
of the workers within the firm, as noted above. It should also be noted that wage increases 
are more prevalent in the private sector where there is a lower degree of unionisation, than 
in public sectors, with a higher degree of unionisation, and where work conditions are also 
considerably better. 
The point of mentioning how workers attain their goals in wage-bargaining is to confirm 
that evidence suggests that unions are not necessary to achieve goals in wage- bargaining. 
Given that wage-bargaining is important irrespective of the shape or form it takes, what are 
the factors that agents take into account when bargaining in a dynamic game, that is, an 
ongoing relationship? The manner in which wages are determined also has macroeconomic 
implications, since it provides an explanation as to what is available for sharing, and how it is 
being shared, which clearly has an impact on unemployment. Agents would be interested in 
obtaining utilities from the current set of utilities that are being bargained over, but they will 
also be bargaining, more importantly, over the future set of utilities. Typically, all theories 
of wage determination, including union models, adopt a static bargaining framework. In 
the IOT, for example, insiders exert greater influence in the wage-bargaining process than 
outsiders and the unemployed. But that theory makes no attempt to seek a solution to a 
bargaining game, where the relationship is ongoing. Consequently, extant econometric studies 
have followed suit in terms of conducting empirical analysis using steady-state wages. 
It is my view that forward-looking behaviour is important, which naturally has serious 
implications for the behaviour of the macroeconomy. Indeed, Anderton, Barrell and In't Veld 
(1993), assuming forward-looking behaviour in wage formation in the context of credibility of 
policy commitment, discuss its role and its implication for monetaxy union. But the analysis 
there makes no attempt to assess the importance of forward-looking behaviour in the context 
of a single economy, not withstanding the role it plays in wage determination. 
12 Japan is randomly chosen for illustration purposes. 
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I will be examining empirically the relevance of forward-looking behaviour in the deter- 
mination of wages in a relationship which is ongoing, in the context of the theoretical model 
developed in a later chapter. The general concept is the following and will be explained partly 
by illustration. 
Suppose the future financial performance, as implied by the current state of the market, 
is favourable. If wage-bargaining is static there will not be any anticipation, that is, a state of 
expectation which may involve the certainty of some contingencies and various probabilities of 
other contingencies. Consequently, the wage bargained (and indeed wage settlements) will not 
be a reflection of the firm's future financial performance. If agents are forward- looking, they 
would clearly bargain with foresight and not bargain myopically, without taking into account 
their bargaining partner's expected endowments in the future irrespective of whether it is 
favourable or adverse. Thus, they will demand wages in accordance with the future financial 
performance of the firm, for example, in a favourable state of the market. 
When forward-looking behaviour is important there will be a tendency for a favourable 
future financial performance to be captured in the form of a higherwage share as the workers 
appropriate the anticipated/expected surplus rent. Similar remarks apply to any other expec- 
tations pertaining to the firm's future financial performance. The tendency will be for wages 
to increase, translating the favourable future financial performance into a wage increase and 
an adverse future financial performance into a paycut or freeze (see chapter 4, for example, 
for preliminary evidence of this). The variables that would capture the forward-looking as- 
pect of the bargainers' behaviour in wage determination are the future financial performance 
variables. 
If the future financial performance of the firm has an important influence in the determi- 
nation of wages, then this has macroeconomic implications, as alluded to earlier. For example, 
if the firm's favourable future financial performance increases current wage settlements, then 
employment in that firm will increase further. An important policy implication is that wage 
(and price) inflation ensues because of agents anticipating future profitability. 
Therefore, this chapter focuses on several issues. First, the main objective is to investigate 
whether the future financial performance of the firm has an important influence on wages. 
It is clear from my theoretical chapter, that this reconciles with the fully rational behaviour 
of agents in a game where the solution is sub-game perfect. In addition, there is a body of 
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evidence to suggest that price-setting is forward-looking and not myopic (see for example, 
Martin, 1999; Price, 1992) where price-setters are shown to be rational and forward-looking 
agents. Moreover, Moghadam. and Wren-Lewis (1994) have shown that wage-setters do antic- 
ipate future movements in prices. They accomplish this by first proposing that agents form 
rational predictions about future price movements and second, that they use simple rules-of- 
thumb based on past price movements. They show that agents form rational expectations 
with respect to inflation when setting nominal wage contracts. 
Second, how important are insider factors in the determination of wages? It is clear both 
from the theoretical and empirical evidence that insider factors are prevalent. It has been 
found by a wide variety of studies that a firm's financial performance is an important determi- 
nant of pay. Managers report that it is the financial performance of the firm, which includes 
profitability, that is the important determinant of pay (Gregory, Lobban and Thomson, 1985; 
or Blanchflower and Oswald, 1988). 
A third issue which is of some interest is the question of what actually determines insider 
power. We examine a variety of determinants, including the relevance and/or the extent 
of unionisation. Another issue I investigate is the importance of external labour market 
conditions on wage-bargaining, that is, the importance of outside factors in shaping pay. If 
these are irrelevant, then this is in support of the pure insider-outsider model of Blanchard 
and Summers (1986). 
Before I undertake to investigate the determinants of wage settlements, it is useful to first 
consider the factors that are relevant to wage determination. Thus, the plan of the chapter 
is as follows: In Section 3.2,1 briefly consider the factors that have an impact on wage 
determination. In Section 3.3,1 provide a brief discussion of my empirical specification. In 
Section 3.4 1 discuss the data, the processes underlying wage determination and the results. 
The final section concludes. 
3.2. FACTORS THAT HAVE AN IMPACT ON WAGE 
DETERMINATION 
The main theories of wage determination which have informed empirical studies over the years 
have been provided in the earlier literature review chapter. The discussion there provides an 
indication of the variables used in my empirical specification, in the light of my comments 
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of the importance of incorporating of forward-looking behaviour in the bargaining process. 
Special attention is focused on IOT. 
The extant theoretical determinants of wages, reviewed in the earlier literature review 
chapter, appear to focus more on predicting wage levels rather than pay adjustments, which 
accrue to reflect the change in circumstances that have occurred since the previous pay was 
determined. So it would be useful to provide a brief discussion of the variables that would 
be present in a satisfactory empirical specification. It should be noted at the outset, that the 
studies I refer to are based on wage levels, whereas my study uses wage increases (settlements) 
as the dependent variable, so this may produce slightly different results. 
Many other variables have been found to affect wage determination. Naturally, special 
attention will be focused on forward-looking effects in wage determination. 
First, there is ample evidence in the union literature, to show that union recognition is 
correlated with higher wages. Blanchflower (1991) finds that the union wage gap in the UK 
is 10 per cent, Stewart (1990) also finds the mean union pay differential to be 8 to 10 per 
cent. However, other more recent studies have found that union status is less important in 
pay determination (Brown, Ingram and Wadsworth, 2004). In addition, there is currently, 
a body of evidence to show that there has been a decline in collective representation with 
regards to pay, and that individual bargaining has increased. This should be unsurprising, 
given the industrial relations changes since the Thatcher era, although employee-employer 
disputes at individual level have not received a great deal of attention vis-a-vis collective 
disputes (Knight and Latreille, 2000a). They do suggest that unresolved disputes are taken 
to Employment Tribunals. 
Indeed, pay is negotiated through consultation, independent individual contracts and 
workers conduct on-the-job search and take up higher offers. With respect to the former, 
this also implies that workers also bargain individually through employee representatives 
(Drinkwater and Ingram, 2002). There is a maxked movement towards greater individualism 
with respect to the employment relation (Kelly, 1998). Moreover, with the Employment 
Relations Act 1999, which curtails the qualifying period for unfair dismissal to one year and 
raises the compensation payments to C50,000, there has been a rapid increase in tribunal 
cases (Knight and Latreille, 2000a). Greater individualism is also reflected in the remarkable 
increase in individual Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service cases. 
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The demise of the union voice is also suggested by Bryson and Gomez (2003). This has 
been echoed by, for example, Machin (2000,2003), Disney, Gosling and Machin (1995), Nlill- 
ward, Bryson and Forth (2000) and Charlwood (2001). In addition, in widespread recognition 
of the declining numbers of employees covered by collective bargaining, an EU Directive on 
Information and Consultation has been passed, which will cover the majority of the workforce 
by 2008 (Gospel and Wilman, 2002)13. Thus, it would be of interest to examine particularly 
if employee coverage by collective bargaining plays a role in wage determination and to what 
extent. So another issue I will be investigating is the importance of union coverage in wage 
determination. 
Second, there is a body of evidence to suggest that an improvement in the firm's financial 
performance will induce insiders to appropriate the excess rent. Blanchflower, Oswald and 
Sanfey (1996) show that an increase in profits leads to an increase in wages. According to 
IOT, the establishment's financial performance could also have an important influence on 
wages (see for example, FM, 2000a). If the profits of the firm have risen, for example, this 
will be reflected in higher wages. In addition, changes in labour productivity will also have 
an impact on wages. Likewise, future financial performance of the firm may also have an 
impact on wages. For example, if the product market is improving, this could lead to higher 
wage settlements. Hence, the better the financial performance, the higher is the bargained 
wage, since greater excess surplus rent accrues from more favourable financial performance. 
Third, following from the above (and also my theoretical analysis in my theoretical chap- 
ter, which deals with the dynamic aspect of the above variable, given agents who axe rational 
and have foresight, firms pay wages in accordance to their future financial performance, irre- 
spective of whether it is adverse or favourable. For example, firms whose future performance 
is better will pay higher wages and vice versa. Similaxly, the workers will also depress their 
wage demands, in accordance to the future financial performance when it is adverse or the 
firm has performed less well. These explanations are intimately related to the concept of 
recruitment and retention of workers, for example, the more prosperous the firm, the greater 
the importance of recruitment and retention of labour. However, due to data constraints, it 
was only possible to show this in a static sense. 
"I shall abstract from whether individual disruption arose as a consequence of cost-cutting strategies in 
expressing discontent. See Knight and Latreille (2000b) and Tremlett and Banerji (1994) for an initial inves- 
tigation on this front. 
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It follows that workers will want to be employed by firms who pay higher wages and 
incumbent workers will also want to retain their employment with the firm. The converse 
is also true. This does not imply that employment is purely supply determined. W'ages are 
correlated with firm size, since it is larger firms that make higher profits. Indeed, higher 
wages are paid to retain and recruit workers, as alluded to above. These are in congruence 
with all rent-sharing theories, for example IOT, which is the main focus of this chapter. This 
of course, implies that the higher the wage, the greater the firm size and vice versa. There 
is again a body of evidence which suggests that the wage is positively correlated to firm 
size (examples include Katz and Summers, 1989; Krueger and Summers, 1988; Burdett and 
Mortensen, 1998). 
There is clear evidence that bargaining in accordance with future financial performance, 
that is, the empirical phenomenon of bargainers exhibiting forward-looking behaviour, ex- 
ists. For example, declining firm performances positively correlate with zero settlements (see 
Ingram, Rickman and Wadsworth, 2003). Indeed, pay rise figures collated by the Incomes 
Data Services (IDS), show that average pay rises awarded in January 2002 were below the 
prevailing rate of inflation". Our first and foremost objective, then, is to attempt to pin 
down these impacts with some precision. 
Like FM (2000a), I will be examining pay adjustments. But unlike FM (2000a), I will be 
focusing on the influence of insider power in wage determination in a dynamic environment. 
Hence, I will consider the variables that could capture the dual impact of insider forces and 
forward-looking effects in wage determination. But empirical studies developed from any of 
the above theories do not make attempts to show that wages will be a function of time, that 
is, the future financial performance of the firm. There is a body of evidence that suggests that 
this phenomenon is prevalent. For example, a number of studies (e. g., Nickell and Quintini 
(2003) and Smith (2000)), have shown that workers accept pay-cuts 15 , when the 
firm is close 
to bankruptcy 16 (see Henle, 1973; Brown, Ingram and Wadsworth, 2004), where it was found 
that downward wage flexibility is pervasive. This suggests that wage-bargaining reflects the 
future performance of the firm, irrespective of whether it is favourable or adverse. 
"See The Times 2/3/02. 
15 The notion of workers taking paycuts is known as concession bargaining 
(see Carruth and Oswald, 1989a). 
16 When the union leader was asked, the reason for conceding to pay cuts, his response was that there is 
only one way, you can push him (the firm, that is) is out of 
business' (Carruth and Oswald, 1989a). Recently, 
stewards of American Airlines accepted a paycut to avert 
bankruptcy of the firm for four months (Financial 
Times 26/3/03). 
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In terms of bargaining, LS (1988c) and eaxtier studies, both theoretical and empirical, 
have only used a static Nash bargaining framework. Indeed, in economics generally, the 
static Nash framework is used. For example, Shi (1995), Týejos and Wright (1995) and 
Rubinstein (1982) focus their analyses on steady states, and even if dynamics are discussed, 
the Nash axiomatic bargaining solution is imposed. This is tantamount to assuming that the 
agents are myopic. This is the case in Christofides and Oswald (1992), where they find that 
the real wage is an increasing function of the level of past profits. But the analyses there 
make no endeavour to show that agents are highly rational agents, who bargain with foresight 
and are forward-looking. My model, in contrast gives rise to a different type of equilibrium. 
In other words, the bargainers consider the future baxgains, irrespective of whether the firm 
is in an adverse or favourable position. For example, if the firm is going to be bankrupt 
in a few year's time, the insider will dampen his wage demands and if the firm will be in 
a favourable financial position, insiders will demand higher wages. The firm will meet the 
workers' demand, since there is immediate trade equilibrium (see my Theorem 1 in Chapter 
5, for more details), on account of factors such as turnover costs of the insiders, in accordance 
with LS, where the IOT is analysed in a static sense, in contrast to the analysis of the IOT 
in this study, which is in a dynamic sense. 
NW's empirical results from their IOM, which axe derived from several empirical specifi- 
cations using a comprehensive and extensive data set, indicate that: 
(i) insiders have an important influence on wage determination, 
(ii) there is some persistency in employment, with both wage demands and offers by firms, 
(iii) wages are more rigid downwards than upwards, 
(iv) outsiders have an impact in wage determination. 
However, the empirical analysis developed by NW (1990) makes no attempt to incorporate 
the fact that the bargained wages axe a reflection of the near future financial performance of 
the firm. I do take into account the fact that each bargainer can costlessly take account of the 
future performance of the firm. This is an important extension for the following reason. In the 
NW result, all bargainers exert greater power in increasing wages, in a static sense. However, 
some workers may not be in a position to increase their wages, notwithstanding the fact that 
some firms will be unable to meet the demand for higher wages due to the adverse financial 
performance of the firm. This occurs even if at time t, the firm is performing well financially, 
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since at t+1, for example, the firm may be in difficult circumstances, financially. If any 
worker were permitted to deviate from the steady-state result, and could bargain the wage in 
accordance with the financial strength of the firm in the future and if the financial strength 
is favourable, he or she would bargain for the highest possible wage, thereby extracting the 
maximum feasible rent from the firm. NW rule this out, by assumption, since workers are 
not ever permitted to bargain in accordance with the near future financial performance of the 
firm. But this is an unappealing feature of their model. In particular, it suggests that allowing 
for the forward-looking and rational behaviour of agents would lead to a very different type 
of result. 
In this chapter, workers are permitted to take into account the near future performance 
of the firm when bargaining at any time. Like NW, it is consistent with the four stylised facts 
described above. Unlike NW, it also implies that workers bargaining with firms expected to 
be in a financially favourable position in the near future will demand and receive higher wages 
and vice versa. However, it is also shown that the result of my investigation converges to 
their result in the limit as t --+ oo or rf =- r.,,,, where r is the discount rate and the subscripts 
f and w pertain to firms and workers respectively as in Chapter 5. NW's assumption that 
wages cannot be a reflection of the near future performance of the firm does not alter the 
qualitative nature of the result in this limiting case. 
Fourth, there is some evidence to suggest that where there are many competitors, product 
markets will be more competitive and firms will strive to lower costs. This is consistent 
with the findings in Guadalupe (2003), where it is shown that product and service market 
competition have a positive correlation with returns to skill. Increases in skill enhance cost 
reduction, which in turn induces firms which are more sensitive to curtailing costs, in the face 
of increasing competition, to pay higher wages to these skilled workers, vis-A-vis low skilled 
workers. Thus, wage increases will only be justified if there is a corresponding increase in 
productivity, for example as shown in NW (1990). In addition, there is also evidence that 
suggests vaxiance of rent appropriation by insiders, is in accordance with the establishment's 
competitive product maxket conditions and the degree of product maxket power (Stewart, 
1990). If I incorporate this factor into our models, I will find that bargained wages will be 
higher, the greater the concentration of output on one product or service. The firm's product 
market power, on account of its output concentrated in a single product or service, has a 
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positive impact on wages, indicating insider forces at play. 
Fifth, if insider power is prevalent, then vacancies are likely to be fined internally. NN"hen 
firms recruit internally it lends support to the 'insider-outsider' theory in a sense. Since the 
firms have already invested in search costs and so forth on these workers, it would be more 
cost-effective to hire from within the organisation. 
Sixth, there is considerable evidence to suggest that foreign ownership pays higher wages 
(see for example, FM, 2000b). If I incorporate this factor into our model, I find that foreign 
ownership lead to higher wages. 
Seventh, bargained wages will also be expected to be higher in the private sector, since 
insider forces are more likely to prevail in the private sector, given union membership. The- 
ories of wage determination generally assume a profit-maximising employer, irrespective of 
whether they are in competitive or imperfectly competitive labour markets. This is not ap- 
plicable to the public sector since the government ultimately determines pay in this sector, 
and its objectives may not be to maximise profits. Hence, it is widely acknowledged that 
insiders cannot fully exert their market power in the bargaining process with the government, 
particularly since the demise of strong union power. 
Eighth, bargained wages are also a reflection of the external factors which have an impact 
on the firm's ability to recruit, retain and motivate. The fewer are vacancies, the lower the 
bargained wage is expected to be, since the exertion of worker power, particularly insider 
power, is limited, due to the fact that the chances of being laid off are greater at any given 
wage. There is ample evidence to suggest this (see for example, Blanchflower and Oswald, 
1994). Similarly, the higher the number of unemployed workers, the lower are the bargained 
wages, since the probability of being substituted by an unemployed worker axe greater at 
any given wage. Since IOT is an offshoot of EWT, the same reasoning is applicable to 
IOT, but not of course the strong version of IOT, as mentioned in Chapter 2. There is a 
considerable body of evidence to suggest this, (see for example, Ericksson and Gottfries, 2002). 
Dolado and Bentolila (1993) using 1,167 manufacturing private firms over the period 1983-8, 
found the Spanish natural unemployment rate had a negative (-0.928) and significant (5-60) 
impact on wages. Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) also show theoretically that a wage curve 
is prevalent, i. e., there is a negative correlation between unemployment and wages across 
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regions. Moreover, they also found this holding the level of regional productivity constantI7. 
Thus, I investigate the relevance of these outside factors to the wages of the employed. 
These considerations which take into account a dynamic environment in wage-bargaining, 
will enable us to provide a more satisfactory empirical formulation, which I undertake next. 
3.3. EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION 
In the IOT a theory of wage determination is developed, which incorporates as a special case 
the static wage determination problem, as is the case with all wage determination theories 
where the steady-state Nash solution is used. But the theory there, and indeed all other 
wage determination theories, ignores the forward-looking aspect of wage determination, that 
is, what it is worth to each agent to have the opportunity to engage in the ongoing game. 
In the light of this, I use the theoretical model of my succeeding theoretical chapter, where I 
explicitly show that agents are fully rational and have foresight and show the consequences 
of forwardlooking behaviour. Naturally, the agents' behaviour plays an important role in 
the bargaining process and, as a consequence, the outcome. It is my view that statistical 
estimation of wage determination must focus on the depiction of the bargainers' behaviour, 
since it cannot be satisfactorily be represented in a wage equation derived from the static Nash 
bargaining solution. Only following such an analysis can one proceed to formulate a model 
of wage determination encompassing additional factors such as forward-looking variables in 
the context of insider or rent-sharing factors accruing from either agent and so forth. 
As implied above, the forthcoming empirical analysis is devoted to this viewpoint. The 
behaviour of agents is incorporated in the estimation of wage equations. In particular, the 
wage will be a function of insider factors, including the firm's financial performance, the state 
of the market for the firm's products, market concentration, firm size, union recognition and 
unemployment. Since I am handling firm-level data, it is clearly necessary to control for the 
proportion of vacancies filled within the organisation and the ownership of the firm. The 
former may reveal the relevance of insider power and in the latter, foreign ownership may 
contribute to higher earnings as opposed to insider power having any effect. We do this by 
including the appropriate variables in the wage equations. 
"A multitude of other studies echo similar results, across a wide range of countries (see for example, 
Montgomery, 1994). 
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Following the NW analysis18, I formulate the following empirical specification, 
Wi = ßO + ßlPi + ß27i + ß3ei + ß47ni + ß5Ui + Xli5 +'Ei 
where wi is the wage settlement in establishment i; p is the financial performance of the 
establishment; r is the union coverage, c are the market concentration/compet it ion variables; 
m is the state of the market for the firm's product; u is the unemployment variable and X, 
a vector of other controls. The 3's and J are the parameters to be estimated and -i is the 
error term. 
It is the variable m which is a novel feature of this model, vis-A-vis earlier studies. This 
variable is used to determine whether forward-looking behaviour matters in determining 
wages. Using the data on the percentage change in wages, the manner in which wages are 
bargained, I am able to show the determinants of wages. Such a formulation, which uses 
explanatory variables, including the behaviour of agents with foresight, is in contrast to 
previous studies. 
3.4. DATA AND METHODS 
Although preferable, it was infeasible to apply variables such as stock maxket valuation vari- 
ables to reflect the impact of the future financial performance on wages to our empirical 
work, since I found no measures in our chosen dataset and I cannot match in any data, as 
workplaces cannot be identified. Prior to choosing the illuminating Workplace Employee Re- 
lations Survey of 1998 (Department of Trade and Industry, 1999), (WERS98 henceforth'9), I 
conducted a cost-benefit assessment of using the various datasets, to investigate the relevance 
of forward-looking behaviour in the determination of wages in the UK. The WERS98 dataset 
is comprehensive, laxge, and nationally representative, since it is a random sample of all firms 
with ten or more employees. However, in common with most datasets of this type, there are 
several potential problems with the data, specifically, managers not responding to all the 
questions in a group and some firms who do not respond at all. In addition, as I have alluded 
18 In addition, more importantly, my analysis in my succeeding chapter 5 where I show there is immediate 
trade equilibrium when t< oo and when rf 0 r. - 
"Funded jointly by the Department of Trade and Industry, the Economic and Social Research Council, 
the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service and Policy Studies Institute (from funds provided by the 
Leverhulme Trust). The datasets are available from the Data Archive, University of Essex. 
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to before, there is a potential problem with respect to the forward-looking variable, due to 
this variable exhibiting some form of measurement error. Also it is possible that this variable 
is endogenous, since respondents take into account the bargained wage when forming their 
assessment of future profitability. Nevertheless, overall, it is preferable to its counterpart the 
CBI Pay Settlements Databank, since it has a better range of control variables. 
WERS data contain a considerable amount of information based on the perception of man- 
agers and there may be considerable heterogeneity across firms in how they perceive their 
economic performance. Whilst there may be heterogeneity across firms on how they measure 
economic performance, the traditional aggregate indicators were outperformed by the disag- 
gregate indicators such as our data anticipating movements in both manufacturing output 
and sectoral output growth (see Mitchell, Smith and Weale, 2002). In addition, disaggregate 
indicators of economic activities, of both manufacturing and sectoral output growth, both 
in-sample and out-of-sample, yield more precise early estimates than conventional aggregate 
indicators (see Mitchell, Smith and Weale, 2004). Furthermore, disaggregate forecasts based 
on data such as ours also exceed the performance of conventional forecasts with respect to 
anticipating movements in manufacturing output growth on an in-sample basis (see Mitchell, 
Smith And Weale, (2005). 
Aggregate data have been found to be a source of problems (Wolfson 1993). Although 
WERS does not provide information on the timing of the settlement, this is obtainable from 
Income Data Services. Indeed, WERS98 has been extensively used for a wide range of analy- 
ses, including the examination of the effect of employee involvement on financial performance 
(see for example, Addison and Belfield, 2000). Other authors using the WERS98 dataset 
in conjunction with WIRS3, specifically, McNabb and Whitfield (2000a) have analysed the 
reasons for marked differences in the relationships between the single and joint participation 
variables and financial performance. 
WERS98 data have also been used to show the following: bargaining arrangements have 
little influence on financial performance (see Bryson and Wilkinson, 2001). Second, bargain- 
ing levels generally had little impact on workplace performance (ibid. ). Third, bargaining 
coverage had no correlation with workplace financial performance (ibid. 
). Fourth, while, 
management attitudes to unions and union membership were not correlated with workplace 
financial performance, they were correlated with the employee relations climate (ibid. ). Union 
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decline is due to the age of the workplace, as opposed to the age of the worker (see Nlachin, 
2000). Using linked employer-employee WERS98 data, it is found that higher wages for 
unionised workers are a reflection of the individual's earning capacity, such as individual 
characteristics, the type of employment and the workplace employed in (see Bryson, 2002). 
WERS98 data have also been used to show that although foreign establishments pay 13 per 
cent higher than domestic establishments, this differential vanishes when the skill structure 
within establishments is controlled for (see Te Velde, 2002). Utilising WERS98 data it is 
shown that employee voice is undeveloped in a majority of the workplaces (see Rainbird, 
Sutherland, Edwards, Holly and Munro, (2003)20. 
Overall, the WERS data are well equipped to provide both fulfilling and satisfying answers 
to our question. In addition, I also obtained certain restricted data from the Department 
of Trade and Industry to conduct my analysis. These facilitated the investigation of the 
importance of external factors in wage determination. 
We now investigate the importance of insiders and forward-looking and rational behaviour 
in the bargaining process on wage setting, using the WERS98. The settlements mostly took 
place between early 1997 to early 1998. As mentioned previously, WERS98 is a nationally 
representative survey. Using appropriate weighting to compensate for the complex sampling 
design, the survey results can be generalised with confidence to the population of firms in the 
UK employing 10 or more employees, covering all sectors (with the exception of agriculture 
and coal-mining), including both private and publicly owned firms. These 340,000 or so firms 
employed approximately 18.6 million employees, that is, 82 per cent of employees in the UK. 
We use the data from the primary element of the 1998 survey, the management interview, 
which is conducted face-to-face with the firm's most senior manager accountable for personnel 
or employee relations. Interviews were conducted with 2,191 firms between October 1997 and 
June 1998, with a 80.4 per cent success rate. The majority of the questions related to the 
organisation as a whole. However, for topics such as wage determination where wages were 
likely to be dispersed intrafirm, there was more focused questioning in up to nine occupational 
20To further indicate the robustness of the WERS98 data, I provide a few illustrations of the wide range 
of studies it has been utilised in, including Mumford and Smith (2003); Gray (2002); Ramsey, ScholariOs and 
Harley (2000); Budd and Mumford (2004); Budd and Mumford (2003); Perotin and Robinson (2000); Harley 
(2001); Machin (2000); Knight and Latreille (2000a); Bryson (2002); Litwin (2000); (Adams, 2001); McNabb 
and Whitfield (2000b); Brown, Deakin, Nash and Oxenbridge (2000); Kodz, Davis, Lain, Strebler, Rick, Bates, 
Cummings, Meager, Anxo, Gineste, Trinczek and Pamer (2003). 
It should be noted that the studies above are by no means an exhaustive list of analyses using WERS98, as 
indicated at the outset. For a more complete list, see Millward, Woodland, Bryson, Forth and Kirby (2004). 
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groups, which are the Major Groups of the 1992 Standard Occupational Classification. In 
such cases, the survey sought even greater detail by focussing on the arrangements for the 
largest occupational group (henceforth, LOG), with the exception of the managers. 
The WERS98 management interview included a wide range of questions about the most 
recent wage settlement for the LOG at the firm. Data on the size of the most recent wage 
settlement was obtained by asking the manager: 'the average percentage change in basic pay 
[for employees in the LOG] from the last review or settlement'. The response rate was very 
high (95 per cent). Responses were aggregated around integer or half integer values. But the 
degree of aggregation is only slightly greater than that in the Income Data Services' published 
records on wage settlement over a similar period. This is to be expected, as establishments 
belonging to the same organisation, if they have had the same LOG and if wage setting was 
at the organisation level, will report the same wage settlement. 
The managers were then asked the following questions: how does the percentage change 
in basic pay compare with the average increase for other groups, both within and outside 
the workplace; specific factors that had an impact on the size of the settlement; the agents 
involved in determining the wage settlement; and the nature of the agents' involvement 
in determining pay. These questions provide us with information about the wage increases 
across the groups in the UK; the specific factors that were crucial in influencing the size of the 
wage settlement; and whether it was senior level management or unions who were responsible 
for negotiating a rise in wages. Additional questions in the management interview provide 
us with information about the establishment's performance; financial performance; future 
financial performance or the manager's assessment of the current state of the market (for the 
main product or service)/value of sales over the last 12 months. 
The insider variables tested, in addition to ones mentioned above, will include the follow- 
ing: concentration of output or service on one or more different products or services, which 
will have a positive impact on wages. If the output of the firm is concentrated on one output 
or service, higher wage settlements axe more likely to prevail. If concentration of output or 
service is on different products or services, the impact on wages axe expected to be lower. 
The degree of competition in the market will also have an influence on wages. The greater 
the degree of competition, the lower the pay settlements are expected to be. 
The external variables tested include: the average vacancy rate by travel-to-work area 
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which refers to the number of job centre vacancies divided by the labour force in the travel- 
o-work area) and total unemployment rate by travel-to-work area. This is because a typical 
vorker would tend to work within the travel-to-work area and similarly a typical vacant job 
vould be more likely to be filled by a worker within that area. Both unemployment and 
, acancies are likely to have a negative impact on wages, as discussed previously. 
It would also be useful to incorporate other controls, specifically, the proportion of all 
! mployees covered by collective bargaining, changes in the circumstances of the firm, including 
he change in the percentage of vacancies within the past 12 months filled by employees within 
he organisation, the change in the flexibility to transfer employees from one task to another, 
he change in the degree of employee control over managerial decision-making and change in 
iwnership, the change in the proportion of pay pertaining to performance and the change 
n ownership. My statistical modelling of the size of wage settlements was estimated using 
he survey estimation procedures in STATA8 (StataCorp, 2003). These procedures utilize 
ý robust variance estimator and take into account, when calculating point estimates and 
tandard errors, the complex sample structure of the WERS98. The method of estimation 
vill be Ordinary Least Squares. The definitions of the independent variables used in the 
egressions are given in Appendix I. 
3.5. THE PROCESSES UNDERLYING WAGE DETERMINATION 
Tarious questions were asked of the management respondents about the processes of wage 
letermination in the LOG at each firm. In 67 per cent of the firms, the LOG comprised 
f the majority of the employees (FM, 2000a). In private sector manufacturing, the craft, 
killed, and the operative and assembly workers dominate, whereas in private sector services, 
he identity of the LOG is difficult to discern. Sales and clerical and secretarial workers were 
ommon, but did not dominate the sector. As noted in FM (2000a), the wage determination 
rrangements are similar for employees that constitute the LOG across the workplaces in the 
fK. 
fow frequent are the pay reviews? 
Frequent pay reviews naturaUy provide opportunities for the bargainers to set wages 
ccording to the prevailing circumstances. Most establishments, in 
fact 89 per cent of the 
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sample, reviewed their wages annually. There may be several reasons for this, including 
the appropriation of rent by incumbent worklers arising from an improvement in the firm's 
financial performance, for example. 
What are the determinants of the wage settlement? 
WERS98 asks the management respondent precisely which specific factors influenced the 
wage settlement of the LOG. Three specific factors were cited as having an upward influence 
on pay, namely good workplace or organisation performance, the cost of living and industrial 
action. Similarly, three factors were also considered to have a downward influence on wages. 
These were the cost of living, poor organisation performance and the risk of redundancies. 
Good or poor organisational performance had influenced 75 per cent of the wage settle- 
ments in the LOG in the private sector, whereas this was true of only 33 per cent of the 
wage settlements in the public sector. Table 3.1 provides statistics of the organisations' per- 
ception of the impact of these factors on wages. The percentages in Table 3.1 facilitates the 
comparison between the influences. 
TABLE 3.1 
FACTORS INFLUENCING WAGES (IN PERCENTAGES) 
Upwar d Influence Downward Infl uence 
Good Uo-s-t- -Industrial Poor Cost Risk 
Establishment of Action Establishment of of 
Performance Living Threatened Performance 
- 
Living Redundancies 
Very important 36 45 2 TT 11 _ 5 
Fairly important 27 35 5 14 12 12 
Not important 37 20 93 74 77 83 
N 2108 2093 2114 2106 2092 2106 
The statistics indicate that 36 per cent of organisations perceive good workplace per- 
formance to have a very important upward impact on wages, as opposed to 27 per cent 
who consider good establishment performance to have fairly important upward influence on 
wages, while 37 per cent view good establishment performance as not an important influence 
on pay. With respect to the cost of living, 45 per cent of the organisations consider it to have 
a very important upward influence on wages. With regard to the industrial action threatened 
or taken, 93 per cent view industrial action threatened or taken, not to have an important 
influence on pay. This is expected due to the decline in union power. 83 per cent of the 
firms do not regard the risk of redundancies as having an important downward impact on 
pay. Although they are only perceptions, I may then want to investigate them further, if it 
is the insider power which is causing this result. 
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The size of the wage settlements 
Prior to discussing the size of annual settlements, it should be noted that some estab- 
lishments had no increase in wages and some have had a pay-cut. The main reason for the 
former is that the recent performance of the firm did not warrant it. Other reasons include 
the provision of performance-related pay. The annual settlements are generally clustered 
around 3 per cent. The mean, median and the standard deviation of the wage settlements 
for all establishments, future financial variables and the establishment financial performance 
are depicted in Table 3.2. Establishment performance constituted a common cause for the 
dispersion in wage settlements. 
TABLE 3.2 
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE WAGE SETTLEMENTS FOR ALL SECTORS FUTURE FINANCIAL 
PERFORMANCE AND THE ESTABLISHMENT FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE VARIABLES 
Variables Mean Med ian Standard Deviation 
Size of the wage settlements for the LOG: In allsectors 3.57 3.0 2.0 When the market is growing 3.76 3.3 2.05 When the market is mature 3.52 3.1 1.62 When the market is declining 3.50 3.0 2.01 When the market is turbulent 3.55 3.0 2.06 When the assessment of the workplace is a lot better than average 3.73 3.0 2.10 When the assessment of the workplace is better than average 3.67 3.2 1.92 When the assessment of the workplace is about average for industry 3.58 3.0 2.17 When the assessment of the workplace is below and a lot below average 3.03 3.0 1.87 
The dispersion of wage settlements when the market is growing, mature, declining and 
turbulent are also shown in Table 3.2. When the market is growing, the wage settlements 
are still clustered around 3 per cent, but there is an increase in settlements within the range 
from 4.5 to 5.5 per cent, compared to the wage settlements for all sectors (not shown in the 
table). This indicates that firms where the market for product or services is growing, were 
being awarded greater pay rises, depending on the extent of the growth. In addition, the 
mean of the settlements when the maxket is growing is distinctly high, showing that when 
the financial performance is expected to improve, wage settlements are higher. As mentioned 
earlier, there is a potential problem, with respect to this variable exhibiting some form of 
measurement error and also it is possible that this variable is endogenous, since respondents 
take into account the bargained wage when forming their assessment of future profitability. 
When the maxket is declining, wage settlements were lower in the 4.5 and 5.5 per cent range 
(not shown in Table 3.2). Similarly, a laxger number of firms had wage settlements in the 
range 3.5 and 4.5 per cent when the market is mature, and less so when the market is 
turbulent and declining. This suggests that wage settlements are higher, the more favourable 
the future state of the market (not shown in Table 3.2). 
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The dispersion of the wage settlements, when the assessment of the workplace financial 
performance is, a lot better than, better than, about average, and below or a lot below 
average, are also displayed in Table 3.2. When the performance is a lot better than average, 
wage settlements were concentrated between the range 2 and 6 per cent, whilst when the 
performance is better than average, wage increases were clustered around a range of 1 per 
cent to 5.5 per cent (not shown in Table 3.2). The pattern is similar when the performance 
is about average (not shown in Table 3.2). However, with respect to below and lot below 
average performance, the pay settlements are lower, and concentrated around the range 1 and 
5 per cent (not shown in Table 3.2), implying that the assessment of the financial performance 
is higher when the wage settlements are correspondingly higher. 
There were large variations between bargained and non-bargained settlements in the pri- 
vate sector. The average was 4.1 per cent for non-bargained settlements and 3.3 per cent, 
when negotiated with the trade union, see FM (2000a). 
Uniformity of wage settlements within and across firms 
WERS98 asked managers how the wage settlement compared with wages both within the 
firm and also across firms. Within firms, managers were asked how the wage settlement of 
the employees in the LOG compared with the managers' wage settlement. WERS98 also 
suggested that comparability played an important role in both bargained and non-bargained 
wage setting. In the majority of cases the average increase in wages for both the managerial 
and non-managerial employees was similar. This was more pronounced when most employees 
were covered by collective bargaining. 
Agents involved in pay determination 
WERS98 contains data relating to the agents involved in determining the wage and the 
extent of their influence. In most cases, the consultation with higher level managers was high; 
however, the final decision on the size of the settlement rests with the workplace managers. 
Table 3.4 presents the descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables used in the 
econometric modelS21 . As can be seen from the statistics, Table 3.3 illustrates that a 
high 
percentage of establishments considered that their financial performance was good. For ex- 
ample, 7 per cent of establishments viewed their performance as below average (includes a lot 
" They relate to the sample used in the most general model (5). 
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below), less than 32 per cent assessed their financial performance as about average, whereas 
in excess of 43 per cent considered their workplaces to be above average, and 18 per cent a 
lot above average. 
Similarly, as can been seen from Table 3.3, a high percentage of establishments considered 
that their future financial performance (current state of the market) would be good. For 
example, 7 per cent of establishments perceived the current state of the market as declining, 
17 per cent considered the current state of the market to be turbulent, whilst 51 per cent 
assessed the current state of the market to be growing, and 25 per cent that the market was 
mature. 
In addition, a high percentage of establishments consider that a high proportion of em- 
ployees are not covered by collective bargaining. For example, 16 per cent of establishments 
reported that all their employees were covered by collective bargaining, 9 per cent assessed 
that most employees were covered by collective bargaining, whereas 57 per cent consider none 
of their employees to be covered by collective bargaining, whilst 11 cent reported almost all 
their employees to be covered by collective bargaining and 7 per cent as some or few of their 
employees to be covered by collective bargaining. 
Moreover, a high percentage of establishments stated that their size was 50 - 199 employ- 
ees. For example, 8 per cent of establishments reported the size of their establishment was 
between 10 to 24 employees, 13 per cent 25 - 49 employees and a further 19 per cent 50 - 99 
employees and a similar percentage between 100 - 199 employees, whereas 27 per cent stated 
that their workplace size wascomprised of 200 to 499 employees and 14 per cent as 500 or 
more employees. 
Furthermore, a high percentage of establishments considered that there were many com- 
petitors for their main product or service. For example, 63 per cent of establishments con- 
sidered there were many competitors for their main product or service, whilst 33 per cent 
assessed there were few competitors for their main product or service and 4 per cent reported 
there to be none. 
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TABLE 3.3 
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR EXPLANATORY 
VARIABLES IN THE WERS98a 
Variables N Niean ko. Li. ) 
Establishments financial performance: 
Lot better than average 860 0.38 0.18 
Better than average 860 
1 1 
0.43 0.50 
About average for industry 860 0.32 0.47 
Below and Lot below average 860 0.07 0.26 
Future financial performance (the current state of the market): 
Market is growing 860 1&0 0. 5 5 
Market is mature 860 2 5 0ý 043 
1 
Market is declining 860 0.07 0.25 
1 
Market is turbulent 860 0.37 0.17 
Proportion of all employees covered by collective bargaining: 
All (100%) 860 0.16 0.37 
Almost all (80-99%) 860 0 . 11 0.3 1 Most 860 0 . 09 0.28 Some or few (below 60%) 860 0.07 0.26 
None (0%) 860 0.57 0.50 
Size of Establishment: 
10 to 24 employees 860 08 28) 0 (0 
25 to 49 employees 860 0: 13 0ý34 
50 to 99 employees 860 0.19 0.39 
100 to 199 employees 860 
1 1 
0.19 0.39 
200 to 499 employees 860 0.27 0.44 
500 or more employees 860 0.14 0.35 
Competitors for the Main Product or Service: 
None 860 0.04 0.20 
Few 860 
ý ý 
0.33 0.47 
Many 860 0.63 0.48 
Output concentrated on one or several different Product(s) or Services: 
Single product or service 860 0.38ý0.49ý 
Different products or services 860 0.62 0.49 
Percentage of vacancies in the past 12 months filled by employees within the organisation: 
All (10097o) 860 2 15 0-( 0N 
Almost all (80-99%) 860 .003 05 
Most (60-79%) 860 0.09 0.29 
Around half (40-59%) 860 
1 1 
0.16 0.37 
Some (20-39%) 860 0.24 0.42 
Just a few (1-19%) 860 0.44 0.50 
Ownershi of the workplace: 
UK owneg/controlled 860 0.76(0.43 ) 
Predominantly UK-owned(in excess of 51%) 860 0.06 0.24 
50/50 UK and foreign ownership 860 O. Ol ll 
Predominantly foreign owned (in excess of 51%) 860 
R ý 
0.05 0.22 
Foreign owned /controlled k t l b t 
860 0.12 0.33 
o-wor area: rave - y Banded average vacancy rate 
0-0.80 860 0.42 0.23 
0.80-1 860 
1 1 
0.33 0.47 
1-1.30 860 0.22 0.41 
Over 1.30 860 0.22 0.42 
Banded total unemployment rate by travel-to-work area: 
0-3% 860 0.22 0.41 
3-5% 860 
1 1 
0.30 0.47 
5-7% 860 0.35 0.48 
Over 7% 860 0.13 0.34 
aStandard deviations are given in parentheses. 
3.6. ESTIMATION AND RESULTS 
Several empirical studies (for example, NW (1990) and FM (2000b)) and the theories men- 
tioned earlier, augmented by my theoretical chapter, have informed my empirical study. 
My 
empirical analysis is a natural complement to my theoretical analysis 
in chapter 5.1 have 
estimated five different models, due to different response rates 
for each variable and the need 
to focus on separate influences. Various specifications are set out in columns 
(1) to (5) of 
Table 3.4. The dependent variable is the average percentage change in basic wage for the 
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LOG, excluding managers from the last review (in 1998). The independent variables of the 
baseline specification (1) are union coverage, establishment size and the assessment of the 
financial performance. The importance of these variables on pay was assessed in both the 
private and public sectors. 
First, the impact of the proportion of employees covered by collective bargaining can be 
examined for all establishments (private and public) using model (1). The following points 
are worth noting with respect to model (1)'s estimates. The influence of union non-coverage is 
strong and well determined and is highly significant. This accords with current evidence cited 
in the earlier section. Second, establishment size had a negative but insignificant influence on 
wages, with the exception of the establishment comprising the smaller firm size of 10 to 24 
employees, where the impact is positive but insignificant. Third, the impact of establishment 
financial performance is strong, with strong well-determined positive coefficients. Fourth, 
private sector-other (non PLCs) have a positive and a significant influence on wages. In 
line with expectations, the impact of the public sector on wages is negative and strongly 
significant in models (1) and (2). These are strong and well determined in both models, since 
insiders cannot fully exert their market power in the bargaining process with the government, 
particularly since the demise of strong union power over the last two decades. 
We must incorporate market and output concentration variables as well as other factors 
which I have identified earlier, which could provide bargaining strength to the insiders and 
thus have an impact on wages. In the light of this, in specification (2) the number of com- 
petitors for the main product or service, and output concentration on one or several different 
product(s) or service(s) are included. The impact of there being no competitors for the main 
product or service is positive but insignificant. 
In model (3) 1 have included some control variables, specifically, the effect of the percent- 
age of vacancies in the past 12 months filled by employees within the organisation and the 
ownership of the workplace. 
In model (4), 1 include the current state of the market as a variable, which would provide 
us information about the future financial performance. It should be noted that there are 
many missing observations in the case of this variable, since it does not apply to public 
sector organisations. In addition, as mentioned earlier, one should note that this variable 
exhibits some form of measurement error and it is possible that the variable is endogenous, 
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since respondents take into account bargained wage when forming their assessment of future 
profitability. This was the only variable in the WERS98 dataset that measures the future 
financial performance. 
In model (5), 1 included the external variables, which indicate the relevance of these 
outside factors to the wages of the employed. Specifically, these variables are the banded 
average vacancy rate by travel-to-work area and the banded total unemployment rate by 
travel-to-work area. With respect to the banded average vacancy rate by travel-to-work area, 
I have amalgamated the banded average vacancy rates into four categories: 0-0.80,0.80 - 
1,1 - 1.30 and 1.30 - 1.60+. With regard to the banded total unemployment rate by travel- 
to-work area, I have amalgamated total unemployment rates into four categories: less than 
3 per cent, 3-5,5 -7 and over 7 per cent. 
The principal findings from Table 3.4 are as follows: First, firms with several competitors 
have significantly higher wage settlements. This effect is well determined in all our equations, 
and it takes its highest value in our final regression (5). In models (4) and (5) it can be seen 
that when competition is high for the product or service, this has strong and well-determined 
impact on wage settlements; in the case of models (1) and (2) positive and significant at the 
5 per cent level. This is consistent with the findings in Guadalupe (2003) and other studies, 
and conforms to expectations. Clearly, the larger the distribution of these variables, the 
greater will be its impact on wages, as I would expect. 
Second, the favourable future financial performance variable is also positive and signif- 
icant. This implies that bargainers do consider and take into account the future financial 
performance of the firm when negotiating pay. Similarly, consistent with our expectations, 
when a market is mature and has reached its peak, the impact would be positive, but less 
powerful. However, this influence is insignificant. Likewise, when a market is declining, the 
impact on pay is also less powerful, unsurprisingly, as insiders would dampen their wage 
demands. But this variable, although positive and stronger than it is for mature markets, is 
also insignificant. 
Third, establishment financial performance is found to have a positive and significant 
influence on wage settlements at the 5 per cent level of significance in all five models. The 
strength of the financial performance is positively correlated to pay. This conforms to the 
results of several studies, for example NW (1990) found own price and productivity to be 
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ell determined. Blanchflower, Oswald and Garrett (1990) also find wages are positively 
)rrelated to the establishment's financial performance; and further, Blanchflower and Oswald 
M8) also find that wages are influenced by the firm's financial prosperity. 
Fourth, the firm size effects are not strong in any of the five models. 
The concentration of output on a single product or service effects has a positive impact on 
-ages in all four equations and its importance increases with the addition of the ownership 
ad proportion of vacancies filled internally, the future financial performance of the firm 
iriables, and the banded average vacancy rate by travel-to-work area and the banded total 
nemployment rate by travel-to-work area. This is consistent with the results obtained in 
tewart (1990), who showed that workers in establishments with product market power were 
ble to appropriate rent from their firms. However, the coefficients are not significant at the 
per cent level. 
The influence of the percentage of vacancies that have been filled by employees from 
, ithin the organisation over the last 12 months are in most cases positive, except where the 
npact of the percentage of vacancies in the past 12 months filled by employees within the 
rganisation is between 60 - 70 per cent, where it consistently appears as having a negative, 
ut not significant, effect on pay in models (3) and (5). However, these variables are not 
gnificant. 
UK-owned firms have a positive influence on pay settlements, with the impact increasing 
-ith the inclusion of the financial performance and external variables in models (4) and (5), 
at not significant influence on pay. This positive impact is greater in firms which axe 50 per 
!., nt UK and foreign owned in models (3), (4) and (5), and approaching significance at the 
) per cent level in the latter model. The effect on wages is still positive and slightly lower 
hen the establishments are predominantly foreign owned. However, all of these positive 
Auences are insignificant, with the exception of semi foreign/UK in model (5), where it is 
: )proaching significance. The results of the positive ownership effects are consistent with 
M (2000b) and Te Velde (2002), where the latter suggests that there is evidence for a wage 
-emium in foreign owned firms, but this vanishes when controlling for skill level. 
Finally, the inclusion of the external variables of unemployment and vacancies in equation 
showed that these variables had a negative impact on wages. Iyavel-to-work areas where 
iemployment is between 5 and 7 per cent had a negative and well 
determined influence on 
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wage settlements, whilst although negative, establishments located in areas of high unem- 
ployment did not experience significantly lower wage settlements. Thus, the results of the 
external variables conform to expectations and is consistent with evidence in earlier studies 
of total unemployment rate by travel-to-work area having a significant effect on wages. 
However, vacancies are not significant, but again establishments located in areas with a 
lower vacancies rate have a negative impact on wage settlements. The statistical non signif- 
icance of vacancies is consistent with the insider-outsider theory. According to the assump- 
tions of IOT, there will be persistent unemployment, since by the fundamental assumption 
of the IOT the insiders bargain, exerting their market power to enhance wages on account of 
turnover costs, and this is attained at the expense of the outsiders or unemployed workers. 
In sum, all this by implication means the impact of vacancies is minimal, primarily due to 
turnover costs, which according to IOT is non-transferable in its entirety to its employees in 
the form of wage reduction. 
Unemployment appears to have a negative and significant impact on wages in the middle 
band rate, but is not significant in other bands. This is consistent to expectations, and also 
conforms to most of the earlier studies, where the relationship between wage and unemploy- 
ment is well established in the literature, over time and intra and across countries. This 
finding has also been corroborated by Blanchflower and Oswald using British wage curves 
from the General Household Survey for the period from 1973 - 1980 and 1981 - 1990, that 
unemployment elasticity to pay is robust. In addition, Blanchflower and Oswald (1989,1990), 
Blanchflower and Freeman (1992,1993) and Lee and Pesaran (1993) also echo the downwaxd 
sloping wage curves. 
Furthermore, when additional changes in the circumstances of the firm over the five years 
variable are included: namely, the impact on pay; the flexibility to move employees from 
one task to another; the proportion of pay for non-managerial employees which is related to 
measures of performance; and the amount of employee influence over managerial decision- 
making, and the other vaxiables under this category (equation (3) and then incorporated with 
equation (4)), those of the above results which remain relevant are much the same. However, 
the future financial performance vaxiable is consistently well determined and is stronger (with 
at statistic of 2.44). These results can be obtained from the author upon request. 
We did not find that the union coverage set of vaxiables, had a positive impact on wages 
ill 
in any of our equations. Instead I find that no union coverage had a weU determined and 
TABLE 3.4 
WAGE EQUATIONS FOR THE LARGEST OCCUPATIONAL GROUP (EXCLUDING 
MANAGERS) ACROSS ALL SECTORS IN THE UK, 1998* 
Dependent variable: percentage change in wage settlements 
Independent variables' (1 ) (2 ) (3 ) (4 ýc ( 5) 
Constant 2.73 ( 10.4) 2.25 ( 8.4) 2.07 ( , 5.0) 1.90 (4.4) 2.45 (5.2) 
Proportion of employees covered 
by collective bargainingd 
All (100% 1 0.08 0.5 0.07 0.4 0.13 0.7 0.04 0.2 0.04 0.2 
Almost (80-99%) 0.13 0.9 0.19 1.2 0.32 1.6 0.24 1.2 0.25 1.2 
Some or few (below 60%) 0.32 
1 1 
1.7 
1 
0.38 
1 
1.7 
1 
0.50 
1 
1.8 0.42 
1 1 
1.5 0.41 
1 1 
1.4 
None (0%) 0.75 4.8 0.78 4.8 0.92 5.6 0.82 4.8 0.85 4.8 
Establishments financial Performance 
Lot better than average 0.71 3.5 0.85 4.3 0.76 2.7 0.69 2.4 0.64 2.3 
Better than average 0.68 
ý ý 
3.8 
ý 
0.83 
ý 
5.0 
ý 
0.66 
ý 
3.1 
ý 
0.61 
j 
2.8 0.54 
ý ý 
2.6 
About average for industry 0.62 3.3 0.71 4.2 0.58 2.5 0.58 2.5 0.48 2.2 
Size of establishment 
10 to 24 employees 0.10 (0.4) O 30 ( 1 1 ) O 71 1*5 0 66 1A 060 1,3 
50 to 99 employees 0 16 -9 0 
ý0 
-0 3 2 ) -6 
ý 0 14 0 *6 
: 0 1 0 0*4 0ý09 0.4 
100 to 199 employees 
: 0: 06 : 0.3 0.13 0.7 0.18 0.7 0. 1 3 0.5 0.17 0.6 
200 to 499 employees -0.13 -0 .8 
1 1 
ý 
0.04 
ý 
0.2 0.10 0.4 0.06 0.2 0.07 0.3 
500 or more employees -0.06 -0.4 0.03 0.2 0.23 0.9 0.21 0.9 0.26 1.0 Competitors for the main 
o duct or service ýO 
n e 0.03 0.3 0.04 0.2 0.01 0.1 0.11 0.5 
Many 
ý 
0.21 
ý 
2.0 
ý 
0.30 
ý 
2.1 
ý 
0.32 
ý 
2.3 0.35 
ý ý 
2.4 
Output concentration on one or several 
different product(s) or service(s) 
Single product or service 0.04 (0.4) 0.09 ( 0-6) 0.11 (0.7) 0.15 (1-0) 
Percentage of vacancies in the 
pqst 12 months filled by employees 
within the organisation 
All (100%) 01( 0 0) 0.0 1 (0. 0) 0 06 (0.2) 
Most (60-70%) - 0: 12 
% 
) .4 0.12 ( . ) -04 
: 
-0 14 -0.5) Around half (40-59%) - - 0.14 0.6 0.12 0.5 0.10 0.4 Some (20-39%) - - 
ý 
0.24 
j 
1.1 
ý 
0.21 
ý 
1.0 0.18 
ý ý 
0.8 
Just a few (1-19%) - - 0.10 0.5 0.08 0.4 0.06 0.3 Ownership of the workplace: 
UK owned/cont rolled - - 0.03 0.2) 0.0 6 0.4) 0.09 0.6) Predominantly UK-owned(> 51%) - - 
1 
-0.14 -0.4) 4 -0.1 
1 
-0.4) -0.09 
1 
-0.3) 
50/50 % UK and foreign owned - - 0.96 1.4 0.97 1.5ý 1.06 1.6ý Predominantly forei n0 ed (>51 %) 7ormwance 
of the Future financial per 
- - 0.53 
ý 
1.3 0.52 1.3 0.58 1.5 
firm (the current state of the market)': , 
Market is growing - - 0.49 2.3 0.52 2.4 Market is mature - - 
ý 
0.12 
ý 
0.6 0.16 
j ý 
0.8 
Market is declinin ý - - 0.34 0.9 0.31 0.9 Banded Avera acancy Rate by ee A ,r Travel-to-wor rea: 
0-0.80 - - - - -0.35 - 1.5 
0.80-1 - - - - -0.26 
ý 
-1.1 
H 
1-1.30 - - - - -0.23 .0 Banded Total Unemployment Rate 
by Travel-to-work Area: 
3-5 - - - - -0.43 - 1.8 
5-7 - - - - -0.51 
ý 
-2.3 
ý 
Over 7% - - - - -0.40 -1.4 
Status of the organisation 
Private sector-other 0.28 2.1) 0.37 %8) - - 
Public sector -0.55 
ý 
-6.6) -0.40 
ý 
) .2 - - - N 17 6 13 1 86 1 860 8 60 
R2 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.08 
F 15.33 (0.000) 10.55(0.000) 2.61 (0.000) 2.67 (0.000) 2.25 (0.000) 
It ratios in parentheses 
b The omitted categories in each variable grou are as follows: 
Proportion of employees covered by collective 
largaining: 
Most (60 - 79%) 
Establishments financial performance: Below and a Lot below average 
Size of establishment: 25-49 employees 
Competitors for the main product or service: Few 
Output concentration on one or several different product(s) or service(s): Differentiated products or services 
Percentage of vacancies in the past 12 months filled by employees within the organisation: 
Almost all (80 - 99%) 
Ownership of the workplace: Foreign owned /controlled firms. 
Future financial pprformance of the firm (the current state of the market): Market is turbulent 
Banded average Vacancy rate by travel-to-work area: Over 1.30 
Banded total unemployment rate by travel-to-work area: 0- 3% 
Status of the organisation: Private sector company - plc 
cModel (4) estimated with the following additional variables: unemployment rate by government office region; 
Avera e vacancy rate over course of fieldwork by government office region, yielded the coefficients 
-0.70 
ý-1.0) 
and -0.11 (-0.3) respectively. t ratios are 
in parentheses. 
dI have also conducted further estimations with just the union coverage variables as the 
explanatory variable and 
found similar results to this. 
eA wide variety of experiments conducted with the other 
forward-looking variable, the expected value of sales. 
consistently had a positive coefficient of about 
0.54 and at ratio of greater than 3. But 
inclusion of this variable, slightly lowers the t ratio of our forward-looking variable, the growing market variable. 
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strong impact on wage settlements in all five of the equations estimated here, but also showed 
up to be consistently well determined on the additional experiments, mentioned above. This is 
not entirely surprising, given changes in the industrial relations climate compared to previous 
decades. 
3.7 CONCLUSIONS 
The results here establish that bargainers are forward-looking and rational, that is, they care 
about the future, bearing in mind the caveats to our conclusion. This is in contrast to past 
studies which have neglected to establish this fundamental and inherent behaviour of bar- 
gainers in the bargaining process. This study has endeavoured to explain the determinants 
of wages in a representative sample of firms in the UK with greater than or equal to ten 
employees, with the exception of coal mining and agriculture, including both private and 
publicly owned establishments. We have investigated wage determination at the establish- 
ment level focusing special attention on the impact of the future financial performance. The 
key variables were found to be the future and current financial performance variables, the 
absence of collective bargaining, having many competitors for the main product or service, 
and to some extent local unemployment. The following are the important results attained. 
(i) The future financial performance, as captured by the growing markets variable, has 
a significant influence on pay determination. In addition, the future financial performance, 
as captured by the establishment financial performance variable, has a significant impact on 
wage determination. 
(ii) Determinants of insider power, such as the number of competitors for the main prod- 
uct or services, have a significant influence on wage determination. 
(iii) The non coverage of employees by collective bargaining has a positive and significant 
impact on pay. 
(iv) External variables, such as a high level of unemployment, have a negative impact 
on wages. The impact of the local unemployment on wages is in most cases is insignificant, 
whilst the impact of unemployment in general, in most cases is significant or approaching 
significance. This is corroborated by a multitude of wage-curve evidences in Blanchflower 
and Oswald (1994) both spatially and over time. 
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The empirical determination of wage negotiations in this study (if we accept it is true) 
should facilitate the explanation of wage movements satisfactorily, using such additional 
factors as the manner in which wages are bargained, the standard insider factors and so 
forth. The results of this study (again, if we accept it is true) have important implications 
for policy, since the manner in which wages are determined has implications for employment, 
that is, as to whether workers want to be employed in the firm given the form of wage 
determination. This is specifically, as stated at the beginning, since employment will only 
expand in firms where the future financial performance of the firm is improving, and not in 
firms where it is declining. This is because more workers are more likely to want to retain their 
employment and be employed in firms that have a favourable future financial performance 
relative to those in firms with an adverse future financial performance, by virtue of the fact 
that pay is higher in the former and not the latter firms. 
Encouraging mobility from failing to successful firms is a attractive option. Moreover, 
retraining subsidies could be provided to specific firms for the workers where the future 
financial performance is adverse, to provide firm-specific skills training or for workers to follow 
nationally recognised qualifications, granted by institutions independent of the recipients, 
that is, the firms. An alternative example would be through tax concessions to stimulate 
product or service demand (see for example Snower, 1995 with respect to product demand). A 
further example, would be properly targeted and well-designed Active labour market policies 
(ALMP), which augment the matching process between unemployed workers and vacant jobs, 
and if it entails job subsidisation, will aid job creation (see for example, Pissarides, 1999). In 
addition, reduction in payroll tax also enhances recruitment directly (see for example, Dreze 
and Malinvaud, 1994). All these policy recommendations are viable on the grounds of equity 
considerations. As I have clearly mentioned above, if this entails job subsidisation, it will 
help create jobs. Also, a more important policy implication is the wage (and price) inflation 
that ensues on account of agents anticipating future profitability. 
To recapitulate, using the WERS98 dataset, I have found that firms that are prospering 
financially pay higher wages than firms that are not performing so well financially (of course, 
bearing in mind the caveats). It would be interesting to amalgamate both employer and 
employee WERS98 datasets, and consider whether large firms pay higher wages, as noted in 
my theoretical chapter, using these data sets. This is on my future research agenda. 
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Although illuminating, the WERS98 does not permit the incorporation of the more prefer- 
able stock market valuation variables, such as (PE) ratio, to show the impact of future fi- 
nancial performance on wages. Second, the dataset is not derived from published accounts 
of publicly quoted companies, as with a dataset like DATASTREAM on-line. As a conse- 
quence, it is not clear how accurate the information about the process of wage determination 
is. Thus, for example, there will be considerable heterogeneity across firms in how they per- 
ceive the level of economic activity. Second, there are several potential problems in the data, 
specifically, managers not responding to all the questions in a group and few firms who do 
not respond at all. Nevertheless, it is preferable to other survey datasets, particularly on 
account of the data being well-structured with a better range of control variables as noted 
earlier. Overall, its attractive features far outweigh the general drawbacks, as demonstrated 
by its wide use in a number of analyses. However, again we need to bear in mind the caveats 
I have alluded to earlier, in particular with respect to the forward-looking variable, for the 
purposes of this study. 
In this chapter, I have established empirically that in an ongoing game, firms and workers 
care about the future and bargain in accordance to the future financial performance of the 
firm, again bearing in mind the caveats I have mentioned earlier. The, first is the potential 
problem of using a variable which exhibits some form of measurement error. If this is in 
fact present, it may cause the regressor to be correlated with the disturbance term. Second, 
it is possible that the market growth variable may be endogenous, since respondents take 
into account the bargained wage when forming their assessment of future profitability. This 
implies we are not certain to what extent the market growth variable has an impact on the 
wage settlement. One reason why firms want to pay higher wages in this ongoing game 
(and the concept ongoing is critical here), is because they want to prolong the relationship 
between workers and firm (that is, to retain) and form new firm-worker relationships (that is, 
recruit more workers) to maximise profits. This could be attributed laxgely to the fact that 
the majority of employment involves utilising some element of human/firm-specific human 
capital in the production process. Hence, workers are of a fundamental and crucial importance 
to a firm. Therefore, I next examine the importance of recruitment and retention of workers 
in wage determination, using a dataset with a time element to it; namely, the Confederation 
of British Industries dataset. This I undertake in the next chapter. 
CHAPTER 4 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF 
RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION OF 
LABOUR IN UK WAGE SETTLEMENTS 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
Labour is an essential factor of production, without which a firm cannot be a viable ongoing 
concern. Nor can workers survive satisfactorily on an ongoing basis, if their sole means of 
income is through employment. Wages offered and accepted by workers in a match will reflect 
this. In addition, the wage also reflects the payment required to hire new matches (workers), 
since both firms and workers are interested in an ongoing relationship. Research on labour 
economics , both theoretical and empirical traditionally only considers pay determination in a 
stationary environment. However, the game between firms and workers occurs within a non- 
stationary environment, with the relationship between these two agents ongoing. My earlier 
empirical chapter has taken account of this important phenomenon, thereby establishing that 
agents in such an environment will be forward-looking. 
The succeeding theoretical chapter pursues the consequences of this behaviour. Thus, 
workers with firms with a favourable future financial performance will be paid higher wages, 
and vice versa. Thus, in terms of firm size and wage dispersion, firms with a favourable 
financial position will encourage the retention and recruitment of more workers. Hence, those 
firms that have better financial performance will be paying higher wages, as well as having 
a large number of employees, and will also crucially consider the need to recruit and retain 
labour as an important factor in exerting upward pressure on wage settlements (henceforth 
RRF). 
The underlying reason for the payment of higher wages is to prevent labour turnover, 
which is very costly for firms. It is equally costly for workers in employment to re-search (that 
is, seek) for and re-match with, another employer. With respect to firms, these turnover costs 
mainly pertain to hiring and firing costs and with respect to workers it is the loss of continuity 
of service with a given firm, and its repercussions, one of which I noted above. Almost all 
non-competitive theories, including turnover theories, EWT and IOT, have expounded the 
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importance of firm's attempts to curtail labour turnover. Special attention will be focused on 
IOT 22. In the IOT workers are paid higher wages to curb turnover costs. If workers did not 
retain their employment in the firm, the firm incurs further recruitment costs in replacing 
these workers. Further details of these costs were provided in chapter 2. 
The nature of the WERS dataset, exploited in Chapter 3, permitted the verification 
of the behaviour of the bargainers, since the dataset has a better range of well-structured 
explanatory variables compared to the CBI dataset utilised in this chapter. However, the 
WERS data is cross-section data and does not permit an in-depth analysis of the influence 
of wage settlements over time, across regions and so forth. In order to get a handle on the 
performance of the firm, the WERS98 dataset was preferable; this I analysed in Chapter 
3.1 have used the market growth variable as an indication of future financial performance 
variable, as the question clearly /effectively asks the respondents whether the current state of 
the market for the main product or service is growing, as mentioned earlier. However, one 
needs to note two potential problems of using this proxy (as mentioned in Chapter 3). First, 
the potential problem of using a vaxiable which exhibits some form of measurement error. 
Second, it is possible that the market growth variable is endogenous, since respondents take 
into account the bargained wage when forming their assessment of future profitability. This 
implies, that we are not certain to what extent the market growth variable has an impact on 
the wage settlement. 
Given that value of output, volume of output and value added per person employed, are 
modes of measuring output used mainly by certain types of industries, it would be reasonable 
to use these vaxiables to proxy for the extent of insider power in these industries. It is 
well known that insider power are greatest where the rents to be shared are the greatest. 
Preliminary analysis by the author has shown that the most appropriate method of measuring 
most service sector output, such as professional and scientific services and business services, is 
by the value of output per person employed. The ONS has informed the author (indeed, their 
statistics show) that these industries have one of, if not the highest gross domestic product 
(GDP) in the UK, of course, CBI data does not indicate this. In addition, I have also used 
the size of the bargaining group as a proxy for an indication of the firm size. There are two 
caveats to note here: first, all employees of an establishment may not join a bargaining group. 
"In addition, IOT is an offshoot of EWT as noted in chapter 2. 
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Second, some establishments may have more than one baxgaining group. These caveats may 
lead to underestimation of the firm size. 
Although the CBI dataset may lack information, such as financial information, overall 
the CBI dataset does permit us to develop and establish an analysis of the influence of wage 
settlements over time, including an in-depth/detailed analysis of the RRF. The CBI dataset 
allows us to explore the influences of wage settlements adequately and satisfactorily as does 
the WERS dataset. However, it should be noted that there may be some limitations with 
respect to the choice of'explanatory variables, as alluded to above. So, the dataset is fairly 
well equipped to provide reasonably satisfactory answers to our question, bearing in mind 
the possible data limitations. 
The price settled, that is, the terms of trade in chapter 5, implicitly incorporates factors 
such as the importance of the RRF to firms and the workers' desire to retain and new 
workers desire to gain employment in the firm, since by definition the wage bargained is 
monopolistically priced, that is, the wage that each agent is indifferent to. Thus, in this 
chapter I will investigate the influences of wage determination in general, but focus special 
attention on the RRF, since it is labour turnover costs that sustains IOT. This, exemplifies 
the importance of recruitment and retention as a major negotiation consideration exerting 
upward pressure in wage settlements, using a unique illuminating and previously unexploited 
longitudinal dataset. The latter is the primary goal of the chapter. 
As alluded to above, my theoretical analysis in chapter 5 encompasses the following 
findings (see Theorem 1); wages are determined monopolistically as noted. That is, both 
agents are indifferent to the price agreed. In setting this price, primal factors such as the 
importance of recruitment and retention of labour will be accorded major consideration. 
Both parties are accurately aware of the pivotal role played by the importance of recruitment 
and retention of workers. Second, bargained wages will be a function of the future financial 
performance of the firm. I have established this empirically in an earlier chapter. 
I now investigate the importance of recruitment and retention of labour as a major bargaining 
consideration. Successful/prosperous establishments pay higher wages to recruit and retain 
workers. Similaxly, more workers would want to be employed and want to be retained in 
successful/prosperous firms. 
If recruitment and retention is important in wage-bargaining and prosperous firms pay 
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high wages to recruit and retain workers this could have serious macroeconomic implications 
for the behaviour of the economy. For example, if recruitment and retention activities occur 
in more prosperous establishments and regions, then there will be agglomeration effects and 
increasing amount of workers would want to be employed and want to retain their employ- 
ment in these prosperous establishments. Equally these prosperous establishments would 
pay higher wages to lure workers and retain more workers at the expense of the other less 
prosperous or deprived regions of the economy. 
We are therefore, interested in a variety of issues. First, is recruitment and retention 
of labour a major consideration in wage settlements? Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
managers view the need to improve the ability to recruit and retain labour as important 
determinants of pay settlements. For example, the prevalence of ascending pay scales is a 
manifestation of the importance of the RRF to firms. Equally, the importance of workers 
to be employed and to retain their employment in these firms, is also propounded in the 
EWT. Indeed, in some EWTs (Salop, 1979; Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984) it is suggested that 
higher wages are paid to reduce quits. This has been developed further by LS (1988c) in 
insider-outsider theory, in which higher wages are paid on account of turnover costs. Other 
theoretical and empirical studies have also found turnover is an important determinant of 
higher wages (see for example, Martin, 1999). Gregory, Lobban and Thomson (1987), using 
CBI data, suggested that recruitment or retention effects are fairly important, as part of a 
general enquiry on wage determinants. But no attempt has been made to analyse in detail 
how important this factor is in wage determination. 
My main purpose is to attempt to pin down the importance of recruitment and retention 
effect with some precision. A second issue of some interest is the question of what actually 
determines the need to enhance the ability to retain and recruit labour, as a factor exerting 
upward pressure on the level of settlement. Here I am interested in investigating a vaxiety 
of characteristics of establishments, with an emphasis on industries, regions and bargaining 
groups, which consider the RRF as very important in exerting upwaxd pressure on wage 
settlements. Therefore, the main purpose of this analysis is to complement my empirical 
analysis in chapter 3, which is applied to the IOT. This will provide an indication of the 
characteristics of establishments that who are most likely to consider the need to recruit and 
retain labour as a very important factor in exerting upward pressure on wage settlements, 
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and identify those establishments where insider factors may be greatest, given the importance 
of turnover costs in this theory. I accomplish the former and the latter over a very long 
dimension, identifying this need and where insider power may be greatest with bargaining 
groups, industries, regions, which previous studies have been bereft of. 
The outline of the chapter is as follows. In Section 4.2,1 discuss characteristics of those 
establishments likely to consider the RRF to be a very important factor in wage settlements. 
Section 4.3 discuss our data. Section 4.4 provides preliminary data analysis pertaining to 
influences on wage settlements in general. Section 4.5 empirically models the importance of 
RRF. Section 4.6 discuss the results. Section 4.7 concludes. 
4.2. CHARACTERISTICS OF THOSE ESTABLISHMENTS LIKELY 
TO CONSIDER RETENTION AND RECRUITMENT A VERY 
IMPORTANT FACTOR IN WAGE SETTLEMENTS 
I make it clear at the outset, as I have alluded to earlier, since I have investigated in Chapter 
3 the importance of forward-looking behaviour in the context of the IOT, I now examine 
the relevance of IOT by looking at the importance of recruitment and retention, given that 
turnover costs sustains the IOT. This will be undertaken in a static sense with less than 
ideal/preferred variables, due to data limitations. 
I will first discuss the characteristics of establishments who we might expect likely to 
consider the RRF to be a very important factor in exerting upward pressure in wage set- 
tlements. As noted earlier, by prosperity I mean that profitability of establishments that is 
of prime importance, as these are the establishments where insider power is greatest. That 
is, more prosperous/ profitable establishments, such as computing services, are more likely to 
consider the RRF is a very important negotiation consideration. Prior to discussing further 
characteristics, it would be useful to set out a simple framework of analysis within which 
to examine the chaxacteristics of the establishments most likely to consider the RRF is im- 
portant (that is, where insiders are more likely to have power) prior to embarking on the 
econometric analysis. I also state at the outset, that I would have preferred a wider range of 
more suitable variables, but due to data limitations this is not possible. 
The decision to consider RRF to be very important can be represented within a prosper- 
ity/profitability of the firm framework, which goes along with the IOT hypothesis. In the 
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IOT insiders have the greatest power where the financial prosperity/profitability of the firm 
is highest. It follows that recruitment and retention of the appropriate workers is an activity 
undertaken in accordance to the prosperity of the firm, in which costs are borne by estab- 
lishments in return for a steady stream of rewards (including productivity gains) accruing 
over time. So, establishments have more to lose, the greater their profitability. This is in 
the spirit of the IOT and indeed, goes along with the hypothesis of the IOT. Examples of 
rewards include the benefits of having an economic mass (Rice and Venables, 2004), and con- 
tribution to the agglomeration effects, such as face-to-face contact (see for example, Stroper 
and Venables, 2003). 
The prosperity/profitability of the firm model, which goes along with the IOT hypothesis, 
as mentioned earlier, is used to explain the properties/characteristics of the establishments 
which consider the RRF to be very important. First, establishments in all industries are 
more likely to consider recruitment and retention of labour as an important bargaining con- 
sideration; this is consistent with the hypothesis of the IOT. The importance of recruitment 
and retention of labour as a major bargaining consideration tends to be greater in industries 
that are more prosperous /profitable, since this is where insiders have the greatest power on 
account of higher turnover costs. In addition, these industries should also reap the greatest 
potential returns from the human capital investment in labour because they are in a better 
position to take advantage of the benefits flowing from the hiring or retention of the worker. 
By better position I mean features such as deeply seated agglomeration effects, including 
higher innovativeness, strong local knowledge networks and spill-overs. Moreover, proximity 
to direct and intermediate markets, well established connections with traditional markets and 
the new markets, also enables these industries to be in a better position to take immense 
advantage of the benefits accruing from hiring/retention of workers. Furthermore, these es- 
tablishments may have a strong first-mover advantage, which vastly increases their return. In 
the case of the South East, this relates to the first-mover advantage in information and com- 
munications technology. So, the benefits of recruitment and retention will far outweigh the 
costs. There is a body of evidence which suggests that industries with the benefits mentioned 
above are prosperous /profitable 23, with of course, gradation of prosperity/ profitability both 
intra and inter industries (see for example, Martin, Miller and Mayes, 2003). All the above 
23 The list is by no means exhaustive. 
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corroboraies with the hypothesis of the IOT. 
Second, spillover effects to the regions, emanating from factors such as agglomeration 
effects, contributes to a region's prosperity. The factors determining a region's prosperity 
include GDP, earnings and unemployment. In regions with lower unemployment, GDP and 
earnings, insiders are more likely to be important. With respect to unemployment the rents 
to be shared are likely to be lower in areas of high unemployment. This corroborates with 
IOT, EWT and a body of evidence suggesting a negative impact of unemployment on wages 
and factors such as the RRF, which is a major bargaining consideration. Having said this, 
even in prosperous regions there will be relatively deprived areas, where firms are less likely 
to be successful in recruiting labour, since the potential workers' reservation wages are low. 
Of course, there are other characteristics that render a region prosperous. For instance, 
workers would also want to be employed in the prosperous region. Some workers would want 
an attractive environment and rural areas for quality of life reasons 24 (see Bolton and Chalk- 
ley, 1989). Key managers, professional and scientific/technical staff, have been attracted to 
East Anglia due to its attractive environment. 
In addition, regions in southern England are preferred as opposed to other regions, due to 
its historic and industrial structure. The attraction of highly qualified professionals to climat- 
ically favourable regions for quality-of-life reasons is of major importance in understanding 
current regional dynamics (Keeble, 1991), and indeed, two-thirds of those questioned report 
that it was the region's perceived attractiveness as a residential place which swayed them to 
locate in East Anglia (Keeble and Gould, 1985). 
As alluded to earlier, the key locational influences overlap with each other, for example, 
in the existence in particulax axeas of southern England of significant local concentrations of 
scientific research activity (this includes the ancient Universities of Cambridge and Oxford 
and government research laboratories). The majority of these axe located in the South East 
and the provision of capital to firms in southern England by London (Martin, 1992). 
I will extremely briefly note the salient features of the degrees of prosperity in each 
region of the UK covered in this analysiS25 in turn, so as to deepen our understanding of 
the extent/reason for the importance of the RRF in that region, which underpins my theory 
portrayed in chapter 5. There is a positive relationship between prosperity and wages, as 
"Demographic Trends (1989): Rural Rush, The Economist, September 23,43-44. 
25 My discussion will be constrained to the periods of this analysis. 
122 
expounded in Theorem 1 of chapter 5. My theory is also applicable to the insider-outsider 
theory, which is investigated in this chapter. Quantitative evidence on comparative regional 
economic performance is in Table A4.1 - A4.4 in the Appendix. Quantitative evidence on 
comparative industrial economic performance is in Table A4.5 - A4.6 in the Appendix. I 
will first focus on the quantitative evidence during the period of my analysis. I will then 
supplement it briefly with some remarks on the characterisations of regions, which may 
assist in highlighting the cause of, or provide some background to, some of the differences in 
economic performances between regions and industries. 
Table A4.1 shows unemployment is generally the lowest in the South East for the duration 
of my period of analysis. East Anglia and the South West regions have the second lowest 
unemployment during the period of my analysis. East Midlands' unemployment generally 
tends to be high. Scotland, Wales and the North generally have the highest unemployment 
rates during the sample period. Unemployment in the North West region is also relatively 
high, while unemployment in Yorkshire and the West Midlands is around the UK average. 
In accordance with the IOT, insiders are less likely to be important in high unemployment 
regions, whilst insiders will be important in low/lower unemployment regions. Therefore, 
RRF is unlikely to be important in regions with high unemployment, but is likely to be 
important in regions of low unemployment. 
Another important indicator of regional economic performance is the GDP of the regions. 
This is provided in Table A4.2. With the base of UK = 100 for the whole of UK, the South 
East consistently has the highest GDP throughout the period from 1979 to 1996. Consistent 
data was unavailable for the last year of my analysis. East Anglia also has a relatively high 
GDP, indeed it has the second highest GDP of the regions analysed and Scotland has fared 
relatively well in terms of GDP. South West, Yorkshire and Humber and the East Midlands 
also have a relatively high GDP. The North West and North have comparatively low GDP 
amongst the UK regions, while Wales has consistently the lowest GDP in the UK throughout 
the duration of the analysis. All these suggests that insiders axe likely to be important in 
regions like the South East, where GDP is high/the highest. This is because there are more 
rents available for sharing, insiders would want a shaxe of it, as indicated by IOT. Therefore, 
RRF is likely to be more important in regions with high GDP and conversely, not so in 
regions with low/lower GDP, such as Wales. 
123 
Another indicator of regional economic performance is earnings. This is given in Table 
A4.3. The pattern of earnings differentials are very similar to GDP, with the South East 
having consistently the highest earnings for the duration of my period of analysis. The 
South West, East Anglia and North West have relatively high earnings during the 18 years 
of my analysis. Comparatively high earnings are seen in Scotland and the West Midlands. 
Yorkshire and the North, have relatively lower average earnings, while Wales and the North 
have consistently the lowest average earnings for the duration of my analysis. In regions where 
earnings are high, insiders and therefore turnover costs, are more likely to be important. This 
implies RRF is more likely to be important in these regions. Conversely, in regions with very 
low earnings, RRF is unlikely to be very important. 
A final indicator of regional economic performance is vacancies. This is given in Table 
A4.4. Although the differentials are not so large, again the South East tends to have the 
highest vacancy rates for most of the period of analysis, followed by East Anglia and the 
South West. According to IOT, insiders are likely to be important in these regions, as are 
turnover costs. This implies again that RRF is likely to be important in these regions. 
I now consider the quantitative evidence on comparative industrial economic performance 
provided in Table A4.5. Employment is a good indicator of industrial economic performance. 
In the interests of maintaining consistency for the whole span of the analysis and with the 
regions discussed above, I have categorised some of the industries into groups, in accordance 
with the availability of statistics. 
First, employment growth has been highest in distributive trades and leisure, insurance, 
banking, finance and business, and scientific and professional services of the groups of in- 
dustries or industries I analysed. Employment in the miscellaneous services, including motor 
distribution, in aggregate has increased steadily from 1979/80 to 1989/90 with the exception 
of 1990/91 and 1991/92, when there was a fall in employment in all industries in Table A4.5. 
Rom 1993/94 employment in this industry rose steadily again, and suggests insiders/turnover 
costs are likely to be important in these industries, and implies RRF is likely to be important 
in these industries. 
In contrast, in manufacturing there has been a steady decline in employment during the 
period of our analysis, with the exception of 1996/7 when there was a very slight increase. Em- 
ployment in the construction industry has largely declined, except from 1984/85 to 1987/88, 
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and then fluctuated for a few years and steadily decreased from 1990/91 to 1996/97. On 
the whole, employment in this industry has been relatively low. Furthermore, employment 
in transport and communication has been relatively low throughout the span of my analysis. 
Therefore, neither insiders nor RRF is likely to be very important in this industry. Overall, 
in industries where employment is high, insiders/turnover costs axe and therefore, RRF is 
likely to be important. Conversely, in industries where employment is low, turnover costs 
and RRF is unlikely to be important, in accordance with IOT. 
Another important indicator of industrial economic performance is GDP per head. This 
is given in Table A4.6. Again, in the interests of maintaining consistency for the whole 
span of the analysis and with the regions discussed above, I follow the same categorisation 
of industries into groups for employment in accordance to the statistics available. GDP 
growth per head in the groups of industries analysed has been highest in insurance, banking, 
finance, business activities, professional and scientific services, distributive trades, leisure, 
repair, transport, communications, and miscellaneous services including motor distribution. 
Insurance, banking, finance, scientific and professional services had a slightly lower GDP 
per head in 1990, and in Construction the GDP was slightly lower in 1983. This suggests 
insider/ turnover costs are likely to important in these industries. Overall, in industries where 
GDP per head is increasing, so are insiders/ turnover costs and therefore, RRF is likely to be 
important. Conversely, in industries where GDP per head is low, so are turnover costs and 
RRF is unlikely to be important, in accordance with IOT. 
Since some of the characteristics of the region were noted earlier I will note only the 
most pertinent characteristics. The South East is considered to be an engine of growth, the 
benefits of which are relayed to other regions. In addition, the South East facilitates more 
face to face contacts, as noted above (see for example, Stroper and Venables, 2003), which is 
an essential ingredient for progress and advancement of an establishment's workforce (ibid. ), 
due to its economic and social diversity. Indeed, it also encourages creativity due to the 
openness of the networks and the liberating force of anonymity (see Florida, 2002). So heavily 
populated cities, such as London, derive their agglomerate force from the classical network 
agglomeration efficiencies and power and influence (for example, government headquarters, 
trade associations and international agencies (Hall, 1998; Scott, 2001). 
Vibrant regions are not devoid of difficulties, particularly that of recruitment, and reten- 
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tion of labour difficulties. These difficulties leads to firms offering higher wages to attract and 
retain their workforce. London, for example, suffers from severe labour shortages, particu- 
larly in engineering (Brown and Walsh, 1991). In addition, growth in the 1990s, particularly 
in business and banking services, concentrated in central London, exacerbated recruitment 
difficulties with respect to professional staff (ibid. ). This will intensify the need to improve 
the ability to recruit and retain labour. 
Furthermore, the continued polarisation of well-paid employees and those in low paid jobs 
notwithstanding the unemployed, exacerbates social segregation within the region (Townroe 
and Martin, 1992). This has led to labour shortages in key sectors, such as construction, 
repair and new technology occupations, such as business and professional services, banking 
and finance. In conjunction with the housing shortage (Bover, Muellbauer, and Murphy, 1989) 
this intensifies the need to improve ability to recruit and retain labour as a very important 
factor in exerting upward pressure in wage settlements. 
East Anglia has grown the fastest in terms of output, employment and population (Town- 
roe and Martin, 1992). Due to the pressures of growth, East Anglia also experienced acute 
labour shortages, poor infrastructure as in the South East, which inhibits growth (see CBI 
2003). 
The South West is more prosperous in terms of most indicators of economic performance, 
such as GDP per head (Townroe and Martin, 1992). It is ranked third, in terms of prosperity 
in the UK (ibid. ). The manufacturing sector in the region exceeded the rest of the UK, 
since most of the manufacturing is in the sectors of aerospace/defence contracting and other 
high technology industries (ibid. ). In addition, the region also exceeded the rest of the UK 
in agriculture and private services (ibid. ). Due to its strength in high technology, business, 
professional, scientific services, insurance, banking and finance industries, the South West is 
relatively prosperous (ibid. ). 
The diverse nature of the economic base and strong manufacturing sector, with large 
numbers of small to medium sized firms, implies that East Midlands is one of the most 
resilient in the UK, in relative terms (ibid. ). A large percent of its GDP, which is one of 
the highest in the UK, emanates from manufacturing industries such as textiles, clothing 
and tourism (ibid. ). Its counterpaxt, the West Midlands is also prosperous, on account of 
its striking economic revival from the catastrophic economic collapse, which has contributed 
126 
favOurably to the wider business revival in this region (Martin, 1992). Birmingham is a major 
provincial centre for corporate finance and associated services (see Smith, 1991). 
Yorkshire and Humberside are also relatively prosperous, due to its expanding service 
sector, post severe rationalisation and comprehensive restructuring (ibid. ). In contrast, the 
North West, on account of its large and relatively independent sectors in chemicals, aerospace 
and electrical engineering including computers, employing a variety of skilled workers, is only 
fairly prosperous (ibid. ). The North is less properous, due to the adverse impact of the 
recession in the early 1980s, from which it has made a modest recovery. Similarly, Wales 
is also only fairly prosperous. This is because although there have been improvements in 
productivity post transfer to service employment, overall it has paxticular problems recovering 
from de-industrialisation. 
To recapitulate, the characteristics of a region which render the need-to-improve ability 
to be a very important factor in exerting upward pressure in wage settlement are regions 
which are endowed with faster growing industries relative to others. For example, the South 
East's- growth rate is attributed to this factor. But there are other reasons apart from 
industry mix which determine a region's economic performance. One of these factors is the 
entrepreneurial activity, since firm creation rate is higher in the South, particularly if the 
proximity to London is higher, than in the North. The South East and its surrounding 
regions have built-in advantages for firm creation, which is less evident in the North (Storey 
and Johnson, 1988). 
In addition, the RRF is likely to be very important with a quality workforce. For example, 
the South East is unique in attracting a disproportionate share of highly skilled and highly 
educated workers. In addition, the South East enjoys from a virtuous circle where highly 
skilled workers want to be employed in highly skilled jobs. 
According to IOT, see for example, LS (1988c), outsider labour maxket conditions are 
relevant to wage-bargaining. There is a considerable body of evidence which suggests that 
there is a negative relationship between unemployment and wages, for example, Blanchflower 
and Oswald (1994). Insiders/turnover costs are unlikely to be important in high unemploy- 
ment regions for a number of reasons, including that proposed by LS. This implies RRF is 
unlikely to be important. The northern regions have been losing managerial control due to 
acquisitions by firms located in the South East, which is the chief location of head offices. 
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Moreover, although there has been a major inflow of branch plants into regions of high un- 
employment, for example, the North, this does not enhance the need to recruit and retain 
labour as a major bargaining consideration for two main reasons. First, the branch plants 
are more susceptible to recessions and company reorganisations than independent plants, 
since the predators' allegiances are questionable, due to incentive incompatibility problems. 
Second, branch plants generate fewer spin-offs than independent firms and concentrate on 
lower level tasks such as processing (Harris, 1988). 
Another important determinant of the need to improve the ability to retain and recruit 
labour as a very important factor in exerting upwaxd pressure in wage determination is 
the education and skill level of the bargaining groups in establishments. There is a body 
of evidence which suggests the skill composition of the workers is pertinent in determining 
wages. Skilled workers are paid more. Reasons for this include their marginal product 
of labour is higher and the beneficial spillover effects on less skilled workers. Most of the 
skilled bargaining groups are concentrated in the South East, where the majority of the 
high technology industries and other services, notably, professional and scientific services 
and leisure are located. The pattern of demand for skills has changed significantly during 
the 1990s. The main growth bargaining groups are managers, supervisors (administrators), 
professional occupations and technical bargaining groups. High technology industries are 
more likely to have these bargaining groups and since these industries are the most prosperous, 
this reinforces recruitment and retention as a very important bargaining consideration. 
Given the growth in service industries and the decline in the manufacturing sector, the 
need to improve the ability to recruit and retain labour as a major bargaining consideration 
will be higher for supervisors, managers, professional/ technical and also for support staff, 
such as clerical staff. 
There is a considerable body of evidence which suggests that methods of measuring per- 
formance can have an impact on the performance of an organisation, and indeed measurement 
systems are implemented to attain a number of objectives, see for example, Mannion and 
Goddard (2002). Further, it has been found that the mode of measuring performance yields 
efficiencies, including cost savings for the establishment concerned (Stevens, 2005). This sug- 
gests that modes of measuring performance can achieve efficiencies and a number of desirable 
objectives, which ultimately improve organisational success. This indicates that there are 
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likely to be higher rents to be shared in these industries and may thus lead to greater degrees 
of insider power. By implication, the RRF is also likely to be important in these industries. 
The size of the bargaining group is likely to be a very important determinant of the 
need to improve the ability to recruit and retain labour as a very important pressure in 
wage settlements. This is because larger firms pay higher wages and thus are likely to have 
lower turnover rates (Salop, 1979) and the size of bargaining group is a proxy for firm size 
(Ingram et al. ). Furthermore, since these establishments are more likely to be content with 
the number of workers, the need to improve the ability to recruit and retain labour is not 
likely to be such a strong bargaining consideration. In smaller bargaining groups, the need 
to improve the ability to recruit and retain labour is thus likely to be a major bargaining 
consideration. There are a number of reasons for this. Due to the continual expansion of 
industries, such as high technology industries nationwide, establishments need to provide 
incentives to encourage recruitment and retention of labour. Moreover, the high-technology 
industries, from the author's preliminary investigation 26 , are relatively smaller, but growing. 
4.3. DATA 
The empirical analysis of the importance of recruitment and retention as a major bargaining 
consideration is based on a pooled cross-sectional time-series survey data on establishments 
collected by the Confederation of British Industry's (CBI) Pay Databank survey. The CBI 
dataset is designed to provide a continuous picture of the level of wage settlements and as- 
sociated details over time. The dataset covers the period from August 1979 to July 1997. 
I matched these data with unemployment statistics from the Office of National Statistics. 
The dataset is the longest source of disaggregated establishment level data, which provides 
information on wage settlement increases and the factors that influence it. The survey col- 
lects information on various factors influencing pay 27. The Databank consists of a structured 
26Available from the author upon request. 
27 To indicate the robustness of the data, and to illustrate that it has been used in a wide range of analysis, I 
refer to a few examples of the studies in which it was utilised. Several authors examine wage determination in 
general, including Gregory, Lobban and Thomson (1985) to assess the general perspective of wage settlements. 
Gregory, Lobban and Thomson (1986) also use CBI data to incorporate the structure of bargaining and assess 
its relationship to pay settlement. The pattern, outcome of pay settlements and wage bargaining in general 
was assessed by Ingram (1991a); and Ingram (1991b) analyse average settlement. 
In addition, CBI data has been utilized for a wide variety of aspects of wages including the investigation 
of the patterns of persistence in UK private manufacturing settlements in Ingram, Wadsworth and Brown 
(1996). Ingram (1995) examines the association between pay and productivity. Ingram (1991c) also assesses 
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sample of establishments stratified by industry, region, bargaining groups of varying skills 
and sizes, and a variety of financial variables. The dataset incorporates a wide range of ques- 
tions on the establishments' perceptions of the importance of the RRF as a major bargaining 
consideration. The dataset also comprises details of the main characteristics of the estab- 
lishments. Furthermore, the dataset also provides information on the factors that determine 
the percentage increase in pay and evaluates the main characteristics of the establishment's 
perceptions of the need to improve the RRF as a factor for exerting upward pressures on 
pay. Moreover, the dataset also contains details of the main characteristics of the establish- 
ments over varying economic cycles and the accompanying reactions of the establishments 
are captured over the 18 years. This, enables a clear assessment of the importance of the 
establishments need to enhance the ability to recruit and retain as a factor exerting upward 
pressure on wage settlements. In addition to surveying the perceptions of establishments' of 
one region, the questionnaires are sent to all the UK regions, to all industries and bargaining 
groups within each establishment. 
The varying economic climate and the accompanying reactions of the establishments 
are captured over the 18 years, as noted, which permits a clear assessment of the factors 
that encourage or enable firms to recruit and retain workers, and its consequent impact on 
firm size. Second, the sample period encompasses varying business climate, with periods of 
recession and booms over the 18 years and their impact on issues such as factors influencing 
wage settlements, specifically, whether the establishments considered the need to recruit and 
retain as a very important factor in exerting an upward pressure on the level of the settlement 
and the resulting firm size. 
There axe a number of merits of using pooled cross-sectional time-series data for econo- 
metric estimation: 
Pooled cross-sectional time-series data can be used to identify changes occurring in a 
sequential fashion, such as high rates of redundancies during the year 1980/81 , shortage of 
skills and labour shortages in general. This produces more effective data analysis, providing 
in-depth reasons as to the cause of the occurrence of such events. Second, it enables us to 
the extent of systematic change at the workplace, following high growth rate in manufacturing industry. 
Other studies that utilise CBI data include Brown and Walsh (1991); Metcalf, Wadsworth and Ingram 
(1993); Ingram, Metcalf, Wadsworth (2001) Drinkwater and Ingram (2003); and Ingram, Rickman and 
Wadsworth (2003) for their analysis on bargaining power and concessions in Britain over 1979-2000. Fur- 
thermore, Gray, Ingram and Rickman (2004), analyse patterns of wage claims, investigate the characteristics 
of the groups who settle for a zero increase in their basic wage and assess the impact of inflation on settlement. 
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analyse and make inferences of the dynamics of change, from the bargainers' perspective, 
in a continuous fashion. It also allows us to analyse the factors that influence important 
aspects of employment, wage determination, and recruitment and retention of employees, all 
of which are crucial to the establishment. Fourth, the availability of multiple observations 
for a given establishment or at a given time permits us to identify the model accurately. 
For example, forecasts of manufacturing output using CBI survey data in general is shown 
to be more accurate than aggregate indicators. For instance, as a disaggregate indicator of 
manufacturing output growth, it provides a more accurate early estimate of output growth 
than traditional indicators, see Mitchell, Smith and Weale (2004). 
Each year, information is collected from a selection of manufacturing workplaces, which 
are chosen according to the number of employees, in order to provide a more representative 
sample. The CBI dataset covers private manufacturing industry, and from 1987 private 
services. Each establishment is asked to provide information on up to three settlement groups, 
whose wages are settled, in part, at a local level in conjunction with information on other 
details pertaining to the settlement and some information on the characteristics of the group 
submitting the information. Initially, the firm is asked to provide details pertaining to the 
largest occupational group (LOG), comprising of both a manual and staff group, where 
feasible. The mean number of responses is 2 groups for every establishment. The annual 
response rate is approximately 65 per cent. A member of the management bargaining team 
directly involved with the settlement process completes the questionnaire. 
The dataset comprises approximately 1,500 observations per year. Since its inclusion in 
1987, the service sector data has constituted one third of the settlement groups, but since 
the groups are typically larger, they cover approximately two-thirds of an employees in the 
sample. In addition to determining the rate of increase in wages as a result of the settlement, 
and any non-wage dimension of the settlement, the CBI dataset provides information on 
calendax year, month and duration of every settlement. Most settlements occur annually, see 
Table 4.1. This information is amalgamated into periods comprising a 12 months 'settlement 
year', which traditionally commences in August. The longitudinal nature of the data implies 
that the same settlement group is pursued over time to ascertain the impact of the need to 
enhance the ability to recruit/retain employees as a negotiation consideration on the level of 
wage settlements, amongst an extensive list of other potential pressures influencing the wage 
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settlement process. The continuity of the data also permits the examination of whether agents 
are forward-looking, specifically, if agents who have good expectation of future productivity 
will consider the RRF to be an important wage determinant. 
Wage settlement data are preferable to the measured growth in earnings. This is because 
although the number of settlements coming into effect varies widely between different months 
of the year, in a pattern which itself appears to oscillate, settlement data alleviate the problem 
of distortion to the time-series of earnings changes which is implied by the fluctuating numbers 
receiving pay settlements in any period. Furthermore, by quantifying the settlement outcome 
directly, the settlement separates the formalised element or wage growth from any influence 
of the changing incidence of overtime or an unanticipated pay contingent on output. 
Moreover, settlement data do not necessitate a plethora of changes in order to render the 
data amenable for econometric analysis, unlike the major obstacles such as the combination of 
varying contract lengths and staged increases (occasionally in the form of partial indexation 
to future changes in a price index) which have confronted other authors, such as Christofides, 
Swindinsky and Wilton (1980a and 1980b), Sparks and Wilton (1971), Ridell (1979) and 
Taylor (1983). As noted, Table 4.1 shows that in excess of 90 per cent of the settlements 
recorded in the Databank have been for precisely 12 months, with both shorter and longer 
settlements mainly reflecting exceptional changes to the annual settlement data. In addition, 
although the data are pooled, they do not suffer from pooling effects of the type expounded in 
Akerlof and Main (1980). That is, for example, for each same sample point some characteristic 
is measured precisely up to a specified level, but no record is made if the characteristic exceeds 
that boundary. The CBI Databank is devoid of such a normalisation. 
TABLE 4.1 
SETTLEMENT DURATIONS: 1979-2000 
Percentage of 
12 months 
Settlements L 
> 12 months 
asting 
< 12 months 
1984-85 
9U. 2 
93.3 
3.4 
4.6 
b. 0 
2.2 
1989-90 91.7 4.6 3.7 
1994-95 90.0 5.4 4.6 
1997-98 91.1 6.0 2.9 
1999-00 90.1 3.6 6.3 
The question which is of relevance to this chapter is one which asks establishments the 
factor which they think influenced the level of their settlement/award and which has exerted 
an upward pressure on the level of the settlement. In particular, how important is the need 
to improve the ability to recruit/retain labour in exerting an upward pressure on the level 
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of the settlement. The precise questions asked in the CBI Survey are shown in the Data 
Appendix. 
Details are also collected on other factors which potentially exert pressure on the level 
of wage settlements, including the effect of high/improving profits, high/improving level of 
orders, good labour productivity performance, the threat of industrial action and industrial 
action taken. The factors listed in the questionnaire are grouped into upward and downward 
pressures. Most of the upward and downward pressures are the reverse of each other. The 
establishments decide independently and unilaterally on the quantity of factors to cite and 
the level of importance to attach to them. The options for the level of importance were 'very 
important', 'fairly important' and 'not important /relevant'. The full list of factors provided 
in the questionnaire and the percentage of respondents citing each factor as 'very' in each of 
the 18 years is shown in Table 4.3. The pattern of responses over the 18 years indicates that 
respondents are selective in their approach when choosing the answers to these questions. 
While the responses are perceptions of managers, rendering them subjective and qual- 
itative, the responses are mainly by CBI members. They thus have an incentive to relay 
accurate information to the CBI so that the organisation can assist them indirectly through 
the government. Second, the questionnaire format permits some measure of influences, such 
as the perceived risk of redundancy, bearing in mind its impact on pay. Some other variables, 
such as establishment-level profits, are in principle observable but in practice may be imper- 
fectly so. The format of the questionnaire permits respondents to report on the measure they 
consider pertinent. 
To summarise, the data takes the form of a series of eighteen sequential annual surveys 
of a sample of settlement groups, providing the opportunity for a comprehensive pooled 
cross-sectional time-series econometric analysis. Thus, the CBI's Pay Databank provides 
a continuous and more reliable account of the factors affecting the need to recruit/retain 
workers, and those exerting pressures on wage settlements for 18 continuous years. 
4.4. PRELIMINARY DATA ANALYSIS OF THE INFLUENCES ON 
WAGE SETTLEMENTS 
The questionnaire asks respondents the amount the settlement will increase or decrease earn- 
ings, including bonus, merit payment and so forth, if made paxt of the settlement of a typical 
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employee over the 12 months and to choose from an array of factors influencing pay. 
Annual nominal and real wage settlement increases from 1979 to 1997 are shown in Figure 
4.1.1 will first discuss the nominal wage settlements and then how the descriptive analysis is 
affected by considering real wage settlements. Nominal wage settlement increases are highest 
in 1979/80. While there have been fluctuations in wage increases since, settlements have 
not reached the 1979/80 level since then. Real wage increases were have been lowest around 
1982 and the real wage increase occured in 1988/89. It is worth noting that when real wage 
increase is are at its lowest, nominal wage increase is at one of its highest point, for example, 
during 1981/82. The percentage of nominal and real settlements within each percentage point 
for the four economic cycles (1979/80 to 1982/83; 1983/84 to 1988/89; 1989/90 to 1992/93 
and 1993/94 to 1996/97) are shown in Figures 4.2a-4.5b. This Permits identification of 
the nature of the wage settlements over time and the percentage of firms settling for the 
percentage point increase. Figure 4.2a shows that most of the nominal wage increases are 
clustered in the 4-8 percentage point range in economic cycle 1, although there is a marked 
dispersion in wage settlements, while the real wage increases are clustered in the -4 - 2.5 
percentage point range in economic cycle 1. Nominal settlements are high during the earlier 
years around 1979/80, since this was a period of high inflation. In cycle 2, nominal wage 
increases are clustered around the 6 percentage point, while real wage increases are clustered 
around the 2.5 percentage point. Bearing in mind this was a boom period, considerably more 
establishments settle at these nominal rates, due to increased firm creation, than was the case 
in economic cycle 1. This is consistent with expectations, since there were an exceptional 
amount of establishment closures in cycle 1. In cycle 3, there is a more uniform distribution 
of nominal wage settlements, while real wage settlements axe clustered around 1.3 percentage 
points as shown in Figure 4.4b. 
Again in cycle 4 most of the nominal wage increases are clustered around the 3 per cent 
level rate, as can be seen from Figure 4.5a. The lower nominal settlement rate is attributed to 
the government's concerted effort at sustaining the inflation rate. Again, there axe far more 
establishments in operation, due to the creation of firms and foreign direct investment, since 
this is again a period of recovery. The real wage settlements axe clustered around the 0.8 per 
cent level rate, as can be seen from Figure 4.5b. This is expected as this is predominantly a 
period of low inflation. 
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Figure 4.1. Annual Nominal and Real Wage Settlement Increases, 1979/80 - 96/97 
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The summary statistics of the increase in nominal and real wage settlements are shown in 
Table 4.2. The mean of the nominal settlements during the inflationary period of 1979 - 80 
was highest at 16.2 per cent, but since then there has been a steady decline in the mean of the 
nonlinal percentage settlements, with successive governments attempting to curb inflation. 
Froin the initial high level of 16.2 per cent in 1979 - 80, nominal settlements fell sharply from 
July 1980 until December 1980, when they were about 8.5 per cent. The average level of 
nominal pay increases fell steadily again to about 5 per cent in the mid 1980s. Subsequently, 
the average settlements rose progressively from 5 per cent to about 9 per cent in the early 
1990s. The mean of the real wage settlements was at its lowest following the period of high 
inflation of 1979 - 80. The low real wage settlements increased steadily until 1983 - 84. After 
this period, real wage settlements fluctuated. 
The data shows a clear cyclical variation in general, which is reflected in the choice of the 
factors deenied to exert an upward or downward pressure on both wage settlements. 
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Figure 4.5b. Annual Real Wage Settlements in Economic Cycle 4: 1993/94 - 1996/97 
Moreover, Table 4.2 also shows the percentage of establishments settling at zero increase in 
settlements. Zero settlements were highest during the general recessionary period of the early 
1990s, peaking in 1992 - 93, and were lowest in 1988/89. From 1989/90 to 1992/93, there was 
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a marked increase in zero settlements. The highest was in 1992 - 93, when there were 19.7 
per cent of zero settlements, after rising steadily from 1989/90 from a rate of 1.1 per cent at 
the beginning of the recession. In the boom period from 1993/94 to 1996/97, the percentage 
of zero settlements dropped from 8.1 per cent in 1993/94 to 6.2 per cent in 1996/97. 
There is a negative correlation between the average increase in nominal wage settlements 
and zero settlements, which reflects the economic cycles. 
TABLE 4.2 
NOMINAL, REAL AVERAGE AND NOMINAL ZERO SETTLE'MENTS 
ANNUALLY: 1979-80 to 1996-97" 
Year -N Nominal Mean Real Mean Nominal Zero settlements 
1979-80 929 16.2 (4.2 - 2.7 4.5 0.9 1980-81 1357 9 0 (3 1 -4.1 3.0 
ý 
1.0 
1981-82 1430 7ý0 ý5 2 2.8 -3.6 3.0 1982-83 1307 6 2.2 0.9 2.4 5.1 
1983-84 1361 :0 6 2.0 1.0 2.0 1.6 
1984-85 1250 6.5 1.7 
1 
0.6 1.9 
1 
0.4 
1985-86 1156 6.1 1.7 2.2 1.9 1.6 
1986-87 1174 5.2 1.6 1.3 (1.6) 3.0 
1987-88 1268 61 9 1 9 2. 1 1 9 1.0 
1988-89 1184 7: 6 ý 21 0 
ý2 ý0 0. 0.3 
1989-90 1467 8.7 24 0.0 25 1.1 
1990-91 1424 7.3 3.1 -0.5(2.9) 8.3 1991-92 1602 4.3 2.2 0.2 2.2 11.7 
1992-93 1662 7 2 9 1 09 1.9 19.7 
1993-94 1673 2: 8 1.6 0.5 1.6 8.1 
1994-95 1626 3.4 1.9 0.2 2.0 
1 1 
7.5 
1995-96 1749 3.5 1.6 0.8 1.7 6.2 
1996-97 1400 3.3 1.5 0.6 1.6 6.2 
'Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
We now turn to analysing the factors that influence nominal wage settlements, focusing 
particularly on the need to improve the ability to recruit/retain labour as a very important 
factor in the upward pressure on the level of settlements from 1979 - 1997. 
One of the main elements in the Databank is the reporting of the managers' perceptions 
of the relative importance of various factors which have an impact on wage-bargaining. The 
factor ratings reflect the measure of the mean level of perception among the managers of the 
importance of each factor. The ratings are given by a member of the negotiating team, who 
is knowledgeable and who is responsible precisely for interpreting and balancing the various 
factors that have an impact on the settlement process. 
The factors listed in the questionnaire axe grouped into upwards, downwards and 'other' 
factors, which comprises comparability factors. For our purposes, we win focus on the former 
two factors. Most of the upwards and downwards factors axe the converse of each other. Table 
4.3 provides, for each factor, the proportion of bargaining groups citing a 'very important' 
rating over the 18 years. 
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The table is interesting for both the relative importance attached to the different factors 
and for changes in these factors over the different cycles. The economic cycle has an impact 
on the frequency with which the perceived pressures are cited by the employers. Both up- 
ward and downward pressures had an impact on the size of the wage change and are more 
important during the periods 1979/80 - 1982/83 and 1988/89 - 1989/90, a recessionary and 
an expansionary period, respectively. Pressure from the need to recruit or retain workers fell 
dramatically in 1980/81. It declined in this recessionary period and recovered from the boom 
period of 1983/84, and has been steadily increasing until 1989/97. The need to improve the 
ability to recruit and retain more workers was highest during the latter period and lowest 
during most of the former period. 
The cost of living factor was strong initially; indeed it had the highest rating, both 
absolutely and relative to other factors. But with the diminishing rate of inflation this 
rating declined. Indeed, cost of living does not have an important impact on wages during 
periods of low inflation, see Hamermesh (1970). This is confirmed by Ingram, Wadsworth 
and Brown (1999), where it was found that the cost of living did not have a noticeable effect 
on settlements. 
In order to provide an empirical treatment of the importance of the need to recruit and 
retain labour as a bargaining consideration, in the context of rent-sharing theories, I shall 
abstract from the situation to give an economic analysis in terms of which to develop the 
econometric model which appears in the next section. 
The upward pressures of profits, initially of very limited influence in the recessionary 
period from 1979/80 - 1982/83, was equally of limited importance in the next recessionary 
period from 1989/90 - 1992/93. In economic cycles 1 and 3 the establishments were also more 
concerned about remaining a viable concern, but particularly so in the former economic cycle. 
The business climate, such as relatively poor levels of education, training and infrastructure 
(CBI, 2003), may also contribute to the weak impact of this factor. The adverse impact of this 
factor is felt more potently during a recessionaxy period, whilst the pressure from the ability 
to pass on wage increases in prices has been weak for the entire period. The pressure from 
industrial action, taken or threatened, was perceived to be of very little significance. Overall, 
this is expected since the Thatcher era, when the unions' power were severely curtailed. The 
pressure for good labour productivity has been fairly important throughout the span of this 
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analysis. The pressure of high or imposing level of orders has only fairly limited importance. 
Most of the principal downwaxd pressures have been consistently highly rated, rising to a 
peak in the second half of 1980/81, after which these pressures declined but did not restore to 
the levels seen in 1980/81. Throughout most of the period, the downward factors receive the 
highest ratings, even higher than the cost-of-living ratings. The product market pressures 
from profit and prices have consistently outweighed the risk of redundancy as a downward 
pressure on settlements. The risk of redundancy pressure has also an opposite impact to the 
RRF pressures, since when one is high, the other is low, and vice versa. For example, risk 
of redundancy was highest in 1980/81; that was also precisely when the RRF was of least 
importance. 
The pressures which the bargainers considered to have influenced the settlement are sys- 
tematically related to the level of wage increase settled. High settlers are systematically less 
affected by the three principal downward pressures: low profits, inability to pass prices and 
the risk of redundancy. In addition, they have been strongly influenced by upward pressures, 
particularly high profits and the need to recruit or retain labour. Low settlers demonstrate 
almost precisely the reverse pattern, and they are strongly influenced by the downward pres- 
sures (Gregory, Lobban and Thomson, 1985). 
Overall, the economic cycles dictate the impact of each factor on wage settlements. More- 
over, among upward pressures during the latter periods such as from 1994/95 to 1996/97, 
it is the recruitment and retention factors, that have shown a steady rise outweighing the 
upward pressure of profits, which is the most important, with the exception of the cost of 
living. For reasons stated above, the cost of living is no longer considered a particularly 
important influence on wage settlements, due to inflation not being important. 
Further dimensions of the nominal settlement pattern are reported in Table A4.7, which 
shows the regional and industrial influences on the percentage of respondents citing retention 
and recruitment factor 'very important7 in exerting pressure on the level of wage settlements. 
The RRF is particularly very important from around 1987/88 to 1989/90 in retailing 
and distribution, insurance, banking and finance, business and professional services. The 
RRF is also particularly very important in most manufacturing industries during this period. 
Similarly, the RRF is also particularly, very important during these periods in most regions, 
142 
CD 
Z 
CD 00 
52 w- 
Pý Z 
< 
Z 
> 
rn 
9 
Z 
< 
<Z 
H 
I- CD C4 C4 C7, C73 M M m C4 Lfl) C4 m C4 M 
cm 0 C4 MCD C4 
1 
M 
4 C4 m. ýC 4 C4 M 
CD m 00 to mM ýo C4 C4 ý cn - C4 M 
00 
C4 M(D, _, CDOO 
t- 
-4 C4 -4 C4 
-4 cz 
V LO 
'I. m 
C4 
-4 
C4 CD cn LO m ý r-I v 
00 m 
v C4 In 
M.,:, 
C4 
CD C, ýMý. "ýDLO cm 4 Cq v 
00 m 
v C14 LO-V m - 
t- 0 
-, cqo 
M 
-4 L-ý . 1-4 
m 00 
v CN IV Nr LO m 
C4 
Vm 
ý_ 
-4 -4 CD 
V to V -4 m Lm m 
m ýo C4 M 
cn 00 C4 -4 
CD LO 00 LO CID LO -4 ý 1-4 
vm 
CID voom 
N m 
t- m C14 clý m 00 (M C14 C4 -4 
v0 
cn -4 m a, 
CD 
C14 Cq 
m ýo 11 v ýo 
1-4 C4 1-4 C4 
C14 ýo 
V -4 
mm 14) 
0 
C14 10 
M -4 N 00 
v J_ 
-4 m C*4 
Lm 
V 
Vm 
m 
cli U'j 
C14 Lo Cq - 
-4 " '44 
m 00 
'" -4 
Vm m 
Idi (M 
CDMC4 cz 
V I" 
-4 
ul) " 
M 
v LO 
t- 
-, Cq IIm m uj 
C14 t- 
LO C14 
cz LO C, 4, -4 11 
CD 
v CD 
N in 
LO m 
V t- 00 Cq " Cq ýo 
ýc m 
IrD " 
4D C14 C4 M LID Cq to 
00 CD 
m C14 
0 WD 
.0 Cd - 
U3 
2 
co . u 
r. ___ 
co :! ý 
0- w --,. cd E 0 
.0 0 
4) 
; 1. C-) 
wd r. 
In .. 4ý C3 ý ;2o 
m W3 W 1 jo 
w 
Cd 
9 A. ce @ (D El 
, 
W 
., ,w . (D 0ws 1.. 
4) 
r. ý C) 
: ý., 
. - 
> rj w - 6.0 
14 
6 M, w 10 W 1. 
J. " 
Q) Q) Q. w 0 0 
ca 0 s. C', 0. 
00.. 
> 
4) 0 0 0,, 
ý 
. - 0_4,1 - 
% o 
U) 
w 4) . 
50 
0. 
ý t- ý rn 
W 
cl. >ý o >ý fs cd 
1 
Cd bo 
0. S. - Q) 4) t, 11) 
ce 
4 W :; , 00 4) > 
(L) cd 
0 rn- 
> 
>ý(D- 
. 'd 0 91, > 9! CD 
Ul CD h 
cd 0- > 
ho 
0 cd ce _W Q o 
"ts FZ -0 v ' 
.ý 
>, 
0, ;3V.. = 0 C? C, - co w 03.0 1. C3 i. 4ý & 1, 
. ce - r. a (v - -IV * 4) Cd 0 co _ &ý 0 g! z . 6ý -. - oo> 0 cd 00 C6 0 cil. Ir. a o 
oo 
'- 04 
cx 
04,. - 
-0.0 cc ce 0. :1w;:,, (L) 
, 
04 
00 ý: 0wI. 
-0 
. - a>o4 ts 4) r W >, W 0.45 = cd cd .- -0 "1 Qv >ý cow 
ce 0 E-0 0 
0 COW--'O OZ430- 60 1-1 cd 0 0 1 s00 
. co 0, co -0 
bo 
0. C' M. Cd mw -0 0 
Ej 00 0 '43 u cd ýn ý' 
> 'ý 0 
Q 0 co 00 0=0 0 Ex. .3 U0 :ýU. 
WOO 
0 
_ Q.. 56. 
- -4 
00 
oom 
Z 
cd i >0 
<Z 
CJ c5 
143 
but more so in the South East, with East Anglia a close second. 
Figure 4.6 traces the average level of the RRF as a very important factor in exerting an 
upward pressure on nominal wage settlement, average nominal and real wage settlements and 
unemployment rates over the 18 year period. It is worth noting, for example, from 1983/84 
to 1989/90 the upward pressure from the need to improve the ability to recruit/retain labour 
was higher than the previous years, since the mid 1980s to 1990 reflected the general recovery 
of the economy. There appears to be a similarity in the movement of the RRF being very 
important and the average nominal wage increase, and a negative correlation between both of 
these and unemployment. For example, in and around March 1990 both the average increase 
in the nominal wage settlement and the RRF being very important was at its highest, whilst 
unemployment was at one of its lowest rates. 
Post 1990, the average of the RRF declines progressively and the lowest average of the 
RRF is in 1993 - 1994. The average increase in nominal settlement was also at its lowest 
in 1992 - 1994. During the recessionary period between 1980/81 and 1982/83, unemploy- 
ment was high, whilst the importance of the RRF was relatively low, which is consistent 
with expectations. Between 1988/89 and 1990/91 the importance of the RRF is very high, 
whilst unemployment is low, thus highlighting the increasing need for labour, in the growing 
service sector of banking, insurance, finance, business, professional and scientific services, 
in conjunction with the fact there were acute skill shortages, especially in engineering, and 
labour shortages generally. Again during the period from 1994/95 - 96/97, the RRF became 
increasingly important, whilst unemployment was steadily falling. This, highlights the fact 
that during upswings the RRF is very important, whilst unemployment is steadily falling. 
With respect to real wage increases there appears to be a similarity in the movement of the 
average unemployment rate and the average real wage increase, and a negative correlation 
between the RRF and the latter and also with the mean of the increase in nominal wage 
settlements. For example, in and around March 1990 both the average increase in real wage 
settlement and the unemployment rate were at their lowest, whilst there is a lag of the RRF 
after real wage increases and also the mean of the increase in nominal wage settlements is 
at one of its highest rates. In the early 1980s the real wages were high compaxed to nominal 
wages, since it was a blip period due to high inflation. In addition, during this period the 
nominal wages matches the RRF. Post 1990, the real wage settlements does not show a 
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marked increase at all, in fact, they only increased slightly. This is unsurprising, due to the 
period from around 1991 - 1997 being one of low inflation generally. 
Table 4.4 provides the summary statistics of the importance of the recruitment and reten- 
tion of labour as a major bargaining consideration in the UK over 18 continuous years from 
1979/80 to 1996/97. In particular it shows the percentage of establishments reporting that 
the need to improve the ability to recruit/retain labour as a very, fairly, and not important 
factor in exerting upward pressure in wage settlements. It can be seen from the table that 
there are some clear differences in the responses given by establishments for each year. It 
shows that this influence exerted a great deal of upward pressure in 1989/90 and 1990/91 
and as we have seen from Figure 4.1 the nominal settlements were also high in this period. 
Insider influences are important in this period. 
We will consider all three types of responders in turn. With respect to the establishments 
who considered the RRF is important: the average nominal settlement in 1979 - 80 was the 
highest during our period of analysis for all three categories. Overall the statistics are similar 
for establishments who responded the RRF is very, fairly and not important, although the 
average of the latter two categories are slightly lower each year. It is worth noting that 
the average nominal wage settlements for each category are lower over time generally; this is 
attributed to successive governments attempts to reduce inflation. But for the establishments 
who have reported the RRF is not important, the average nominal settlements for every year 
is considerably lower. For instance, in 1987/88 the average was 6.8 percent for establishments 
who consider the RRF is very important, but for establishments who consider the RRF is 
fairly and not important it is 6.1 and 5.7 respectively. In 1990/91 for establishments who 
reported the RRF is very important, the average is 8.5 percent, whereas the average for 
establishments who reported the RRF is not important is 6.5. The findings for 1990/91 are 
in line with the acute skill shortage during the period when the RRF was high. The results of 
1987/88 also conform with acute skill shortages at the time in some engineering companies. 
It was approximately this time, in 1989, for example, British Airways were awarding 15 per 
cent increase in wages, to attract qualified engineering staff and to curb turnover rates which 
increased from 2 to 12 per cent in a year, as reported in Brown and Walsh (199 1). In 1992 - 93 
and 1993 - 94, the nominal wage settlements were less than 4 per cent for establishments 
who consider the RRF is very important, for establishments who consider the RRF is fairly 
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important the figure was less than 3.5 per cent and for establishments who consider the RRF 
is not important, the figure was less than 3 per cent. 
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Figure 4.6. - Average Nominal and Real Wage Settlement Increases, Recruitment/Retention 
as a Very Important Factor and Unemployment Rates: 1979/80 - 1996/97 
TABLE 4.4 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE IMPORTANCE OF THE 
RECRUITMENT/RETENTION OF LABOUR IN EXERTING 
UPWARD PRESSURE ON THE LEVEL OF SETTLEMENTS 
AND AVERAGE WAGE SETTLEMENTS: 1979/80-1996/97' 
The Need to Improve Ability to Recruit/Retain Labour as a 
Very Important Fairly Important Not Important 
Factor 
Y ear IN mean A mean IN mean 
1979-80 208 16.4 (4.5) 277 16.9 (4.1) 444 15.6 (3.9) 
1980-81 99 10.0 (3.2) 266 9.6 3) ( 3 992 7 8 ( 3 0 
1981-82 84 7 9 3.4 249 7.5 2 :4 1097 6: 8 2 : 4 
1982-83 69 :0 7 2.7 239 6 1 2*0 1000 5 6 (2.2 
1983-84 127 6.6 2.6 322 6: 4 2,2 912 :8 5 1 .8 1984-85 155 7.1 2.3 328 6.6 1.5 767 6 3 1.6 
1985-86 147 6.6 1.4 296 6.4 1.7 713 :9 5 1.8 
1986-87 158 6 5 1.6 307 5.4 1.6 709 5.1 1.6 
1987-88 336 : 68 8 1.9 364 6 1 9 1 568 5.7 1.7 
1988-89 391 8: 2 2.4 395 :5 7 1 :5 398 7.0 2.0 
1989-90 476 9.1 2.4 486 8.8 2.1 505 81 2.5 
1990-91 243 8.5 2.6 440 8.1 2.4 741 6: 5 3.3 
1991-92 174 5.6 2 5 401 4.9 1.8 1027 3.9 2.2 
1992-93 159 3.7 : 1.8 375 3.4 1.9 1128 2.3 1.7 
1993-94 213 3.7 1.7 452 3.0 1.3 1008 2.5 1.6 
1994-95 285 4.2 2.5 519 3.5 1.7 822 3.0 1.7 
1995-96 349 4.1 2.0 532 3.7 1.4 868 3.2 1.5 
1996-97 b 357 3.9 (1.7) 445 3.4 (1.5) 598 2.9 (1-3) 
'Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
6Unavailable from 1997-98. 
My earlier chapter 3 has empirically established agents are forward-looking. Figure 4.7 
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depicts the average expected productivity increase throughout the 10 years 28 . It is worth 
noting that the mean of the expected productivity was at its lowest points in 1995/96 and 
Figure 4.6 also shows that the mean of the increase in nominal wage settlements in 1994/95 
was low and was also at one of its lowest in 1995/96. This, reinforces my empirical results in 
chapter 3 and my theoretical analysis in chapter 5, that wages bargained will be a reflection 
of the future financial performance. That is, since the expected productivity was expected 
to be low in 1995/96, the wage was also correspondingly low. Another example is that when 
expected productivity was at its highest in 1990/91, the mean of the increase in nominal 
wage settlement was at its highest in 1989/90. As expected, both the expected productivity 
increase/ decrease has been fluctuating just as the mean of the nominal wage settlements. 
The crucial point to note is that there is a correlation between these two factors. 
Table 4.5 shows the establishments expectations' of productivity in the next 12 months, 
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Figure 4.7. - Expectation of productivity to increase or decrease in the next 12 months 
with average nominal wage settlements. The table also shows nominal settlements from 
expected productivity levels of 0-5, and greater than or equal to 10 per cent respectively. 
It is worth noting that the number of establishments expecting 0-5 per cent increases in 
productivity is very high from 1987 to 1991. This is due to more establishments in operation 
and productivity growth was around 0 to 5 per cent for majority of the establishments. aom 
28Due to data constraints it is only available for these years. 
198M 1988189 1SM090 19W91 19D%W 19MM 19WS4 1SD4'95 1995W 19WWf 
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the recessionary period from around 1990/91 to 1992/93 these 0 to 5 per cent increase in 
TABLE 4.5 
MEAN SETTLEMENT BY EXPECTED 
PRODUCTIVITY, 1986/87-1996/97', c 
Increase in Expected ProductiTi-ty 
0-5 per cent > 10 per cent 
Year N Meang- N -M fea -n- 6' 
1988/89 271 72 (2 0) 1 20 75 »8 1989/90 327 8: 6 jý9 162 97 .7 1990/91 255 71 23 110 7.2 .8 1991/92 329 4: 7 1 :6 154 4.8 0 
1992/93 340 2.9 1.4 151 4.7 2.6 
1993/94 383 3.0 1.2 123 5.6 2.0 
1994/95 363 3.7 1.5 141 3.7 2.8 
1995/96 372 3.5 1.0 124 4.1 2.1 
1996/97 311 3.1 1.1 108 3.3 2.0 
'Unavailable until 1987. bI have provided the average expected 
productivity rate (i. e., authors own 
calculations), for observations involving the 
first, second and third freqýency, annuall 'Standard deviations are given in parentLses. 
expected productivity have been declining since there have been considerable numbers of 
redundancies, which occurred around 1990/91 to 1993. As can be seen from Table 4.5, nomi- 
nal wage settlements for those establishments with 0 to 5 per cent productivity expectations 
increased steadily in the recovery period from 1993/94 to 1995/96. 
We can see a similar pattern of nominal wage settlements for establishments with an 
increase in expected productivity of greater than or equal to 10 per cent. But, as can be 
seen, the sample size is considerably smaller. Nonetheless, average nominal wage settlement 
increases were higher in this category, with the exception of 1994/95 when they were equal. 
This again shows the importance of expected productivity levels (a forward-looking variable) 
on nominal wage settlements. 
Figure 4.7 confirms that expected productivity has been fluctuating from 1987, although 
it has generally been on an upward trend. However, expected productivity did dip towards 
the end of 1996. The general trend may be attributed to the economy recovering from the 
recessionary period and labour shortages. 
The CBI dataset currently provides 18 years of data enlightening wage negotiations at 
the bargaining group level and the influence of recruitment and retention as a major nego- 
tiation consideration. The period from 1979 - 1997, incorporating four economic cycles, is 
an especially interesting period to study, not just for the period, but for its colourful. nature. 
First, the country went through a major recession, when some regions of the UK underwent 
major transformation, particularly the traditional manufacturing regions such as the North 
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East, the North and Wales. The other recession, in economic cycle 3, mainly affected the 
service sectors. The period also has two boom periods, which clearly had different and very 
favourable impacts on the whole, and on the need to recruit and retain labour as a major 
bargaining consideration. More prosperous establishments are more likely to consider the 
need to recruit and retain labour as a major negotiation consideration. Hence, it follows that 
more successful establishments pay higher wages and axe larger. There is a body of evidence 
which suggests that large firms pay higher wages, see for example Krueger and Summers 
(1988). 
4.5. MODELLING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE RECRUITMENT 
AND RETENTION OF LABOUR 
Establishments are presented with a scale that requires them to state which of the categories 
best describes their perception of RRF; this renders the observed dependent variable to be 
categorical and ordered. Therefore an ordered probit model is estimated, which has been in 
wide use as a framework for analysing such responses. The ordered response model was first 
developed by Aitchison and Silvey (1957). McKelvey and Zavoina (1975) wrote the computer 
program NPROBIT based on the Newton-Raphson iteration method which facilitated the 
production of their output. 
The ordered probit model of the importance of the need to improve the ability to re- 
cruit/retain labour as a factor in exerting upward pressure on wage settlements (conditional 
on explanatory variables x) can be derived from a latent variable model. The observed cate- 
gorical dependent variable is related to an establishments underlying importance of the RRF 
as follows: 
yi* = xliß + ei ei - N(O, 1) (1) 
where yi* is unobserved variable indicating an establishment's perception of the RRF. It is 
assumed that ei is normally and identically distributed. Since yi* is only observed ordinally, 
the scale of the y! is then normalised by fixing the variance of Ej. The establishments 
have their own perceptions, which depend on certain measurable factors xi which are the 
explanatory variables comprising of a set of establishment characteristics, and its associated 
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vector of coefficients 6, which is Kx1 and certain unobservable factors c. The latent 
dependent variable is associated to the establishment's underlying RRF as follows, which we 
do observe: 
Yj =1 if Yj* <p1 
yj =2 if IL, 4: ý Yi* -< A2 
yj 3 'f A2 "ýý Yi P3 (2) 
where the M's are unknown parameters to be estimated with 3. We then have the following 
implied probabilities: 
Prob(yi = llxi) = Pfyi* :5 jilIxil = 4D(-x'i, 3) 
Prob(yi = 21xi) = PfYi 1121Xil = 41ý(Al - Xý%O) -'Iý(-Xi, 3) 
Prob(yi = 31xi) =1- "ýGL2 - Xi, 3) (3) 
where -D is the cumulative standard normal distribution. 
V- 
Fur all the probabilities in (2) to be positive, we must have 
Al "ý A2 ": ý A3 
The interpretation of the 3 coefficients is in terms of the latent variable model (for example, 
a positive 0 implies that the corresponding variable increases the importance of an establish- 
ment's need to improve the ability to recruit/retain labour as a factor exerting an upward 
pressure on level of settlement), or in terms of its effect on the respective probabilities. For 
instance, if in the above model, Ok is positive, this implies that the latent variable yi* increases 
if Xik increases. Then, the probability that yj =3 will increase, whereas yi =1 will decrease. 
The probability that yj =2 may increase or decrease. 
Maximum likelihood methods axe used to obtain estimators of the population parameters 
of the model. Since the log likelihood function is a function Of 16k and the ki's, we have to 
locate a maximum to the log likelihood function, subject to the constraint in equation (4). 
We then solve this constrained maximisation problem and then obtain the partial derivatives 
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of the log likelihood function with respect to the unknown parameters in conjunction with 
the matrix of second partials. To obtain the Maximum Likelihood Estimator, the equation of 
the first partial derivatives are then set to zero and solved for the unknowns as in NIcKelvey 
and Zavoina (1975). 
To ensure that the solution is a maximum, the matrix of second partials evaluated at the 
solution point should be negative definite. It has been shown by Pratt (1981) in the case 
of a simple probit model that this is the case. The equations generated by the first partial 
derivative are non-linear, which implies they cannot be solved by the standard methods 
for simultaneous linear equations. But an iterative method of solution, the Newton Raphson 
method is used. We use Stata 8, which uses the Newton Raphson algorithm to iterate towards 
a root of the first partial derivative and the matrix of second partials. Pratt (1981) has 
shown that the Newton-Raphson method will converge to a global maximum. The resulting 
estimates of p's and, 8's are consistent, asymptotically efficient and their asymptotic sampling 
distribution known. 
The equation generated by the first partial derivative is then solved iteratively, using the 
Newton-Raphson method. The parameters p and 3 axe estimated by maximum likelihood, 
which maximises the joint probability of obtaining the observed values. The convergence of 
the iterative procedure has consistently converged rapidly, with convergence taking about 
five iterations for the models estimated in this chapter. 
Marginal effects are interpreted as a change in the probability that the RRF being very 
important equals a given level, per unit change in independent variable, conditional on other 
covariates. So, for the above probabilities in (3), the marginal effects of changes in the 
explanatory variables are, as in Greene, for example 
OProb(y = llxi) 
49Xik 
= 4)(-xi, 8)0 
i9Prob(y = 21xi) 
OXik 
aProb(y = 31xi) 
19Xik 
= "NA2 
Prior to analysing the results it is useful to examine the descriptive statistics for the explana- 
tory variables used in the econometric models. Table 4.6 reports the descriptive statistics for 
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Specifications 1 and 2. Two different specifications are estimated because some variables are 
not available in all years. As can be seen from the statistics, Table 4.6 inustrates that a wide 
range of industries are represented in my analysis. 
In terms of regional vaxiation, Table 4.6 illustrates that a high percentage of establish- 
ments are from the South East. For example, around a quarter of the establishments are 
located in the South East. Establishments from other regions of the UK are also fairly well 
represented. The bargaining group has been included to capture whether establishments with 
a specific type or specific types of bargaining group consider the RRF is very important. The 
expected productivity variable has been included to capture forward-looking effects to show 
that recruitment /retention will follow the pay increase pattern and to generally gain a deeper 
understanding of the characteristics of those who consider the RRF as an important factor. 
This investigates whether firms are more likely to undertake more recruitment /retention ac- 
tivity, if expected productivity is higher in the near future. 
It is natural to consider the size of the firm, because the importance of turnover costs 
in the IOT suggests recruitment and retention activity is likely to be important to firms of 
most sizeS29, if financial viability permits. If we incorporate this factor into our model, then 
most bargaining group size are more likely to consider RRF to be important. Since there 
is not a satisfactory variable for firm size in the dataset, baxgaining group size is used as a 
proxy for the size of the establishment. There is a correlation between firm size and the size 
of bargaining unit, and it is a reasonable proxy for firm size. This was inferred to be the case 
in Ingram, Metcalf and Wadsworth (1993). 
Acceptance by employees of the introduction of a new technology as part of the settle- 
ment has been included, because of possible capital-labour complementarities or substitution. 
Alternatively, the RRF may be lower if there is capital substitution. If the firm is fairly pros- 
perous, then such acceptance should reflect the importance of the RRF. Similarly, the method 
the establishment uses to measure performance is included to gain further insight into the 
importance that recruiting/retaining has on exerting upward pressure on wage settlements. 
For example, the method of measuring performance by the value of output per person em- 
ployed is utillsed mainly by business and scientific services 30 - The mean of these dummy 
vaxiables do not naturally sum to one by the conventional method. 
2'Given that Lindbeck and Snower (1988c) stress that workers can bargain individually as mentioned earlier. 
30 Preliminary analysis by the author on CBI dataset has confirmed this. Details available upon request. 
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TABLE 4.6 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR EXPLANATORY 
VARIABLES IN THE CBI PAY DATABANK' 
Variable 
(1) 
Mean ( 
Specitication 
b (2) c 
S. D. ) Mean (S. D. ) 
Sector 
Food, Drink and Tobacco 0*086 ( 2 0 8 ) 0*071 26 (0 
Chemicals and Allied 0.139 0 
:3 5 0.136 0: 34 
ý 
Metal Manufacturing 0.061 ( 0 2 4) 0.053 (0.22 
Mechanical Engineering 0.258 :4 4 0 22 0 7 4 )) (0 
Instrument, Electrical, Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering 01 22 ( 33 0 ) 011 
: 6 j 0: 3 
Textiles, Leather, Leather Goods, Fur, Clothing and Footwear 0: 060 
: 0 24 051 0 (0 22) 
Bricks, Pottery, Glass, Cement, Timber and Furniture 41 0 0 0.20 0: 035 
: 018 
Paper, Printer and Publishing 0 
: 057 0.23 0 050 22 0 
Construction 0,004 
1 
0.06 0 005 : 07 0 
Transport and Communication 0.022 0.15 0 035 0* 18 
Distributive Trades 0.036 0.19) 0.060 0.24 
Insurance, Banking and Finance 0.031 0.17 0.053 0.22 
Business, Professional 0.067 0.25 0.092 0.29 
Leisure 0.006 
1 
0.08 0.009 0.10 
Miscellaneous Services, Inc. Motor Distribution 0.005 0.07 0.007 0.09 
Region 
Scotland 4 1( 01 32 0 ) 116 0 32) 0 ( 
North 62 0.0 :2 04 : 067 0 : 25 0 
Yorkshire 2 0 09 ( 2 0 9) 0086 28) (0 
East Midlands 0.072 :2 06 0: 0 65 :2 05 
East Anglia 4( 00 0 0 2 0) 46 0 0 21) (0 
South East 253 0. : 0 43 273 0: 5 :4 0 
South West 0.079 0.27 0.083 0.28 
West Midlands 0.109 0.31 0.100 0.30 
North West 
1 
0.122 
1 
0.33 0.111 
1 1 
0.31 
Wales 0.057 0.23 0.054 0.23 
Ba in G ou f L r r sta l n 
a s ed ai u U n il i 0.423 049 0 435 (0 5 0) 
Semiskilled Manuals 0.255 Oý44 : 0 253 : 0 43 
Skilled Manuals 0.166 037 0.154 0.36 
Supervisors 0.138 0.34 0.137 
ý ý 
0.34 
Clerical, Professional and Technical staff 0.018 0.13 0.021 0.14 
Financial Variables 
Expected Productivity - 2.510 ý4.83ý 
Acceptance by employees the introduction of New Technology as part of the settlement - 0.040 0.20 
Methods of Measuring Performanced Value of Output per person employed - 18 ( 0- 0 fl8) 
Volume of Output per person employed - 0.22 41 
Value added per person employed - 0.13 0.33 
Unit Labour Costs - 
1 
0.30 
1 
0.46 
None - 0.12 0.32 
Other - 0.12 0.32 
Size of Bargaining Group 
< 25 workers - 178 0 38) (0 
T6-50 - 1 0: 144 0: 35 
51-100 - 0.172 0.38 
101-200 - 0.174 
1 1 
0.38 
201-500 - 0.160 0.37 
501+ - 0.173 0.38 
Year 
1979/80 0037 ( 0- 19) 
1980/81 0.054 0.23 
1981/82 0.057 ( 0.23) 
1982/83 0.052 0 22 
1983/84 0.054 0,23 
1984/85 0.050 0*22 
1985/86 0.046 0.21 
1986/87 0.047 0.21 - 
1987/88 0.051 0.22 0.122 ( 0.33 
1988/89 0.047 0'21 0 . 115 0 . 32 
1989/90 0059 0.23 0.143 0,35 
1990/91 0 0 57 0.23 0.1 39 0,35 
1991/92 0.064 0.24 0.156 0.36 
1 1 
1992/93 0.066 0.25 0.162 0.37 
1993/94 0.067 0.25 0.163 0.37 
1994/95 0.065 0.25 - 
1995/96 0 0.070 0.25 
1996/97 0.056 0.23 - 
N 25030 10254 
aStandard deviations are in parentheses. 
bThe sample size in Specification 1 relates to the most basic specification. 
cThe sample size in Specification 2 relates to the general specification. 
dThe excluded category for the measures of performance variable refers to establishment s using no or other 
performance measures. Establishments were able to select multiple responses for forms of perfor mance 
measure used. 
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4.6. RESULTS 
Table 4.7 reports the results of estimating (1) for the entire sample of establishments from 
1979/80 to 1996/97, for specification 1 (1982/3 is the reference year). Specification 2 is 
estimated for 1987/88 to 1996/97 (1992/3 is the reference year). Prior to discussing the results 
it would be useful to mention the fundamentals of the output. The table reports coefficients 
from each ordered probit model and the marginal effect for establishments that reported the 
RRF as very important in wage settlements. The z-ratios are the ratios of the estimated 
coefficients to their respective estimated standard errors. The z-ratios axe (asymptotically) 
distributed at N(O, 1) under the null hypothesis that the associated coefficients are zero. 
The value of Ll is the maximised log-likelihood. Since the hypothesis that all the slopes in 
the specification are zero is also of interest, I have computed the log-likelihood with only a 
constant term, 1n LO -11046.98, also shown in Table 4.7. The Chi2 value rejects the null 
hypothesis. The pseudo R2 is McFadden's (1973) Likelihood ratio index. 
The coefficients associated with the geographical, industrial, bargaining groups and other 
variables generally have the expected sign. For example, the most prosperous sectors, such as 
banking, insurance and finance, and business and professional services, establishments from 
the South East and supervisory bargaining groups consider the RRF as very important. In 
addition, the RRF is considered very important in the leisure industry and has the highest 
marginal effect amongst the sectors. With respect to bargaining groups it should be noted 
that if there are multiple responses from establishments when indicating the number of bar- 
gaining groups in their establishment, the CBI unilaterally selects one. In terms of regional 
differences, having many thriving businesses, has consistently been shown to be positive and 
have a significant effect on the importance of the RRF, such as in the South East with its 
thriving computing industry, for example. With respect to the South East, for example, ex- 
isting literature on regional development in the UK strongly suggests that the South East has 
many features which characterise an economy developing with intensified division of labour, 
which are less evident for instance, in the industrial heartland region of northern England 
which helps to maintain its prosperity vis-a-vis other regions, for example, by being com- 
petitive (see Athreye and Keeble, 2002). Establishments in the West Midlands, which has 
traditionally had an equally vibrant manufacturing base, also highly significantly consider 
the need for the ability to recruit and retain as a very important factor in exerting upward 
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TABLE 4.7 
ORDERED PROBIT RESULTS OF THE NEED TO IMPROVE ABILITY TO RECRUIT/RETAIN LABOUR 
AS A FACTOR EXERTING AN UPWARD PRESSURE ON LEVEL OF WAGE SETTLEMENTS' 
Dependent variable: RRF 
Independent Variableb 
Specification (1) 
1979/80-1996/97 
Estimate Marginal Effect 
Specification 2) 
1987/88-1996ý97 
Estimate Marginal Effect 
Industry 
Chemicals and Allied 0.118 2.28 0.022 2.70) 0.1 6 8 2 06 0.0 23 1.52 
Metal manufacturing 0.153 
ý 
2.40 0.014 1.39 9ý 
ý 
0.14 1 : 46 0 0.0 5 0.28 
Mechanical engineering 
1 
0.409 8.80 0.074 
ý 
9.27 
1 
0.358 4.72 
1 
0.073 
1 
4.84 
1 
Instrument, Electrical, Shipbuilding 0.548 ) 10.96 0.127 11.96) 
ý 
0.506 6.21 0.110 5.88 
and Marine Engineering 
Textiles I leather leather goods, 0.259 ( 4.28) 0.062 (5.54) 0.223 (2.27) 0.065 (3.14) fur, clothing aný Footwear 
Bricks, Pottery, Glass, Cement, 0.004 ( 0.06) -0.014 (-1.38) -0.025 (-0.21) -0.024 (-1.27) Timber, Furniture 
Paper, Printing, Publishing 12 0 1 ( 79 1 23 0 0 (225 0 144 ( 4) 1 4 39 0 1 99 ( ) 
Construction 9 0: 45 :0 1 3 
ý 
0: 125 9 3: 4 
ý 
.1 00 8 
: 0 74 2 2 :0 03 0: 6 08 
Transport and Communication 0 0 78 0.94 0 024 ( 1 74 O 148 1,28 0 67 0 292 
Distributive Trades :6 4 00 10.12 : 0 165 1 6 . 10) 
ý5 0 70 6,23 166 0: 7ý06 
Insurance, Banking and Finance 0.683 
ý 
10.53 0.171 9.73) 0.885 9.39 0.244 891 
Business, Professional and Scientific Services 0.834 
1 
15.04 0.213 14.47) 0.799 9.27 0.208 9.11 
Leisure 0.842 7.28 0.248 
1 
6.70 0.979 6.66 0.339 7.21 
Miscellaneous Services Inc. Motor 0.228 
ý 
1.56 0.039 
ý 
1. 0.315 1.62 0.092 1.94 
Distribution 
Size of Bargaining Group 
< 25 workers - - 0.234 4.12 0 05 5 51 4 H-50 0.29 1 5.02 : 3 006 4 t 8 
51-100 - - 0.241 4.37 0.051 4 30 
101-200 - - 0.110 1.97 0.034 3.02 
201-500 - - 0.095 1.71 0.025 2.22 Bar inin Grouf X L 
anua s illed Un 0.042 1.58 0.005 1.16 0.764 1.90 0.012 1.64 
Skilled Manuals 0.064 
ý 
1.80 0.012 
ý 
2.09 0.042 0.77 0.016 
ý 
1.59 
Supervisors 
1 
0.417 ) 13.28 0.105 
1 
15.25) 
1 
0.471 
1 
9.90 0.127 
1 
10.2 i) 
Clerical, Professional/Technical 0.191 2.69) 0.048 3.17) 0.234 2.39 0.049 1.98) 
and Managerial Staff 
Financial -Variables 
Expected Productivity - - 0.004 ( 1.42) 0.001 2.16ý ý 
Value of Output per person employed - - 0.196 ( 4.98) 0.063 7.11 
Volume of Output per person employed - - -0.062 (-1.58) -0.016 (-2.24) 
Value added per person employed - - 3 0.03 .71 0 0.031 3.24 Unit Labour costs - - 0.06 5ý 0.13 
ý 
0.001 
ý ý 
0.16 
Introduction of New Technology - - 0.081 1.06 0.018 1.18 
Region 
North 031 56 0 23 081 ( 0 9 5 012 0 (073 ) 
Yorkshire 0: 0 11 0.23 0: 007 .8 02 
0: 190 2: 5 1 9 0: 02 1ý9 4 
East Midlands 230 ( 0 457 
1 
0 087 (8 36 
1 
449 ( 0 574 ) 03 8 1 7 51 ( 0 
East Anglia 0 0: 2 4 3: 44 :0 0 66 : 553 01 0: 3 3: 45 0 0: 10 4: 88 
South East 0.470 ( 12.24) 0.116 (14.80) 536 0 9,09 124 0 . 60 9 South West 0.142 2.84 0.030 3.34 1 0: 2 3 2,80 : 036 0 2.32 
West Midlands 0.242 5.32 0.060 
1 
6.65 0.437 6.21 0.099 5.94 
1 
North West 
1 
0.154 
1 
3.37 0.037 
1 
4.57 0.295 4.23 0.082 5.30 
Wales 0.021 0.36 0.023 2.35 0.134 1.49 0.066 3.53 
Year 
1979/80 0.911 11.88) 0.265 (13.02) - - 
1980/81 0.137 70 1 0.023( l. 88) - - 
1981/82 0.038 0 : 46 -0.000 (-0.04) - - 
1983/84 0.296 3.79 
1 
0.073 5 14 - - 
1984/85 0.463 6.05 0.1 20 7: 61 
1 
1985/86 0.489 6.29 0.123 7.50 
1986/87 0.533 6.94 0.136 8.20 - 
1987/88 0.936 12.96) 0.267 14.16 0 730 12.01 0 210 12.68 
1988/89 1.157 16. 00ý 0.373 19.47 
1 :9 0 61 15.83 
1 :3 0 16 18.29 
1 
1989/90 1.120 8 15.81) 0.355 355 19.30 0.914 15.86 0.292 18.28 
1990/91 0 59 8 8 4) 0 0: 1 0.171 10.20 0.397 6.47J 0.122 8.60ý 
1991/92 : 2 030 3: 98 0 77 0 5.48 0.093 1.47 0.030 2.47 
1992/93 0.210 2.73 0: 046 
J 
3.55 - 
1993/94 0.379 
1 
5.10 0.100 6.90 0.164 (2.70) 0.050 (4.14) 
1994/95 0.598 8.20 0.178 10.86) 
1995/96 0.715 9.97 0.201 12-03ý 
1996/97 0.929 12.7 i) 0.278 14.84 - 
N 25030 10254 
Log L -9742.38 -4387. 02 
Wald chi2 (2294.84) (1116. 18) 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 
0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.1181 0.1296 
Log Lo computed with only a constant term -11046 . 98 
Oz-statistics in parentheses. 
bReference Categories: For Specification (1): Food, Drink and Tobacco; semi-skilled manuals bargaining group; 
Scotland and 1982/83. For Specification (2): Food, Drink and Tobacco; semi-skilled manuals bargaining group; 
bargaining group with > 500 workers; No or other performance measure; Scotland; 1992/3. 
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pressure in wage settlement. Since the 1980s, the West Midlands has also received foreign 
direct investment from Japan, coupled with long-term cooperation between customers and 
suppliers to lower costs, and make quality improvements and enhanced efficiency (Okamura, 
1997). This has improved the financial performance of these firms in the Midlands, and is 
likely to have contributed to the RRF being very important. 
Prior to discussing other results, we must bear in mind that the regional and time dummy 
variables included in our regression capture other factors such as spatial differences in unem- 
ployment and demand. Indeed, the year dummies will pick up a plethora of influences, such 
as the inter-industry variation in financial performance3l, general establishment strength, 
labour demand and supply (through the implicit unemployment rates), market conditions 
and other bargaining factors. Evidence of this is demonstrated by the fact that the RRF is 
important in regions with financially prosperous establishments such as the South East, West 
Midlands, East Anglia, North West and South West. Therefore, I did not add a separate 
unemployment variable in Table 4.7 in Specifications 1 and 2. Since we have regions over 
time, doing so will give rise to collinearity of the unemployment variable with the regions. 
(Although I will do so later in Table 4.8. ) 
Regions such as East Anglia have experienced protracted spells of relatively successful 
structural changes and growth over the whole period of our analyses (see Keeble, 1998), 
thereby rendering the RRF very important. It is worth noting the following for the reduction 
in significance of the RRF in the North, Yorkshire and Wales. The recession is fundamentally 
a manufacturing phenomenon and most of the manufacturing activities were focused in the 
North. Thus, manufacturing employment fell by 10 percentage points more in the North 
than in the South. In addition, as the UK economy began to recover from 1983 onwaxds, 
the accentuated disparity in regional trends did not lessen. Manufacturing employment in 
the northern England and Wales progressively declined until 1986 and then recovered very 
slightly. Coupled with other reasons, such as the high rates of direct taxation in the 1980s, this 
produced a negative multiplier effect, which curbs the spending of the ordinary wage earners 
and a reduction in employment in the industries which produce the goods and services, he 
would have purchased from and so forth. Of course, it also applies to regions where these 
industries axe located. The magnitude of the burden vaxies amongst individuals, for example, 
311 shall abstract from referring to future financial performance in this chapter, due to data constraints (i. e., 
unavailability). 
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a typical wage earners spending power was drastically curtailed. This, coupled with the 
inequality of dispersion of pre-tax pay during the 1980s, particularly affecting less prosperous 
areas such as the North, Yorkshire and Wales, contributed to the negative multiplier effect. 
which conforms to our finding with respect to these regions. 
It is also found that all industries are positively associated, with the RRF being a very 
important bargaining consideration, with the exception of the bricks, pottery, glass, cement, 
timber and furniture industry, relative to the excluded category of food, drink and tobacco. 
Of course, the importance of the RRF in exerting an upward pressure on wages vaxies in 
accordance to the prosperity of the industries. 
I now provide some measures of prosperity for each industry or group of industries, when 
measures of prosperity are unavailable on a historically consistent basis. This is given in Table 
A4.5-A4.6. GDP is consistently the highest in the distributive trades and or leisure industries 
as can be seen in Table A4.6. Second, the transport and communication industry has the 
next consistently highest GDP. Third, the construction industry has a relatively high GDP. 
Fourth, business, professional, scientific services and miscellaneous services including motor 
distribution have a comparatively and consistently high GDP. Fifth, insurance, banking and 
finance also have a comparatively and consistently high GDP. Similarly, the manufacturing 
industries generally have a fairly high GDP. 
Another measure of industrial prosperity is the employment in each or a group of in- 
dustries as dictated by the availability of consistent historical statistics as mentioned earlier. 
First, the distributive trade and leisure has the highest employment amongst the industries we 
had consistent statistics for. Second, insurance, banking and finance have the second highest 
level of employment amongst the industries in my analysis, for which we have the consistent 
statistics. Third, employment in the manufacturing sector as a whole, is relatively high, as 
can be seen in Table A4.5. Fourth, the construction industry also has a comparatively high 
employment level. Fifth, business, professional, scientific services and miscellaneous services, 
including motor distribution, has a relatively high employment level. Sixth, the construction 
industry also has a fairly high employment level. 
In the light of the quantitative evidence, it is cleax for example, that the banking, finance, 
insurance, business, professional, scientific services, distributive trade and the leisure industry 
are likely to consider the RRF to be very important. This is in congruence to expectations, 
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for example, computing services have had the fastest GDP growth rate (see ONS 2003). 
Second, the high significance of the RRF in the distributive trades is due to the heaN, y 
demand for consumer goods, particularly during protracted periods of low interest rates 
within this period. This has promoted the retailing industries immensely, which is consistent 
to expectations. It is the insurance, banking, finance and business industry that actually has 
the highest very important RRF. Third, the RRF is also relatively important in sectors which 
have traditionally suffered from skill shortages, such as mechanical, instrument and electrical 
engineering. Fourth, the construction industries also consider the RRF to be somewhat 
important but to a lesser degree, than for example, business and professional services. 
The RRF is significantly more important for supervisors, but also for clerical, profes- 
sional/technical and managerial bargaining groups, relative to semi-skilled manual workers. 
The importance of the RRF is highest for the supervisory bargaining group. There are no 
significant differences between the skilled and unskilled manual bargaining group and semi- 
skilled manuals32. 
The importance of the RRF has varied considerably over time, even after controlling 
for other factors as shown by the significant year dummies. Our common perception would 
be that the importance of the RRF will be highest in boom years, and lowest in periods 
of recession. This has been borne out by these results, even when I include controls for 
the above characteristics. Indeed, all the year dummies corroborate well with the figures in 
Table 4.4 and overall figures in Table 4.6. The RRF is very important and highly significant 
for all the years except years 1980/81 relative to 1981/82, when it is positively associated 
with very important RRF. This is expected, since the economy was experiencing one of 
the worst recessions ever experienced. It is worth noting that the coefficients for 1988/89 
and 1989/90 are very strong and well determined. This conforms to expectations since the 
economy was booming at the end of the 1980s. Similarly, the coefficients at the end of the 
period (1994/5 - 1996/7) are also strong and well determined. In the former two yeaxs, they 
were particulaxly very strong, and the RRF rating was at the highest (see Table 4.4). This 
corresponds to a period when the UK economy had recovered after the recession of the early 
1980s. The RRF was also very important but not significant, during 1980/81 and 1981/82. 
The reduction in the strengths during these years was naturally, primarily due to the de- 
32 In the analysis I conducted, including the semi-skilled manuals, which is available on request. 
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industralisation which commenced from the mid-1970s, particularly affecting the North and 
Yorkshire (Townroe and Martin, 1992), coupled with the unprecedented level of the recession 
at this time. Output fell by 15 per cent and employment by about 19 per cent (see Fothergill 
and Guy, 1990). Towards the end of the decade unemployment fell but a dearth of skilled 
labour was the main constraint on growth. This strengthens the insider power on account of 
turnover costs. 
The following pertains to all our specifications. Upward RRF pressures in the 1980s 
generally, are due to the disinvestment in skills, in traditional industries, such as mechanical 
engineering and instruments and electrical engineering. On account of this an exceptionally 
high number of workers of the UK workforce in comparison to our overseas competitors has 
been left jobless or untrained. In addition, the UK's record in education and training vis-A-vis 
overseas standards was poor and deteriorating during the 1980s, for example. GDP devoted 
to education fell from 5.5 per cent in 1980 to 4.7 per cent in 1987, relative to countries 
such as the US and Denmark, which devoted 6.5 and 7.9 per cent of their GDP respectively. 
Furthermore, decreasing number of 16 to 18 year olds undertake full-time education in the UK 
than in any other advanced country. For example, in 1988, only 35 per cent did so, as opposed 
to 66 per cent in France, 79 percent in the US and 77 per cent in Japan. Moreover, only 
38 per cent of the British industrial workforce received skilled vocational training, compared 
with 67 per cent, 79 per cent and 80 per cent in West Germany, Italy and France respectively 
(Miliband, 1990). 
Throughout the 1980s official youth-training policy underwent constant change. Offi- 
cial expenditures were mainly directed at job creation, rather than independently validated 
training. This neglect of formal education as a basis for training and training itself, explains 
why skills shortages have become a major constraint upon economic growth (Steedman and 
Wagner, 1987). All this also explains the reason why the RRF upwaxd pressures rose. 
Indeed, difficulties with recruitment and retention have become important bargaining 
considerations at the end of the 1980s, when the RRF being very important as an upward 
pressure in settlement was the highest (see Table 4.4). Skill shortages were becoming increas- 
ingly severe (OECD, 1989), and was a major contributor towards wage inflation between 1987 
and 1989 (Sentance and Williams, 1989). In addition, CBI data show that there has been 
a marked increase in the proportion of establishments reporting problems with recruiting 
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specific types of skilled labour, which rose from 55 per cent in 1986 to 70 percent in 1989 
(CBI, 1989). This conforms to the RRF being very important as an upward pressure and 
being the highest in this period (see Table 4.4). The gravity of the skill shortage, particularly, 
during the end of the 1980s, as noted, increased the importance of the RRF. For instance. 28 
per cent of the establishments' growth were constrained by skill shortages, according to the 
CBI Industrial Trends Survey. This aligns with our RRF statistics in Table 4.4. The above 
periods in the 1980s were also when insider power was at its peak. 
In/around 1988/89, the percentage, of respondents citing the determinant 'good labour 
productivity performance' as a 'very important' exerting upward pressure on wages rose, as 
shown in Table 4.3. This is attributed to the acute skill shortage, particularly in the South 
East, where, for example, property prices and the general inertia experienced nationwide33 7 
impedes labour mobility, thereby enhancing the importance of the RRF as a very important 
bargaining consideration. The regional property price differential in the South-East, which 
had been 25 per cent in excess of the national average in 1981, increased to 53 per cent in 
excess of the national average (Cambridge Econometrics, 1990; Hamnett, 1998). The severe 
labour shortages, have led to financial and business service sectors attracting applicants with 
very attractive remuneration packages, particularly in the aftermath of the deregulation of the 
financial markets. These remuneration packages have been subject to frequent adjustments, 
both in terms of quantity and quality to attract applicants or a specific type of applicant. 
Regional imbalances in pay were most noticeable in the South East and these imbalances 
could not be alleviated by attractively packaged wage supplements. For instance, the Alliance 
and Leicester Building Society was unable to provide an efficacious package: despite raising 
London allowances by 37 per cent in 1987, turnover rates in London were still twice as high 
as the rest of the UK as reported in Brown and Walsh (1991). Another explanation which 
dislocates the effective operation of labour markets in the 1980s is the incentives to owner- 
occupation, paxticularly, the tax relief for mortgages which increased the portfolio returns 
compared to other assets and caused a 'mobility trap' in the South-East (Bover, Muellbauer 
and Murphy, 1989). All this increases the importance of the RRF as a very important 
negotiation consideration. Generally, there is a negative correlation between good labour 
33 Pencavel (1994) attributes this to high housing costs in the UK viz-a-viz the US. Henley (1998) finds 
home-owners are averse to mobility under changing labour market conditions. 
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productivity performance pressure and RRF (see Table 4.3)34. 
In order to further examine the impact of unemployment in Specifications 1 and 2, coef- 
ficients on the measures of regional unemployment are reported in Table 4.8. This shows the 
impact of local labour market variables on the RRF. Three models are shown with respect 
to Specifications 1 and 2. Inclusion of the regional unemployment measure in Specification 
1 (as expected it does cause multicollinearity with the regional and year dummies) shows 
unemployment to have a negative and significant effect on the RRF, as expected. This cor- 
roborates with a body of evidence, including for example, Blanchflower and Oswald (1994). 
Excluding the regional dummies from Specification (1) also shows the unemployment measure 
is negative and significant. Similarly, exclusion of time dummies also shows unemployment 
to have a negative and significant impact on RRF. Regressions estimated using Specification 
2 reported in Table 4.8 also show unemployment to have a negative and significant impact 
on RRF, again aligning to expectations. Furthermore, excluding regional dummies and the 
time dummies separately from Specification 2, also showed unemployment to have a strong 
negative and significant impact on RRF as expected. 
Overall, with respect to the marginal effects of the establishments who reported the need 
to recruit and retain labour is a 'very' and 'fairly, 35 important factor in exerting upward 
pressure on the level of wage settlements for specification 1, are similar. There is a dichotomy 
between respondents who report the need to recruit and retain as a 'very', 'fairly' and 'not' 
important in exerting upward pressure on the level of wage settlements'. 
TABLE 4.8 
SOME ADDITIONAL ESTIMATESa 
Description of Experimentb 
Specification ý1) 
1979/80-1996 97 
Estimate Marginal Effect 
Specification (2 
1987/88-1996/4 
Estimate Marginal Effect 
(1) Same sample, measures of regional unemployment, -. 07 (-9.44) -. 07 (- 9.44) -. 10 (-6.48) -. 03 (-8.72) 
regional dummies and time dummies included 
(? ) Same sample, measures of regional unemployment, -. 08 (-14.40) -. 02 (-18.96) -. 09 (-10.61) -. 02 (-12.55) time dummies included, no regional dummies 
Same sample, measures of regional unemployment, (3) -. 11(-23.0) -. 02 (-28.21) -. 16 (-20.11) -. 04 (-25.48) . regional unemployment, regional dummies 
included, no time dummies 
a z-statistics in parentheses 
b The reference categories are as in Table 4.7 with respect to the corresponding specifications for all three experiments. 
34 To confirm robustness of these results, I conducted further investigations. A brief report is presented 
below. The coefficient of the introduction of new technology variable without the control for the size of the 
bargaining unit is 0.12 with a z-statistic of 2.46 and the coefficient of the introduction of the new technology 
variable with controls for the size of the bargaining unit is 2.82. The number of observations for the former 
model is 20257 and 20255 for the latter. There are few overall differences between these two models and 
specification 1. 
35Details available on request. 
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Additional specifications were estimated to shed further light on other characteristics af- 
fecting the importance of the RRF. It is infeasible to include these results with Specification 
1 in Table 4.7, due to some of these vaxiables not being present in the data until 1987/88. 
Hence, I include additional variables in Specification 2, specifically the acceptance by employ- 
ees of the introduction of new technology, size of the bargaining groups, expected productivity 
over the next 12 months and the establishments' mode of measuring performance. These are 
included since it is natural to consider that the manner in which establishments measure 
performance, expected productivity, differing new technological accumulation and the size 
of the bargaining groups have an impact on the RRF being very important. For example, 
firms would report the RRF to be very important if specific skill types enhance the financial 
performance of the firm and vice versa. Firms would recruit and retain more workers, if 
introduction of the new technology accumulation enhances the financial performance of the 
firm, and vice versa. 
Second, the future expected productivity or financial performance in general, is likely 
to have an impact on the firm's recruitment and retention activity, on account of the rents 
available for sharing. If the expected productivity is higher, we find the RRF is higher. 
However, we should also note the potential endogeneity between future expected productivity 
and the RRF. Third, more prosperous firms have a large workforce, see for example, Burdett 
and Mortensen (1998), and will consider the RRF to be very important, and vice versa. 
Besides the establishment size being an important institution, which reflects the prosperity 
of the firm, for our purpose it is an important dimension of the importance of the RRF, since 
my explanation of the size-importance of the RRF differential is based on my theoretical 
analysis in my succeeding chapter, that results from more prosperous establishments being 
attracted by more workers and more workers wanting to retain employment in these firms. 
The more prosperous firms would want to recruit and retain more workers. The opposite is 
also true for both these cases, as stated earlier in both my empirical and succeeding theoretical 
chapters. 
These results are presented in the same table 36. Note I only report the differences between 
36 Further investigations on the skill groups, showed that the impact of the professional and technical and 
managerial group have a powerful impact on the likelihood of establishments reporting RRF is very impor- 
tant relative to unskilled groups. The coefficients and their respective significance levels are as follows: For 
professional and technical workers the coefficients are 0.152 (4.52) and for managerial workers the coefficients 
are 0.146 (4.42). This corroborates with expectations, since increasing number of establishments are relying 
on the workers technical, professional knowledge and skilled managerial guidance. For example, most indus- 
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this Specification 1 and Specification 2, and this strategy will be followed throughout the 
chapter. The significance level of most of the coefficients in Specification 2 has been reduced. 
This can be attributed to the smaller sample size, than the fun sample used in specification 
1. In terms of the results from Specification 2, the following points are of interest and worth 
noting. 
The most interesting marginal effects relate to the financial variables. Although a unit in- 
crease in expected productivity only increases the probability of the establishment reporting 
that the RRF exerts a very important influence, the significance of this variable has increased. 
The marginal effect on the expected productivity variable is significant at the 5 per cent level. 
However, as mentioned earlier, one should also note that future productivity is potentially 
endogenous, since firms which use the wage to recruit and retain staff employ high quality 
workers and hence have higher productivity, or at least firms expect it. Thus data of a longer 
duration and well-structured variables may be required to rule out the endogeneity and cap- 
ture the strong and powerful forward-looking effects of this variable. Second, establishments 
who have introduced new technology are 2 percentage points more likely to report that the 
need to improve ability to recruit/retain is a very important factor in exerting an upward 
pressure on wage settlements. There is a body of evidence to suggest that establishments 
which utilise new technology, for example, in business services, as expounded in Townroe and 
Martin (1992), are the most prosperous establishments in the UK. This has been confirmed 
by all our investigations. But again this variable is not significant. 
Third, firm size is an important indicator of the firm's performance level as noted. The 
marginal effects of all sizes of the baxgaining groups are positive and significant as expected. 
The estimates suggest that the bargaining group with less than or equal to 25 workers are 6 
percentage points more likely, the baxgaining group with 26 - 50,51 - 100,6 and 5 percentage 
points respectively, and 10 1- 200 and 201 - 500 workers, are 3 percentage points more likely to 
report the need to improve the ability to recruit/retain a very important factor in exerting an 
upward pressure on wage settlements relative to the establishments whose size of bargaining 
group is greater than 500. The significance level is slightly lower in a baxgaining group size 
tries in the banking, finance and business centre, in London and East Anglia. Indeed, nationwide there is a 
tendency, where feasible for establishments to be increasingly reliant on these skill groups. I have not reported 
the estimates of all the other skill groups, due to some collinearity with the bargaining group. Similarly, I had 
also investigated the influence of unions with specification 2, but there was some collinearity with the size of 
the bargaining group. In addition, I also examined the impact of unemployment, but as alluded to earlier, 
there was some collinearity with regions. 
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greater than 200, since the evidence is that old manufacturing firms, such as the aerospace 
and defence industries in the South West are no longer important. There is no longer a dire 
need to recruit and retain in these firms. In a sense, these establishments are content with 
their recruitment and retention activity. That is, higher/efficiency wages do not need to be 
paid to reduce quits and increase hires, since manufacturing on the whole throughout the UK 
is in decline and the incumbent workers are content with their employment in these firms, due 
to most of the lucrative industries in the UK which pay higher wages are mainly in business 
and banking or other similar services, so the skills of the workers in these establishments 
are no longer as marketable as they once were, prior to the influx of the highly skilled 
service industries. In smaller bargaining units, that is with less than or equal to 100 workers, 
establishments report a more significant desire/need to recruit and retain workers, as for 
example the small prosperous establishments in East Anglia and the diverse small prosperous 
establishments in the East Midlands (see Townroe and Martin 1992). 
Fourth, the estimates suggest that establishments whose method of measuring perfor- 
mance is through value of output per person employed, are 6 percentage points more likely, 
and establishments whose method of measuring performance is value added per person em- 
ployed, are 3 percentage points more likely, to report the need to improve the ability to 
recruit/retain a very important factor in exerting an upward pressure on wage settlements 
relative to the establishments who use no or other performance measures. The effect of the 
former is very powerful relative to establishments using no or other performance measures. 
This is the most frequently used mode of performance by professional and scientific services, 
specifically, 310 establishments use this method of measuring performance. Moreover, the 
estimates suggest that establishments whose method of measuring performance is through 
volume of output per person employed are 2 percentage points less likely to report the need 
to improve the ability to recruit/retain a very important factor in exerting an upwaxd pres- 
sure on wage settlements relative to the establishments who use no or other performance 
measures. This mode of measuring of performance is largely employed by manufacturing 
industries, such as motor manufacturing, and chemical industries. In the former, 179 estab- 
lishments and in the latter, 133 establishments use this method of measuring performance37. 
This is consistent with expectations, as manufacturing is no longer important and is largely 
37 These are derived from preliminary data analysis conducted by the author. 
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in decline. Furthermore, a unit increase in labour costs only increases the probability of the 
establishment reporting that the RRF exerts a very important influence. 
Fifth, the estimates suggest that the supervisors' bargaining group is 13 percentage points 
more likely, bargaining groups of clerical, professional/technical and managerial staff, skilled 
manual and unskilled manuals are, 5,2 and 1 percentage points respectively more likely, to 
report the need to improve the ability to recruit/retain as a very important factor in exerting 
an upward pressure on wage settlements38. 
In addition, with respect to the marginal effects of the explanatory variables on the proba- 
bility of an establishment reporting that the need to recruit and retain labour is a fairly impor- 
tant factor in exerting upward pressure on wage settlements for specification 239, the estimates 
again are considerably lower than the estimates for the marginal effects of establishments who 
considered the need to recruit and retain labour as a very important factor in exerting upward 
pressure on wages settlements, as with specification 1. With respect to the marginal effects 
of the explanatory variables on the probability of an establishment reporting that the need to 
recruit and retain labour is not important in exerting upward pressure on wage settlementS40 ) 
are similar to specification 1. The estimates suggest a negative likelihood, with the exception 
of the building industry and volume of output per person employed, with the need to improve 
ability to recruit and retain labour as a very important factor in exerting upward pressure 
on wages, as expected. 
For robustness, I also computed the average of the marginal effects (see Bartus, 2003), 
with respect to every establishment who reported the need to recruit and retain labour as 
either, very, fairly important, and not important factor in exerting upward pressure in the 
level of settlements for both specification 1 and 2. These are shown in Tables A4.8. The 
results are fairly similax to the results of the average of the marginal effects for the average 
observations reported in Tables 4.7, except that the significance levels are slightly lower. 
Overall, there is again a dichotomy of those respondents who report the need to recruit 
and retain labour as a 'very', 'fairly' and 'not' important factor in exerting upward pressure 
in the level of settlements for specifications 1 and 2. 
Analysing economic cycles for our specification (1), which is for the whole sample, reported 
"All results in Table 4.7 are robust to a wide range of specifications, which the author conducted. Details 
available upon request from the author. 
3 'Details available from the author. 
"Details available from the author. 
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in Table 4.9, enables us to gain a deeper understanding of the changes that have occurred 
within these disaggregated timescales and their varying impact on the need to improve the 
ability to retain and recruit labour as a very important factor exerting upward pressure on 
settlements. It should be noted that since some of the variables, including expected produc- 
tivity and the other financial variables in specification 2, are only available from 1987/88, it 
is infeasible to incorporate these variables, as it will not permit us to undertake comparative 
analysis with the earlier years preceding 1987/88. 
It is important to analyse the RRF in different periods, since we can then focus particular 
attention to sub-periods. For example, it is shown in Table 4.7 that the importance of 
the RRF varies considerably with the economic cycle. Table 4.9 reports the ordered probit 
estimates of the importance of the RRF in exerting an upward pressure on wages for the 
four periods. The first period, 1979/80 - 1982/83 is a recessionary period, whilst the second 
period, 1983/84 - 1988/89 is a boom period. Similarly, the 1989/90 - 1992/93 corresponds 
to a recession and 1993/94 - 1996/97 a period of recovery. 
Model (1) displays estimates from economic cycle 1. During cycle 1, the economy experi- 
enced one of the most adverse recession it had experienced for many years. The South East 
and East Anglia were the only regions where establishments reported that the RRF had an 
important significant influence relative to Scotland. With respect to East Anglia, the rela- 
tively rapid growth rates compared to the rest of the UK, brought East Anglia through the 
recession with its underlying dynamic structural conditions unimpaired, thereby sustaining 
the prominence of insider power and simultaneously the significance of the RRF. 
The regions which are less likely to consider the RRF is very important, for example, the 
North, had suffered a catastrophic impact. This is due to closures of steelworks, shipyaxds, 
engineering plants, the job-displacing capital investment undertaken in the Teeside chemical 
industry, coupled with the mass exodus of multinationals, and the reductions in the coal 
mining industry. In the East Midlands, the recession spurred massive restructuring of the 
region's industrial base, resulting in substantial job losses in the engineering textiles and 
mining industries. Wales also experienced specific difficulties surmounting the aftermath of 
the recession. This is in conformity with our results in Table 4.7. Naturally, this render 
insider powers less prominent and indeed, dampened the insider effects and consequently the 
importance of the RRF. While positive coefficients are also associated with the South West, 
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West Midlands, and the North West, insider effects axe not strong and hence, nor is the 
significance of the RRF- With respect to the South West, this is due to most manufacturing 
employment being in the aerospace/defence contracting sectors and other high technolo&N' 
establishments (examples of high technology industries are Plessey and Hewlett Packard). In 
addition, their agricultural, manufacturing and private services output was the highest in the 
UK. In West Midlands this is due to its cyclical dynamism, which emanates from the diverse 
but interlinked metal-based manufacturing sectors. 
In this period, there is no information on the CBI database on service sector establish- 
ments, which is unfortunate given that the recession was mainly manufacturing based (a large 
decline in manufacturing industries, and high interest rates). Relative to the food, drink and 
tobacco industry, establishments in the mechanical, instrumental, and electrical engineering 
industries were the only manufacturing industries to report a significantly more important 
influence of the RRF in this period. Two of the other industries showed a lower influence of 
the RRF. This shows the severe effect that the recession had on the labour markets in many 
Northern areas. The lower but positive association with the textiles and clothing industry is 
due to the buoyant East Midlands with its diverse and fairly robust industrial base. 
In common with the estimates in Table 4.7, the supervisory baxgaining group is more 
likely to report that the RRF had an important effect on wage pressure. 
Model (2) displays the estimates for economic cycle 2. The RRF is significantly impor- 
tant in the South East and East Anglia again, but it is positive relative to Scotland in all 
regions and these differences are significant with the exception of the North, Yorkshire and 
Wales, which show recovery. With respect to the North, our results corroborate with the 
experience of the North during this period, where there was a wave of closures in the coal 
mining industry. In East Anglia, by 1988 the pressures of growth lead to increasing labour 
shortages, thus rendering the RRF to be significantly important, as noted, due to enhanced 
insider power. In the East Midlands there has been increased growth in the service sector. 
The region has a stronger small business sector than its counterpart the North, which ex- 
plains the powerful impact on the RRF, as being very important in East Midlands, second 
only to the South East. The very powerful impact of the RRF, being very important, in 
the West Midlands is attributed to the pronounced economic revival. The main cause of the 
recovery is due to the favourable restructuring of its manufacturing sector, which generates 
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in excess of one-third of the GDP. The region's metal and engineering group has altered its 
product and market strategies. There has also been marked growth in overseas investments. 
All ihese imply insider effects are intact and the RRF is significant. Amongst the positive 
associations, the impact of the RRF being very important in Yorkshire is due to its upturn, 
as evidenced by the demand for office spaces exceeding supply in major cities. The cities of 
Leeds, Bradford and Sheffield have been at the forefront of the revival. With the additional 
industries included, these service industries have a significantly higher RRF than the food, 
drink and tobacco industry, with the exception of the building, transport and communication 
and miscellaneous services, but the same applies to some of the other manufacturing indus- 
tries. Only positive associations pertain to transport and communications industry, since 
a good proportion of these industries were owned/regulated by the government during the 
years of our investigation, as noted in an earlier chapter 3 and hence, there are divergence in 
objectives between the public and private sector and also the significance of the RRF. Again, 
the only significant bargaining group is the supervisors. 
Model (3) depicts the estimates for economic cycle 3. This was a period of a service- 
sector based recession in the South. Despite this, the RRF is still significantly higher in 
the South East. This is due to the overall prosperity of the region, due to several factors, 
including its close proximity to the EU, more businesses in the South East, and as noted, the 
severe housing shortage, partly attributed to the inflow of population, has hampered more 
people moving to the South East, thereby creating acute labour shortages in the South East. 
Again the RRF is higher in all regions relative to Scotland and in some regions significantly 
so. For instance, in the East Midlands, there were gains in employment in the engineering 
establishments. Most of the services industries also reported higher RRF, with the exception 
of construction industry, some significantly so. This was a period when the demand for houses 
was at its lowest for a considerably long time. This was reflected in the rise in negative equity 
for houses. Hence, the negative association of the construction industry to the RRF is due to 
the demand for buildings being low, on account of high interest rates. In addition, the RRF 
is also significantly higher in mechanical, instrumental, electrical and marine engineering. 
Again the supervisory baxgaining group is positively significant, in conjunction with the 
clerical, professional/technical and managerial staff. 
Model (4) presents economic cycle 4. The sample size is considerably smaller (with 4 
168 
years usable observations). In addition, the three years are in a recovery period. Only the 
South East has a significantly higher RRF relative to Scotland, with the South West and 
the West Midlands, which also have a higher RRF. Most other regions have a lower RRF. 
The RRF is low in the food, drink and tobacco industry, but all industries ha%-c a significant 
RRF, apart from miscellaneous services and transport and communication. Again, the only 
significant bargaining group is that of the supervisors 41 . 
41 My investigations of the skill groups in economic cycles, consistently showed that the coefficients were well 
determined and sometimes had a powerful impact on the RRF being very important for all economic cycles 
for the professional and technical skill group and the last two cycles for the managerial group. 
In order to investigate the importance of the RRF in greater depth, we also conducted investigations with 
respect to the economic cycles, by including size of bargaining groups, occupational and introduction of new 
technology category to the specification 1 of the whole sample in Table 4.7. The results are consistent to 
expectations. Details are available from the author upon request. 
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TABLE 4.9 
ORDERED PROBIT ESTIMATES OF THE NEED TO IMPROVE ABILITY TO RECRUIT/RETAI. N 
LABOUR AS A FACTOR EXERTING AN UPWARD PRESSURE ON THE LEVEL 
OF WAGE SETTLEMENTS DURING ECONOMIC CYCLESa 
Dependent variable: RRF 
Independent Variableb 1979/80-82/83 
ECONOM 
(2) 
1983/84-88/89 
IC CYCLE 
(3) 
1989/90-92/93 
(4) 
1993/94-96/97 
industry 
Chemicals and Allied -0.050 (-0.41) 0.177 2 0 9 0.086 0*81 0- 246 2,13 
Metal manufacturing 0.043 0.30 0.140 1ý 2 6 0.1 go 1*45 0.279 2,09 
Mechanical engineering 0.216 2.17 0.541 7.18 0.278 2.83 0.514 4.78 
Instrument, Electrical and Marine Engineering 
1 1 
0.368 3.42 0.649 7.90 0.391 3.71 0.723 6.32 
Textiles, leather, leather goods, fur, clothing 0.031 0.22 0.365 3.69 0.098 0.76 0.486 3.63 
and Footwear 
Bricks, Pottery, Glass, Cement, Timber, -0.134 (-0.86) -0.078 (-0.60) -0.052 (-0.34) 0.301 ( 2.01) Furniture 
Paper, Printing, Publishing -0.223 (-1.59) 45) 0.153 (1 202 (1.54) 330 ( 0 2 3 9) 
Construction - 
: 0.179 0 24 
%-109 
(-0.36) :8 0 22 4 :0 5 
Transport and Communication - 77 0.167 0 0.004 003 0 38 2 70 1 
Distributive Trades 5: 0.725 12 0.327 2ý85 1: 008 8 38 ý 
Insurance, Banking and Finance - 1.120 8.30 0.487 0 45 0.810 4 648 
Business, Professional and Scientific Services - 0.630 3.04 0.785 7.41 0.966 9.01 
Leisure - 1.171 4.34 0.732 3.75 0.930 4.79 
Miscellaneous Services, Inc. Motor Distribution - -0.007 (-0.02) 0.358 1.46 0.351 1.65 UrouF Bar tai nin 
s l i, s il Un ed anua 8 0.066 0.91 -0.001 (-0.01) 0.057 1.10 0.063 1.38 
Skilled Manuals 0.117 1.23 0.87 0.059 0.093 1.35 
ý 
0.031 
ý 
0.48 
Supervisors 
1 1 
0.417 5.44 
ý ý 
0.452 8.46 0.483 
1 
7.59 
1 
0.244 3.39 
Clerical, Professional /Technical and 0.139 0.75 0.178 1.62 0.322 2.39 -0.108 (-0.44) 
Managerial Staff 
Region 
North -0 38 0 0153 
(1.42) 54 0 0 (04 9) Ol 6 0 0 1 7 
Yorkshire -0.243 
ý: 
1: 8 0.154 1.62 1 0: 14 14 1: 45 
:0 
87 :0 
:0 : 9 9 
East Midlands -0.216 -1.47 
ý 
0.601 6.38 0 14 j 4 14 -0.049 -0.54 
1 1 
East Anglia 0 322 98 1 0.448 3.96 O 177 11 :5 -0.002 -0.02 South East : 0 360 47 3 ý 
1 
0.820 10.91 0.382 5.06 0.290 4.35 
South West 0 0.134 1 02 0.312 3.27 0.118 1.18 
1 1 
ý 
0.055 
ý 
0.62 
West Midlands 0.110 0.95 0.471 5.50 0.256 2.75 0.119 1.46 
North West 0.216 0.18 
1 
0.404 4.76 0.231 2.56 -0.076 - 0-89 
Wales -0.091 (-0.57) 0.204 1.85 0.034 0.30 -0.100 
ý ý-0.95 
Year 
1979/80 0.920 11.98) - - 
1980/81 
ý 
0.145 1.82ý 
1981/82 0.043 0.53 - - - 
1984/85 - 0*1 75 2.51 - - 
1985/86 - 
1 
0.201 2.83 - - 
1986/87 - 0.248 3.55 - - 
1987/88 - 0.637 9.64 - - 
1988/89 - 
1989/90 - 0.904 (16.01) 
1990/91 - 0.389 ý6.50ý 
1991/92 - 0.090 1.47 
1994/95 - - 0.213 3,86 
1995/96 - 0.325 6.05 
ý 
1996/97 - - 0.539 9.76 
N 5026 7403 6155 64 6 
Log L -1349.82 -2927.84 -2508.42 -2866.87 
Wald chZ2 330.16 926.93 558.26 466.14 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.1225 0.1542 0.1089 0.0764 
az-statistics in parentheses. 
bThe reference categories are the same as specification 1, in Table 4.7 with the exception of the year dummy 
variables, which are different for each period. The excluded year is 1982/83 for cycle 1; 1983/84 for cycle 2; 
1992/93 for cycle 3 and 1993/94 for cycle 4. 
4.7. CONCLUSION 
No industry or organisation can function without its workforce. The size of the workforce will 
vary over time, reflecting a host of diverse economic circumstances. This chapter has shown 
that the impact of the need to recruit/retain labour on wage pressure varies substantially by 
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industry, region and time. In particular, prosperous industries such as banking, insurance 
and finance and business professional services are where the RRF exerts the highest pressure 
on wages. Similarly, in successful regions such as the South East, the importance of the RRF 
is highest. This is where rent-sharing bargainers, as in IOT, have the most potent influence. 
So, another reason why the importance of the RRF is highest in successful regions like the 
South East is because it is where insiders axe likely to have the greatest influence (Lindbeck 
and Snower, 1988c), since turnover costs are the greatest in more prosperous regions. Hence, 
the more prosperous the firm, the greater the rent that can be appropriated by insiders. In 
addition, in financially prosperous firms, turnover costs for firms axe likely to be the greatest, 
specifically where firms are large. 
The important factors are generally the same in each of the sub-periods, despite these 
models being estimated at different points in the economic cycle. Previous to this study, 
existing econometric research has failed to consider the importance of recruitment and reten- 
tion as a major bargaining consideration in datail. It has been found that more prosperous 
establishments will want to hire and retain more workers, and more able workers, would 
want to work for these establishments and retain their employment with them in areas such 
as the South East. Less prosperous establishments will have difficulties, both in recruiting 
and retaining their workforce, as we saw, in areas such as the North. 
Prior to offering policy prescriptions, it would be useful to bear in mind the fundamental 
reasons for regional disparities in the importance of RRF. First is the geographical inertia 
of workers, in conjunction with the immobility of capital and the current belief of the local 
businesses about economic success/development. In our current economy, locations which 
axe rich in ideas and talent are the key to business, as we saw, for example, with East Anglia. 
Second, attracting educated people is crucial. Third, physical and cultural amenities are im- 
portant in attracting key workers. Fourth, prosperity of the regions depends on organisations 
and individuals having ability to innovate, learn and adapt. Fifth, efficacious partnerships 
among businesses, government and the non-profit sector can bring forth change. 
Now it will be useful to consider the problems that need to be surmounted and or myths 
that need to be dispelled. First, a strong emphasis on clusters/agglomeration in new regional 
policy is not devoid of obstacles. Second, the indigenous regional policy model overlooks 
inter-regional dependencies and relationships. Third, the South East has strong first-movcr 
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advantage since it benefits both by being in close proximity to the European Union markets 
and it also having close links with strong sectors in the region. Both are essential for economic 
success. So the way forward is to implement policies which will increase the formal education 
and training of potential or incumbent workers accredited by an independent authority, other 
than the establishment seeking it. The Blair government has already set its sights on attaining 
this although in a small way, by aiming to increasing the proportion of the population that 
enters university education. 
Using the CBI dataset, I found that the need to recruit and retain is a major bargaining 
consideration in wage determination, notably, where turnover costs are high, with caveats 
stemming from limitations of the dataset. Having established that retention and recruitment 
of workers are an important wage determinant over time, in this chapter and in the previ- 
ous chapter I have established that wage bargainers are forward- looking, with an extremely 
comprehensive/structured dataset. Naturally, it is clearly of considerable interest to examine 
the consequences of this and rational behaviour in the bargaining process and this I pursue 
in the next chapter. 
CHAPTER 5 
THE DYNAMIC BARGAINING PROBLEM 
IN LABOUR MARKETS 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
A two-person ongoing bargaining situation arises when two individuals have the opportunity 
to collaborate in a long-term relationship for mutual benefit in various ways. In the simpler 
case, which is the one considered in this chapter, all aspects of the game are analysed, within 
a dynamic equilibrium. No aspect of the game is analysed in steady-state (in particular, 
the terms of trade of the ongoing partnership), as has been done in the past in the labour 
economics literature. No, agent will bargain with his trading partner, myopically, without 
taking into account what his partner's expected bargaining endowments may be in the future, 
irrespective of whether these are favourable or adverse. 
The ongoing labour economics situations of bargaining between members of trade union 
workers and firms, as expounded in the trade union models of Monopoly Union, Right to 
Manage and Efficient Bargaining Models, insiders and firms, can be regarded as dynamic 
bargaining problems. The object of this chapter is to provide a theoretical discussion of this 
problem, to obtain equilibria and to show overall a definite solution to dynamic analysis of 
wage determination, which could then provide an explanation of unemployment in a imper- 
fectly competitive labour market". Of course the results found here can be generalised to 
any economic situation where the relationship is ongoing between the two agents. 
This is a classical problem of exchange in a labour market model in a dynamic envi- 
ronment, and more specifically of firms and workers, as developed by Shapiro and Stiglitz 
(1984), Stigler (1961), Lindbeck and Snower (1988c) and others. A different approach is 
suggested by Pissarides (2000), which permits the identification of this typical exchange in a 
dynamic labour market model. However, his analysis imposes Nash's axiomatic bargaining 
solution within a dynamic environment, a feature in common with the large literature on de- 
centralised trade. In addition, he focuses on linear utility with risk-neutral agents and linear 
"I will leave this for my future research. 
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cost functions. Agents in general are risk averse. I have generalised the Pissarides model by 
considering risk-averse agents and non-linear cost functions. 
In general terms, we assume that the two individuals have perfect foresight, are rational, 
forward-looking, and each can compare the utility he or she derives from various economic 
situations, each can accurately estimate the other's expected endowments at the time of 
bargaining, each is fully equipped with astute bargaining skills and each has perfect knowledge 
of the other's tastes, preferences and time preferences. 
In developing our labour market model with random matching, strategic bargaining as 
in Pissarides (2000) (henceforth, referred to as Pissarides model), our terms of trade, the 
wage, is a differential function of time, in contrast to the Pissarides model. We assume that 
agents are forward-looking, and show that this makes a qualitative difference in the tYpes of 
equilibria that emerge. 
The concept of expectation with foresight in an ongoing relationship is crucial in this 
theory. This concept will be partly explained by way of illustration. Suppose a worker who, 
having formed a match with a firm, is bargaining with the firm as to the wage at some 
period t: the worker knows that the firm is expected to make a great deal of revenue in the 
near future. With knowledge of this, the worker bargains a higher wage. The firm accepts, 
which is consistent with rent-sharing theories, the sociological model of the efficiency wage 
theory (Akerlof, 1982), insider-outsider theory and so forth. On the other hand, if the worker 
knows that the firm is going to perform adversely in the near future, and may even be on the 
verge of bankruptcy, the worker suppresses his wage demands. There is a body of evidence 
which is consistent with workers accepting paycuts, see for example, Smith (1994), Smith 
(2000), Nickell and Quintini (2003), who indicates that wages are significantly downward 
flexible. Also Brown, Ingram and Wadsworth (2004) and more recently, stewards of American 
AirlineS43 accepting paycuts to postpone bankruptcy of the airline. 
Labour market models in the past, including that of Pissarides's analyses, imposes the 
Nash bargaining solution (henceforth, referred to as NBS), in a special case of the dynamic 
model. That is, although the bargainers are in an ongoing relationship, the bargainers bargain 
wage at its steady-state values, i. e., the values when t --+ oo, or they have equal rates of time 
preference. But the theory developed, there makes no attempt to reconcile that rational 
43 See Financial Times, 26/4/03. 
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bargainers in an ongoing relationship will bargain with foresight and will be forward-looking 
in a dynamic environment in all aspects and hence a dynamic equilibrium should be sought 
for a given non-stationary environment, that is, to determine what it is worth to each agent 
to have the opportunity to engage in an ongoing game with a long-term partner". This 
determination is only accomplished in the case of a game in stationary environment. 
In any labour market model, the way in which wage is determined plays a crucial role for 
the number of job matches taking place per unit of time, and thus for unemployment. There- 
fore, special attention will be focused on dynamic determination, which has been relatively 
neglected in the labour economics literature. I state at the outset that I have unified for the 
first time the Coles and Wright (1998) [henceforth, referred to as CWJ and Pissarides (2000) 
model, to show a stable and unique wage and employment outcome with no limit cycles, that 
is, I show a new equilibrium concept. Whilst the CW model is equilibrium deficient in an 
entirely different model and Pissarides does not analyse a fully dynamic labour market model 
as effectively the steady state Nash solution is imposed in an otherwise dynamic model. In 
addition, Pissarides only analyses linear cost functions. In contrast, I analyse a fully dynamic 
labour market model with risk averse agents and non-linear cost functions. The CW model 
had a limit cycle in their model, whilst Pissarides did not perform any simulations and only 
analysed a two-dimensional non-linear model. The latter derived the stability properties of 
his system purely by visually inspecting the signs of his simple two-dimensional system with 
only the unemployment and the market tightness variable. 
Wages should reflect an equilibrium which is derived as a function of time, and by the 
construction of the said equilibrium the agreement is immediate. That is, this equilibrium 
will depend continuously on the set of the value of the labour services and the value of the 
output of these services over time, constituting the mathematical description of the game and 
which expresses the utility to each player of the opportunity to engage in the ongoing game. 
The ensuing equilibrium is non deficient, that is, it has a stable and unique wage outcome, 
in contrast to the extant literature. 
CW study forward-looking bargaining in a totally different environment to ours in mone- 
tary economics, where of course, agents are different and behave markedly differently to ours. 
441 will refrain from discussing the typical difficulty (in terms of both monetary costs and time) of finding 
long-term partners, although this is an interesting issue. Search theory has covered some elements of this, for 
example, Mortensen (2002). 
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For example, where the two agents adopts the role of the other upon completion of the trade. 
This phenomenon is unobserved in an ongoing game in the labour market. However, their 
general theoretical result can be applied to our model. 
The organisation of the chapter is as follows: In Section 5.2 1 review the basic labour 
market model of matching. In Section 5.3 1 analyse dynamic wage-bargaining and characterise 
the equilibrium in terms of a simple differential equation. In Section 5.4 - 5.7 1 integrate the 
dynamic bargaining solution to market equilibria. Section 5.8 concludes. 
5.2. TRADE IN THE LABOUR MARKET MODEL 
The main idea of the model is that trade in the labour market is typically a decentralised 
economic activity by agents in a dynamic environment, which is reflected more importantly 
in the price the agents trade as well. Trade is uncoordinated, time-consuming and costly 
for both firms and workers. That is, firms and workers expend resources prior to job cre- 
ation and production, and existing jobs command rents in equilibrium, unlike the Walrasian 
labour markets. We use a simple modeling device to capture the implications of trade in a 
market equilibrium where I ensure that every aspect of the model is dynamic, including wage 
determination. 
Pissarides develops a theory of unemployment which includes as a special case the two- 
person static wage-bargaining problem within an otherwise dynamic model, that is, where 
the expected values of employed workers, unemployed workers, the expected value of an 
occupied job and vacancies to the firm axe all dynamic. But the theory there developed 
makes no endeavour to find a value for a given ongoing wage-bargaining game, that is, to 
determine what it is worth to each agent to have the opportunity to engage in the ongoing 
bargaining game, which is crucial to a proper development of any unemployment theory. The 
determination is accomplished only in the case of the two-person static bargaining game, 
within an otherwise dynamic environment. In other words, the special dynamic model using 
steady-state wages developed by Pissarides, makes no endeavour to characterise the wage 
as a differential function of time, in an ongoing relationship where in all other respects the 
model is dynamic. The model in this chapter is dynamic in all respects as it should be. 
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5.3. THE MATCHING FUNCTION AND THE BEVERIDGE CURVE 
We use the matching function as a modelling device that captures the outcome of the in- 
vestment of resources by firms and workers in the trading process as a function of inputs. In 
order to provide a theoretical treatment of dynamic wage-bargaining situations in the labour 
market, I abstract from the intricacies of the matching function, for example, with hetero- 
geneous workers, jobs, skills, search intensity of both workers and firms, geographical areas 
and so forth, to form a mathematical model in terms of which to develop the theory. 
Vacant jobs and unemployed workers become matched and move from trading to pro- 
duction activities, in accordance with the prevailing matching technology. Unemployment 
persists in the steady-state, due to the fact that during the matching process, and prior to 
all job-worker pairs matching, some of the existing jobs break up, due to shocks such as de- 
mand and technology, providing a flow into unemployment. Firms and workers search for the 
other agent, with full knowledge of the job-matching and job-separation process, but make 
no attempt to coordinate their actions. 
The equilibrium developed in this chapter is a dynamic equilibrium. The aggregate equi- 
librium is where both agents maximise their respective objective functions, subject to the 
matching and separation technology and where both the inflows into and outflows out of 
unemployment are equal. We assume, that there is no on-the-job search. It has been claimed 
(see, for example, Pissarides (2000)), that it makes no qualitative difference to the theory of 
unemployment, whether the assumption of no on-the-job or on-the-job search is introduced. 
Time is considered as a sequence of discrete periods of length At > 0. 
Then the number of job matches per unit time is given by the matching function 
mL = m(uL, vL) (1) 
where L is the workers in the labour force, u is the unemployment rate, v is the number of 
vacant jobs as a proportion of the labour force and (1) is assumed to be increasing in both 
its arguments, concave and homogenous of degree 1. Job matches at any point in time are 
randomly selected from the sets vL and uL. Thus, a typical matching function is 
m (u, V) =v 
[1 
- e-1-1 
I (1 a) 
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It follows, the Poisson process that fills vacant jobs vL has a rate 
mL m(uL, vL) u 
= m(-, q(O) vL VL v 
or following (1a) 
(2) 
m (U'v) 1 
v-1- 
e-o (2a) 
where, 0=U, is a measure of labour market tightness, which one can interpret as the balance 
between the demand and supply of labour as in Brigden and Thomas (2003). Thus, q (0) is 
the rate at which vacancies become filled. Note that qI (0) < 0. The unemployed workers 
move into employment according to a related Poisson process with rate 
m(uL, vL) vL m (uL, vL) v 
m(u, l)=Oq(O)=O(I-e (3) 
uL uL vL uv 
In yet another Poisson process, suppose that the employed workforce of size (1 - u)L 
loses jobs at an exogenous rate A per unit of time. Thus, the outflows from employment are 
A(l - u), per unit of time. The latter can be expressed as uOq (0) L, from (3). Hence the 
evolution of unemployment is 
ü=A (1 - u) - Oq (0) u 
Then, in steady-state 
(1 - u) = Oq (0) u 
which implies, 
A 
A+ Oq (0) 
This equation can be represented in vacancy-unemployment space, by a downward-sloping 
convex to the origin curve. The curve is referred to as the Beveridge curve. If we restate (5) 
in terms of the job flows, then clearly the key driving force of this model is job creation. This 
is because the empirical literature on job flows defines the job creation rate as m(u, v)/ (I - u), 
where m(u, v) is the number of jobs created and (1 - u) is employment. In addition, the job 
destruction rate is also defined as the ratio of A (1 - u) to (1 - u). Equating the constant A 
to Oq (0) u/(l - u) yields (5), thereby demonstrating that it is job creation that is the main 
driving force of the model. 
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5.4. THE FIRM: THE VALUE OF A JOB AND A VACANCY 
Each firm has one job when entering the market which it desires to fill. When the job is 
filled the firm obtains revenue by selling its output. The value of the output is some constant 
p>0. While the job is unfilled, the search costs are fixed at h>0 each time, which is a 
proportion of productivity. The rate at which jobs are filled is q (0). These preliminaries are 
the same as in the Pissarides model. 
The number of jobs available at any given time is determined by profit maximisation. All 
firms can open a vacancy and engage in searching. Thus, profit maximisation requires that 
the profit from a marginal vacancy is zero. In the environment of this model, with each firm 
having one vacancy only, profit maximisation is equivalent to a zero profit condition for firm 
entry. Let J (t) be the present discounted value of expected profits from a filled job and V (t) 
be the corresponding value of a vacant job, both evaluated at the beginning of the period [t, 
t+ At]. Assume the rate at which vacant jobs become filled is q (0) and the rate at which 
unemployed workers attain jobs is Oq (0). Assume that at each date t agents who can match 
complete negotiations immediately at w (t), which could possibly be random. Then the job 
generates a profit (p - c(w)) At, during a small time interval and c (w) is the cost of labour. 
Assume 0< c' (0) < 1, and c" (w) >0 for all w>0, in sharp contrast to the Pissarides 
model. The latter implies that there are diminishing returns to scale. The reason for the 
former assumption will be seen later. The Pissaxides model is restricted to linear utility only, 
that is, for instance, c(w) = cw. The job also dies with probability AAt and survives with a 
probability 1- AAt. Hence, the standard dynamic programming (D. P. ) equations for filled 
jobs and vacancies gives us 
1+1 At 
Rp -c M) At + (1 - AAt) J (t + At) r 
+AAtv (t + At) +o (A)] 
V(t) = Y- 
1 
+ rat 
[-hat + (1 -q (0) at) V (t + at) 
+q (0) AtJ (t + At) +0 (A)] 
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where r is the rate of time preference and the term o (A) appears due to the Poisson process, 
which satisfies '(A) as At --. ý 045. A 
Taking the limit as At --ý 0 we obtain the standard continuous time equations 
j= rJ+ A (J- V) - (p-c(w)) 
ý' - rV + q(O) (V - J) +h 
In equilibrium, with free entry of firms, all profit opportunities from new jobs are exploited, 
driving rents from vacant jobs to zero. Thus, in equilibrium, the supply of a vacancy is V=0, 
which implies from (10) 
i= (11) 
For an individual firm, -1 is the expected duration of an unfilled vacancy. The interpretation q(-Zý 
of (11) is that, in equilibrium, market tightness is such that the expected profit from a new 
job is equal to the expected cost of hiring. The latter is due to the competition for vacant 
jobs. Given (11), (9) will now be 
j (r+A)h (P (w» 
q (0) 
Next, we consider the behaviour of workers. 
5.5. THE WORKER: THE VALUE OF EMPLOYMENT AND 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
(9a) 
Workers receive a wage w per unit of time if employed and an unemployed insurance and 
income z if unemployed. Assume the worker derives current utility of p (w) from the wage. 
Assume /2(w) > 0,1? (w) < 0. That is, agents' behaviour are risk-averse, as mentioned 
above. This is another contrast to the Pissarides model. Let W and U be the corresponding 
value functions of employment and unemployment. Then following the same reasoning as 
before the D. P. equations are: 
45 For example, the interpretation of (7) is that between t and t+ At a firm meets a worker, with whom it can 
form a productive match, which yields payoff (p -c (w)) and with the probability (1 - \At) the job-specific 
shock not occuring and with probability AAtV (t + At) the shock occuring. 
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W(t) = T- 
1 [y(w)At + AAtU(t + At) + rAt 
AAt)W (t + At) +0 (A)] 
[zAt + (1 - Oq (0) At) V (t + At) 1+ rAt 
+Oq (0) AtW (t + At) +z+o (A)] 
where z is the unemployment benefit and letting At , 0, we obtain 
W= rW - p(w) +A (W - U) 
rU + Oq(O) (U - W) -z 
Ii Since q (0) =1- e- e, this implies, Oq (0) = 0(1 - e- o Considering both the discrete and 
continuous time value functions of both the firms and workers, it is abundantly clear, that it 
is the determination of the wage that plays a very crucial role in this model and indeed, in 
imperfectly-competitive theories of unemployment that have been put forward over the years. 
The wage, w (t) remains to be determined. In the next section, I analyse explicit strategic 
bargaining games between the firm and worker. Prior to this, for illustrative purposes, I will 
consider the implications of the adoption of the NBS as it was in the Pissarides model (except 
that in the latter's model, strategic baxgaining analyses were not used): w (t) = w' (t), where 
w' arg max [W U (t)1'6 [J (t) -V (t)]'-'6 
w 
where U and V axe the threatpoints of worker and firm respectively, and PE [0,1] is the 
bargaining power of the worker. In addition, I need to impose that this maximisation is 
subject to the constraints that guarantee trade is voluntary; that is, there are gains to trade: 
ww (w, t) = JL(W) +W (t) >U (t) (17) 
Wf(w, t)= P-C(W)+J(t)>V(t) 
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where the instantaneous payoff functions following a successful match are on the LHS of the 
inequality sign in both these equations. 
We will choose a utility function of the form p (w) with 0<p<1, thereby 1-P 
rendering our game to be more general than the Pissarides model. c (w) can also be nor- 
malised. Redefine costs in terms of units of utility. Two points arise from this definition. 
First, in the vicinity of w=0, (18) becomes p-c (0) w+J (t) >V (t). Hence the reason 
for the additional assumptions initially of c' (0) < 1. Second, if c (w) = cw in conjunction 
with p (w) = 'I -P, then with c<1, there will always be some p-c (w) and V (t) such 1-P 
that p-c (w) +J (t) >V (t). The same applies to (17). 1 generalise the Pissarides model 
which has constant returns- to-scale and linear utility with risk-neutral agents and nonlinear 
cost functions with decreasing returns- to-scale. Therefore, ITE :A NBS, in contrast to the 
assumption of ITE _= 
NBS in the Pissarides model. Thereby, introducing a new equilibrium 
concept. 
Given bargaining power, an equilibrium can be defined as a list of nonnegative and 
bounded paths [j (t), V (t), W (t), U (t), wn (t)jooo t= satisfying for all t the dynamic program- 
ming equations in either discrete or continuous time and the maximisation problem in (16) 
subject to (17) and (18). 
In a related model CW claim to have obtained limit cycles. But this gives rise to indeter- 
minacy and instability. Pissarides (2000) also analyses a labour maxket model, but effectively 
imposes the steady-state wage-baxgaining solution, that is, the Nash solution in an otherwise 
dynamic model. In addition, he also only analyses a two-dimensional non-linear model, when 
considering out-of- steady-state dynamics. Second, Pissarides (2000) does not conduct any 
simulation as noted. In the next section I apply some results of CW to a model of Pissaxides. 
In the succeeding section after that I define a saddle-path stable and unique equilibrium with 
no limit cycles in a fully dynamic model, in contrast to past studies, including CW and 
Pissarides (2000), where all or either of these elements are absent/lacking. 
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5.6. A BARGAINING MODEL BETWEEN FIRMS AND WORKERS 
If both firms and workers form a successful match, their instantaneous payoffs are w,,. (w, t) and 
wf (w, t) as given in (17) and (18) respectively, where w,, is increasing and wf is decreasing 
in w and both explicitly vary with time. Agent i discounts the future at rate ri > 0, so 
-rt the payoff for i from trading at t discounted back to date 0 is ei 'w (w, t). Assume WiE C', 
wi concave in w for all t, wi*t) bounded in t, and 2-, ý91-'t) bounded for all (w, t). Since at 
firms exploit all profit opportunities from new jobs, in equilibrium V=0. Workers derive 
some utility from not trading, but this is normalised to zero for expositional purposes in 
this section. This should have no impact on the qualitative result of this chapter. Define 
4; (t) =f wi : wi (w, t) ý! 0, i=w, f 1, and assume that, ý (t) is nonempty for all t and uniformly 
bounded in t. 
5.6.1. The Bargaining Process 
In making our treatment of wage-bargaining we employ a Rubinstein-type bargaining process 
of the type considered in CW with the following features: 
(i) Random alternating offers, where with some probability7r.,,,, nature chooses the worker 
to propose a value of w and the firm, with probability7rf 7r,,. 
(ii) There is no delay (immediate agreement) 
When agreements are reached, agents trade and depart. But when agreements have not 
been reached immediately, agents prefer to pursue bargaining until they have reached one 
in accordance with constraints (17) and (18), which is consistent with individual optimising 
behaviour46. 
Our object is to characterize subgame perfect equilibria in strategies that are history 
independent, but typically nonstationaxy, since payoffs axe time varying. In equilibrium 
firms and workers reach immediate agreement upon meeting. This category of equilibrium is 
referred to as the Immediate Trade Equilibrium (ITE). 
Following CW, we define reservation values w,,, (t) and wf (t) such that at time t the 
worker will accept any w>w. (t), and the firm will pay any w -< wf 
(t). In addition, the 
4r'Later in this section I also generalize the model to permit exogenous breakdown in bargaining. 
183 
best proposal is always the reservation value of the other agent. This implies we identify a 
strategy profile with [ww (t) , wf 
(t) ]'0, where each agent proposes t= the other's reservation 
values and accepts each agent's own reservation values, when it is his turn to accept. 
Theorem 1. In an ITE, in the limit as At --+ 0, the expected terms of trade, w (t) is a 
differential function of t, (Coles and Wright, 1998), which satisfies 
7rf 
(w, t) -ap. (w, t) /at + ir,,, 
rf wf (w, t) - awf (w, t) /at (22) 
1 
aWW (w, t) law 
II 
awf (w, t) law 
I 
By Theorem 1, if we know w (t) = ib at any given time i, for example, then the entire 
00 path [w (t)]t=o can be found by iterating on (22). Next, we will establish precisely such a 
condition, and thereby, identify an ITE. The next result considers the case where pi settle 
down over time, that is, when t --+ oo. 
However, (22) permits ambigUity47, when we consider Binmore's continuum example. 
In addition, currently, the Theorem is only applicable when agents use Markov strategies. 
Hence, a uniqueness argument can be provided to render Theorem 1 more genera148. 
Theorem 2 In the limt,. w (t) = limt_,,, w' (t), that is, the steady-state of the ITE 
and the Nash Solution coincide (Coles and Wright, 1998). That is, wi (w, t) - Cvi (w) as 
t --+ oo, and Coi satisfies all the assumptions on wi, then in the limit as At -+ 0, if an ITE 
exists it is unique and w (t) --+ i-v as t --+ oo and satisfies 
iv- = arg max 
CAjw (w)" CD (w)'-" 
f 
where 
0= 
7rwrf 
-7rwrf + -7rf rw 
Proof as in CW. 
Let us consider again the Nash solution, as shown in (16), with different 0 and threat 
points, Tj set to zero, to those in (16), 
w' arg max [w,,, (w, t) - Tw (t) 1'6 [(df (w, 0- Tf (t) I (22a) 
w 
471 will leave this for my future research. 
481 will leave this for my future research. 
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where Ti M=0 and 0=", rf irwrf+7rfrw 
The previous result says that, when hmt,,,,, w (t) = limt,,,. Wn (t); but the coincidence 
does not generally hold when t< oo. The conditions in Theorem 2 apply to the Pissarides 
(2000) model, when limt,,,. w (t) = limt-,,,,, w' (t), where the steady-state wage is imposed. 
To, illustrate this, let us take the example, of risk-averse workers with foresight. Let 
W (W) = W1_P , with 0<p<1. and wf 
(w, t) = e-6' - w, so that the surplus to be divided is I-P 
depreciating at rate 6 (or, if 6<0, appreciating). In the Pissarides model, where NS ITE19, 
when p=0, which implies, workers are risk-neutral. Again assume ri =r and 7ri 1, then 2 
(22) is 
?b= 
rww + p)] - (1 - p) e-6t (r + 
2 (1 - p) 
Here, Theorem 2 implies w (t) --+ 0 and the solution to the above differential equation, subject 
to this boundary condition, is 
w* = 
(r + 6) (1 - p) e-6' 
- p) + 26 (1 - p) 
It is straightforward to establish that immediate trade is an equilibrium provided (r + 6) 
In comparison, the Nash solution with the threatpoints and 3 that is applicable in steady 
states, implies that 
Wn - 
p) e-6t 
2-p 
for all t. While w* and w' converge to the same limit as t --+ oo, for finite t, w* > w' if 6>0 
and w* < w' if J<0. 
Theorem 3. Equivalence of ITE and Nash Solution along the entire path, not just in 
steady-state (Coles and Wright, 1998). 
Suppose wi (w, t) = 77jw + (pi (t) , where 77w >0> 77f , and rw = rf =r>0. 
Then if an 
ITE exists with these functional forms, it is unique and w (t) = Wn (t) with Tj (t) =0 and 
0 
---: 7rw. 
Proof as in CW. 
49 When t --+ oo or rf = rw (that is, the discount rates of agents are equal). 
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In other words, w` (t) =w (t) for all t only when payoffs axe linear in w, separable between 
w and t, and rw = rf 
50. 
Notice that the NBS solution (16) is similar to the one used in the Pissarides (2000) labour 
market model. The NBS used in the Pissarides model does coincide with an ITE, shown 
in Theorem 3. The conditions in Theorem 3 apply in the Pissarides model, except that the 
threat points are now Tw =U and Tf =V for the worker and firm respectively. This does 
not affect the logic of the Rubinstein-type solution though, since one simply measures the 
utility relative to these threat points. As we have shown that this changes, if wage, ul(t) is 
characterised as a differential function of time, in an ITE in the lim as At -+ 0, the workers 
are risk-averse with single period utility given by wl-P, 0<p<1, as we have shown in an I-P 
2 example earlier and if the cost function is for example, c (w) = ao + a1w + a2W 
Theorem 3 also corresponds to how wage-bargaining has been settled in the past in 
general, in the labour economics models, including all the trade union models and the main 
unemployment and the wage determination models. In a dynamic environment as in the 
Pissarides model, in general, where at least one of the functions, that is w or c (w), is non- 
linear, we must use the forward-looking bargaining solution (22) to analyse dynamics. 
So far, we have assumed immediate trade. We need to check that this is consistent 
with equilibrium behaviour. Let 7ri (t) = ej 'itwi [w (t) , tj be the equilibrium payoff to i if 
agreement is made at time t, given w solves (22). Then an immediate trade for all t is an 
equilibrium, if 
-7ri (t) >0 and 7rj (t) <0 (23) 
for all t and both firms and workers. The interpretation of this equation is that, agents would 
prefer to trade sooner than later. 
The second inequality will hold for both agents, given w satisfies (22), if and only if the 
following condition holds as in CW: 
-7ri ei "twi [w (t) , t] 
5OIn the risk averse example, if we assume a=1, then the assumptions of Theorem 3 are satisfied, and we 
can confirm that w' (t) = w* for all t, as shown below. 
W. = --61 2 
- 6t 
W* = (r+b)e -T- 2(r+J 
2 
at 
= W" 
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(rw-w aw"', f 
rf wf - at 
(24) 
at aw aw 
ýW--f )w<o ) ýw 
The agents will trade sooner as opposed to later if (23) is satisfied. The interpretation of 
(23) is that e-'itwi (w (t) , t) decreases in tV wo; (t) and is strictlY decreasing for one agent 
(Binmore, 1987). 
We now consider the case where we permit exogenous breakdowns in the bargaining game. 
Let oi be the Poisson arrival rate with which i believes an exogenous breakdown will occur 
during bargaining, and bi his utility in this event. Note, we now let ri, 7ri, ai and bi be time 
varying. For brevity, this variance is not made explicit in the notations. 
In this case, a simple generalisation of Theorem 1, yields, following CW 
7rf 
+ w,, - o,,, b,,,, - c9w,, Iat + 7rw 
(rf + of ) wf - of bf - awf lat (25) 
aw""law 
II 
awf law 
I 
Just as in the case with no breakdown, we can analogously show, that when wi (w, t) converges 
over time to Coi (w) , then limt,,,. w 
(t) = Cv is the Nash solution with, 
aibi 
ri + ai 
13 
7rw (rf + of ) 
7rw (rf + of )+ 7rf (rw + orw) 
Following Theorem 3, it can be shown that if payoff functions are linear and r,, = rf and 
aw = af, then w (t) = Wn [t] along the entire path and not just in steady-state5l. 
5.7. MARKET EQUILIBRIA 
We axe now in a position to characterize equilibrium in the labour market model, with 
the dynamic wage-bargaining model. Agents are of measure zero, that is, agents are one 
of the many in the economy, but of course, their actions are typical; the likelihood of any 
two traders meeting again after separation is zero. In addition, any delay to trade between 
two agents has no impact on the aggregate market outcome. Thus, while bargaining, each 
agent takes the expected value of returning to the market as given. We assume, now. that 
" All calculations of solutions are available upon request from the author. 
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in the bargaining game 7ri =1 and there axe no exogenous breakdowns, that is, (a, = 0). If 2 
the game is subject to delay, constraints (17) and (18) dictate that agents prefer to pursue 
bargaining than separate. 
In discrete time, to describe an ITE, we need to determine I 
1W M, UM, JW, MM, ww M, wf (t)JO'O - The instantaneous payoffs of a successful match t= 
are: wu, (w, t) (w) +W (t) and wf (w, t) = (p -c (w)) +i (t), for the workers and firm 
respectively. In an equilibrium, beliefs must be consistent with market outcomes, that is. 
taking [ww (t) , wf 
(t)]'t' 
=0 as given, 
[W (t), U (t), J (t), V (t)j't. 'O, must satisfy the dynamic 
programming equations, in discrete time and vice versa. 
In the limiting case, as At --+ 0; we need to determine [W (t) ,U (t) ,J (t) ,V 
(t) ,w (t) 
I cý t=O' 
where the value functions solve the continuous time equations, and w(t) is the value of ww (t) 
and wf (t) as At --+ 0. If an ITE exists in the labour market, then w satisfies (22) which in 
this model becomes 
?b= 
IrA (W) + rw (t) - 
[r(p 
-c (w)) + rJ (26) 
2/2 (w) 2c(w) 
It is crucial to note, in contrast to the Pissarides model, I generalise the cost function by 
using non-linear cost function and risk-averse utility function, which is also non-linear. The 
equilibrium is given by paths for [W (t) ,U 
(t) ,J (t) , 
(V) (t) 
,w 
(t)] tczo satisfying the continu- 
ous time equations and (26), subject to the constraints, which guarantee, that the trade is 
voluntary and the condition for immediate trade. 
We have reduced the dimensionality of the system, by defining, x=U-W. Subtraction 
of (14) and (15) is 
i=x(r+Oq(O)+A)+IL(w) -z (27) 
inserting (9) and (14) into (26) yields 
rp (w) + IL (w) + Ax r ((p -c (w)) + (p -c (w)) - AhO) 
21LI (w) 2cl (w) 
(28) 
In addition, note h1q (0) = J. Thus, further simplifications to the system, as shown below. 
enabled us to depict the system in four dimensions, of (x, 0, w, u) . 
Incorporating the results from our analysis in the earlier sections, the full dynamical 
A 
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system is: 
w 
U 
j 
V 
L 
rw - iL (w) +X (W - U)] 
rU + Oq (0) (U - W) -z 
rj +A (J - V) - (P -c (w» 
rV+q(0) (V - J) +h 
A (1 - u) - Oq (0) u 
, w) 
rt£(w)+it(w)+, \x 
_ 
(r(p-c(w»+(p-c(w»-, \h0 
iiu7Tw-) 2cl (w) 
where in order to maintain proper generality, M (w) 1-P . In contrast to the Pissarides 0 1-P 
model, my model is more general. The Pissarides model pertains to risk-neutral workers. 
CW also does not explicitly analyse risk-averse workers. 
Following (27) and settin V=0, implies, j=h, we now have a system in four 9 -q T07 
dimensions, which is 
rx + Oq (0) x +Ax + li (w) -z 
rj +A (J) - (P -c (w» 
üA (1 - u) - Oq (0) u 
ril(W)+tz(W)+, \x r(p-c(w» +(p-c(w» 
2ß'(w) 2c'(w) 
But 
h (q (0»-' 
q (0) 
Then, 
-h (q 
(0»-2 q' (0) häq' (0) i 
(q (0»2 - (q (0»2 
and the above equation, becomes after rearrangement, 
Öq, (0) (r + A) c (w» 
q (0) h 
(r A) q 
(0) 
+ 
(p -c (w» (q (0»2 
qI (0) h qI (0) 
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Hence, the above dynamic system will now be in 0, instead of j, 
ýb x(r + Oq (0) +X) +m (w) -Z 
+ \) q(0) + 
(p-c(w» (q(O»2 
q7(, Z- h q7-(W (29) 
üA (1 - u) - Oq (0) u 
ýx) r(p-c(w»+(p-c(w»-, \h0 lb 
(rp(w)+p(w)+, 
2pl(w) 2c(w) 
I 
where the appropriate expression for q (0) is q (0) e- o, q' (0) which implies, 
I e-ý - 02 W2 tS52 1-e- R /--7- 
(1 
- 01) ,c 
(w) = ao+alw+a2 , as shown below. In a few experimen 
I also exclude the fixed cost, where c (w) = a, w+ a2W 2 and without loss in generality, 
normalise p (w) = 
"-P, 
p'(w) = w-P. Then an immediate trade equilibrium is any solution to 1-P 
(29), that confines in both constraints (17) and (18), and also satisfies 7r,, = e-r" [M (w) + W1 
and7rf = e-" [p -c (w) + J]. 
A special case is a steady-state, which is an equilibrium where w and x are constant. Then 
(w, x) = (0,0) is a steady-state. In the Pissarides model, the dynamical system, comprises of 
purely b and it, where w and x are constants. 
5.8. CALIBRATION OF THE MODEL 
The choice of the U. S. data for my empirical analysis is due to all labour market simulation 
work being U. S. based. The past literature source/econometric studies is based in the U. S., 
provided all the data I required from one country, specifically, the U. S.. Needless, to say, 
it is not possible to obtain data for all the variables in my analysis from the UK, since no 
simulation work is UK based. It is not possible to obtain data for all the variables in my 
analysis from one paxticular country, for example, the UK. 
Prior to conducting the stability analysis it is useful to conduct a very brief tour of the 
available data pertinent to our study, in order to make an appropriate choice of the literature 
source/econometric studies, which would match/reflect the concepts of our model as far as 
possible. All the data sources pertaining to the literature source/econometric studies are of 
the U. S., except the econometric estimate of hiring costs, which is from Abowd and Kramarz 
(2000). The latter claims that all the microeconomic evidence for France has counterparts in 
"Details available from the author upon request. 
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the U. S., which are similax to those observed in France. Thus, the calibrations apply to the 
U. S. in most cases, except due to the scarcity of data on hiring costs (Hamermesh, 1993), the 
hiring costs is sourced from France's data53. 
5.8-1. Unemployment 
We considered the official unemployment rate as the most appropriate data compatible with 
the concepts of our model. This is because other categories such as those responding affir- 
matively to the question if they 'wanted a job now' are inappropriate. 
The reason for exclusion of the out-of- t he- labour- force data in our study is obvious, no- 
tably, since the out-of-the-labour force flows exhibit distinct cyclical properties relative to 
flows between employment and unemployment. The unemployment to employment flows 
are countercyclical or acyclical, whilst the out-of- t he- labour- force to employment flows are 
pro-cyclical. 
It is worth noting that there is a high correlation between the official unemployment rate 
data and other configuration of unemployment rates data, namely, the official plus 'want a 
job now' unemployment rate data (Yashiv, 2005). 
Given this choice, it is natural to consider only the official rate data when studying 
dynamic wage-bargaining in the labour market and the associated worker flows. 
5.8.2. Vacancies 
The pertinent concept of vacancies compatible to the concepts of the model is the one per- 
taining to those vacancies that are to be occupied by workers from outside the employment 
pool, but within the labour force. But the available and widely-used data series relates to 
another concept, which also includes vacancies that axe subsequently occupied with workers 
in job-to-job transitions. 
The available vacancy data series in the U. S. economy has two representations. One is 
the index of Help Wanted advertising in newspapers published by the Conference Board (see 
Abraham (1987) for an analysis and discussion of this series). A newer data series is the job 
53 Other authors also use Abowd and Kramarz (2000), when all their other data sources are obtained from 
the U. S. For example, Silva and Toledo (2005). 
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openings data series available from the BLS since December 2000, utilising the Job Openings 
and Labour Turnover Survey (JOLTS)54. 
The third data series has the gross flows of workers from outside employment (unemploy- 
ment and out of the labour force) to employment. The latter was recently compiled at the 
Boston Fed, based on the Current Population Survey (CPS) data, see Bleakley, Ferris and 
Fuhrer (1999). The hiring flows data series is negatively correlated with the first two series, 
that is, -0.27 with JOLTS series and -0.36 with the Help Wanted ads data series (Yashiv, 
2005). The flows data series is considerably less persistent than the two vacancies series. The 
hiring flows data series is less volatile than the Help Wanted Index and the JOLTS data series 
(Yashiv, 2005). 
In addition, there is a body of evidence on gross worker flows. For example, Fallick 
and Fleischman (2004), using CPS data in the period 1994 - 2003, find that job-to-job 
transitions are massive, that is 2/5 of new jobs represent employer changes. They also 
demonstrate that the cyclical properties of job-to-job transitions are distinct from the flows 
into and out of employment. Nagypal (2004), using microdatasets, also shows the prevalence 
of job-to-job transitions. Pissarides (1994) provides a possible explanation for the higher 
volatility of vacancies associated with both job-to-job transitions and to transitions from out 
of employment. 
I conclude that in the light of our model, which is an aggregate55, representative firm and 
worker type of model, job-to-job transitions axe inappropriate, as its behaviour is distinct from 
the pertinent data series, where vacancies axe filled by workers from outside the employment 
pool. Since the latter is unobserved, I use the vacancy rate from the literature that utilises 
the rate for the observed worker flow data series. 
5.8.3. Wages 
The existence of a variety of data series of wages with various cyclical properties was reported 
by several studies, for instance, Abraham and Haltiwanger (1995), Abraham, Spletzer and 
54 This survey defines a job as "open", conditional on it fulfilling the following criteria: (i) a specific position 
exists and there is work available for that position; which can be full or part time, permanent , temporary, 
short-term or seasonal; (ii) the job could start within 30 days, irrespective of whether the establishment 
has found a suitable candidate during that time and (iii) the employer is actively recruiting from external 
establishments to fill the position. 
55AIthough we have bargaining between one worker and firm, they are representative of their respective 
type. 
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Stewart (1999), and Krueger (1999). But the analysis in these studies does not lead to any 
definitive conclusions as to which series is the most pertinent. The Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA) series using total compensation56 and wages, suggests that although the 
series are correlated 0.83 (Yashiv, 2005), there are a multitude of important differences. 
Specifically, the wage series declines more over time, it is lower by 10 percentage points on 
average and exhibits considerably more variation, that is a coefficient of variation of 0.037 as 
opposed to 0.016 with respect to the compensation series (Yashiv, 2005). Both series have 
. an extremely weak correlation with 
the cycle. The compensation series has -0.05 correlation 
and the wage series has a 0.12 correlation with the employment rate (Yashiv, 2005). 
Needless to say, econometric study using the U. S. data on wages settled on the basis of 
future financial performance, does not exist. The series of labour share using total compen- 
sation as opposed to wages, reconciles more with the concepts of the model. 
Hence, I have used the compensation data series rate from the literature, as it incorporates 
all the firm's wage-related costs, which is the terms of trade, wage, w, in our model. 
5.8.4. Other Data Series 
With respect to the job destruction rate, A, I use the rate which represents the flow from 
employment to unemployment. The discount rate r, in the model is the rate of time preference 
for both agents. 
5.8.5. Calibration Values 
To conduct the numerical simulation and hence, examine the model's performance, we need 
to calibrate the model. We parameterise the model to match the relevant U. S. data. That 
is, we assign values to the variables of the v/u ratio, 0, unemployment, u, wages, w, and 
the difference between the value functions of the unemployed and employed workers, at the 
steady-state values of these endogenous variables and the steady-state values of the exogenous 
variables. The latter axe: the rate of interest, r; destruction rate, A; the value of output, 
p; hiring cost rate, h; and unemployment benefit rate, z. I do this by experimenting with 
"Defined as the total compensation of employees relative to GDP, latter including wages/salaries, employer 
contributions for employee pension and insurance funds and government social insurance. 
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fundamental parameters such as ao, a,, a2 and p. To attain this, I utilise, wherever possible, 
results from econometric studies and prior empirical estimates on U. S. quarterly data, which 
use the average values of the longest possible sample period available. 
I proceed to explain the choice of the parameters. Since the firm's output can be sold at 
any price, with no loss in generality, I normalise the value of output, p=1. Based on Yashi%, 
(2005), 1 set the separation rate to A=0.0404.1 normalise time period to be a quarter 
and thus, set the discount rate to r=0.01, which reflects historical U. S. values. Surveys 
on hiring costs are scant (Hamermesh, 1993) as noted earlier. Based on Silva and Toledo 
(2005), 1 set the hiring costs to h=0.30. They follow the econometric estimate of Abowd 
and Kramarz (2000). They estimate the cost of hiring as a fraction of the annual labour 
costs per worker to be 30 percent57 for a representative sample of French establishments. 
Abowd and Kramarz (2000) also claim that all of the microeconomic evidence for France 
has counterparts in the U. S., which are similar to those observed in France as mentioned 
above. Based on Shinier (2004), unemployment benefit is set to z=0.40. Based on Yashiv 
(2005), 1 set u=0.063, v 0.047 and hence, 0= v/u = 0.75. Also based on Yashiv (2005), 
I set total compensation of employees as a proportion GDP, w=0.579. Taking into account 
z=0.40 and w=0.579,1 set x to be the difference between 0.40 and w=0.579, implying 
the difference between the value functions of the unemployed and employed worker to be 
x= -0.179, on the grounds that it is not directly observable nor available/ accessible. Table 
5.1 describes these parameters, including their calibrated values and sources. 
TABLE 5.1 
BASELINE CALIBRATION VALUES 
Steady State Values of the Endogenous Variables and the Parameters of 
Parameter /Variable Notation Value 
the ExogenoUs Variables 
Source 
Difference between the value functions of x -U. 179 Own Calculation the unemployed and employed workers 
Vacancy- unemployment ratio 0 0.75 Yashiv 2005 
Unemployment U 0.063 Yashiv 2005 
Wage W 0.579 Yashiv 2005 
Discount rate r 0.012 Shimer 2005 
Se? aration rate k 0.0404 Yashiv 2005 
v lue of Output I Quarterly Normalisation 
Hiring Costs 0.30 Abowd and Kramarz (2000) 
Unemployment Benefit z 0.40 Yashiv (2005) 
Coefficient of the quadratic term in the cost function a2 0.312 Own calibrated value 
Coefficient of the first term in the cost function al 0.623 Own calibrated value 
"This entails reported expenditure on job advertising, search firm fees and compensation of applicants. 
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5.9. STABILITY ANALYSIS 
5.9.1. Constant w and x: Nash Bargaining Solution 
I make it clear at the outset, that we analyse a fully dynamic labour market model in contrast 
to the Pissarides model, and we also generalise with risk-averse agents and non-linear cost 
functions. This, shows that ITE 0 NBS and introduces a new equilibrium concept in labour 
economics. I have applied the CW general result to my model with risk-averse agents and 
non-linear cost functions in a fully dynamic labour market model. The issues that arise of 
immense interest are: is such a model saddle-path stable? In addition, are there limit cycles? 
CW in related literature show a limit cycle in their two-dimensional non-linear system. This 
implies there is indeterminacy and instability in their system. For a model to be theoretically 
consistent and dynamically stable, the equilibrium should be saddle-path stable and unique 
with no limit cycles. I now undertake to investigate if this is true in my model. 
When my parameters, which will be my baseline value of parameters, and the parameters 
that I will be varying later in my full model with non-linear costs and utility function, will 
be p and a2 in (p, a2) parameter space (these are zero with linear costs and utility functions 
case) when my experiments are conducted, axe given by, 
r=0.012, p=0, ao = 0.02, al = 0.623, a2 = 01 P=1, h=0.30, A=0.0404, w=0.579 
the equilibrium is 
0.75, u = 0.07 
The information about eigenvalues for the finearised equation and its nature and the fixed 
points axe provided in Table 5.2. The eigenvalues are: 1.50 and -0.59 as shown in Table 5.2. 
TABLE 5.2 
Equilibria 
SAD131=NT 
Pissarides Model 
Linear Costs and Utilty Function 
NBS = ITE' 
c+ =0 c- =0 im =0 
r+ r- =I Value of Fixed Points 
U=U. 75 
u=0.07 
Eigenvalues 
I. bu 
-0.59 
GWhen t -+ oc, and rf = r. - 
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where the information about the eigenvalues for the linearised equation are given in the 
middle; c+, the number of complex eigenvalues with positive real parts, is zero; c-, the 
number of complex eigenvalues with negative real parts, is zero; im, the number of purely 
imaginary eigenvalues with zero real part, is zero; r+, the number of positive real eigenvalues 
is 3; and r-, the number of negative real eigenvalues is, 1. The results of the simulations, 
with both linear cost and utility is unstable, namely, when a2 =0 and p=0, as is the case 
when NBS ITE. 
Numerical simulations of fixed points and eigenvalues using the software XPP, showed the 
typical equilibria to be saddlepoint, as we would expect, with one positive and one negative 
eigenvalue, and did not yield a stable limit cycle, that is, an isolated" periodic orbit59 for 
the differential equations which is stable or attracting. That is, if the system is perturbed 
from its regular oscillatory state, the ensuing new path will be attracted back to the limit 
cycle. That is, all the neighbouring trajectories approach the limit cycle. A stable limit cycle 
model the system exhibiting self-sustained oscillations. That is, the system oscillates devoid 
60 of external periodic forcing . If all the neighbouring trajectories approach the limit cycle, 
then the limit cycle is stable or attracting. The steady-state as remarked is a saddle point, 
that is there is one positive and negative eigenvalue. 
5.9.2. The Full Model 
V_ F or the remainder of the analysis, we assume that tb and :i are not zero and pursue and show 
dynamic equilibria. The equilibrium states are found by setting the RESs of the remaining 
four differential equations, that is, the full model, to zero, and solving for x, 0, w and u. 
This can only be performed computationally. Further numerical simulations with a wide 
range of parameter values of the combination of the pair (p, a2), were conducted, where p 
is the risk aversion paxameter of the Constant Relative Risk Aversion utility function of the 
workers, with 0<p<1 and a2 is the coefficient of the non-linear wage parameter of the 
firm's non-linear cost function, as mentioned eaxlier, where a2 ý! 0- Of Course, when a2 ý! 11 
58 Isolated in the sense that there is not another closed path in its immediate neighbourhood. That is, the 
neighbouring trajectories are not closed, they either spiral toward or away from the limit cycle. In rare cases, 
half stable. 
"A periodic orbit is the orbit of any point through which a periodic solution passes. 
A periodic solution is 
a solution which is periodic in time 0 (t) =0 (t + T) , 
for a fixed positive constant T-T is a period of 0 (t) 
"Another example, would be the beating of the heart. 
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we have decreasing returns to scale in the firm's cost function and a2 < 0, due to increasing 
returns to scale. To preserve generality I also constructed examples with 0<p<1 and 
-3 < a2 :53, in (p, a2) parameter space. Depending on the accurate/precise combination of 
the pair (p, a2) , the system (29) can lead the labour maxket into a unique equilibrium with 
saddle-path stability. We briefly demonstrate this, with the dynamics associated with our 
dynamical system in (29). We discuss the combination of pairs (a2 , P) that lead the system 
to a unique equilibrium with saddle-path stability. 
We combine the dynamics of unemployment with those of labour market tightness, the 
difference between the value functions of the unemployed and employed workers, and wages, 
as in (29). We first discuss the results of the combination of the pair (p, a2) which leads the 
labour market to a unique and stable equilibrium with saddle-path stability. The conditions 
for a stable and unique equilibrium depend on the magnitude of the eigenvalues of the RHS 
of (29). If the number of eigenvalues outside the unit circle is equal to the number of non- 
predetermined variables, the system (29) has a unique equilibrium which is stable. That is, 
if we have one stable root and three unstable rootS61. All examples constructed to examine 
if the model yields a limit cycle or a unique saddle-path stability, include fixed costs in the 
firm's cost function. 
When the baseline value of the paxameters are the same as above; and the parameters 
varied are given by, 
0.01 and a2 = 0.312 
the equilibrium is 
x= -0.19,0 = 0.74, u=0.07 and w=0.52 
The matrix has eigenvalues62,1.54,0.47, -0.59 and 0.80, see Table 5-3. The equilibrium is a 
saddlepoint (that is, one negative eigenvalue associated with one pre-determined variable (u) 
and three positive eigenvalues associated with three non pre-determined variables). They are 
consistent with the equilibrium in Maple (where the orbit of u was converging towards the 
equilibrium), while attempting to see if there is a limit cycle. The three positive eigenvalues 
61 Instability occurs when the number of eigenvalues of the RHS of (32), outside the unit circle is greater 
than the number of non predetermined variables. That is, if we have four unstable roots, when the economy is 
pushed off its steady state following a shock, it will not converge back to it, and results, in explosive dynamics, 
that is, with the orbits tending to infinity. 
62 Eigenvalues informs us of the local stability of the fixed point. XPP computes the Jacobi matrix numeri- 
cally and then utilises standard eigenvalue routines to compute the eigenvalues of the resulting matrix. 
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are likely to pertain to the forward-looking variables and the negative eigenvalue (that is, 
a stable root/root in the unit circle of the complex plane) relates to the unemployment 
differential equation, u as expected is consistent with the b, w and ii in the Pissarides model, 
except that, as will be noted, the wage there, in their otherwise dynamical model is the 
steady-state wage, in a two-dimensional dynamical system. Our results are also consistent 
with the values I obtained for comparable parameters, in (p, a2) parameter space, when I 
performed numerical simulations of eigenvalues, using the software XPP. 
TABLE 5.3 
Equilibria 
SADDLE'-PXTTr-STABLE 
Non-Linear Costs and Utility Function 
c+ =0 c- =0 im =0 
r+ =3 r- =1 Fixed Point Values 
x -0.21 0 0.74 
w=0.52 
u=0.07 Eigenvalues 
1.54 
0.47 
-0.59 0.80 
I have varied a wide range of parameters in (p, a2) parameter space, see Table A5.1 in 
Appendix B, which reports the results from simulations of the model with dynamic bargaining 
in labour markets. In the values of the (p, a2) combinationS63, that is, from a2 = 0-01 to 
a2 =3 and p=0 to p=0.09, the solution is uniquely saddle-path stable. 
The conclusion is that for calibrated parameter values the system has a unique equilibrium 
and is saddle-path stable. Of course, the three positive eigenvalues and the other negative 
eigenvalue do not necessarily mean that the system is unstable or stable (since any periodic 
orbit always has an eigenvalue of 1 along the orbit). The other two eigenvalues can be unstable 
(i. e., >1 in magnitude with the one eigenvalue stable). The steady-state is a saddle point. 
The result of the unstable solution, with linear cost functions, at a2 =0 and p=0.09 
in 
the (p, a2) combination is consistent with expectations, since it further confirms the presence 
of non-linearities in the model and is not in support of the NBS or the 
Pissarides model. 
Similarly, the results of the solution, with both linear cost and utility is unstable, that 
is, 
where a2 =0 and p=0, as is the case when NBS =- 
ITE64 and the Pissarides model. This 
is also consistent with expectations and confirms support 
for our model as opposed to the 
NBS or Pissarides mode165. 
63 Except when a2 =0 to a2 = -3 and p=0 to p=0.09, 
in the (p, a2) parameter combinations, the 
solution/equilibrium of the system is unstable. 
64 Where rf = r. and t- oo. 
"Or any other wage bargaining model in labour economics. 
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The numerical simulations and numerical calculations of eigenvalues in XPP, suggest that 
limit cycles do not exist for realistic values of the parameters. XPP calculates the equilibria 
of our system. Calculations are performed using the values provided for the initial conditions 
as a first guess, applying the Newton's method. When a value is found, XPP then finds 
the eigenvalues, which were given above. The program continues to integrate to calculate 
the equilibria of our system beyond the current numerical parameters I specified. When the 
equilibrium is computed, the information on the value of the fixed point and its stability 
are provided, see Appendix A. Since the eigenvalues on the whole of the non-predetermined 
variables are unstable, it would be hard to find a limit cycle. Similar results were obtained for 
several experiments I conducted with a wide range of parameter values in (p, a2) parameter 
space, to examine if a limit cycle can be detected and the stability if the equilibria. Further 
numerical simulations, on a wide range of parameters in XPP, also did not Yield a limit cycle, 
as shown in Table A5.1 in Appendix B. In addition, numerical simulations in the software 
DsTool, also suggest that limit cycles are non-existent for sensible values of the parameters. 
The ranges I conducted my search are similar to the ranges I constructed in XPP in (p, a2) 
parameter space. 
There are no limit cycles, in the various experiments I conducted, but the equilibrium 
is unique and saddle-path stable. Overall, the model, where naturally all four variables 
are dynamic, in contrast to models in the past, performs remarkably well, in reflecting the 
observed behaviour of wage-bargaining in labour markets found in the U. S. data. As will be 
seen below, my equilibrium values for most variables match exactly the real life data of the 
U. S.. 
Naturally, the (p, a2) parameter combination is the most important for our analysis, as 
these introduce non-linearities that cause the ITE to depart from the NBS. I then varied a 
wide range of p and a, parameters from the (p, al) combination. Table A5.2 in the Appendix 
reports the results. Again, from a, = 0.1 and p=0 to p=0.09, in (p, al) parameter space66 
the system has a unique equilibrium and the solution is saddle-path stable. This reaffirms the 
consistent remarkably good performance of the model. For example, the equilibrium values 
from my simulation match precisely the real life time-series data of the U. S. with respect to 
most variables, except 0 and w, where it is 0.01 and 0.05 out, as alluded to above. 
66 From a, =2 to a, =3 and p=0 to p=0.09 in (p, al) parameter space, the solution is unstable. 
This 
confirms the non-linearities inherent in the system. 
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We use the combined dynamics of the four variables in (29). The equation for the evolution 
of unemployment is stable with driving force 0. Substitution of wages and job values J from 
(11) into (9) yield an unstable equation in 0, with no other unknowns in it. The critical 
point of the four-dimensional dynamical system is that it yields a unique equilibrium which 
is saddle-path stable. The simulation were also conducted in the same software XPP, where 
Newton's method is used to find fixed points and then numerically linearises about them to 
determine stability as mentioned earlier. 
We first discuss the results of the parameter combination of the pair (p, a2) which led the 
labour market to a unique equilibrium and saddle-path stability. The sign pattern of a first- 
order linear approximation to the four differential equations are three positive eigenvalues 
and one negative eigenvalue as noted. Since the number of eigenvalues outside the unit 
circle is equal to the number of non- predetermined variables of the system, the equilibrium is 
unique and saddle-path stable. The combination of the pair (p, a2) that lead to the solution 
of saddle-path stability are from a2 = 0.1 to a2 -3 and p=0 to p=0.09. All areas 
from a2 = 0.1 to a2 =3 and p=0 to p=0.09 in (p, a2) parameter space, are associated 
with a unique and well behaved rational expectation equilibrium. This could be the result of 
a one-off moderately favourable tax-reduction, which could induce the dynamics associated 
with an increase in productivity, for example. Specifically, a fall in tax-reduction shifts the 
wage curve up and job creation curve to the right, causing an immediate rise in both 0 and 
w. Both 0 and w jump to their new equilibrium, while there is an anticlockwise rotation of 
the job creation line in u, v space. 
The saddle point axises since one of the variables, unemployment is sticky and stable, 
whilst the others, vacancies, difference between the value functions of an unemployed and 
employed worker and wages axe forward-looking and unstable. Firms in this model treat 
vacancies as an asset, since it is the price that has to be paid now in order to attract employees 
in the future. The expected axrival of employees is the rate of return on this asset. In common 
with other assets, there is an instability inherent in the supply of vacancies. If the arrival 
rate of employees is expected to fall, then firms will want to be left with a lower supply of 
vacancies, in anticipation of less demand for it. But if the firm wants to hire more workers 
sooner, the firm needs to create more vacancies. Thus, an expected fall in the arrival rate of 
employees leads to the creation of more vacancies and to an immediate fall in the arrival rate 
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of employees to each vacancy. 
The expected changes in the arrival rate of employees reflects the expected capital gains 
or losses on the firm's outstanding vacancies. The unique feature of vacancies is that the firms 
allocate the current vacancies in accordance to their future needs. For example, if the arrival 
rate of employees is expected to fall, the firm creates more vacancies now, and hires more 
employees now. The upshot is that, as a consequence, vacancies overshoot their equilibrium 
value when an adjustment is anticipated to occur. 
The perfect foresight path in the neighbourhood of the equilibrium is stable and unique. 
The number of stable roots in (29) is equal to the one predetermined variable. The initial 
condition on the predetermined variable, and the stipulation that the perfect foresight path 
should converge, uniquely defines an initial point in (0, u, w, x) space, from which adjustment 
to equilibrium occurs. In the absence of anticipated changes in the exogenous variables, the 
initial point will always be on the saddle-path, since this is the unique convergent path. 
In system (29), the saddle-path is easily found, due to the independence of the other 
three equations from unemployment. This can be easily shown, that is, the exogenity of 
unemployment from the other three variables, in XPP and Maple. Since 0, w and x are the 
unstable variables, if 0, w and x are not in equilibrium, it will diverge. 
Let us consider the impact of a change in productivity on wages, tightness, the difference 
in the value functions of the unemployed and employed workers and unemployment. If 
the initial equilibrium is at [w(O), O(O), u(O), x(O)], in u, v space, vacancies will increase 
as firms create more vacancies to take advantage of higher productivity. This leads to a 
decrease in unemployment simultaneously, lowering vacancies. Obversely, in the case of a 
fall in productivity, the adjustment dynamics will move the economy in the reverse direction. 
That is, there will be a fall in the job creation in the u, v space, that is, there will be fewer 
vacancies, due to firm closures. Unemployment increases, then more vacancies are created as 
firms anticipate the demand for them will be high. Then this leads to fall in unemployment 
and vacancies as they axe matched with employees67. 
67 For some combination of the pair (p, a2) of the four equation system, leads the economy into instability. 
The combination of parameter values of a2 and p for which this is applicable are only for a2 =0 (this is 
expected and supports our non-linear cost function and not the NBS or Pissarides model with linear cost 
functions) to a2 = -3 (where there are increasing returns to scale, in the firm's cost 
function), for p=0 and 
to p=0.09 in (p, a2) combination as mentioned. Instability was triggered naturally by the choice of the pairs 
(p, a2). These choices were attempted, since I wanted to provide a comprehensive account of what happens in 
the labour market, when one uses a wide range of parameters. That is, it is purely conducted for expositional 
purposes. Typically, these combination pairs does not imply a strong enough response to induce the necessary 
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Since the bottom right entry of the Jacobian matrix of (29) is very complicated, it is 
infeasible to investigate the characteristic equation analytically. The situation is made worse 
by the fact that the steady-state (equilibrium) cannot be found analytically (the steady-state 
has to be substituted into the Jacobian prior to finding the eigenvalues). 
As is well known, due to the complex nature of, and the fact, that we have a four- 
dimensional system, it is infeasible to check all of these, in particular whether the solution 
stays within both constraints (17) and (18), and to verify by numerical integration the exis- 
tence of a limit cycle. With regard to the latter, in the extensive experiments I conducted 
by me, using both a linear cost function of constant returns to scale for the firm of the form, 
c (w) =w and the non-linear cost function of the form c (w) = a,, + a1w + a2W2 , and also 
that workers are risk-averse and have single period utility function of the form, IL (w) " I-P I-P 
with 0<p<1, where p=0, which is the risk-neutral case, the ITE =- NBS, for p>0, 
the workers are risk-averse; to numerically prove that there is a limit cycle, we did not find a 
limit cycle. In principle, we should detect a limit cycle, but as is well known, see for example, 
McCord, Mishaikow and Mrozak (1995) and Jordan and Smith (1999), we may not find a 
periodic solution, although there is one in principle. We have no grounds to completely rule 
out stable limit cycles. 
CW, using a two-dimensional dynamical system, claim to have detected a limit cycle; 
which is reputably considerably easier, than in higher order systems. Equally, proving it ana- 
lytically is also considerably easier, as the straightforward application of Poincare-Bendixson 
Theorem, will theoretically prove its existence, which was indeed claimed to have been applied 
, ges, vacancies, unemployment and 
the difference between the value functions of the unemployed changesin wa 
and employed worker. 
The sign pattern of a first-order linear approximation to (29) of these choices of parameter values in (p, a2) 
parameter space, is that, there are four positive fixed points, when x should be negative in the model. This 
implies that when the economy is pushed off its steady state following a shock, it cannot converge back to it, 
but ends up with explosive dynamics as mentioned, that is the orbits go away from the equilibrium to infinity. 
The first thing to note is that the variable unemployment which should be sticky and stable, is not. This 
implies that the unemployed workers are increasing at a fast rate. This has detrimental effects on the economy: 
First, firms will not be able to supply sufficient vacancies to provide sufficient jobs for the increase in the 
arrival rate of employees, that is they are unsustainable when unemployment increases considerably. Second, 
it engenders an unfavourable signal to both the incumbent and unemployed workers, thereby reducing their 
incentive to remain in employment or exert the necessary effort as expounded in efficiency wage theory. In 
the case of the former and in the case of the latter, it discourages the volatility of the unemployed workers, 
and discourages the unemployed workers from applying to posts. Third, if there is a sudden increase in 
unemployment, labour market tightness fluctuates, with tightness oscillating from low to high. Fourth, wages 
similarly will fluctuate from low to high, with it being low when unemployment is high and high when 
unemployment is low. There is a body if evidence to suggest that unemployment has a negative impact on 
wages (for example, the empirical Chapter 3 of this thesis). Fifth, the difference in the value functions of the 
unemployed and employed workers would also naturally fluctuate with the other three variables fluctuating. 
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by CW to show the limit-cycle's existence. No such standard proof can be applied to dynam- 
ical systems of three dimensions or higher. Of course, in our system, the Hopf-Bifucation 
theorem can be applied to show the existence of a limit cycle, if one is found by numerical 
integration. Furthermore, with respect to the CW study, although they provide a distinct 
analysis of monetary theory, the theory there developed makes no attempt to calibrate the 
model adequately. In addition, with regard to the CW paper, they did find a limit cycle 
for their two-dimensional model, but they used values of the parameters, which I feel are 
unrealistic, given their initial condition. The numerical value used for their cost function, 
was a -27.04902, which is inconsistent with their condition, 0< c'(0) < 1. 
In my model, values of the parameters are consistent with first, the experiments with, 
0< c' (0) < 1, and second the experiments with, c(0) < 168 , and the important result is that 
both sets of experiments show that the system has a unique equilibrium and is saddle-path 
stable, but do not seem to produce a limit cycle in either set of experiments. Moreover, 
CW used two special functions, bo and bl; a cost function, which is inconsistent with their 
cost function in their model, namely, c(q) in their model, with bo and b, functions, and 
two special parameters, which are both inconsistent to their model. Their functions are 
bo(q, y, z) =q+ (y - 2ez)(e - y/2z) + z(e - y/2 * Z)2 and bi(q) = 2ez and their parameters 
were d=0 and e=0.001. Devoid of these functions, but including their a value, which as I 
noted above is inconsistent to their conditions, the equilibrium in their model is also a saddle 
point. In my model, the functions employed are consistent with the functions in the model, 
21 namely, c(w) = ao + a1w + a2w and q (0) e- o, and I produce a unique equilibrium 
with saddle-path stability when experimenting with a wide range of parameters, but do not 
appear to produce a limit cycle. 
In the past, related literature has shown there is a possibility of limit cycles, as shown in 
CW, which would give rise to indeterminacy and instability. To claim to represent reality, 
the equilibrium should be saddle-path stable and unique with no limit cycles. In my model, 
we have a well-behaved equilibrium. 
Policy prescriptions can be made on the basis of whether policy critically influences wages 
in equilibrium. The supply of jobs is a variable and subject to profit maximisation. The wage, 
w determined in the model, absorbs/incorporates all variations in parameters, including 
"Details available from the author upon request. 
L 
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policy parameters relevant at the time of bargaining. Hence, there will be no qualitati%, e 
difference to the results. The policy implication of varying interest rate, r and unemployment 
benefit, z can be shown over time in Xpp69 
5.10. CONCLUSIONS 
The chapter has analysed a labour market model with random matching and strategic bar- 
gaining. The solution to the bargaining problem was characterised in terms of a dynamical 
equation. It was also shown that the system in (p, a2) parameter space has a unique equi- 
librium and is saddle-path stable for all four variables, including the dynamic variable for 
workers with both risk-neutral and risk-averse single period utility and both linear and non- 
linear cost functions of the firm, which has not been attempted in the past. But overall, this 
chapter had shown that there is a well behaved unique and stable equilibrium for plausible 
ranges of parameter values. Such a characterisation for the wage is important in a dynamic 
labour market model, besides informing us as to what was originally available for sharing be- 
tween the bargainers, but also what, why and how it was shared by the same. It is found in 
this chapter that the solution did coincide with the wage-bargaining analyses in steady-state, 
but not when t< oo, that is, out of steady-state, except when both the bargainers have equal 
rates of time preference and the agents axe risk-neutral. 
We analysed constructing a wide range of examples to show uniqueness and saddle-path 
stability of equilibrium in our full labour market model and no limit cycles, as in the past 
related literature of CW. Limit cycles would give rise to indeterminacy and instability. But 
my model has a well behaved equilibrium. This shows that forward-looking behaviour is 
consistent with stable and unique outcomes in wage-bargaining. Our analysis complements 
remarkably well the forward-looking behaviour, empirically established in Chapter 3 of this 
thesis. Our analysis with one worker and firm bargaining, also shows there is an efficient 
outcome in terms of both wages and employment. 
"This is in my future research agenda. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has analysed both an empirical model of forward-looking wage determination and 
a theoretical a model of the consequences of this behaviour with full rationality, in conjunction 
with another detailed empirical analysis of the importance of the recruitment and retention 
of labour on wage determination. 
I shall cover two main topics in this chapter: 
1. Conclusion and Summary of Contributions 
2. Future Research 
Conclusion and Summary of Contributions 
Here I provide short, concise statements of the inferences that I have made as a result of 
my work and briefly list the contributions of new knowledge that my thesis makes and has 
substantiated. All conclusions will be directly related to the research question posed in the 
Research Question Section in Section 2.6 of Chapter 2. 
(i) The first problem stated in Chapter 2 has been solved, as shown in Section 3.6 of 
Chapter 3. 
I have utilised WERS98 to show that future financial performance has a significantly 
positive impact on wage determination, with caveats about a potential endogeneity problem, 
stemming from the limitations of the dataset. Generally, econometric models follow the 
analysis of the theorists in wage determination, which as I have noted all analysed focusing 
in steady states or imposing steady states if dynamics are discussed. 
(ii) The second problem stated in Chapter 2 has been solved, as shown in Section 4.6 of 
Chapter 4. 
I exploited the CBI dataset for the first time, to demonstrate for the first time in detail, 
that more prosperous firms axe more likely to report retention and recruitment of labour 
as an important bargaining consideration in wage determination, with caveats due to data 
limitations. 
k. 
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The econometric research which established both the above main findings in (i) and 
(ii) necessitated primarily good, comprehensive and reliable datasets, and a combination of 
other factors, such as the econometric techniques employed, the structure of the data, and 
importantly also, the econometric and astute skills and knowledge of the modeler. 
(iii) The third problem stated in Chapter 2 has been solved, as shown in Section 5.6.1, 
in particular Theorem I and 5.9.2 of Chapter 5. 
I developed for the first time an efficient, satisfactory and adequate analysis for the dc- 
termination of wages dynamically with a subgame perfect equilibrium in labour economics, 
pursuing the consequences of forward-looking behaviour with full rationality. I also showed 
for the first time, that forward-looking behaviour is consistent with stable and unique out- 
comes in wage-bargaining, cucially with no limit cycles which give rise to both indeterminacy 
and instability, crucially with no limit cycles, which give rise to both indeterminacy and 
instability. 
The principal mechanism needed to improve rent-sharing theories of wage determination 
are, first, analysing wage as a function of time in a game which is subgame perfect and 
therefore, rational. In addition, it is necessary to provide stability analysis, showing that 
forward-looking behaviour is consistent with stable and unique outcomes in wage-bargaining. 
In the past, labour economics literature such as Pissarides (2000) have analysed the steady- 
state wage bargaining using the Nash solution in an otherwise dynamic model. 
In Chapter 1,1 provided an overview of the main research questions, I would be investi- 
gating in this thesis, highlighting the lacuna that needs to be bridged in the light of the past 
literature, vis-&-vis one of the main specie of rent-sharing theory, the insider-outsider theory. 
I then undertook a comprehensive review of the insider-outsider theory in chapter 2, pointing 
out weaknesses of all the models and the main overall deficiency, which has been ignored by 
all labour market theories. 
I then conducted an empirical investigation of the importance of the behaviour of forward- 
looking behaviour in wage determination in Chapter 3. Using the WERS98 cross-sectional 
dataset, I found that forwaxd-looking variables have a well determined impact on wages, with 
caveats noted eaxlier. I also showed that larger firms pay higher wages to workers. 
In Chapter 4,1 found that firms that are more prosperous than others in relative terms, 
such as R&D services, business, insurance and banking, will want to recruit and retain more 
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workers. Given that these establishments are high technology and high skilled industries, 
there is a demand for highly skilled labour. The skilled workers would want to AA, ork for 
these establishments and retain their employment in these industries. The main result of this 
chapter is that recruitment and retention is a very important factor in wage negotiations for 
more prosperous establishments across the UK, especially in the South East, across particular 
bargaining groups and over time, with caveats on data limitations. The results indicate that 
rent-sharing is very important, with caveats. 
I then analyse a model of wage-bargaining in a labour market in Chapter 5, pursuing the 
consequences of forward-looking behaviour with rationality. I unify for the first time Pis- 
sarides model and Coles and Wright model, to show saddle-path stability with unique wage 
and employment outcomes, in a general model with risk averse agents and non-linear cost 
functions, in contrast to the Pissarides model. In contrast, the Coles and Wright model is 
equilibrium deficient and Pissarides does not analyse a fully dynamic labour market model, 
as effectively the steady state Nash solution is imposed in an otherwise dynamic model. The 
solution to the bargaining problem was characterised by a simple full dynamical system. 
Equilibrium wages are determined by monopolist pricing and wages determined are forward- 
looking. The former implies that both workers and firms extract surplus rent from each 
other. So, each agent is indifferent to the wages settled in equilibrium. Given that wages are 
monopolistically priced, both new recruits and incumbent workers would want to match at 
these prices and establishments would want to hire them at these prices. In the context of the 
labour market model, our characterisation of the wage-bargaining solution provides the same 
answer as the myopic Nash solution only in steady-state. In particular we constructed exam- 
pleS70 of a unique equilibrium of the full system, which was also saddle-path stable, unique 
and well behaved, with no limit cycles which would entail indeterminacy and instability. 
The main finding of this chapter is that with random matching and strategic wage- 
baxgaining, the equilibrium baxgained wage is chaxacterised in terms of a simple differential 
equation. This suggests that first, the bargained wage is monopolistically priced and both 
parties are indifferent to the negotiated wage, second, these wages are a function of time. For 
example, if the firm is expected to have a favourable future financial performance, the wages 
demanded will be higher, but if the firm is expected to have an adverse financial performance, 
70 Using a wide range of parameter combination of the pair (p, a2) , where p is from the 
Constant Relative 
Risk Aversion utility function of the workers and a2 is from the nonlinear cost function of the firm. 
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then the workers will suppress their wage demands or even accept a pay cut. There is a bodN' 
of evidence which suggests this; a number of examples of this phenomenon have been pro- 
vided in Chapter 2,3 and 5. In addition, crucially, forward-looking behaviour is consistent 
with stable and unique outcomes in wage determination. I also find that the equilibrium is 
well behaved without the absence of limit cycles, which can give rise to indeterminacy and 
instability. 
My empirical results in Chapter 3, with caveats, and especially in conjunction with the 
results in Chapter 5 illuminates why large firm pay higher wages. As mentioned before, in the 
conclusion of both these chapters and elsewhere, the implications of the empirical results are 
that more workers will want to be employed and retain their employment in more prosperous 
firms, with caveats, since wages are set and demanded in accordance to the firms future 
performance. If the firm's future performance is favourable, higher wages will be demanded 
and if the firm's future performance is adverse, wages will be set to a lower level or workers 
will accept a pay cut, if the firm's financial circumstances warrant it. So, more workers would 
want to work with and retain their employment in prosperous firms and vice versa. This was 
also verified empirically in chapter 3. This being so, in empirical chapter 4 we also showed 
(with caveats), that larger firms would want to improve their recruitment and retention of 
labour activity by paying higher wages; this is particularly applicable to more prosperous 
firms, since in these, the reservation wages of both workers (on account of, for example, 
general/specific human capital) and firms are higher, as shown in equations (19) and (20) of 
chapter 5. 
In terms of policy, the implications of our findings are that more workers will want to work 
with more prosperous firms, as noted paxticulaxly in the light of findings in Chapter 3 and 5. 
Conversely, more prosperous firms, in particular, would also want to pay more to recruit and 
retain more workers as found in Chapter 4, with caveats. This follows as a direct implication 
of the findings in Chapters 3 and 5, specifically, that more workers would want to work for 
more prosperous firms. Our empirical analysis in Chapter 4 also indicates that part of the 
reason for the finding of recruitment and retention being a major bargaining consideration, is 
attributed to labour shortages and skill shortages, particulaxly in the engineering industries. 
The implications of the declining manufacturing sector, for example, as shown in Chapter 4, 
is that the need to recruit and retain labour will clearly not be of very strong importance. The 
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reason for skill shortages in more prosperous industries, is primarily due to UK lagging behind 
other EU and other major industrialised nations in its provision of education or vocational 
training or continuing of education by the young people. The results are highly relevant 
for the implementation of optimal employment strategies which would entail increasing the 
education and training of the workforce, given that the prosperous establishments are high 
technology and high skilled industries, who naturally seek highly skilled labour. 
Riture Research 
The topic of future research is included, so that other researchers or myself picking up/building 
on this work, in future have the benefit of the ideas that I generated while I was working on 
the project. 
As a result of my work, I have found that inevitably that the results of my work would 
have been reinforced, by investigating/confirming the global applicability of my outcome, if 
I had particularly larger datasets and so forth, covering more countries and years. 
In Chapter 3, it would be useful to perform the analysis for my future research across a 
wide variety of countries again and over a longer time, using panel type or time-series cross- 
sectional data. I would like to conduct the same investigation for Chapter 4 (the dataset 
was for a longer period in Chapter 4). 1 would not expect the results to change much, but it 
would nonetheless, be useful to confirm this. 
With respect to chapter 5, it would have been useful if we had the time, to develop a 
software package in conjunction with an appropriate algorithm than is currently available in 
the market, to detect limit cycles in a four-dimensional nonlinear dynamical system. How- 
ever, given the softwares that are commercially available, I exploited the packages I have 
used, in paxticular the package I used extensively, to furnish us with information that was 
required to carry out our analysis. Crucially, in principle, my full non-linear dynamical sys- 
tem, could be integrated with macroeconomic models, which will facilitate the provision of 
policy prescriptions. 
It would have also been useful to establish that equation (29) in Chapter 5 describes a 
limiting equilibrium to the bargaining game between firms and workers as At - 0, to avoid 
ambiguity, given Binmore's continuum example. Second, it would also be useful to provide 
a general uniqueness argument, since currently our uniqueness argument7l only applies to a 
71 In order to provide a theoretical treatment of wage bargaining situations, we abstracted from the situation 
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special case, that agents use Markov strategies, that payoffs are additively separable, that 
is, Vi (x) + yi (t) and that yi(t) converge72 to some limit as t --+ oo. The latter necessitates 
that the underlying market equilibrium converges to a steady-state, since in the worker's 
case the worker's unemployment benefit, for example, may expire or a worker's job skills 
may deteriorate whilst unemployed. This should not make much difference to the qualitative 
results. I believe that my current analysis is satisfactory and adequate to convey my point 
across. 
With respect to Chapter 4,1 echo what most econometricians and indeed what generally 
economists would yearn for, a well-structured, larger dataset with a longer time span as 
noted. 
When these additional requirements are available, I would want to conduct all the future 
research outlined here. 
Again, I believe given the dataset and its limitations, other caveats stemming from the 
dataset, and with my theoretical analysis, I have attained a unique result for a general and 
unique, useful and an apt wage determination theory. This thesis has demonstrated bar- 
gainers are forward-looking in determining wages, with caveats with respect to the empirical 
chapters as noted, and shown that wage is a function of time, and that this determination 
of wage is also efficient, both in terms of employment and wage outcomes, since it also em- 
bodies monopolistic pricing as shown in Theorem 1 of Chapter 5. Furthermore, this thesis 
has demonstrated that the wage-bargaining equilibrium is well behaved with no limit cycles, 
which would give rise to indeterminacy and instability. Moreover, forward-looking behaviour 
is consistent with stable and unique outcomes in wage-bargaining. In addition, this thesis 
has established in detail that recruitment and retention of labour is a very important deter- 
minant of the wage (with caveats on data limitations). My research, both theoretically and 
econometrically, is a solid advancement of the labour economics field, and is applicable to 
other economic areas. 
to form a mathematical model in terms of which to develop the theory. 
72V 
i (x) is the instantaneous payoff to i w, where, 
f is the firm and w is the worker respectively, whereas, 
yi (t) is the expected payoff to an unmatched worker or an unmatched vacancy, 
in the case of a job, for the 
firm, at time t in a market equilibrium. 
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I CHAPTER 3: APPENDIX 
DATA APPENDIX 
Definitions of Variables Used in the Regression 
Variable Definition (Management questionnaire that provides the relevant information) 
Future financial "Lookiný; at this list, which of these statements best describes the current state of the Performance [the market [for the main product or service] in which you operate? ": (i) The market is 
current state of the growing (ii) The market is mature (iii) The market is declining (iv) The market is 
market (for the main turbulent 
Uoduct or service)] 
i "Wh n on coverage at proportion of all employees, including managers, are covered b collective 7 bargaining either at this workplace or at a higher level"": (i) All 1000 c (ii) Almost all 80-99% (iii) Most 60-79% (iv) Around half 40-59% (v) Some 20-39% 
(vi) Just a few 1-19% (vii) None 
Establishments "How would you assess your workplace's financial performance": (i) A lot better thall financial average (ii) Better than average (iii) About average for industry (iv) Below average 
performance (v) A lot below average (vi) No comparison possible (vii) Relevant data not available Size of "What is your firm size? ": (i) 10 through to 24 employees (ii) 25 to 49 employees 
establishment iiiý 50 to 99 employees (iv) 100 to 199 employees (v) 200 to 499 employees ý 
vi 500 or more employees 
Competitors for the "How many competitors do you have for your [main] product or service? ": (i) None/ 
main product or Organisation dominates the market (ii) Few competitors (iii) Many competitors 
service 
Concentration of "Is the output of this establishment concentrated on one product or service or are there 
output or service in several different products or services": (i) Single product or service 
one or several (ii) Different products or services different products 
or services 
Percentage of 
i fill d 
"What percentage of vacancies in the past 12 months have been filled by employees f i hi hi ?" vacanc es e rom w t nt s organisation : (i) All Cii) Almost all 80-99% (iii) Most 60-79% 
internally within (iv) Around half 40-59% (v) Some 20-3970 (vi) Just a few 1-19% (vii) None 0% 
the organisation 
Ownership of 
th k l 
"Which of the following statements best describes the ownership of [this workplace/ n am e 
. i 9" f e wor p ace t j o or 
mor 
janisa ion . : (i) U K-owned /controlled (ii) Predominantly UK-owned(51% or 
e (iii) UK and forei n owned (iv) Predominantl f r i w d (51% ) g y o e gn o ne or more 
(v) Foreign owned/controlled 
Banded average Banded average vacancy rate by travel-to-work area: (i) 0-0.80 (ii) 0.80-1 
vacancya rate by (iii) 1-1.30 (iv) 1.30-1.60 (v) 1.60 + 
travel-to-work area 
Banded total Banded total unemployment rate by travel-to-work area: (i) 0-2 (ii) 2-3 (iii) 3-5 
unemployment rate by (iv) 5-7 (v) 7-7.75 (vi) 7.75 + 
travel-to-work area 
Formal status of the "How would you describe the formal status of [this establishment/ name of organisation)? 
establishment Is it privately or publicly owned? ": (i) Private sector company (PLC) 
(ii) Private sector-other (iii) Public sector 
This is defined as the number of job centre vacancies divided by the total labour force in the travel-to-work area. 
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II CHAPTER 4: APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
DEFINITION OF VARIABLES 
The majority of the variables used in Tables 7 to 9 are drawn or calculated from the CBI Pay Databank. The CBI data are designed to provide continuous wholesome information of the level of wage settlements and related details over time. Moreover, a one-off survey conducted in 1979/80 provides further information for the subset of the dataset covered by the survey. Comprehensive account of the sample are provided by Ingram (1991) and Gregory, Lobban and Thomson (1986). 
The question used as the dependent variable in all specifications: 
0 Factors influencing the level of settlement /award 
In this question we want to discover the factors (and their importance) which you think influenced the level of your set t lenient /award. 
Factors exerting an upward pressure on level of settlement 
A need to improve ability to recruit /retain labour 
1. Very important (recoded as 3) 
2. Fairly important (recoded as 2) 
3. Not important/not relevant (recoded as 1) 
Other questions asked as factors which exert an upward pressure on wage settlement. Note the answers are coded as 1.2 and 3 above. These questions and the above form the basis for Table 4. HV ' gh or improving establishment/company profits 
anagement able to pass on substantial part of pay increases i. n pri . ces Cost of living increases (e. g., high or rising inflation) Industrial action threatened Industrial actioft taken High or improving level of orders Good labour productivity performance Factors exerting downward pressure on level of settlement Low or deteriorating es tab lishm ent/company profits Management unable to pass on a substantial part of any pay increase in prices Risk, oif redundancy if laryýr. pay increase awarded Emp oy ee involvement policies Cost 0 living decreases (e. g., low or failing inflation) Low or deteriorating level of orders Poor labour productivity peiformance Other factors influencing level of settlement Comparisons with other employees in some company (including top management) Comparisons with other employees in same industry Comparisons with other employees in same locality Comparisons with general level of pay and/or pay increases nationally Repercussions with national/district agreement negotiated by an employer organisation to which you are a party Definitions of variables used as explanatory variables in the regression are as follows: Size of the Bargaining Group: categorised into 5 groups, with more than 500 workers as the reference category. Barfaining Groups: categorised into unskilled manuals; semiskilled manuals; skilled manuals; supervisors; clerical staff; P essional/Technical staff and Managerial staff. Management questionnaire that provides the relevant information: Details of Settlement/A ward: As part of the settlement, have employees accepted any of the following? Introduction of new technology Removal of restrictive practices Adoption or extension of shift working Reduction of numbers emplpyed Introduction or extension of incentive payment system Acceptance of more flexible working time arrangements Use of sub-contract labour Other pToductivity improvements Measuring Performance 
(a) In this section we are seeking to analyse how companies measure their performance. If possible please indicate 
which of the following best describes how Your company measures performance covering this group. (1) Volume of Output per person employed 
2 Value of output per person employed 
(3) Value added per person employed 
4 Unit labour costs 
ý51 None 
6 Other 
b Please estimate by how much productivity (i. e., output per employee) in thisgroup has increased or decreased in the year 
before this settlement took effect (if it has decreased, please put a minus sign in front of the relevant figure). 
(c) By how much do you expect productivity to increase or decrease in the next 12 months? 
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TABLE A4.8 
AVERAGE MARGINAL EFFECTS FOR EVERY ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ORDERED PROBIT 
RESULTS: OF THE NEED TO IMPROVE ABILITY TO RECRUIT/RETAIN LABOUR AS A 
FACTOR EXERTING AN UPWARD PRESSURE ON LEVEL OF WAGE SETTLE. \1E. %, 'TS-b 
Dependent variable: RRF 
Specification 1 Specification (2) 
1979/80-1996ý97) 1987/88-1996/97 
Average Nlarginal Effect For Every Establishment 
Independent' 'Very' 'Fairly' 'Not' 'Very 'Fairly' . 
Not* 
WE a-STe Important 
Inaustry 
Chemicals 0.022 (2.29) 0.012 (3,13) -0.034 (-2.73) 0.022 (1.34) 0.009 (1-86) -0.032 (-1-57) 
and Allied 
Metal 0.014 (1.30) 0.008 (1.55) -0.022 (-1.41) 0.005 (0.28) 0.002 (0.30) -0.007 (-0.29) 
manufacturing 
Mechanical 0.073 (5.03) 0.038 (5.62) -0-111 (-9-32) 0.070 (3.17) 0.026 (2.68) -0.096 (-5.23) 
engineering 
Instrument, 0.123 (6.06) 0.051 (3.87) -0.173 (-13.94) 0.104 (3.77) 0.032 (1.98) -0.136 (-6-99) Electrical, 
hi ýbuilding Marine 
Engineering 
Textiles, leather, 0.061 (3.99) 0.029 (4.66) -0-090 (-5.98) 0.062 (2.50) 0.021 (2.29) -0.083 (-3.48) leather ods, 
f l l gio ( ur c o t n g 
and Footwear 
Bricks, Pottery, -0.014 (-1.42) -0.009 (-1.22) 0.023 (1.36) -0.023 (-1.31) -0.012 (-0.99) 0.035 (1.22) Glass, Cement, 
Timber, 
Furniture 
Paper, Printing, 0.022 (1.99) 0.013 (2.64) -0.035 (-2.30) 0.037 (1.73) 0.015 (2.17) -0.052 (-2.12) Publishing 
Construction 0.120 3.23 0.044 3.09 -4.25 -0.163 0.67 0.030 0.012 0.81 -0.42 (-0.72) Transport and 
ý J 
0.024 1.64 
ý ý 
0.013 1.97 
ý ý 
-0.037 -1.81 
ý ý 
0.064 2.40 
ý J 
0.022 2.21 -0.086 (-3.27) 
Communication 
Distributive 0.157 (6.29) 0.051 (2.82) -0.208 (-12.99) 0.155 (4.38) 0.035 (1-36) -0.189 (-9.53) Trades 
Insurance, 0.162 (6.28) 0.051 (2.72) -0.213 (-12.59) 0.225 (5.27) 0.032 (0.82) -0.257 (-13.48) Banking 
and Finance 
Business, 0.201 (7.45) 0.057 (2.42) -0.258 (-19.83) 0.192 (5.12) 0.038 (1.19) -0.230 (-13.07) Professional 
and Scientific Services 
Leisure 0.232 (5.65) 0.047 1.71 -9.26 -0.279 0.309 ý5-63J 0.009 ý0.17ý -0.318 ý-9.84ý 
Miscellaneous 0.038 (1.34) 
ý 
0.020 
ý1.62 ý ý 
-0.058 -1.46 0.087 1.82 0.026 1.74 -0.113 -2.23 Services Inc. 
Motor 
Distribution 
Size of 
Bargaining 
Group 
< 25 workers - - 0.053 3 19 0.02 12 
54 -0.073 :4 8 1 
T6-50 - - - 3ý3 0.060 7 
2 ý 0.02 242 5: 3 0 -0.082 
51-100 - - - 0.049 3.11 
0.019 2.51 
1 
-0.068 -4.57 
101-200 - - - 0.033 2.40 
0.013 2.51 -0.046 -3.13 
201-500 - - - 0.024 1.90 
0.010 2.18 -0.034 -2.28 
Bargaining 
Group 
Unskilled 0.005 (1.10) 0.003 (1.19) 0.001 (-1.15) 0.012 (1.47) 0.005 (1.64) -0.017 (-1.63) 
Manuals 
Skilled 0.012 (1.93) 0.007 (2.18) -0.020 (-2.11) 0.016 (1.47) 0.007 (1.58) -0.023 
(-1.62) 
Manuals 
Supervisors 0.103 (6.72) 0.047 4.17ý ý -0.150 ý-16.82) 0.121 ý5.28ý 0.037 ý1.79J -0.158 ý-11.81) 
Clerical, 0.047 (2.90) 3.18 0.024 -0.071 -3.44) 0.047 1.88 0.017 1.75 -0.064 -2.13) 
Professional/ 
Technical and 
Managerial Staff 
Financial 
Variable 
Expected 0.001 (2.00) 0.351 (998.42) -0.002 (-2.16) 
Productivity 
Value of Output 
0.061 (4.73) 0.023 (2.23) -0.084 (-7.60) 
per person 
e! n. ployed 
Volume of -0.016 
(-2.15) -0.007 (-1.68) 0.023 (2.21) 
Output per 
erson p 
employed 
Value added per 
0.030 (2-87) 0.012 (2.08) -0.042 (-3.36) 
ý erson employed 
nit Labour 
0.001 (0.16) 0.000 (0.16) -0.002 (-0.16) 
costs 
Introduction of 
0.018 (1.16) 0.007 (1.17) -0.025 (-1.22) 
New Technology 
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TABLE A4.8 
(CONTINUED) 
Specification 1) Specifi cation 
1979/8 0-1996ý97 1987/88-1996 97 
Average Margin al Effect For Every Esta blishme nt 
Independent 'Very' 'Fa irly' 'N ot, 'V ery 'Fairly' Not' 
Variable Imp ortant Region 
North 0 011 7) (1 1 7 0 0 0 3 (1 3) 18 0 0 ( 1 24 0 011 (0 70 0 005 ( 0. 80) 0 0 1 6 -0.74 Yorkshire 0: 007 9 :7 0 04 0: 0 8 0: 8 0 :0 :01 :0 : 83 0 : 028 1: 1 7 0 11 :0 2 0 3 :0 :0 4 0 -2.02 East Midlands 0 84 0 (5 28 ) 0 038 4 23 0 1 22 ( 93 4 
1 
0 129 4.5 5 0 . 033 1. 58 -0.163 -8.75 
1 
East Anglia 0: 065 : 418 : 0031 4: 23 :0 :0 9 5 : 6 6: 0 :0 0 94 4 3.6 . 0028 8 1.5 -0.122 -5.71 South East 01 14 610 0* 056 4.61 -0.170 (-15.41) 0.119 4.58 0.042 2.22 -0.162 -10.91) South West 0: 030 2ý8 1 0.016 
13.581 
-0.046 -3.45 0.035 1.99 
1 
0.014 
12.21 
-0.04 8 2 44 West Midlands 0.058 4 53 0.030 4.74 -0.088 -7.06 0.094 3.98 0.030 1.99 3 -0.12 
:6 : 91 
North West 0.037 3.50 0.020 4.45 -0-057 
1 
-4.71 
1 
0.078 3.67 0.026 2.16 -0.104 -5.99 
1 
Wales 0.023 2.12 0.013 2.61 -0.036 -2.42 0.063 2.85 0.022 2.16 -0.085 -3.92 Year 
1979/80 0 246 (7 1 2 0.049 1.71 -0-30 ( -21.00 - 1980/81 :0 0 23 
ý 
1: 65 0.013 
ý ý 
2.44 -0.30 ( -21.00ý 1981/82 0.000 (-0.04) -0-000 (-0.04) 0.001 (0.04) 1983/84 0 07 (3 2 .6 ) 0.033 (5 3) 0 104 0 ( 5 63 1984/85 0: 1 15 . 473 0.0 44 82 3: 
:10 :06 :9 : 1 2 
ý 
1985/86 18 0 1 4,74 45 0 0 3*72 0* 163 07 ( 9 
1986/87 0 0 13 : 5,02 047 0 : 3*45 : 0,177 16,1 9 : 
1987/88 0.249 7.33 0.051 1.75 3 0 00 ( 23 4 8 0 19 4 6*04 41 0 0 1*29 0 235 16 61 ( 
1988/89 0.346 9.44 0.035 0.85 :3 :0 81 : 9: 26 5 Oý29 1 7*64 033 : 0 0,69 : 0 324 
:0 : : 18 54 
1989/90 0.330 9.02 0.041 1.05 -0.37 1 ( 3 27 1 0.270 7.18 0.041 0.92 -0.312 19.98 
1 
- 1990/91 0.162 5.73 0.052 2.91 -0.214 
: 
13 4 :6 0.115 4.84 0.034 1.90 -0.149 -10.32 
ý 
1991/92 0.075 3.77 0.034 5 02) 0 109 -6.03 0.028 2.08 0.012 2.28 -0.040 -2.56) 1992/93 0.045 2.75 75 0.023 :8 43 :0 
:0 
68 
ý 
-3.72 - - 1993/94 0.097 4.38 0.041 4.43 -0-138 -7-89 0.048 (3.07) 0.018 (2.50) -0.067 (-4.42) 1994/95 0.169 5.90 0.053 2.86 -0.222 -14.73 - - 1995/96 0.190 6.29 0.055 
1 
2.58 -0.245 -17.25 
ý 
- - 1996/97 0.260 7.55 0.051 1.69 -0.311 -24.88 - - 
az-statistics in parentheses. b'Very important' refers to the establishments who reported that the need to improve abilitglas a very important 
L factor in exerting upward pressure on wage settlement. 'Fairly important' refers to the esta ishments who 
r orted the need to improve ability as a fairly important factor in exerting upward pressure in wage settlements. 
'%t important' refers to the establishments who reported that the need to improve ability as not an important factor in exerting upward pressure on wage settlement. 
'The reference categories are the same as those for Specification (1) and (2), which are provided in the 
footnote of Table 4.7. 
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III CHAPTER 5: APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
1. Solving of the fixed points, eigenvalues and its stability: 
XPP finds fixed points as follows: 
First by solving 
G(X) =0 
where G (X) =F (X) for differential equations X' =F (X) and G(X) =A-F (X). Newton's method is iterative and 
satisfies the scheme 
Xk+l=Xk - J-'G(Xk) 
where J is the matrix of partial derivates of G evaluated at Xk- XPP uses three parameters to implement Newton's 
method, namely the maximum number of iterates, the tolerance and a parameter for the numerical computation of the 
matrix J, referred to as epsilon in XPP. If successive iterates falls within the tolerance, then the convergence is assumed 
and the root is found. The matrix J is found by perturbing each of the variables by an amount proportional to epsilon 
and utilising this perturbation to approximate a derivative. 
Following the finding of a fixed point, the matrix J is evaluated once again and the eigenvalues of J are computed 
using standard linear algebra routines. This information is utilised to compute the stability of solutions. 
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APPENDIX B 
TABLE A5.1 
STABILITY PROPERTIESa 
p Equilibriab, c 023 ---Ri-sR--N-eutraI Workers 
With Linear utility Function 
NBS = ITEd 
and Pissarides Model With linear Costs 
Function 
Fixed Points 
0 0.75 0.44 0.36 0.34 
u 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.11 
w 0.57 0.50 0.44 
X -0.39 -0.26 -0-12 0 Eigenvalues 
1.50 3.38 4.94 5.89 
-0.59 0.42 0.38 0.37 1.59 3.33 -0.36 
-0.43 -0.38 5.05 
msK Averse woricers 
Fixed Points 
0 1.19 0.44 0.36 0.34 
u 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.11 
w 0.39 0.57 0.50 0.44 
X 0.01 -0.39 -0.26 -0.12 0.01 Eigenvalues 
-0.72 3.37 4.92 5.87 0.92 0.42 0.38 0.37 
0.80 1.58 3.32 -0.36 0.53 -0.43 -0-38 5.03 Fixed Points 
0 1.20 0.44 0.36 0.34 
u 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.11 
w 0.39 0.57 0.50 0.44 
X 0.02 -0-38 -0.26 -0.12 0.02 Eigenvalues 
-0.72 3.35 4.90 5.86 0.92 0.42 0.38 0.37 
0.80 1.58 3.31 -0.36 
0 1.21 0.44 0.36 0.34 
u 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.11 
w 0.38 0.57 0.50 0.44 
2ý 0.02 -0.38 -0.26 -0.12 0.03 Eigenvalues 
-0.72 3.34 4.89 5.84 0.91 0.42 0.38 -0.36 0.80 1.57 3.30 0.37 
0.53 -0.44 -0.38 5.01 
Fixed Points 
0 1.22 0.44 0.36 0.34 
u 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.11 
w 0.38 0.57 0.50 0.44 
X 0.03 -0.38 -0.26 -0.12 0.04 Eigenvalues 
-0.72 3.32 4.87 5.83 0.91 0.42 0.38 -0.36 0.80 1.56 3.29 0.37 
0 1.23 0.44 0.36 0.34 
u 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.11 
w 0.38 0.57 0.50 0.44 
x 0.03 -0.37 -0.25 -0.11 0.05 Eigenvalues 
-0.72 3.30 4.85 5.81 0.91 0.42 0.38 -0.36 0.79 1.55 3.28 0.37 
0.53 -0.44 -0.38 4.98 
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TABLE A5.1 
(CONTINUED) 
p Equilibria 0 1 2 3 
Risk Averse WorTe--rs 
Fixed Points 
0 1.24 0.44 0.36 0.34 
u 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.11 
w 0.37 0.57 0.50 0.44 
X 0.04 -0.37 -0.25 -0.11 0.06 Eigenvalues 
-0.73 3.29 4.85 5.81 0.91 0.42 0.38 -0.36 
. 
0.79 1.55 3.28 0.37 
0.53 -0.44 -0.38 4.98 Fixed Points 
0 1.25 0.45 0.37 0.34 
u 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.11 
w 0.37 0.57 0.50 0.44 
X 0.04 -0-37 -0.25 -0.11 0.07 Eigenvalues 
- 0.73 3.27 4.81 5.78 0.91 0.43 0.38 -0.36 0.79 1.54 3.26 0.37 
0.53 -0.44 -0.38 4.95 Fixed Points 
0 1.25 0.45 0.37 0.34 
u 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.11 
w 0.37 0.56 0.50 0.44 
X 0.04 -0.36 -0.25 -0.11 0.08 Eigenvalues 
-0.73 3.25 4.80 5.76 0.91 0.43 0.39 -0.36 0.78 1.53 3.25 0.37 
0.53 -0.44 -0.38 4.94 Fixed Points 
0 1.26 0.45 0.37 0.34 
u 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.11 
w 0.36 0.56 0.50 0.44 
X 0.05 -0.36 -0.25 -0.11 0.09 Eigenvalues 
-0.73 3.23 4.78 5.74 0.90 0.43 0.39 -0.36 0.79 1.52 3.24 0.37 
0.53 -0.44 -0.38 4.93 
aI have also conducted experiments of parameter 
values in between a2 =0 to a2 =I and a2 =1 
to a2 =2 and a2 =3 for values of =0 to p 
= 0.09 in (p, a2) parameter space and found the 
equilibrium of the system to be unique and saddle-path 
stable. Details available from the author upon request. 
bThe nature of eigenvalues for all variations in 
(p, a2) parameter space, are 3 positive and 1 
negative eigenvaluej except where NBS =- ITE 
Pissarides model with linear costs and utility 
? unction. 
cThe a2 values from -1 to -3, that is decreasin cost 
functions and p values from 0 to 0.09 in (p, a2f 
parameter space, the solution is unstable. 
When rf = r.. and t- oo, with linear costs 
and utility function. 
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TABLE A5.2 
STABILITY PROPERTIES' 
p 
a 
Equilibria b 
l 
1 2 3 
Risk-Neutral Workers 
= c N13S ITE 
and Pissarides M odel 
With linea r Costs and Linear utili ty Fun ction 
Fixed Points 
0 0.47 0.35 0.32 
U 0.09 0.11 0.12 
w 0.51 0.38 0.28 
X -0.23 0.06 0.33 0 Eigenvalues 
3.00 5.25 6.54 
0.44 
-0.37 0.36 
-0.45 2.96 5.43 1.28 0.37 -0.35 Fixed Points 
0 0.47 0.35 0.32 
U 0.09 0.11 0.12 
w 0.50 0.37 0.28 
X -0.22 0.07 0.33 
0.01 Eigenvalues 
2.98 5.23 6.53 
0.44 
-0.37 
0.36 
-0.45 2.95 5.43 
1.28 0.38 -0-35 Fixed Points 
0 0.47 0.35 0.32 
U 0.09 0.11 0.12 
w 0.50 0.37 0.28 
X -0.22 0.07 0.33 0.02 Eigenvalues 
2.97 5.21 6.51 
0.44 -0.37 0.36 
-0.46 2.95 5.43 1.27 0.38 -0.35 
Fixed Points 
0 0.47 0.35 0.32 
U 0.09 0.11 0.12 
w 0.50 0.37 0.28 
X -0.22 0.07 0.33 
0.03 Eigenvalues 
2.95 5.19 6.49 
0.44 -0.37 0.36 
-0.46 2.95 5.42 1.27 0.38 -0.35 
Fixed Points 
0 0.47 0.35 0.32 
U 0.09 0.11 0.12 
w 0.50 0.37 0.28 
X -0.21 0.07 
0.33 
0.04 Eigenvalues 
2.94 5.17 6.48 
0.44 -0.37 0.36 
-0.46 2.95 
5.42 
1.27 0.38 -0.35 
Fixed Points 
0 0.48 0.35 0.32 
U 0.09 0.11 0.12 
w 0.50 0.37 0.28 
X -0.21 0.07 
0.33 
0.05 Eigenvalues 
2.92 5.15 6.46 
0.44 -0.37 0.36 
-0.46 0.38 5.42 1.26 2.95 -0.35 
Fixed Points 
0 0.48 0.35 0.32 
U 0.09 0.11 0.12 
w 0.50 0.37 0.28 
X -0.21 0.07 
0.33 
0.06 Eigenvalues 
2.90 5.13 6.44 
0.44 -0.37 0.36 
-0.46 0.38 
5.42 
1.26 2.95 -0.35 
Fixed Points 
0 0.48 0.35 0.32 
U 0.09 0.11 0.12 
w 0.50 0.37 0.28 
X -0.20 
0.08 0.33 
0.07 Eigenvalues 
2.89 5.11 6.43 
0.44 -0.37 0.36 
-0.46 
0.38 5.41 
1.26 2.94 -0.35 
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TABLE A5.2 
(CONTINUED) 
p Equilibria 
a 1 l 2 3 
Ris kAv e-r-s-e- W3 rTc ers 
Fixed Points 
0 0.48 0.35 0.32 
u 0.09 0.11 0.12 
w 0.49 0.37 0.28 
X -0.20 0.08 0.33 0.08 Eigenvalues 
2.87 5.08 6.41 
0.44 -0.37 0.36 
-0.46 0.38 5.41 1.25 2.94 -0.35 Fixed Points 
0 0.48 0.36 0.32 
u 0.09 0.11 0.12 
w 0.49 0.37 0.28 
X -0.19 0.08 0.33 0.09 Eigenvalues 
2.86 5.06 6.39 
0.44 -0.37 0.36 
-0.46 0.38 5.40 1.25 2.94 -0.35 
I have also conducted experiments of 
values of al in between al >0 to al =1 and 
al =2 to al =2 and al =3 for values of 0 
to p=0.09 in (p, al) parameter space andpfound 
the equilibrium of the system to be unique and saddle-path 
stable. Details available from the author upon request. 
bThe nature of the eigenvalues for all variations of the 
parameters in (p, al) parameter space, are 3 tive 
and 1 negative ei. ýenvalues, except in the moNeolssiwith linear cost and utility function. 
cwhere rf = r. and t -* oo, with linear costs and 
utility functions. 
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